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Abstract 
 
 
Protagoras, the first and greatest sophist in the fifth century BCE, is known to have performed 
professionally as a teacher of various subjects, having interests in human language, political 
and ethical theories and activities, and education, associating himself with major and 
influential politicians of his time. 
Ever since Plato’s interpretation of Protagoras’ Man-Measure Doctrine in the Theaetetus 
as a thesis of radical relativism regarding perceptual epistemology (‘each individual is the 
criterion of the truth of a judgement about a given object or a state of affairs’, thus, ‘a thing 
which appears/is perceived as F to/by a is F for a, while the same thing which appears/is 
perceived as ¬F to/by b is ¬F for b’), Protagoras has been criticised by intellectuals both in 
antiquity and modern times for self-contradiction. 
This thesis makes an exhaustive investigation of the ancient evidence for Protagoras and 
concludes that in fact it supports an objectivist reading which, if right, would absolve 
Protagoras of this criticism. For this purpose, I first analyse the so-called Great Speech of 
Plato’s Protagoras as a source for Protagoras’ ethical and political ideas (Chapter II). In the 
light of this, I suggest that an alternative reading of the Man-Measure Doctrine is possible in 
a political-ethical context (Chapter III). My interpretation of Protagoras’ peri theōn (‘on the 
gods’) fragment suggests a new understanding of the sophist’s epistemological views 
(Chapter IV). Then, I examine Protagoras’ interest in the correct use of language (Chapter V), 
and finally his rhetorical sophism through the investigation of the so-called ouk estin 
antilegein (‘it is not possible to contradict’) doctrine (Chapters VI). 
My investigation of the evidence for Protagoras shows that, in his version of objectivism, 
the things that are related to human affairs, such as political virtues, can and should be known 
and taught on the basis of the common and objective civic senses; knowledge and teaching of 
them is accomplished through the human objective epistemological condition and a process 
of synthesis of human experiences, in a correct linguistic and grammatical manner, for a good 
life lived in human community. If this is right, then Protagoras is not vulnerable to the 
accusation of self-contradiction; in fact the sophist holds a coherent ‘epistemological’-
‘political and ethical’-‘linguistic’ position according to which his political and ethical ideas 
are supported by objectivist views of epistemology and naturalism of language. 
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Protagoras, known in the history of western thought as the first and greatest sophist in the 
fifth century BCE, is said to have performed professionally as a teacher of various subjects 
during his acme for about forty years, having interests in human language, political and 
ethical theories and activities, and education, associating himself with major and influential 
politicians of his time. 
 
 
1. A sketch of Protagoras‘ life and works 
 
Diogenes Laertius reports that Protagoras, the son of Artemon, or, according to Apollodorus 
and Dinon the son of Maendrius,
1
 is said to have been born in Abdera, a blooming city of 
Thrace, in which a famous ancient atomist, Democritus was also born (presumably after 
Protagoras);
2
 a comic poet, Eupolis, tells that Protagoras came from Teos (D.L. 9.50: DK80 
A1). Abdera seems somewhat more likely as Protagoras‘ birth place since he has been 
labelled by a number of ancient sources as ‗Protagoras of Abdera (Πξσηαγόξαο ὁ 
Ἀβδεξίηεο)‘.3 Protagoras is said to have been a child (probably a teenager) when Xerxes‘ 
invasion happened in 480 BCE, and with Maendrius‘ hospitality to the Persians he was 
favoured to receive instruction by the Persian magi at Xerxes‘ order (V.S. I.10.1: DK80 A2). 
If Protagoras was in his teens while receiving the Persian magi‘s instruction, his birth date 
can be conjectured to be no later than around 490 BCE. In the Protagoras 317c (DK80 A5) 
the sophist is described as old enough to be the father of any one of those who are at Calicles‘ 
                                                 
* In this thesis all translations of the original Greek and Latin texts are mine, unless the translators are 
specifically mentioned. 
1
 Philostratus (V.S. I.10, 1: DK80 A2) also confirms that Maendrius was Protagoras‘ father. 
2
 The mythical foundation of Abdera was attributed to Heracles on behalf of his fallen friend Abderus, from 
whom the name of this city originated, and its historical foundation was attributed to a colony from Timesius of 
Clazomenae. This historical founding was traditionally dated in 654 BCE, which is unverified, although evidence 
in the seventh century BCE confirmed it. But its prosperity dates from 544 BCE, when the majority of the people 
of Teos migrated to Abdera to escape the Persian domination (I. 1.168). Later the Persians conquered Abdera 
twice in 513–512 BCE, and in 492 BCE, under the King Darius I (cf. Hornblower and Spawforth (1996), 1). 
3
 Cf. De Nat. Deor. I.24.63 (DK80 A23); Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr.12c.2 (DK80 A23); M. VII.60 (DK80 
B10) and IX.55–56 (DK80 A12); V.S. I.10.1 (DK80 A2); Onomatol. bei Schol. Plat. De Rep. 600c (DK80 A3); 
and Stephanus Byzantius (DK80 A21). It is further remarkable that Abdera was once colonised by Teos (cf. I. 
I.168). Eupolis‘ reference to Teos, then, may perhaps indicate Abdera as a colony of Teos. 
2 
house, including Socrates who is probably around 36 years old (cf. Guthrie (1956), 27), and 
in the Hippias Major 282e (DK80 A9) Hippias describes himself as much younger than 
Protagoras. The dramatic dates of Protagoras and Hippias Major are respectively about 
433/5,
4
 and 420 BCE. In the Meno 91e (DK80 A8), whose dramatic date is about 402 BCE,
5
 
Protagoras is said to have died at the age of about seventy after forty years as a practising 
sophist. If Protagoras started his public profession in his late twenties or early thirties, these 
pieces of information enable us to assume that Protagoras‘ heyday would probably be during 
460–422/1 BCE, and that his death may have occurred no later than 421/0 BCE.6 
Two significant activities of Protagoras during his time in Athens are reported in ancient 
sources. The one is his career as a sophist, professing to teach political virtues and charging 
fees for his lessons (cf. Men. 91e and Prot. 312d, 318a–319a, and 320c–328d).7 The other is 
his association with politicians, most significantly with Pericles. For instance, a story from 
Plutarch (Per. 36 [Stesimbrotos, FGrHist. 107 F 11 ii 519]: DK80 A10) tells that once 
Protagoras and Pericles spent a whole day discussing a case when a pentathlete accidently 
killed a competitor (Epitumus the Pharsalian) with a javelin in a contest. They debated where 
the legal responsibility for the player‘s death lies, whether with the pentathlete or the javelin 
or the judges of the contest.
8
 Protagoras‘ association with Pericles may have strengthened the 
sophist‘s political influence over the places where Pericles‘ power was dominant in Hellenic 
areas; Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 150; D.L. 9.50: DK80 A1) says that when Pericles sent a Pan-
Hellenic expedition to found a colony at Thurii in southern Italy, Protagoras went there to 
                                                 
4
 The date is inferred from Alcibiades having just reached manhood (309a–b). Cf. Allen (1992), 89. 
5
 The date is inferred from Meno‘s visit to Athens after the restoration of democracy when the rule of the Thirty 
Tyrants ended in 403 BCE and before his expedition with Cyrus (cf. Xenophon, Anabasis) in 401 BCE (cf. 
Guthrie, 1956, 101). Also the chronological nearness of Anytus‘ threat to Socrates (94e) which is reminiscent of 
Socrates‘ death in 399 BCE is remarkable. 
6
 Some ancient sources, such as D.L. 9.55 (DK80 A1) and Onomatol. bei Schol. Plat. De Rep. 600c (DK80 A3), 
report that Protagoras died at the age of about ninety. Morrison suggests (1941, 4) that the inconsistency of the 
sources on Protagoras‘ death date ―rests on a confusion of koppa (Ϟ), the symbol of ninety, with omicron (O), the 
symbol of seventy‖. On this, cf. also Davison (1953), 35. 
7
 Diogenes Laertius (D.L. 9.50–54: DK80 A1) testifies that Protagoras charged a huge fee, one hundred minae, 
for his teaching course. Philostratus (V.S. 1.10: DK80 A2) and Hesychius (Onomatol. Bei Schol. Plat. De Rep. 
600c: DK80 A3) also report that Protagoras charged a high fee for his lectures. Dillon and Gergel (2003, 341, n. 
9) point out that if Diogenes Laertius‘ testimony is correct, Protagoras‘ fee would probably amount to 
―£ 100,000 at 2003 price, if we reckon the real value of a drachma at roughly £ 10 (100 drachmas = 1 mina).‖ 
They also note that ―this sum, for a full course, is attested also for other sophists (cf. Alc. Ma. 119a; Hipp. Ma. 
282e), so it probably should be accepted. There were quite a number in Athens, such as Callias, son of 
Hipponicus, who could afford such sums. This would have been a maximum charge, however. One could have 
shorter courses of a mina.‖ On the contrary, Loomis in his research on the classical concept of wages, welfare 
costs and inflation in 1998, suggests that it does not seem plausible for one to have charged such high fee for 
one‘s lectures in ancient Athens. 
8
 For Protagoras‘ association with Pericles, cf. Muir (1981), 19; O‘Sullivan (1995), 15–23. 
3 
establish a law-code at Pericles‘ request in 443 BCE,9 as he flourished during the period of 
the 84
th
 Olympiad (444–441 BCE), as Apollodorus (FGrHist. 244 f 71 ii 1040; D.L. 9.56: 
DK80 A1; cf. also DK80 A4) reports.
10
 
It is uncertain how many times Protagoras visited Athens, or how long he stayed there. 
But it seems that he visited Athens at least three times; one visit described in the Meno 
(around 460 BCE), the other described in the Protagoras (around 433 BCE), and the last 
described by Eupolis who in his Colaces presents Protagoras in 422 BCE as resident in Athens. 
Protagoras‘ last visit to Athens is again mentioned in a passage of Athenaeus (the 
Deipnosophistae, V.218b: DK80 A11), according to which Protagoras arrived at Athens, 
probably in order to help Alcibiades who had recently recovered his political influence in 
Athens; this occurred not before 423 BCE and not later than 421 BCE. 
Protagoras seems to have been in Sicily between his visits to Athens, where he had 
gained a high reputation, and later Hippias met him (Hipp. Ma. 282d–e). Two intervals 
between his three visits to Athens are possible for Protagoras‘ visit to Sicily; since Hippias 
says Protagoras was an old man when he met him in Sicily, the second interval seems more 
likely (but Protagoras could have visited Sicily twice). 
Protagoras is said to have been accused and expelled twice from Athens for impiety 
because of his statement concerning the gods in which he says he is not able to know about 
them. The first banishment occurred, according to Cicero and Philostratus, around 458/7 BCE, 
by a decree against agnostics.
11
 Later, Protagoras was accused again by Pythodorus, a 
member of the Four Hundred (tetrakosioi), and expelled once more from Athens, or he 
escaped from Athens to avoid the announcement of death penalty over him. It is said again by 
Cicero and Philostratus that this time all his books were collected and burnt in the market 
place by decree.
12  
However, it is somewhat doubtful whether the real reason for the 
                                                 
9
 Cf. Barrett (1987), 10; De Romilly (1992), viii and 21. For the law-code and educational system established 
by Protagoras in Thurii, cf. Muir (1982), 17–24. 
10
 ‗Flourishing‘ often indicates that one‘s age is in the forties. Cf. Dillon and Gergel (2003), 344, n. 39. 
Eusebius in the Chronicle (DK80 A5), on the contrary, states that his books were collected and burnt during the 
84
th
 Olympiad. Eusebius‘ report, however, seems rather doubtful due to its serious incongruence with other 
ancient sources about Protagoras‘ acme as a professional sophist and teacher as well as his political influence 
from the association with Pericles. 
11
 De Nat. Deor. I.24.63 (DK80 A23); V.S. I.10.2–3 (DK80 A2). Cf. also Davison (1953), 37. 
12
 De Nat. Deor. I.23.63 (DK80 A23). On this, cf. also D.L. 9.51–52 (DK80 A1); V.S. 1.10 (DK80 A2); 
Onomatol. bei Schol. Plat. De Rep. 600c (DK80 A3); M. 9.55 (DK80 A12). However, according to Eusebius‘ 
Preparation for the Gospel X.3.25 (DK80 B2), Protagoras‘ books seem to have survived until 3rd to 4th century 
CE. Regarding the charges against Protagoras, Diogenes Laertius (9.54: DK80 A1) and Apuleius (Florida 18, cf. 
D.L. 9.56: DK80 A4) say that the charges were filed, not by Phythodorus, but by Euathlus who was once one of 
Protagoras‘ pupils and refused to pay the teaching fee. The story of the charges goes that in a law court 
Protagoras claimed that if he won the case, Euathlus should pay the teaching fee because he won, and if he did 
not, Euathlus still needed to pay because through teaching he became good enough to win. Euathlus, in turn, 
4 
accusation against him was actually religious. Diogenes Laertius reports that the first speech 
Protagoras publicly made in Athens was his reading of the book in which his fragment on the 
gods (the so-called peri theōn fragment) was included. So his public performance in Athens 
can be assumed to have been no later than 453 BCE, but later Protagoras flourished and his 
influence and reputation grew in Athens. The fact that his views on the gods were seen as 
impious does not seem to fit with his successful career and political influence for forty years 
in Greece.
13
 The second accusation is said to have occurred around 421 BCE,
14
 when the 
Pericleans lost their political power after the first period of the Peloponnesian War (431–421 
BCE).
15
 Together with this, it is also remarkable that the accuser of Protagoras, Pythodorus, 
later (411 BCE) joined the oligarchic group, which was a revolutionary political movement 
against the Periclean democracy, called the Four Hundred. It may be conjectured that as 
Pericles lost his power, his associates too would lose their power and influence, and a young 
ambitious politician (or a group of people like him) would probably be encouraged to accuse 
the political associates of the former political leader. The religious reason for Protagoras‘ 
banishment probably was a mere pretext; rather the sophist was banished for political reasons. 
Protagoras is said to have drowned whilst he was sailing to Sicily in an attempt to escape 
from Athens,
16
 and Euripides in his Ixion (cf. frs. 424–426, ed. Nauck, J. A.) makes a 
concealed reference to this. To sum up, the main known events in the life of Protagoras can 
be briefly summarised as follows:
17
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
replied that he would owe nothing even if he lost, since that would show that Protagoras had not taught him 
adequately, and if he won, he did not need to pay because he won (cf. also Gellius 5.10). These charges by 
Euathlus would surely be different ones from the accusation by Phythodorus, and seem to have been adopted by 
ancient sources to show a self-refuting sphere of rhetorical and sophistic deeds (e.g. ‗convertible arguments 
(antistrephontes logoi)‘, cf. Castagnoli, 2010, 15, n. 10), rather than pointing out a significant historical event 
that may have affected Protagoras‘ life and death. 
13
 Also, it is noticeable that in his time Protagoras was not the only one who seems to have made an impious 
statement; Xenophanes (570–475 BCE), for example, is reported to have made a statement to attack the idea of 
anthropomorphic gods; a poet, Diogoras of Melos (5
th
 BCE) was also considered to have made an atheist claim in 
antiquity (Nestle (1931, 32, cited in Levi (1940a), 167), probably on the grounds of the atheist connection 
between them in Cicero‘s De Nat. Deor. I.1.2, Diogenes of Oenoanda‘s fragment 12c.2.1.19W (DK80 A23), 
Sextus Empiricus‘ M. 9.56 (DK80 A12), and Theodoret of Cyrus‘ Gr. aff. II.112.2–114.1 (C. A23), suggests that 
Diogoras was one of Protagoras‘ disciples; however, as Levi (1940a, 167, n. 4) points out, there is no real 
evidence of their teacher-disciple association). 
14
 Davison (1953), 38. 
15
 Pericles died of the plague in 429 BCE during the Peloponnesian war. 
16
 D.L. 9.55 (DK80 A1). On his drowning, cf. V.S. I.10.1 (DK80 A2); Onomatol. bei Schol. Plat. De Rep. 600c 
(DK80 A3). Cf. also Guthrie (1971), 263; Kerferd (1981a), 43; Dherbey (1985), 9. On the contrary, according to 
some, Protagoras died on a journey (kata tēn hodon), which may imply a land journey, as Diogenes Laertius 
reports (D.L. 9.55: DK80 A1). On this, cf. Dillon and Gergel (2003), 344, n. 37. 
17
 On the life and death of Protagoras, cf. also Morrison (1941), 1–16; Davison (1953), 33–45. 
5 
Year (BCE) 
 
Around 490 
Around 479–470 
Around 460 
? (458/457) 
444/443 
Around 433 
? (428/427) 
Around 422 
421/420 
Event 
 
Abdera/Thrace: birth 
Abdera/Thrace: instruction from the Persian Magi 
Athens 1: working as a sophist/public teacher 
? (Sicily? Banishment from Athens) 
Thurii: establishing a colonial law 
Athens 2: working as a sophist/public teacher 
? (Sicily? Meeting Hippias?) 
Athens 3: working as a sophist/public teacher 
Pythodorus‘ accusation, drowned on the way to Sicily 
Age 
 
0 
11–19 
30 
(32/33) 
46/47 
57 
(62/63) 
68 
69/70 
 
Diogenes Laertius (9.54–55: DK80 A1) reports Protagoras‘ books on various subjects: 
 
On the Gods (To Peri Theōn) 
The Art of Eristic (Technē Eristikōn) 
On Wrestling (Peri Palēs)18 
On Learning (Peri tōn Mathēmatōn)19 
On the State (Peri Politeias) 
On Ambition (Peri Philotimias) 
On Excellences (Peri Aretōn) 
On the Original State of Things (Peri tēs en Archēi Katastaseōs) 
On the Things in Hades (Peri tōn en Haidou) 
On the Misdeeds of Men (Peri tōn Ouk Orthōs tois Anthrōpois Prassomenōn) 
Instruction (Prostaktikos)  
Law-Case about a Fee (Dikē Hyper Misthou) 
Opposing Arguments books 1 and 2 (Antilogiōn A B) 
 
Plato (Theaet. 161c: DK80 B1 and Crat. 391c: DK80 A24) and Sextus Empiricus (M. 7.60) 
mention Protagoras‘ book entitled: 
                                                 
18
 In Soph. 232d–e (DK80 B8) Plato also says that Protagoras wrote a book on wrestling. 
19
 There is controversy regarding the exact title of this book, since mathēmatōn could possibly mean both 
‗mathematics‘ and ‗learning (or disciplines and teaching)‘. One, like Diels and Kranz, may argue that focusing 
Aristotle‘s Metaphysics III.2,997b32 (DK80 B7), where he discusses Protagoras‘ argument against his 
contemporary geometricians on the perceptual concepts of lines and measuring rods, the title may be concerned 
with mathematics. However, Plato, illustrating that Protagoras professes that, unlike other teachers who abuse 
their students by teaching them what they do not want to learn such as arithmetic, he himself teaches only what 
his pupils want to learn from him, namely political art and how to be a good citizen (cf. Prot. 318d7–319a2: 
DK80 A5), reveals Protagoras‘ disinterest in mathematics. In addition, if we take Protagoras‘ interest in 
education into consideration and notice that besides the passage from the Metaphysics there is no evidence in 
which the sophist is said to have paid attention to mathematics, the title may perhaps be understood as referring 
to learning. 
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Truth, or, Downthrowers (Alētheia, or, Kataballontes) 
 
Eusebius (P.E. X.3.25: DK80 B2) says that the sophist once wrote a book in which he 
expressed a view on what is (to on) contrary to that of the Eleatic thinkers, titled:  
 
On What Is (Peri tou Ontos) 
 
According to Anecdota Parisiensia I.171.31 (De Hippomacho B 3: DK80 B3), Protagoras 
emphasised the importance of nature and practice for education (a fragment on education (1) 
below) in a book entitled: 
 
The Great Speech (Megas Logos) 
 
None of these
20
 has survived. Despite the absence of extant books of Protagoras, ancient 
sources contain fragments of these works. Albeit few in number, they are still available for us 
to examine Protagoras‘ thoughts (the order of Protagoras‘ fragments given below is based on 
that of DK): 
 
The Man-Measure Doctrine (DK80 B1: Theaet. 152a3–4 and M. 7.60): πάλησλ ρξεκάησλ κέηξνλ 
ἐζηὶλ ἄλζξσπνο, η῵λ κὲλ ὄλησλ ὡο ἔζηηλ, η῵λ δὲ νὐθ ὄλησλ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ. (cf. also Crat. 385e6–
386a1: DK80 A13; Met. X.1.1053a35 and XI.6.1062b12: DK80 A19; P.H. 1.216: DK80 A14; D.L. 
9.51: DK80 A1) 
Of all things the measure is man, of the things that are that/how they are, of the things that are not 
that/how they are not. 
 
The peri theōn fragment (DK80 B4: P.E. 14.3.7): πεξὶ κὲλ ζε῵λ νὐθ ἔρσ εἰδέλαη νὔζ' ὡο εἰζίλ, νὔζ' 
ὡο νὐθ εἰζίλ, νὔζ' ὁπνῖνί ηηλεο ἰδέαλ· πνιιὰ γὰξ ηὰ θσιύνληα κε εἰδέλαη, ἣ η' ἀδειόηεο θαὶ βξαρὺο 
ὢλ ὁ βίνο ηνῦ ἀλζξώπνπ. (cf. also D.L. 9.51: DK80 A1; M. 9.56: DK80 A12; Theaet. 162d6–e7: 
DK80 A23; Ad Autol. III.28: C. A23; M. 9.56: DK80 A12; P.E. 14.3.7: DK80 B4; Gr. aff. II.112.2–
114.1: C. A23. Cf. Appendix 1 below for ancient sources of this fragment) 
On the one hand, on the gods I am not able to know either that/how they are or that/how they are not, 
or what they look like in shape. For many are the things preventing me from knowing [the gods]; 
the obscurity [of the gods] and the shortness of human life. 
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 Untersteiner (1953, 18–25) conjectures that all these works were parts, as different sections, of a single work 
entitled Contradictory Arguments (Antilogiai); but his conjecture is grounded on no textual evidence. 
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The two-logoi fragment (DK80 B6a: D.L. 9.51): δύν ιόγνπο εἶλαη πεξὶ παληὸο πξάγκαηνο 
ἀληηθεηκέλνπο ἀιιήινηο. (cf. also D.L. 9.51: DK80 A1; Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies VI.65 
and Seneca, The Moral Letters to Lucilius 88.43: DK80 A20) 
[Protagoras was the first to say that] on all issues there are two arguments (logoi) opposed to each 
other. 
 
The weaker/stronger logoi fragment (DK80 B6b and A21: Rhet. II.24.1402a23): ηὸ ηὸλ ἣηησ δὲ 
ιόγνλ θξείηησ πνηεῖλ. (cf. also Eudoxus, fr. 307 Lasserre in Stephanus Byzantius, Ethikon s.v. 
Abdera: DK80 A21) 
Making a weaker argument (logos) stronger. 
 
A fragment on art and practice (DK80 B10: Stob. iii (Flor.) 29.80): κεδὲλ εἶλαη κήηε ηέρλελ ἄλεπ 
κειέηεο κήηε κειέηελ ἄλεπ ηέρλεο. 
Art is nothing without practice and practice nothing without art. 
 
A fragment on education (1) (DK80 B3: Anecdota Parisiensia I.171.31): θύζεσο θαὶ αζθήζεσο 
δηδαζθαιία δεῖηαη, … ἀπὸ λεόηεηνο δὲ ἀξμακέλνπο δεῖ καλζάλεηλ. 
Teaching requires nature and practice … one must start learning from early youth. 
 
A fragment on education (2) (DK80 B11: Plutarch On Practice 178.25): Education does not sprout 
in the soul unless one goes to a great depth. (The original Greek is lost, the English version 
translated by O‘Brien in Sprague (1972, 24) is a translation of a German translation of a Syriac 
version by J. Gildemeister and F. Bücheler.) 
 
The ouk estin antilegein doctrine (DK80 A1: D.L. 9.53; DK80 A19): νὐθ ἔζηηλ ἀληηιέγεηλ. (For the 
argument, cf. Euthyd. 285e9–286a3) 
It is not possible to contradict. 
 
The correct use of language (logos) and grammar (DK80 A1: D.L. 9.52): ὀξζνέπεηα, ὀξζόηεο 
ὀλνκάησλ (the correctness of words and names). (For the contents, cf. Phdr. 267c4–d4: DK80 A26; 
Crat. 391c2–4: DK80 A24. Cf. also Rhet. III.5.1407b6–9: DK80 A27; Soph. Elen. XIV.173b16–25: 
DK80 A28; Poet. XIX.1456b15–9: DK80 A29; and Aristophanes, the Clouds 658–679: DK80 C3) 
 
Protagoras‘ teaching subject (DK80 A5: Prot. 318e5–319a2): εὐβνπιία πεξὶ η῵λ νἰθείσλ, ὅπσο ἂλ 
ἄξηζηα ηὴλ αὑηνῦ νἰθίαλ δηνηθνῖ, θαὶ πεξὶ η῵λ η῅ο πόιεσο, ὅπσο ηὰ η῅ο πόιεσο δπλαηώηαηνο ἂλ εἴε 
θαὶ πξάηηεηλ θαὶ ιέγεηλ. 
Good deliberation concerning domestic affairs, how best to manage one‘s household, and 
concerning the affairs of the city, how to be the most influential in the affairs of the city, both in 
action and speech.  
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The Great Speech (DK80 C1: Prot. 320c8–328d2): κεγάο ιόγνο.21 
 
 
2. The aim of the present thesis: Protagorean objectivism 
 
On the grounds of the ancient evidence for Protagoras, scholars both in antiquity and modern 
times have tried to construct Protagoras‘ own unique philosophical outlook. Their attempts, 
beyond the shadow of a doubt, have always commenced having Protagoras‘ Man-Measure 
Doctrine (hereafter the MMD) and its interpretation as the fundamental basis of all the 
sophist‘s thoughts on various subjects. 
Many intellectuals in antiquity paid attention to the MMD and proposed interpretation of 
it. Plato, for instance, treated it as a claim of radical relativism, equated with an idea that 
knowledge is perception, and criticised it for its intrinsic problems such as the impossibility 
of teaching and self-refutation (Theaet. 152a–186e: DK80 B1); Aristotle discussed the MMD 
to reveal its logical fallacy, namely the violation of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (Met. 
IV.4.1007b18 ff. and XI.1062b11–19: DK80 A19); Sextus Empiricus, interpreting the MMD 
as a thesis of epistemological relativism, discerned it from Pyrrhonian scepticism and 
discussed its self-refutation (M. VII.60–64, 388–397 and P.H. I.216–219: DK80 B1). 
All these interpretations of the MMD are grounded on a certain assumption and 
                                                 
21
 This Great Speech represented in Plato‘s Protagoras must be distinguished from one of Protagoras‘ lost 
books, which is, according to Anecdota Parisiensia I.171.31 (DK80 B3), also entitled The Great Speech (Megas 
Logos) from which Protagoras‘ fragment on education (1) is delivered. The Great Speech would probably have 
been a part of The Great Speech, and thus entitled so (cf. page 19 in Chapter II below). 
Besides the fragments above, a passage in Didymus the Blind‘s Commentary on Psalms 3, 222.21–22 was 
unearthed during the Second World War and first published by Gronewald (1968, 1). Protagoras was given the 
paternity of this passage. The new alleged Protagorean fragment runs as follows: 
 
ζνθηζηὴο δὲ ἤλ ὁ Πξσηαγόξαο—ιέγεη, ὅηη ηὸ εἶλαη ηνῖο νὖζηλ ἐλ ηῶ θαίλεζζαί ἐζηηλ. [ι]έγεη ὅηη 
θαίλνκαη ζνὶ ηῶ παξόληη θαζήκελνο· ηῶ δὲ ἀπόληη νὐ θαίλνκαη θαζήκελνο· ἄδεινλ εἰ θάζεκαη ἠ νὐ 
θάζεκαη. 
Protagoras was a sophist—he says that for things that are, being is in appearing. He says that for you 
who are present, I appear as sitting, but for someone who is not present, I do not appear as sitting; 
whether I am sitting or not sitting is obscure. 
 
Protagorean authenticity of this fragment has been questioned. Gronewald (1968, 1–2), Mejer (1972, 177), 
Woodruff (1985, 485), and Gagarin (2002, 114–20) agree to attribute the fragment to Protagoras, as the fragment 
fairly reveals Protagorean view of empirical epistemology. Mansfeld in Kerferd (1981, 51, n. 45) and Schiappa 
(1991, 149–51) carefully suggest that although it is suspicious whether the words in the fragment are original to 
Protagoras, the fragment might contain the genuine Protagorean ideas. On the contrary, Barnes (1982, 645, n. 
16) and Osborne (1987, 1–9), pinpointing the objectivist epistemological viewpoint from the fragment, suggest 
that this fragment does not match with Protagoras‘ epistemological relativisms supplied by Plato in the 
Theaetetus, and reject Protagorean authenticity of the fragment. Barnes‘ and Osborne‘s rejection, however, 
depends upon the reading of Plato‘s Protagoras in the dialogue, not on Protagoras‘ works found in ancient 
sources in general as a sophist. 
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arguments supplied by Plato in the Theaetetus. In the dialogue, as soon as Theaetetus defines 
knowledge as perception, Socrates equates this definition with Protagoras‘ MMD. In this 
equation, Plato assumes that metron, chrēmata and anthrōpos in the MMD mean respectively 
‗the standard of truth‘, ‗any things (as objects of perception)‘, and ‗each individual human 
being with perceptual power‘, and on this basis he argues that each appearing to me is being 
for me, appearance (from ‗appearing‘) is perception (from ‗to be perceived‘), and thus to be 
perceived is to be (Theaet. 152a–c, esp. 152b5–7)—Plato seems to take these assumption and 
arguments for granted in interpreting the MMD, but their validity has not been properly 
proved through argument in the Theaetetus. 
Supported by the arguments and assumption, the MMD has hence been read as a claim 
of radical relativism based on perceptual epistemology, according to which ‗man is the 
measure of all things‘, thus ‗I am the measure, i.e. the standard of truth, of (my judgement 
about) all things that appear to/are perceived by me; whilst you are the measure of (your 
judgement about) all things that appear to/are perceived by you‘. In other words, ‗the Platonic 
reading‘ of the MMD proposes that it declares that each individual is the criterion of the truth 
of a judgement about a given object or a state of affairs; thus, a thing which appears/is 
perceived as F to/by a is F for a, while the same thing which appears/is perceived as ¬F 
to/by b is ¬F for b (cf. Appendix 3 below for my analysis of the Platonic reading of the 
MMD).
22
 
Such a reading has characterised Protagoras as an epistemological relativist; owing 
much to the Platonic reading of the MMD in the Theaetetus, modern scholarship on 
Protagoras has tried to present the sophist as having stood for relativism (and against the 
objectivism defended by philosophers like Plato and Aristotle) in the history of western 
philosophy, interpreting his thoughts and activities on epistemology, moral theory, political 
views, and language in a relativistic way (cf. e.g. Guthrie (1971), 164–75; Kerferd (1981a), 
139–62; De Romilly (1992), 213–33; Zilioli (2007), 89–112, etc.). This picture of the sophist 
has been widely accepted till the present without doubt. 
Despite such attempts to interpret the sophist‘s philosophy in a relativistic way, however, 
a serious criticism against Protagoras has never been answered. The criticism is that on this 
interpretation Protagoras becomes unable to maintain a coherent stance for his own activities 
and thoughts; rather he ends up ‗throwing down‘ his own ideas and ‗self-contradicting‘ 
himself (as Plato endeavours to show in the Theaetetus 170a–179b and Sextus Empiricus in 
                                                 
22
 Cf. also Met. IV.4.1007b18–19; M. VII.60 and P.H. I.216. 
10 
Against the Mathematicians VII.388–397). As Cole properly pointed out in 1972, in other 
words, if Protagoras is understood as one who maintains a relativist position, he cannot help 
but entirely contradict himself and demolish all his ideas by himself. A relativist whose 
epistemological notion is grounded on perception (i.e. the Platonic reading of the MMD) can 
confess no agnostic view concerning the gods, since he must profess his belief about them as 
he experiences them in the way that they appear to, and are thus perceived by, him. Also such 
a relativist can neither promise to teach political virtues nor emphasise the correct use of 
language, such as the correctness of words and grammar. Since all men are by themselves the 
measure of (their judgements about) the political virtues (which are just and true for each of 
them as they appear so), no one needs to learn it from Protagoras, and the nature of the 
correct use of language will vary depending on what the names and grammars are judged to 
mean by each person. 
Taking such criticism into consideration, a significant question in relation to a study on 
Protagoras arises: does the ancient evidence for Protagoras, i.e. the sophist‘s works and 
activities reported by our sources in antiquity, indeed show him to be someone who endorses 
a relativist position on every issue in which his concerns lie? In order to suggest an answer to 
this question, my thesis about Protagoras‘ philosophy aims to exhaustively investigate and 
evaluate the ancient evidence for him, as Kerferd (1981a, 173) emphasises that for a study on 
the sophist ―what is needed is a process of quasi-archaeological reconstruction on the basis of 
the traces that survive.‖ This thesis, I believe, will show us either that, as Plato and Sextus 
Empiricus show in their works, Protagoras indeed takes a wobbly approach to thinking in 
which he is constantly illustrated to be astray, even unable to comprehend the absurdity of the 
self-contradiction by sustaining a relativist notion of epistemology, or that his stance stands 
on a straight path according to which he is seen to take an unshaken and consistent position 
for his thoughts and activities.  
For this purpose, in the following chapter, I will scrutinise Protagoras‘ Great Speech as 
presented in Plato‘s Protagoras 320c8–328d2. Protagoras professes to teach good 
deliberation (euboulia) concerning domestic affairs (how best to manage one‘s household), 
and concerning the affairs of the city (how to be the most influential, both in action and 
speech) (Prot. 318e5–319a2), i.e. political virtues. Socrates objects to this profession for two 
reasons: since anyone can bring opinions and advice regarding political matters in the 
Assembly there can be no expert on political art and no one, even great politicians like 
Pericles, could teach political art to their sons or could have any other specialist educate them 
in the subject. Therefore, Socrates argues, political virtues are not teachable (319b3–320b5). 
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Then, Protagoras immediately gives the Great Speech as a response to Socrates‘ objection. In 
this speech, Protagoras first admits that all human beings equally share in the civic senses (as 
Zeus‘ gift), i.e. a sense of what is right (dikē) and a sense of shame (aidōs), for the 
preservation of their community and race, and then professes to teach political virtue (politikē 
aretē) such as justice (dikaiosynē) and moderation (sōphrosynē), as a type of knowledge (art), 
produced by the application of the civic senses, by which they can pursue a better life in their 
community. Through a systematic analysis of the Great Speech, I will reveal the objective 
character of the civic senses and their role as the fundamental political and ethical principles 
by means of which human beings can measure their actions and speeches with a view to the 
preservation of the human race and community. Further I shall suggest that in Protagoras‘ 
view, political virtue is knowledge of different factors and circumstances, which promotes the 
application of the civic senses in a better way and thus produces political and ethical benefits. 
In Protagoras‘ political and ethical viewpoint, the application of the civic senses to certain 
issues regarding human (political) affairs has a form of ethical relativity, depending upon 
diverse factors such as chronological and geographical differences. 
In Chapter III, I will propose an alternative reading of the MMD in the light of 
Protagoras‘ ethical and political perspective grounded on the analysis of the Great Speech. In 
this reading, the MMD is understood, not as a radical relativist thesis of perceptual 
epistemology, but as a political and ethical claim according to which man as a social being, 
who shares in the common civic senses as the objective political and ethical principles and in 
political virtues, is by himself the measure of all the basic needs for the purpose of 
preservation of human race and community, i.e. of all ethical and political actions and 
speeches that he and others do and make in the community; all these are measured as to 
whether and how they are appropriate things to practise in the light of the civic senses and 
political virtues. 
In Chapter IV, I will examine the peri theōn (‗on the gods‘) fragment in which 
Protagoras confesses his ignorance of the gods, in relation to the sophist‘s epistemology and 
anthropological concerns through which his interest in human affairs is fairly well 
documented. In the fragment Protagoras states that on the gods he is not able to know either 
that/how they are or that/how they are not, or what they look like in shape, due to the 
obstacles that prevent him from knowing the gods, and then states that the obscurity of the 
gods and the shortness of human life are such obstacles. First, I will show that the peri theōn 
fragment is a characteristic agnostic claim concerning only the gods‘ nature, and then suggest 
that the Protagorean epistemological obstacles found in the fragment enable us to assume that 
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the sophist sharply demarcates the area of what can be known by human beings from that of 
what cannot be known by them. The standard of the demarcation, as its context can be fairly 
inferred from the nature of the obstacles, is the range of the objects of human experience in 
the length of human life. This standard, which applies equally to all human beings, is 
considered, at least to Protagoras‘ eyes, a universal and objective epistemological condition; 
no one can know the things beyond this standard. Knowledge in Protagoras‘ view is hence 
acquired through a filter of the universal and objective epistemological condition. 
I will argue further that since things are experienced in various ways and a single 
experience of an object always reaches a judgement about the object in a certain way, such as 
a judgement that ‗x is F‘ or that ‗x is G‘, Protagoras‘ ignorance of the gods comes not from a 
single experience, but from a process of inference between two or more different—sometimes 
conflicting—experiences about the gods, which I shall call a ‗synthesis‘ in Protagoras‘ 
epistemology. Protagoras‘ confession hence, paradoxically, brings out the role of synthesis in 
his idea of acquiring knowledge about given objects. Together with this, I will show 
Protagoras‘ hidden intention in the peri theōn fragment to encourage human beings to 
abandon studies on cosmology, natural philosophy or theology, and turn their attention to 
anthropological concerns,
23
 i.e. a sort of humanistic study that concerns the affairs of human 
beings in human life and community. 
After that, I will discuss, in Chapter V, Protagoras‘ idea on the correct use of language 
(logos). Protagoras‘ interest in the topic is found in his ideas regarding the correctness of 
names and words (orthoepeia) and the correction of grammar in which he argues that things 
should be correctly spoken in accordance with their nature. I shall argue that in his interest in 
the correct use of language, Protagoras expresses an idea of the naturalism of language which 
shows the consistency of grammatical genders on the basis of the natural genders of things 
and the morphological consistency of the words based on their grammatical genders. 
In Chapter VI, I will examine Protagoras‘ rhetorical sophistry, by analysing the ouk estin 
antilegein (‗it is impossible to contradict‘) doctrine and the argument in its support as 
presented in the Euthydemus 285e9–286b6. In the doctrine Protagoras argues that it is not 
possible to contradict, since it is possible only to speak of what is (to on) as it is (hōs esti) and 
impossible to speak of what is as it is not (hōs ouk esti) because it is the same as speaking of 
what is not (to mē on). I will maintain that in this argument, in order to prove that 
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 The term ‗anthropological‘ with regard to Protagoras‘ peri theōn fragment was first suggested by Jaeger 
(1947, 176), and later adopted by Barnes (1982, 450) and Schiappa (1991, 145–8). For further discussion on this 
issue, cf. Section 3 in Chapter IV below. 
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contradiction is absolutely impossible so long as no one is able to speak of what is as it is not, 
Protagoras adopts the objectivist use of logos, and that a relativist reading of the doctrine (in 
the light of the Platonic reading of the MMD in the Theaetetus) is thus invalid at all. I will 
further show the logical fallacies of the ouk estin antilegein doctrine, such as the equivocation 
of the Greek words einai, logos, and pragma, and then its character as Protagoras‘ rhetorical 
sophistry in connection with the two-logoi fragment and the weaker/stronger logoi fragment. 
Lastly, as the conclusion of my study on Protagoras‘ ideas, in Chapter VII, in the light of 
the whole discussion of the ancient evidence for Protagoras examined in the previous 
chapters, I will attempt to present a whole philosophical framework of Protagoras‘s outlook 
in a coherent way, which I shall call ‗Protagorean objectivism‘.24 In this framework the 
sophist takes a firmly objectivist position regarding his political and ethical views, 
epistemological ideas, and linguistic concerns, as well as even the art of rhetorical sophistry. 
In short, according to Protagoras whose interest lies in the things that properly belong to 
the range of the objects of human experience and the length of human life, i.e. human 
(political and ethical) affairs, knowledge and teaching about them can be accomplished 
through the human objective epistemological condition and a process of synthesis of human 
experiences (as indicated in the peri theōn fragment). More specifically, the things that are 
related to human affairs, as the subjects of Protagoras‘ teaching, such as political virtues, can 
be known and established on the grounds of the common objective civic sense, i.e. the 
fundamental political and ethical principles (as indicated the Great Speech and the MMD). As 
Protagoras emphasises the importance of the laws of a city as a method of preserving the city 
(cf. Prot. 325d2–326e1), it is important for people to understand what is said and written in a 
correct way in order to practise properly political and ethical actions and speeches. Protagoras 
thus insists upon grammatical and linguistic correctness on the grounds of the nature of things, 
avoiding relative usages of language (which is known as the correct use of language). Even 
when Protagoras utilises rhetorical sophistry, he appeals to the objectivist use of human logos, 
universally given to all human beings who have a capacity to speak (the ouk estin antilegein 
doctrine). In this regard, Protagoras is not vulnerable to the accusation of self-contradiction, 
but advocates a certain type of objectivism, namely ‗Protagorean objectivism‘, holding a 
coherent ‗epistemological‘-‗political and ethical‘-‗linguistic‘ position according to which his 
                                                 
24
 As it will be revealed in the discussion on Protagoras‘ fragments in the following chapters (especially stated 
in the conclusion chapter), I admit that Protagoras‘ objectivism does not entail the traditional concept and 
structure of objectivism found in the ancient philosophy such as Platonic or Aristotelian metaphysics, ontology 
and epistemology. Basically, by ‗objectivism‘ I mean a type of arguments or claims, as discerned from those in a 
form of relativism, to which the so-called ‗pros ti‘ concept (cf. Theat. 152a6–c6 and M. VII.60–64) does not 
apply for the truth of any judgments constructed in them. 
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political and ethical ideas are supported by objectivist views of epistemology and the 
naturalism of language. 
(After all these Chapters, I will give three Appendices: in the first Appendix I will 
provide the ancient sources of Protagoras‘ the peri theōn fragment, which are slightly 
different in wording, and suggest the most probable form of the original fragment; in the 
second Appendix I will discuss Plato‘s equation of the ouk estin antilegein doctrine with the 
impossibility of falsehood in the Euthydemus, and show the invalidity of such an equation; 
and in the last Appendix I will analyse the Platonic reading of Protagoras‘ MMD in the 
Theaetetus.) 
At this preliminary stage of the presentation of my study on Protagoras‘ philosophy, I 
should note that this is not entirely the first attempt in the history of philosophy or the study 
of the early Greek sophists to provide an objectivist reading of the thought of the sophist. A 
series of studies presenting Protagoras as an objectivist has already been proposed by some 
modern scholars. Levi, for instance, in his papers on Protagoras‘ MMD and ethical concerns 
in 1940, argues for the sophist‘s utilitarian objectivism, especially for the sophist‘s social 
ideas. Dupréel (1948, 30–5 and 55) and Donovan (1993, 35–47) also present a similar view, 
that Protagoras‘ interest in a humanist study may focus on universal practice in the light of an 
utilitarian or pragmatic viewpoint. Woodruff (2005, 158–9), briefly but strongly, indicates 
that no radical relativist can hold fast to the idea of the correctness of words and grammar, 
focusing on an objectivist stance of Protagoras in the field of language and linguistic 
education. 
Despite their value, however, these studies are somewhat fragmentary, focusing 
respectively on each of Protagoras‘ works or fragments, and restricting the scope of 
Protagoras‘ objectivism. On the contrary, my study aims to present the full scope of 
Protagoras‘ objectivist thought as reflected in his interests in language, political and ethical 
issues, and epistemological ideas, found in his surviving works as reported by ancient sources. 
Since such attempt at a complete picture of Protagoras‘ character as an objectivist in this way 
has not yet been proposed in modern scholarship, in this regard my research aims to 
contribute a new perspective for study of Protagoras in particular. Moreover, like Bett‘s 
suggestion (1989, 136–69) about the non-relativistic activities of the sophists in the early 
Greek period (on the basis of his argument for a clear distinction between a notion of 
relativism and the concept of relativity), I expect my work to provide a possible basis for a 
new and wider interpretation of the ancient Greek sophistic movement in the fifth and fourth 
century BCE in general. 
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Chapter II 
 
Political-Ethical Claim 1: The Great Speech 
 
 
In the Protagoras 320c8–328d2, Protagoras gives a long speech, the so-called Great Speech 
in which the sophist tells the origins of the human race and community as well as arguing for 
the teachability of political virtues. This speech is composed of two parts, the ‗Myth‘ and the 
‗Logos‘. The former explains how human beings are equipped with technical wisdom 
(entechnon sophia), fire (pyr), and a sense of what is right (dikē) and a sense of shame 
(aidōs); the latter concerns the idea that all men in a community care for and teach political 
virtue/art (politikē aretē/technē). 
Many modern scholars have endeavoured to construct one of the earliest political and 
ethical theories from the Great Speech, such as the first form of democratic idea in antiquity 
(cf. Adkins (1973), 3–12; Kerferd (1981a), 139–62, esp. 144–7; Farrar (1988), 44–125, esp. 
77–98; Moore (1988), 357–68; Schiappa (1991), 168–74; Zilioli (2007), 129–31), or the 
earliest theories of social contract (cf. again Kerferd (1981a), 139–62, esp. pp. 147–8; De 
Romilly (1992), pp. 213–33). Mostly, however, one general agreement among those scholars 
is that, no matter what form of a political-ethical idea the Great Speech may detail, it 
explicitly reveals an ancient structure of ethical relativism according to which various 
relativist views on politics, morality, culture, and language in Protagoras‘ thoughts can also 
be explained (cf. Oehler (2002), 207–14; Zilioli (2007), 89–112, esp. 93–102). 
In this chapter, I shall first briefly argue for the importance of the Great Speech for 
scholarship on Protagoras, against the suggestion of doubt about Protagorean authenticity. I 
shall then analyse the speech as presented in the Protagoras, arguing that it provides 
objectivist political and ethical ideas. In this argument I will show that Protagoras first admits 
that all human beings equally share the common objective civic senses, i.e. a sense of what is 
right and a sense of shame, for the preservation of their community and race, and then 
professes to teach political virtues, such as justice (dikaiosynē) and moderation (sōphrosynē), 
as a type of knowledge (art), produced from the application of the civic senses, by which they 
can pursue a better life in their community. The application of the civic senses to certain 
issues regarding human affairs, from which political virtues are produced, can be relativised 
depending upon diverse factors such as chronological and geographical differences; yet the 
objectivist character of the civic senses is not lost. 
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1. Protagoras and the Great Speech 
 
In modern scholarship on Protagoras, some have doubted the attribution of the Great Speech 
to Protagoras, believing that the Great Speech, particularly the Myth part, in which the 
sophist expresses his views on the gods, is not reconcilable with his agnostic views expressed 
in the so-called peri theōn fragment. Allen (1996, 100–2), for instance, states that the Great 
Speech, especially the Myth, ―is hard to reconcile with the agnostic views of the historical 
Protagoras‖ because Plato says that Protagoras is one ―who expressly refused to discuss the 
existence or nonexistence of gods (Theaetetus 162d–e),‖ and thus suggests that the Myth 
should not be taken seriously in scholarship on Protagoras.
25
 However, it is strange that here 
Allen uses a Platonic passage (from the Theaetetus) to reject Protagoras‘ views of the gods in 
the Myth presented in another Platonic work (from the Protagoras). 
In the Theaetetus where Protagoras‘ MMD is reported by Socrates, the sophist is 
depicted as dead and the main discussion regarding the doctrine—and its fallacies—is guided 
not by Protagoras but by Socrates and Theaetetus, whereas in the Protagoras, Protagoras is 
portrayed as being alive, getting involved in all the discussion as Socrates‘ main interlocutor. 
Taking into account the characteristic features of the dialogues, the probability regarding 
what Protagoras authentically stated can thus be considered higher in the latter dialogue. 
Allen needs to present a convincing explanation why a passage from the Theaetetus is more 
reliable than that from the Protagoras; otherwise, his argument cannot escape the fallacy of 
petitio principii.
26
 
On the grounds that the Great speech is presented in Plato‘s Protagoras, it may be 
conjectured that this speech was purely Plato‘s creation and does not reflect Protagoras‘ 
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 For a similar suggestion, cf. Levi (1940b), 290, n. 1; however, in the following passages (ibid., 292–3) he 
immediately ends up admitting the possibility of Protagorean authenticity of the Great Speech, emphasising its 
importance for scholarship on Protagoras‘ thoughts. 
26
 One, appealing to the fact that besides the passage from the Theaetetus other sources also report Protagoras‘ 
agnostic claim, i.e. the peri theōn fragment, may argue that the Myth still seems hard to reconcile with the 
sophist‘s agnostic views. However, Allen‘s argument simply focuses on the passage from the Theaetetus, and 
does not refer to other sources. In addition, (even though Allen‘s argument is supported by other sources for 
Protagoras‘ agnostic claim,) it is not necessarily the case that Protagoras should not express any ideas about the 
gods, since he has agnostic views on them. According to the sources, in the fragment the sophist claims to be 
unable to know the gods. Someone who has some ideas about the gods (as Protagoras does regarding what the 
gods did to human beings and their divinity in the Great Speech) is not counted as entirely knowing them. Even 
a Christian who has a number of views about God can claim that he is unable to know God, emphasising human 
limited rationality. For my analysis of Protagoras‘ peri theōn fragment, cf. Chapter IV below; for ancient sources 
of the fragment, cf. Appendix 1 below. 
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original thoughts on the origins of the human race and the teachability of political virtues. 
However, the fact that the style of the Great Speech does not seem to be congruent with 
Plato‘s own, but is characteristic of pre-Platonic epideixeis (displays) in the fifth century BCE, 
enables us to assume that the Great Speech could be Plato‘s representation extracted from 
Protagoras‘ own ideas, rather than taking it to be Plato‘s pure creation. The typical form of 
Plato‘s so-called earlier and middle dialogues, including the Protagoras, is, as is well known, 
Socratic conversation in which Socrates and his interlocutors have conversations on 
various—but mostly ethical and political—issues; usually, the interlocutors give their views 
about certain topics and Socrates questions and refutes them. On the contrary, Plato‘s 
representation of the Great Speech has the form of epideixis without breaks at great length 
(320c8–328d2). When it ends, Socrates explicitly says that ‗then Protagoras, having 
displayed so many and such things [i.e. the Great Speech], ceased his argument (Πξσηαγόξαο 
κὲλ ηνζαῦηα θαὶ ηνηαῦηα ἐπηδεημάκελνο ἀπεπαύζαην ηνῦ ιόγνπ)‘ (Prot. 328d3–4).27 Hence 
Gagarin (1968, 90) argues: 
 
The many indications of pre-platonic style in it [i.e. the Great Speech], and the many parallels in style 
and content to other writers of the fifth century … indicate that the speech must go back to a fifth-
century source, and it seems hardly likely that Plato would have looked to any source but Protagoras 
himself. These factors and the inner unity and cohesion of the speech, moreover, indicate that this is 
probably not a patchwork creation from several of his writings. 
 
Gagarin (ibid., 93–5) further suggests that the mode of representing the Great Speech is 
significantly different from that of the rest of the arguments and conversations in the 
Protagoras, since the former is described ―in a way that is unusual, if not unique, in Plato,‖ 
and that Socrates does not object to the Great Speech itself, but ―sets out at the end of it on 
what is essentially a new course.‖28 
One may suggest that the Great Speech, especially the Myth, in the Protagoras is 
neither Plato‘s creation nor his representation of Protagoras‘ own thought, but rather Plato‘s 
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 It is very rare that Plato has one of Socrates‘ interlocutors offer such a long display without breaks, except for 
a very few cases, such as Socrates‘ representation of Aspasia‘s democratic funeral orations (236d–249c) in the 
Menexenus, Socrates‘ self-defence in the Apology, Lysias‘ speech (230e–234c) and Socrates‘ two speeches 
(237b–241d; 243e–257b) on love (eros) in the Phaedrus, and some speeches on love made by the characters in 
the Symposium. On Plato‘s characteristic style to represent others‘ speeches, cf. Beresford (2009), 5; Morgan 
(2000), 133–4. 
28
 Schiappa (1991, 147) further conjectures that the Great Speech is indeed Plato‘s mere transcription of 
Protagoras‘ own words. As Manuwald (2007, 1) pinpoints, however, such conjecture is ―untenable since the 
speech alludes to a performance of Pherecrates‘ comedy entitled The Savages in 420 BCE (327d) and at the same 
time presupposes that Pericles‘ sons, who died in 429 BCE, are alive and present (328d).‖ 
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use of the traditional and authoritative myth of Prometheus, which he attributes to Protagoras 
in the Protagoras for his philosophical discussion. He does so either because he believes that 
the Myth is the same as (or at least a good example to express) Protagoras‘ actual views on 
the origins of the human race, or because Protagoras indeed adopted the Myth for his own 
thoughts on the matter. However, both cases do not seem credible for the following reason: in 
the eighth century BCE, Hesiod composed two poems in which he relates the myth of 
Prometheus, Works and Days (42–105; esp. 69–89) and Theogony (511–616); and later, 
during the fifth century BCE, Aeschylus, in his tragedy entitled Prometheus Bound (esp. II. 
436–506), tells the details of the myth of Prometheus; finally, we have Plato‘s representation 
in the Protagoras (320c8–322d5). Yet, besides some trivial references in Ibycus (PMG, 342) 
and Sappho (207 LP; Servius on Virg. Ecl. 6. 42), as Griffith (1983, 3, n. 10) points out, there 
is almost no textual trace of the myth of Prometheus between the time of Hesiod and the fifth 
century BCE. 
It is also noticeable that some remarkable references to the gods‘ and Prometheus‘ 
characteristic features and deeds found in the versions of the myth of Prometheus in Hesiod‘s 
and Aeschylus‘ works are not stated in the Great Speech at all. For example, according to 
relevant passages from the Theogony, Prometheus tries to trick Zeus into accepting the lesser 
portions of sacrificial victims, while teaching human beings the art of sacrifice. Zeus then 
punishes the human race by withholding the secret of fire, and Prometheus in turn steals fire 
from Zeus to give it to human beings. The version in the Works and Days explains why we 
must labour to survive. Hesiod does not give any explanation why Prometheus wishes to 
bring benefits to the human race, while Aeschylus does; but none of these is found in the 
Great Speech. In addition, differences in the contents of the versions of the myth, albeit slight, 
can be pointed out; in Hesiod‘s and Aeschylus‘ works human beings are said to be created out 
of clay by Prometheus‘ effort, while in the Great Speech they are created out of earth, fire, 
and their mixture, by the gods.
29
 Such different representations of the myths of Prometheus 
in antiquity demonstrate that the Myth in the Great Speech is not extracted merely from the 
traditional and authoritative one—indeed, there may not be such a one. Of course, there are 
some common features in the myths of Prometheus in Hesiod‘s, Aeschylus‘ and Plato‘s works, 
such as the fundamental idea of Prometheus‘ care for the human race. Nonetheless, this does 
not deny that Plato, in presenting the Myth, as well as the Logos, does not attempt to 
represent what Protagoras intends concerning the issues of the origins of the human race and 
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 On the difference of the myths of Prometheus and Zeus in ancient texts, cf. Griffith (1983), 1–4; Taylor 
(1991), 77–8; Ferrarin (2000), 292–300. 
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community, although partly shared with earlier traditions. 
Consequently, regarding the issue as to whether the Great Speech needs to be examined 
when studying Protagoras, modern scholars have reached a consensus that the Great Speech 
offers precious information about Protagoras‘ ideas on human virtues and the origins of the 
human race and community. In short, the Great Speech, though represented in a Platonic 
work, is produced on the basis of original Protagorean thought. Grote (1875, 47, n. 1), 
remarks that if the Great Speech is ―the composition of Protagoras himself, my estimation of 
him would be considerably raised,‖ argues that the Great Speech fairly represents Protagoras‘ 
own ideas. Similarly, Adkins (1990, 4–5), albeit personally believing that it seems 
improbable that Plato borrowed a genuine Protagorean work to present the Myth, confesses 
that indeed ―there was nothing to prevent him [sc. Plato] from so doing [i.e. presenting 
Protagoras‘ own ideas] since all published work was in the public domain‖ at Plato‘s time. 
Levi (1940b, 292–3) also supports this view, affirming that as ―the myth and the logos are 
presented by Protagoras without a break, without his having to answer to objection from 
Socrates, it is natural to think that, in their substance at least, they are taken from the sophist‘s 
writings and that they faithfully represent his opinion: accordingly, these texts have a 
fundamental importance for the interpretation of the essence of his thought.‖  
Probably, as Protagoras endeavours in the Great Speech to prove the teachability of 
political virtues and emphasise the importance of education in the subject, it would have been 
part of one of the sophist‘s lost books, entitled also The Great Speech (Megas Logos), from 
which, according to Anecdota Parisiensia I.171.31 (De Hippomacho B 3: DK80 B3), 
Protagoras‘ fragment on education (‗teaching requires nature and practice … one must start 
learning from early youth‘, cf. n. 39 below) is also found. Or, as Dillon and Gergel (2003, 22 
and 343, n. 30) suggest, the Great Speech which ―seems to embody positions that Protagoras 
should have held—and that Plato certainly did not hold—so that it seems legitimate to make 
at least cautious and qualified use of it as a source for his [i.e. Protagoras‘] political theory‖, 
would probably have been a part of the sophist‘s book, On the Original State of Things (Peri 
tēs en Archēi Katastaseōs), which may have contained Protagoras‘ views on the origins of the 
human community as well as his political views,
30
 and from which Plato might have 
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 Then, the book The Great Speech could be considered a part of the book On the Original State of Things. 
Similarly, Kerferd (1981a, 125) posits that the Great Speech, especially the Myth, ―in all probability is based to 
some extent on doctrines of the historical Protagoras as published in such works as his treatise On the Original 
State of Man.‖ However, a Protagorean treatise entitled in this way is not found in the list of his works in D.L. 
9.55. For similar views, cf. also Nestle (1942), 282–9; Untersteiner (1953), 75–85; Havelock (1957), 407–9; 
Farrar (1988), 78. On the genuineness of the title Peri tēs en Archēi Katastaseōs, cf. O‘Sullivan (1996), 120–1. 
20 
extracted the Great Speech.
31
 
 
 
2. The Great Speech in the Protagoras 
 
In the Protagoras, Protagoras is depicted, by both Socrates and Hippocrates who is eager to 
learn from the sophist, as someone whose task is to be ‗in charge of making [people] clever at 
speaking (ἐπηζηάηελ ηνῦ πνη῅ζαη δεηλὸλ ιέγεηλ)‘ (312d6–7). To Socrates‘ question in what 
subject precisely Protagoras makes people clever at speaking, the sophist answers that ‗it will 
be given to you, if you are [i.e. study] with me, that on the very day you associate with me, 
you will go home a better man, and the same thing will happen on the day after. And also 
every day, day after day, you will become better (ἔζηαη ηνίλπλ ζνη, ἐὰλ ἐκνὶ ζπλῆο, ᾗ ἂλ 
἟κέξᾳ ἐκνὶ ζπγγέλῃ, ἀπηέλαη νἴθαδε βειηίνλη γεγνλόηη, θαὶ ἐλ ηῆ ὑζηεξαίᾳ ηαὐηὰ ηαῦηα· θαὶ 
ἑθάζηεο ἟κέξαο ἀεὶ ἐπὶ ηὸ βέιηηνλ ἐπηδηδόλαη)‘ (318a6–9). The learning (mathēma) of 
Protagoras‘ teaching is then summarised as ‗―good deliberation (euboulia)‖32 concerning 
                                                 
31
 Cf. also Wolfsdorf (1998), 126–33, for the historicity of dramatic elements of the Protagoras, where he 
suggests that it is fairly acceptable to take Protagoras‘ ideas viewed in the Protagoras to be historical on the 
basis of some reliable historical backgrounds illustrated by Plato in the dialogue, such as Callias‘ figure both in 
characteristic and financial aspects. On Protagorean authenticity of the Great Speech, cf. also J. Adam and A. M. 
Adam (1893), xxi–xxii; Nestle (1942), 282–9; Kerferd (1953), 42–5; Untersteiner (1954), 72, n. 24 and 75–85; 
Havelock (1957), 407–9; Guthrie (1971), 64, n. 1 and 265–8; Barnes (1982), 450; Nill (1985), 5–7; Farrar 
(1988), 78 and 87–98; Schiappa (1991), 145–7.; Taylor (1991), 78; Morgan (2000), 12 and 132–6; Lavery in 
O‘Grady (2008), 39; Beresford (2009), 2–5. 
32
 Euboulia (according to LSJ. s.v.) literally means ‗good counsel‘, ‗soundness of judgement‘ or ‗prudence‘, and 
especially in the fifth century BCE, it generally means good or wise counsel, or best decision. Cf. Pr. 1035–1038: 
 
Πξ.: ζὺ δὲ πάπηαηλε θαὶ θξόληηδε, κεδ' αὐζαδίαλ 
εὐβνπιίαο ἀκείλνλ' ἟γήζῃ πνηέ.  
Χν.: ἟κῖλ κὲλ ἗ξκ῅ο νὐθ ἄθαηξα θαίλεηαη 
ιέγεηλ· ἄλσγε γάξ ζε ηὴλ αὐζαδίαλ κεζέλη' 
ἐξεπλᾶλ ηὴλ ζνθὴλ εὐβνπιίαλ. 
PROMETH. So then, do you take heed, deliberate, 
and do not hold good counsel cheaper than an 
obstinate sprit.  
CHOR. To us it seems that Hermes speaks in 
season, bidding thee lay aside thy obstinacy and 
with good counsel walk the path of wisdom. 
(trans. Thomson, 1932) 
 
Cf. also Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War I.78, 4: 
 
἟κεῖο δὲ ἐλ νὐδεκηᾷ πσ ηνηαύηῃ ἁκαξηίᾳ ὄληεο 
νὔη' αὐηνὶ νὔζ' ὑκᾶο ὁξ῵ληεο ιέγνκελ ὑκῖλ, ἕσο 
ἔηη αὐζαίξεηνο ἀκθνηέξνηο ἟ εὐβνπιία, ζπνλδὰο 
κὴ ιύεηλ κεδὲ παξαβαίλεηλ ηνὺο ὅξθνπο, ηὰ δὲ 
δηάθνξα δίθῃ ιύεζζαη θαηὰ ηὴλ μπλζήθελ. 
Neither we nor you, as far as we can see, are in 
any danger yet of this mistake. So we urge you 
now, while we both still have the freedom to 
make the best decisions, not to break the treaty or 
contravene your oaths, but to let our differences 
be resolved by arbitration under the agreement. 
(trans. Hammond, 2009) 
 
Regarding Protagoras‘ use of this term, scholars have offered various translations; ―proper care of [one‘s] 
personal affairs‖ (Guthrie, 1956), ―prudence‖ (Ostwald, 1956; Kerferd, 1981a), ―formation of correct decision‖ 
(Havelock, 1957), ―good judgement‖ (Lamb, 1964; Schiappa, 1991; Allen, 1996; Woodruff, 2005; Schofield and 
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domestic affairs how best to manage one‘s household, and concerning the affairs of the city 
how to be the most influential in the affairs of the city, both in action and speech (εὐβνπιία 
πεξὶ η῵λ νἰθείσλ, ὅπσο ἂλ ἄξηζηα ηὴλ αὑηνῦ νἰθίαλ δηνηθνῖ, θαὶ πεξὶ η῵λ η῅ο πόιεσο, ὅπσο 
ηὰ η῅ο πόιεσο δπλαηώηαηνο ἂλ εἴε θαὶ πξάηηεηλ θαὶ ιέγεηλ)‘ (318e5–319a2). After that, 
Socrates asks whether Protagoras professes to teach political art (politikē technē) and to make 
a man into a good citizen (agathos politēs), and the sophist agrees (319a4–5).33 
Listening to Protagoras professing to make men into good citizens by teaching political 
art (virtues), Socrates objects to Protagoras‘ claim of the teachability of political art for two 
reasons: (1) that unlike the case of other arts such as the art of building houses or ships of 
which the Athenians (who are considered wise by Socrates) look for the experts and call them 
to the Assembly in order to gain advice whenever they encounter some issues regarding those 
subjects, when deliberating on the political issues and on the management of their city, the 
Athenians gather all together in the Assembly whether they are rich, poor, well-born, or low-
born, and anyone can bring opinions and advice, clearly on the assumption that there is no 
such expert on political art (319b3–d7);34 and (2) that those who are deemed to be great 
                                                                                                                                                        
Griffith, 2010), ―sound judgement‖ (Maguire, 1977), ―good planning‖ (Hubbard and Karnofsky, 1982), ―proper 
management‖ (Taylor, 1991), ―sound deliberation‖ (Lombardo and Bell in Cooper, 1997), ―good management‖ 
(Dillon and Gergel, 2003; Lavery in O‘Grady, 2008), ―being good at working out what to do‖ (Denyer, 2008). 
For a philosophical use of the term, cf. E.N. VI.9.1142b6 ff., where Aristotle distinguishes simple good 
deliberation (euboulia haplōs) that leads its holders to the state of well-being and to the political aim, from more 
specialised good deliberation that directs its holders to work for more special aim. On the use and meaning of 
euboulia in Pre-Platonic thought, cf. Schofield (1986), 6–31, and for Protagorean use of this term, cf. Schiappa 
(1991), 184–5. 
33
 On Protagoras‘ profession of education in politics, cf. Men. 91d–92a (DK80 A8); Maguire (1977), 104–5; 
Kerferd (1981a), 25–6. 
34
 Taylor (1991, 72–4) formulates Socrates‘ first objection as below: 
(1) The Athenians are wise (319b3–4). 
(2) (Thus, their opinion can be taken as true.) 
(3) On any arts which the Athenians think can be taught, they allow only experts for advice (319b5–c7). 
(4) On political issues and the management of a city, they allow anyone for advice (319c7–d6). 
(5) Thus, from (3) and (4), the Athenians think that political art cannot be taught (319d6–7). 
(6) Therefore, by (2) and (5), political art cannot be taught. 
He points out that this formulation does not perfectly work unless the inserted proposition (2), which is derived 
from (1), is confirmed to be valid: the proposition (2) is ―neither explicitly stated by Socrates nor challenged by 
Protagoras.‖ However, if we closely notice the task which Protagoras is performing and the place where the 
sophist performs his task, we can defend Socrates‘ objection by a relativising method without asking for the 
proposition (2): the propositions (1) and (5) can be modified as ‗(1 ') The Athenians to whom Protagoras is trying 
to teach political art are wise‘, and as ‗(5') (Thus, from (3) and (4), the Athenians whose opinions are considered 
wise think that political art cannot be taught)‘. Then, the conclusive proposition can be modified as ‗(6') 
Therefore, by (5'), at least to the Athenians, political art cannot be taught, and Protagoras‘ profession to teach it 
is meaningless or unwise to them—thus, no one in Athens will be willing to learn from Protagoras‘. Taylor 
(ibid., 73–4) points out one more problem of Socrates‘ first objection, arguing that ―[T]he step from 4 to 5 
requires the additional assumption 4': The Athenians consider that it is not the case that all citizens are experts 
on questions of running the city,‖ and thus suggests that Protagoras‘ consideration in his Great Speech is to 
reveal that the Athenians are indeed wrong (regarding the teachability of political virtues. However, Taylor‘s 
suggestion seems somewhat dubious, since what Protagoras tries to reveal by the Great Speech is not that the 
Athenians are wrong, but that the Athenians who are still wise indeed think that political art can be taught; 
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politicians, i.e. those who are regarded to hold political art, like Pericles, though providing 
their sons with the best education for everything, neither teach them themselves nor have any 
other specialist educate them in the subject at which they are really wise, namely, political art 
(319d7–320b3). Socrates thus argues that therefore, to him ‗it does not seem that such virtue 
(aretē) [on political matters] is teachable for these two reasons (εἰο ηαῦηα ἀπνβιέπσλ νὐρ 
἟γνῦκαη δηδαθηὸλ εἶλαη ἀξεηήλ)‘ (320b4–5).35 Since Protagoras has professed to teach it, 
Socrates thus requires Protagoras to prove that political virtues can be taught. As a response 
to Socrates‘ objections, Protagoras gives a long display, the Great Speech (320c8–328d2), 
which consists of what has been called ‗the Myth‘ as a response to Socrates‘ first objection 
(320c8–322d5) (and its explanatory parts and summary from 322d5 to 324d1) and ‗the 
Logos‘ as a response to the second objection (324d1–328c2), and a very brief summary of 
them (328c3–d2).36 Protagoras asserts that he can demonstrate the teachability of political 
virtues, against Socrates‘ objections, by presenting his point either in a form of a story 
(mythos) or in that of a reasoned account (logos). Then, saying that presenting it in the form 
of a story will be more charming (chariesteron), he first begins with the Myth, responding to 
Socrates‘ first objection and explaining how and why political virtues can and must be taught. 
Protagoras offers no further account about the methodological or argumentative 
differences between the Myth and the Logos. The main difference between the Myth and the 
Logos in the Protagoras, some suggestions on this notwithstanding,
37
 as we will see shortly, 
seems to lie in their aims. The former, as a story, is self-complete in and of itself, offering a 
                                                                                                                                                        
Protagoras‘ consideration is rather an attack on Socrates‘ misunderstanding of the wise Athenians‘ belief on this 
issue. 
35
 What Protagoras first promises to teach is political art, i.e. technē, but here Socrates now converts this term 
into political virtue, i.e. aretē. The conversion of art into virtue implies that Socrates regards the former as 
equated with the latter, and vice versa. However, Protagoras in the following speeches does not seem annoyed 
by such conversion; rather he also seems to admit it, based on his belief that both political technē (art) and 
political aretē (virtue) are, as equated with each other, teachable. The equation of art with virtue seems 
somewhat problematic, because not all virtues can be treated as equivalent to art. A good ability to see, for 
instance, is a sort of virtue (or excellence) of the eyes, but this virtue is not considered an art of the eyes. 
Nonetheless, in the matter of political affairs, it is probable that one can be deemed to fully have an art of 
managing a city only when one is indeed expert at it, that is to say, one has the virtue (i.e. excellence) in it. In 
this regard, both Protagoras and Socrates seem to admit the interchangeable usage of art and virtue. Along with 
them, in my analysis of the Great Speech, ‗political virtues‘ and ‗political art‘ are entirely interchangeable with 
each other. For further discussion on such equation of technē with aretē, especially in Protagoras‘ thought in the 
Myth, cf. pages 33–5 and n. 46 below. Cf. also Adkins (1973), 4; Taylor (1991), 75–6; Allen (1996), 144. 
36
 For a division of the Great Speech, cf. Kerferd (1953), 42; Gagarin (1969), 134 and 139–44; Taylor (1991), 
76 and 99–100; Taylor (1996), 16–17. Most recently, Schofield and Griffith divide Protagoras‘ Great Speech 
(320c–328d) as follows (2010, 140): 
 320c–323c: The myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus, with commentary on its meaning. 
 323c–324c: The practice of punishment reveals a general belief that goodness can be taught. 
 324cd–328a: The relevant forms of teaching are not a matter for a specialised art or science. 
 328a–d: Protagoras reformulates his manifesto, and summarises the case he has made. 
37
 Cf. Taylor (1991), 76; Morgan (2000), 138–41; Dillon and Gergel (2003), 348, n. 87 and n. 88; Denyer 
(2008), 100. 
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descriptive and self-justifying idea that does not require any further proof, whereas the latter, 
as an argument, uses certain types of argumentative methods for justification or proof of the 
suggested points in its structure. In fact, the Myth, relying on the divinity for its justification 
in relation to the idea of the initial and original disposition of human beings with the civic 
senses, is presented to show that all men in a city share in a sense of what is right (dikē) and a 
sense of shame (aidōs) so that they are capable of possessing political virtues such as justice 
(dikaiosynē) and moderation (sōphrosynē) to some extent—against Socrates‘ first objection.38 
On the contrary, the Logos, adopting argumentative methods such as a kind of hypothetical 
method and analogical method for its justification, aims to demonstrate that all good men in a 
city indeed (try to) teach their sons political virtues and thus their possession of the political 
virtues (to a relatively higher degree compared to those who absolutely lack them) makes 
them not entirely bad—against Socrates‘ second objection. Such differences will be more 
clearly revealed below. Let us first examine the Myth of the Great Speech. 
 
2.1. The Myth 
 
The Myth runs as follows: Once upon a time the gods existed, but mortal creatures did not, 
and when the time came that was set by fate for mortal creatures‘ generation, the gods put 
earth, fire, and the elements blended with earth and fire into the earth and mixed them to 
mould the mortal creatures. The gods then ordered the two titans, Prometheus (‗Forethought‘) 
and Epimetheus (‗Afterthought‘), to assign various powers for survival to the mortal 
creatures. Epimetheus begged Prometheus for the privilege of assigning the powers himself, 
and distributed each power to each mortal with Prometheus‘ consent. Epimetheus gives 
different kinds of power (dynamis) of survival to non-reasoning mortal creatures. They are 
respectively assigned strength, speed, claws, horns, small size, wings, the ability to dwell 
underground, thick hair, tough skins, natural bedding, hooves, and the ability to digest and 
survive upon different kinds of food such as pasture, fruits, roots, and a meat-eating habit, 
and finally prolific and non-prolific characters for a good balance of survival. These powers 
are given as innate capacities to the non-reasoning mortal creatures because the assignments 
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 Similarly, Plato tries to establish his cosmology by presenting a likely story (eikōs mythos) on the origins of 
the physical universe and relies on the story itself for the plausibility, or validity of his cosmology (Tim. 26a ff.). 
There the Demiurge, using paradigms and imitating the heavenly universe, creates the physical universe as it is 
now as an image (eikōn) of the heavenly universe, but no explanation or justification of why he had to create it 
as it is now; the only justification of his creation of the world is suggested through his divinity. Likewise, 
Socrates‘ explanation of the existence of human soul and its immortality in the Meno 81a, takes a form of story, 
relying on the saying of priests and priestesses for its justification. 
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were made before they were born. However, since Epimetheus was not very wise, he 
absentmindedly assigned all the possible given powers to the non-reasoning animals, and was 
then left with the problem of a completely unequipped human race: 
 
ἅηε δὴ νὖλ νὐ πάλπ ηη ζνθὸο ὢλ ὁ ἖πηκεζεὺο 
ἔιαζελ αὑηὸλ θαηαλαιώζαο ηὰο δπλάκεηο εἰο ηὰ 
ἄινγα· ινηπὸλ δὴ ἀθόζκεηνλ ἔηη αὐηῶ ἤλ ηὸ 
ἀλζξώπσλ γέλνο, θαὶ ἞πόξεη ὅηη ρξήζαηην. … 
ἀπνξίᾳ νὖλ ζρόκελνο ὁ Πξνκεζεὺο ἣληηλα 
ζσηεξίαλ ηῶ ἀλζξώπῳ εὕξνη, θιέπηεη Ἡθαίζηνπ 
θαὶ Ἀζελᾶο ηὴλ ἔληερλνλ ζνθίαλ ζὺλ ππξί—
ἀκήραλνλ γὰξ ἤλ ἄλεπ ππξὸο αὐηὴλ θηεηήλ ηῳ ἠ 
ρξεζίκελ γελέζζαη—θαὶ νὕησ δὴ δσξεῖηαη 
ἀλζξώπῳ. ηὴλ κὲλ νὖλ πεξὶ ηὸλ βίνλ ζνθίαλ 
ἄλζξσπνο ηαύηῃ ἔζρελ, … ἐπεηδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄλζξσπνο 
ζείαο κεηέζρε κνίξαο, πξ῵ηνλ κὲλ δηὰ ηὴλ ηνῦ 
ζενῦ ζπγγέλεηαλ δῴσλ κόλνλ ζενὺο ἐλόκηζελ, 
θαὶ ἐπερείξεη βσκνύο ηε ἱδξύεζζαη θαὶ ἀγάικαηα 
ζε῵λ· ἔπεηηα θσλὴλ θαὶ ὀλόκαηα ηαρὺ 
δηεξζξώζαην ηῆ ηέρλῃ, θαὶ νἰθήζεηο θαὶ ἐζζ῅ηαο 
θαὶ ὑπνδέζεηο θαὶ ζηξσκλὰο θαὶ ηὰο ἐθ γ῅ο 
ηξνθὰο εὕξεην. νὕησ δὴ παξεζθεπαζκέλνη θαη' 
ἀξρὰο ἄλζξσπνη ᾤθνπλ ζπνξάδελ, πόιεηο δὲ νὐθ 
ἤζαλ· (321b6–322b1) 
Now Epimetheus, since he was not wholly wise, 
did not notice himself having used up all the 
powers on the non-reasoning kinds; so the 
human race was left unfurnished by him, and so 
he was at a loss what he should do. … 
Prometheus, having this problem, found a way of 
preservation for mankind, so he stole from 
Hephaestus and Athena technical wisdom along 
with fire—for it was impossible for anyone to 
acquire or use that art without fire—and in this 
manner he bestowed [them] to man. Thus man 
obtained the wisdom about life [i.e. individual 
survival] in this way, … since man shared of a 
divine portion, first of all, because of his kinship 
with the god, of living creatures he only 
worshiped the gods, and he attempted to set up 
altars and statues of the gods. Second he soon 
articulated sound and words by means of his art, 
and he discovered housings, clothing, foot-gear, 
bedding, and food from the earth. Thus equipped, 
at the beginning men lived scattered, and there 
were no cities. 
 
Seeing that among the mortal creatures only the human race was equipped with no powers to 
survive, Prometheus stole from Hephaestus and Athena technical wisdom (entechnon sophia) 
along with fire (pyr) by which one can acquire wisdom, and gave them to the human race. 
These two things were given by Prometheus to human beings before they were asked to come 
out in the light of day. Thus, like non-reasoning creatures who received Epimetheus‘ gifts for 
their individual survival, now human beings were equipped with their own powers for 
individual survival. 
Technical wisdom and the use of fire enable human beings not only to advance their 
individual survival through the ability to create bedding, housing, and get food from the earth, 
but also to worship the gods with which they share in divinity to some degree, developing the 
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use of articulate speech—the symbols of rationality that distinguish human beings from non-
reasoning creatures. In Protagoras‘ thought, thus, human beings, who are innately equipped 
with technical wisdom and fire, are by nature those who are able to develop and use language 
and to establish the fundamentals for individual survival.
39
 
However, as the human race is still physically weaker than some non-reasoning mortal 
creatures, men need to gather together to protect themselves from the attacks of other 
creatures, building a community for which they will require a certain type of wisdom such as 
political wisdom. But technical wisdom and fire that are innately given by Prometheus to 
human beings do not ensure them the ability to construct cities and live together. No city 
exists yet at this stage: 
 
ἤλ γὰξ παξὰ ηῶ Δηί. ηῶ δὲ Πξνκεζεῖ εἰο κὲλ ηὴλ 
ἀθξόπνιηλ ηὴλ ηνῦ Δηὸο νἴθεζηλ νὐθέηη ἐλερώξεη 
εἰζειζεῖλ—πξὸο δὲ θαὶ αἱ Δηὸο θπιαθαὶ θνβεξαὶ 
ἤζαλ (321d5–7), … ἀπώιιπλην νὖλ ὑπὸ η῵λ 
ζεξίσλ δηὰ ηὸ παληαρῆ αὐη῵λ ἀζζελέζηεξνη 
εἶλαη, θαὶ ἟ δεκηνπξγηθὴ ηέρλε αὐηνῖο πξὸο κὲλ 
ηξνθὴλ ἱθαλὴ βνεζὸο ἤλ, πξὸο δὲ ηὸλ η῵λ 
ζεξίσλ πόιεκνλ ἐλδεήο—πνιηηηθὴλ γὰξ ηέρλελ 
νὔπσ εἶρνλ, ἥο κέξνο πνιεκηθή—ἐδήηνπλ δὴ 
ἁζξνίδεζζαη θαὶ ζῴδεζζαη θηίδνληεο πόιεηο· ὅη' 
νὖλ ἁζξνηζζεῖελ, ἞δίθνπλ ἀιιήινπο ἅηε νὐθ 
ἔρνληεο ηὴλ πνιηηηθὴλ ηέρλελ, ὥζηε πάιηλ 
ζθεδαλλύκελνη δηεθζείξνλην. (322b1–8) 
For that [i.e. political art] was near to Zeus. And 
there was not enough time for Prometheus to 
come to the citadel of Zeus—moreover, the 
guards of Zeus were terrible, … so they [i.e. 
human beings] were killed by the wild beasts, 
because they were altogether weaker than them, 
and their craftsman‘s art was sufficient to them 
for providing food, but insufficient for fighting 
against the wild beasts—for they did not yet have 
political art of which the art of warfare is part—
and so they sought to gather together and 
preserve themselves by founding cities. Now 
when they gathered together, they did wrong to 
each other, in as much as they did not have the 
political art, so they scattered and were destroyed 
again. 
 
The natural human power, the craftsman‘s art (dēmiourgikē technē) previously described as 
technical wisdom and fire, is sufficient to help the human race to secure food and bedding, 
the basic necessities for individual, but not communal, living. However, due to their physical 
weakness compared to wild beasts, the human race is not able to survive when living 
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 In a fragment on education, which states that ‗teaching requires nature and practice … one must start learning 
from early youth (θύζεσο θαὶ ἀζθήζεσο δηδαζθαιία δεῖηαη … ἀπὸ λεόηεηνο δὲ ἀξμακὲλνπο δεῖ καλζάλεηλ)‘ 
(Anecdota Parisiensia I.171.31: DK80 B3), Protagoras seems to mean by ‗nature‘ this natural rationality 
through which human beings are able to develop and use language. Students must have natural rational abilities 
to learn, basically an ability to understand what is said, i.e. language. Later, in the Logos part (325c6–7), when 
demonstrating that indeed all good men in a community teach their children political virtues, Protagoras asserts 
that parents educate their children from early youth, as soon as they can understand what is said. 
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individually. To protect themselves against the threat of the wild beasts, human beings need 
to build a community in which they can gather together, with the potential to wage the art of 
warfare (polemikē technē) which constitutes a facet of political art (politikē technē)—the art 
of warfare is not equivalent to the wild beasts‘ innate ability to hunt; the latter is more like a 
natural instinct which comes with their naturally equipped powers such as sharp teeth and 
strength, while the former is what needs to be performed with certain strategies, aiming to 
gain victories in battles. Thus, the art of warfare, when performed, requires man to be able to 
maintain relationship with others, i.e. (a sort of) political art. In short, to survive, human 
beings need to possess political art. As they gather together with the hope of protecting 
themselves but without the necessary facility in political art, they do wrong to each other 
(adikein allēlous), scatter and live individually, again facing the end of the race. 
Next, Protagoras presents the final passage of the Myth on the issue regarding human 
survival in a community. In this passage, Zeus, worrying about the survival of human beings 
and wishing to save them from extinction, devises a way: 
 
Ζεὺο νὖλ δείζαο πεξὶ ηῶ γέλεη ἟κ῵λ κὴ ἀπόινηην 
πᾶλ, ἗ξκ῅λ πέκπεη ἄγνληα εἰο ἀλζξώπνπο αἰδ῵ 
ηε θαὶ δίθελ, ἵλ' εἶελ πόιεσλ θόζκνη ηε θαὶ 
δεζκνὶ θηιίαο ζπλαγσγνί. ἐξσηᾷ νὖλ ἗ξκ῅ο Δία 
ηίλα νὖλ ηξόπνλ δνίε δίθελ θαὶ αἰδ῵ ἀλζξώπνηο· 
"Πόηεξνλ ὡο αἱ ηέρλαη λελέκεληαη, νὕησ θαὶ 
ηαύηαο λείκσ; λελέκεληαη δὲ ὧδε· εἷο ἔρσλ 
ἰαηξηθὴλ πνιινῖο ἱθαλὸο ἰδηώηαηο, θαὶ νἱ ἄιινη 
δεκηνπξγνί· θαὶ δίθελ δὴ θαὶ αἰδ῵ νὕησ ζ῵ ἐλ 
ηνῖο ἀλζξώπνηο, ἠ ἐπὶ πάληαο λείκσ;" "἖πὶ 
πάληαο," ἔθε ὁ Ζεύο, "θαὶ πάληεο κεηερόλησλ· νὐ 
γὰξ ἂλ γέλνηλην πόιεηο, εἰ ὀιίγνη αὐη῵λ 
κεηέρνηελ ὥζπεξ ἄιισλ ηερλ῵λ· θαὶ λόκνλ γε ζὲο 
παξ' ἐκνῦ ηὸλ κὴ δπλάκελνλ αἰδνῦο θαὶ δίθεο 
κεηέρεηλ θηείλεηλ ὡο λόζνλ πόιεσο." (322c1–d5) 
So Zeus, fearing that our [i.e. human] race would 
wholly perish, sent Hermes to bring to men a 
sense of shame (aidōs) and a sense of what is 
right (dikē), so that they might be the principles 
of order of cities and the bonds of friendship. 
Now Hermes asked Zeus in which way he was to 
give a sense of shame and a sense of what is 
right to men: ―As the [technical] arts were 
distributed, so shall I distribute these [to men]? 
These [arts] were distributed thus: one doctor is 
enough for many men, and so with the other 
craftsman‘s arts. Shall I give a sense of what is 
right and a sense of shame to men in that way 
too, or distribute them to all?‖ ―To all,‖ said 
Zeus, ―and let all share in them; for cities could 
not exist, if only a few shared in them as in the 
other arts. And establish a law from me that he 
who cannot share in a sense of shame and a sense 
of what is right must be killed as a disease of the 
city.‖ 
 
Zeus orders his son, Hermes, to bring human beings two senses by means of which they will 
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become capable of maintaining a social life and living all together. These two senses are a 
sense of shame (aidōs) and a sense of what is right (dikē). Anyone who receives a sense of 
what is right and a sense of shame has an ability to develop his powers to construct and 
preserve a community in which he can safely survive and exist with others who too share the 
same senses; if not, he must be regarded as a serious disease causing fatal problems in the 
community and killed in the name of Zeus.
40
 
At the same time, these senses are the principles of the order and the bonds of friendship 
among men. Without the order and the bonds of friendship, no one is able to live together 
with others. A man who lacks these senses cannot coexist with others and so will perish. In 
short, a sense of what is right and a sense of shame are given to men, not to worship higher 
beings such as the gods, but to care for one another in a human community.
41
 Unlike the 
distribution of other technical arts (e.g. the art of medicine), Zeus commands that all human 
beings must be given these senses in order to live all together in societies and avoid the 
extinction of their race, and that whoever does not have them must be punished by death. 
From this passage, Protagoras is now seen to suggest a complete idea of a human being: 
‗one who can properly and safely exist as a man only in a community is a man who must be 
given a sense of what is right and a sense of shame; otherwise he can no longer survive.‘42 
The initial powers, technical wisdom and fire, enable a man to pursue an individual life, but 
outside a community only for a very short period until he gets killed by wild beasts, so that 
they cannot fully guarantee the complete preservation of man‘s survival. The survival of a 
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 Protagoras‘ promise to teach good deliberation on how to manage domestic affairs can be understood in this 
regard, since a family is also a human community, as a starting point of social life. Even in a domestic 
community man needs to know how well to manage it with a sense of what is right and just; otherwise this 
community will not exist and neither will man. The management of domestic affairs, thus, is no less important 
than that of political affairs in Protagoras‘ thought. 
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 Zeus is often illustrated as the god of friendship. Cf. Gorg. 500b6 and Phdr. 234e2. 
42
 Some scholars have considered a sense of what is right and a sense of shame, together with political virtues 
(justice, moderation and etc.), a human nature or natural powers. This consideration, however, does not seem 
plausible for the following reason: non-reasoning mortal creatures were innately equipped by Epimetheus‘ 
distribution with their natural powers, such as strength, speed and ability to fly and swim, to survive. Likewise, 
human beings were innately equipped by Prometheus‘ effort with technical wisdom and fire before they came 
out to the light. However, a sense of what is right and a sense of shame were given by Zeus to human beings 
when they faced the extinction of their race; in other words, according to the Myth, human beings came to 
possess these senses obviously after birth. Something that one obtains after birth is not a natural power; these 
senses are rather something afterwards acquired, especially in this case of the Myth. In fact, if a sense of what is 
right and a sense of shame are considered human natures, Protagoras would be instantly questioned how he can 
process to teach something that everyone has as a human nature. If these senses are not human natures, then, 
what does Protagoras think they are? Protagoras would probably believe that they are ‗basic and fundamental 
moral insightful dispositions‘, by which human beings are able to establish and develop political virtues such as 
justice and moderation, through education and punishment, and thus subsequently hold and exercise them, 
pursuing a better civic life in a human community. On this point to understand a sense of what is right and a 
sense of shame as moral insightful disposition, cf. Levi (1940b), 294, n. 4; Loenen (1940), 11, n. 28; Heinimann 
(1945), 116; Kerferd (1953), 42–5 and (1981a), 142–3; Rankin (1983), 89–91. 
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human being in a full sense is possible only in a community that men build when they 
possess a sense of what is right and a sense of shame—these senses are thus a necessary 
condition of the survival of human beings. These senses, equipped for human civic life in a 
community, are thus a type of civic senses.
43
 
On account of the above passage, the civic senses have been deemed by some scholars 
to be identical with political wisdom and political virtues in Protagoras‘ thoughts. And, in 
reflecting this onto Protagoras‘ claim of teaching and other passages in the Great Speech, this 
identification results in the following equation: ―good deliberation = political virtues (art) = 
good citizenship = virtues = political wisdom = justice, moderation, holiness and the rest of 
political virtues = human virtues‖ (this identification comes from Maguire (1977), 105. Cf. 
also Weiss (1985), 335–6 and Zilioli (2007), 95, n. 13). However, it is not obvious whether 
the civic senses are equivalent to political virtues; at 321d5–7 in the Myth Protagoras simply 
states that political art (virtues) is needed for human beings to preserve their survival in 
community, but it is ‗near to Zeus (para tōi Dii)‘, protected by his terrible guards, so that 
Prometheus was unable to steal it, then later at 322c1–d5 Protagoras says that Zeus gave 
human beings a sense of what is right and a sense of shame. Due to the difference between 
the passages, it is not necessary to identify those senses with political virtues; rather it is 
possible to assume that Zeus decided to give human beings a basic and fundamental moral 
insightful disposition, i.e. the civic senses, for human civic life, by which human beings are 
able to establish and exercise political virtues (cf. n. 42 above). Then, only the following 
remains acceptable: ‗political virtues (art) = justice, moderation, holiness and the rest of 
political virtues = human virtues‘—these are established only on the basis of the civic senses. 
The equipment of the civic senses, as a rudiment later equipped by the order of Zeus, is 
what enables human beings to construct communities and thus preserve their survival and 
existence. At this stage, it is enough for human beings to have only the civic senses in order 
to survive by constructing communities; but on the basis of these civic senses, it becomes 
possible for them to acquire further and establish political virtues for a better life in 
communities, through proper care, teaching, and practice. It is thus not in question whether 
the civic senses are teachable, since they are equally given to all human beings by Zeus—
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 The fact that the Promethean gifts come chronologically earlier to men than the Zeusian gifts does not entail 
that thus the former are more essential than the latter. Rather in Protagoras‘ thought what is essential for 
something seems to be what preserves its existence and survival, not simply what comes first to it. For instance, 
what is essential for lions is, not their fur (coming earlier), but their sharp teeth and strength (coming later). In 
this sense, unlike a traditional view (cf. J. A. Davison‘s TAPhA 80 (1949, 66–93), cited in O‘Sullivan (1995), 15 
and 22, n.3), what is supposed to represent the feature of Protagoras as one caring for humanity is likely, not 
Prometheus, but Zeus. 
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what is in question is, obviously, political virtues. If this disposition of the civic senses is 
given to man unequally and relatively, then no peaceful life and agreement on what is right 
and wrong in a community can be guaranteed. 
Protagoras further explains by showing the teachability of political virtues and 
answering Socrates‘ first objection, i.e. why the Athenians think that everyone should get 
involved with giving counsel on public matters: 
 
δηὰ ηαῦηα νἵ ηε ἄιινη θαὶ Ἀζελαῖνη, … νἴνληαη 
… ὅηαλ δὲ εἰο ζπκβνπιὴλ πνιηηηθ῅ο ἀξεη῅ο 
ἴσζηλ, ἡλ δεῖ δηὰ δηθαηνζύλεο πᾶζαλ ἰέλαη θαὶ 
ζσθξνζύλεο, εἰθόησο ἅπαληνο ἀλδξὸο 
ἀλέρνληαη, ὡο παληὶ πξνζ῅θνλ ηαύηεο γε 
κεηέρεηλ η῅ο ἀξεη῅ο ἠ κὴ εἶλαη πόιεηο. (322d5–
323a3) 
For these reasons [i.e. all human beings share in 
the civic senses by the order of Zeus], the others 
and also the Athenians [whose common opinion 
Socrates takes for his first objection] … think … 
that whenever they come to the counsel on 
political virtue, which
44
 must proceed entirely 
through justice and moderation, they reasonably 
accept advice from all men, since all men share 
in this virtue, or else there would be no cities. 
 
This passage is somewhat tricky, since here Protagoras asserts that all men share in political 
virtue, not in the civic senses; thus the sophist has been criticised by modern scholars (cf. 
Levi, 1940b, 293 ff.; Kerferd, 1953, 43 ff.) for the inconsistency that Protagoras professes to 
teach what all men already have, i.e. political virtue. But in this passage Protagoras does not 
explicitly mention that all men share in political virtue ‗by nature‘ or ‗by Zeus‘ command‘ (cf. 
n. 42 above). Rather, Protagoras seems to mean that the reason why all men are described as 
having political virtue may be due to the earlier education in political virtue that all have in 
their community, as Protagoras himself will shortly say in his Logos. That is, all are supposed 
to be able to give counsel on political virtue such as justice and moderation, because they 
beforehand shared in a sense of what is right and a sense of shame, i.e. the civic senses, that 
have enabled them to be properly educated in political virtues from the very beginning of 
their social life both privately and publicly. 
One more criticism of another inconsistency has been suggested; Taylor (1991, 87–8) 
points out that Protagoras‘ position in this passage seems ―inconsistent with his common 
sense admission that not every member of a civilized community is a good man (cf. 329e5–6, 
349d5–8).‖ The problem of this inconsistency, however, seems to be easily resolved if the 
meaning of ‗unjust‘ in the claim is taken in Protagoras‘ thought as a case of lack of justice 
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 The antecedent referred to by ἡλ is ζπκβνπιὴλ, not ἀξεη῅ο. Cf. Taylor (1991), 87. 
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due to lack of education, not as a case of lack of a sense of what is right. This point will be 
clearer if we look at an analogous example: when the process of fertilisation of a baby has 
just started, the embryo will be immediately equipped with natural powers, but not yet with 
legs and arms. Later on, legs and arms (i.e. proper bodily disposition) will be formed. Having 
formed legs enables a man to achieve and activate his ability of walking and running, and 
later with proper education and practice of it, his walking and running ability will be finally 
completed. In this case, however, it is not true that simply because one has legs, one can 
automatically and naturally run. Likewise, a man, who shares in a sense of what is right by 
the order of Zeus (i.e. proper disposition of the civic senses), can seem unjust (adikos), if he 
has not yet been educated in justice (i.e. a political virtue), especially when compared to 
others who have properly been. This reading of the Myth shows that sharing in the civic 
senses is a pre-condition for sharing in justice and moderation. At this stage, nonetheless, the 
satisfaction of the former condition does not necessarily prove the automatic and natural 
completion of the latter condition; what we can infer from the Myth so far is that the 
satisfaction of the former condition only makes human beings capable of pursuing the 
completion of the latter condition. 
Protagoras, by comparing the confession of being unjust with one‘s profession to be 
good at other technical virtues (323a5–b7), offers one more piece of evidence that all men 
(pantes anthrōpoi) are believed to share in justice, moderation, and other political virtues. 
According to his comparison, if someone claims to be good at the art of flute-playing when 
he is not really so, others around him will laugh at him or get annoyed at him, and his family 
will treat him like a mad man; whereas, in relation to the case of justice and the other 
political virtues, if someone who is indeed unjust (adikos) and also regarded so by others tells 
the truth about himself to others, they will think of him as mad or non-human. All men have 
to claim that, whether they are really so or not, they are just (dikaioi). Protagoras argues that 
it is ‗because they think everyone must share in this [i.e. political virtues] to some extent or 
other, or else not be among men (anthrōpoi) at all (ὡο ἀλαγθαῖνλ νὐδέλα ὅληηλ' νὐρὶ ἁκ῵ο γέ 
πσο κεηέρεηλ αὐη῅ο, ἠ κὴ εἶλαη ἐλ ἀλζξώπνηο)‘ (323b7–c2). 
It is worth examining exactly what Protagoras means by the example of an ‗unjust‘ and 
‗mad‘ man. One can suggest that a man who admits to being unjust is wholly lacking both in 
a sense of what is right and in the justice of which everyone is supposed to share. But this 
suggestion can be only accepted partially; after all, Protagoras would not admit that a man 
who is able to live with others in a community can entirely lack a sense of what is right, since 
it is given by Zeus to all men to (be able to) have a civic life in the community. But lacking 
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justice for someone can be possible, if he has not established it on the basis of his sense of 
what is right, by not having received fine education in it, or having practised it properly. 
Protagoras, by the expression ‗sharing in political virtue to some extent or other (hamōs)‘ 
(323c1), seems to admit the different degree of virtues in people. This expression surely gives 
us the impression that Protagoras insinuates that the degree of political virtues would 
probably be determined by the different extent of education or practice.
45
 Hence, Protagoras, 
in the following passages, of course, immediately tries to prove the teachability of political 
virtues. An unjust man is, in Protagoras‘ eyes, one who, while having a sense of what is right, 
has no justice either at all or fully. 
This unjust man, if he confesses to be unjust before others, is considered mad. But, in 
what sense is he mad? Taylor (1991, 88–9) argues that this unjust man must be considered 
mad, either (a) because ―[E]veryone must possess (justice) to some extent or other, or else be 
banished or put to death‖, or (b) because ―[E]veryone must possess (justice) to some extent or 
other, unless he did he could not live in a community‖. In case (a), the mad man is mad 
because he condemns himself to the death penalty or banishes himself from human 
community by admitting to be unjust; while in case (b), the mad man is mad because he says 
something apparently untrue by admitting to be unjust, since no one can be unjust. Taylor 
then further argues that, although the suggestion (b) ―fits better with 327c–d‖ in the Logos in 
which Protagoras says that even the most unjust man in a human society governed by laws 
appears just and expert at political virtues in comparison with those without education or 
laws, the suggestion (a) ―appears more strongly supported‖ on the grounds that it ―follows 
directly from the words of Zeus at 322d4–5, and is supported by the reference to the capital 
punishment of moral ineducables at 325a7–b1‖; he then points out that (a) is however 
inconsistent with ―the views which Plato attributes to Protagoras in these passages.‖ Neither 
case, however, seems plausible. The case (b) is based on the assumption that there can be no 
unjust man at all. However, as previously mentioned, man, if he is a man at all, who cannot 
stand up against Zeus‘ command, must share in a sense of what is right, but may lack justice 
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 This point seems congruent with Protagoras‘ fragment on art and practice, which states that ‗art is nothing 
without practice and practice nothing without art (κεδὲλ εἶλαη κήηε ηέρλελ ἄλεπ κειέηεο κήηε κειέηελ ἄλεπ 
ηέρλεο)‘ (Stob. iii (Flor.) 29, 80: DK80 B10). In this fragment Protagoras may reveal his idea that all types of 
art—including, of course, political art (virtues)—need practice, since without it even the art that one has 
acquired, whatever it is, will fade. In another fragment on education that ‗education does not sprout in the soul 
unless one goes to a great depth‘ (Plutarch On Practice 178.25: DK80 B11) (The original Greek is lost, the 
English version translated by O‘Brien in Sprague (1972, 24) is a translation of a German translation of a Syriac 
version by J. Gildemeister and F. Bücheler), again, the sophist seems to emphasise the importance of practice. 
Such practice for art needs to begin from early youth, according to Protagoras‘ later claim in the Logos (325c6–
7) and the fragment on education (Anecdota Parisiensia I.171.31: DK80 B3) (cf. n. 39 above). 
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due to lack of education and practice. Protagoras does not completely deny the possibility of 
a human being without education of political virtues such as savages like those in the poet 
Pherecrates‘ play (327d3–4). If this is the case for Protagoras, someone‘s ‗admitting to be 
unjust‘ could mean his ‗admitting that he lacks justice, i.e. admitting that he lacks education 
in political virtues‘, and this is not untrue and impossible. On the contrary, the inconsistency 
in case (a) comes from the apparent contradiction between the proposition that ‗by Zeus‘ 
command all men share in justice‘ and the proposition that ‗there exists an absolutely unjust 
man‘. Indeed, Protagoras, in the above passage, states that ‗everyone must possess political 
virtue, namely justice‘; but the possession of justice is not accomplished at the same level for 
everyone, but ‗to some extent or other‘ depending on different circumstances for people. The 
possibility of different degrees of political virtue entails the possibility of teaching it, and 
thus solves the problem of inconsistency in the case (a). Accordingly, the ‗mad‘ man referred 
to is simply, as a limited instance of case (a) without inconsistency, someone who dares to 
put himself to death, but he is not telling something false. 
Protagoras‘ comparison also sheds light on his use of the notion of art interchangeably 
with virtue in the Great Speech (as briefly mentioned at n. 35 above). As seen above, in the 
comparison of technical arts and political virtues (e.g. justice), Protagoras compares the 
confession of being unjust with the false profession of being expert in the art of flute-playing. 
If someone professes to be expert at the art of flute-playing when he is not really so, people 
will think of him as mad; and if someone confesses to being unjust in the case of political 
virtues, people will think of him as mad too. This shows that, at least in his speech, 
Protagoras seems to suppose that art (technē) and virtue (aretē) are to be treated as equivalent 
to each other, or regarded as something similar to each other in their character. Being an 
expert in flute-playing (i.e. having the art of flute-playing) is being excellent in flute-playing 
(i.e. having the virtue/excellence of flute-playing), and likewise, being an expert at how to 
manage political affairs (i.e. having political art) is being excellent at how to manage political 
affairs (i.e. having political virtues/excellence). One who is thought to have the art of flute-
playing is admitted to possessing it only if he is indeed excellent at flute-playing, and one 
who is thought to be excellent at flute-playing is thought to be really so only if he actually 
has this art. Equally, one who is thought to have political virtues is confirmed in possessing 
them if he is indeed excellent at managing political affairs, and so one who is thought to have 
political virtues is proved to be so only when he indeed has this art. Thus, both Socrates‘ and 
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Protagoras‘ transposition of art into virtue can be understood in this regard.46 
Protagoras now focuses on the demonstration of the teachability of political virtues, 
promptly stating that ‗after this [i.e. that everyone shares the civic senses (and in justice and 
moderation as well)], what I shall try to show you is that they [sc. the Athenians and others] 
think that this [i.e. political virtue] does not come by nature or by accident, but is teachable 
and is present to whomever it comes to be present as a result of care (ὅηη δὲ αὐηὴλ νὐ θύζεη 
἟γνῦληαη εἶλαη νὐδ' ἀπὸ ηνῦ αὐηνκάηνπ, ἀιιὰ δηδαθηόλ ηε θαὶ ἐμ ἐπηκειείαο παξαγίγλεζζαη ᾧ 
ἂλ παξαγίγλεηαη, ηνῦηό ζνη κεηὰ ηνῦην πεηξάζνκαη ἀπνδεῖμαη)‘ (323c5–8). As a 
demonstration of this, Protagoras immediately makes the comparison between an absurd and 
foolish case of attempting to correct one‘s natural deficiency and a fine and necessary case of 
correcting one‘s lack of political virtue. 
According to the Athenians‘ common belief, no one gets angry or annoyed at those who 
have natural faults or deficiencies; those who are naturally ugly or short or extraordinarily 
weak do not get punished or blamed for their natural deficiencies, but pitied. Protagoras 
insists that it is really foolish (anoētos) if one attempts to correct their natural faults by 
reforming them, since it is impossible to change one‘s nature.47 On the contrary, on the 
qualities that can be acquired, not by nature, but by ‗care (epimeleia)‘, ‗practice (askēsis)‘, 
and ‗teaching (didachē)‘, people get angry and annoyed at those who lack them, and are 
willing to punish them for the sake of correction or reformation. Among these qualities, there 
are justice, piety, and other virtues, and thus the absence of them is considered injustice 
(adikia), impiety (asebeia), as an evil state, i.e. ‗collectively everything that is contrary to 
political virtue (ζπιιήβδελ πᾶλ ηὸ ἐλαληίνλ η῅ο πνιηηηθ῅ο ἀξεη῅ο)‘ (323c8–324a1). 
Protagoras continues that, unlike punishment of wild beasts that is inflicted as blind 
vengeance for past misdeeds,
48
 human punishment aims at reformation in the future so that 
not only the same person who beforehand received proper punishment but also the others 
who have seen this person receiving punishment do not commit the wrongdoing, e.g. 
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 One may raise an objection that art is defined in terms of, or aims to, virtue/excellence, and thus they cannot 
be equivalent to each other. This may be true; but at least both in Protagoras‘ and Socrates‘ thoughts in the 
Protagoras, this objection is not taken into consideration. On this equation of art and virtue, cf. Adkins (1973), 
4; Taylor (1991), 75–6. They both suggest that aretē, in some passages like 323a7–8, can even be read as ‗skill‘ 
that can apparently be taught. 
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 Protagoras, adopting the Athenians‘ common beliefs, appeals to their being wise by implicitly emphasising 
that the wise men would not do such a foolish (anoētos) thing to correct human natural deficiencies. The point 
here asserted by the sophist, of course, is that even the wise Athenians think that political virtues that are not 
given to human beings by nature but gained by care, practice, and teaching are something that can be taught, 
standing against Socrates‘ first objection. 
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 It is not quite sure in what sense Protagoras claims that the wild beasts punish and take vengeance for the past 
misdeed. Allen (1996, 98) posits that ―in fact wild beast do not exact vengeance.‖ 
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something unjust or impious, again in their community. This kind of human punishment 
which is inflicted for the sake of the future is taken ‗with reason (meta logou)‘ (324b1), while 
that of animals‘ that is inflicted for the blind vengeance would apparently be without reason. 
Human beings, who are originally and innately equipped with some divine features like 
technical wisdom and the use of fire (322a5–6) by means of which they can develop 
language and are considered rational, should consider the punishment something 
administered on the basis of reason—an instrument designed for reformation and correction. 
And by offering this sort of rational instrument, people can acquire and establish the proper 
virtues for a better life in a community.
49
 
At this stage, it seems that Protagoras manifestly identifies punishment with a sort of 
education. Education is, as the sophist initially stated when he was asked by Socrates to tell 
what he taught, and as he will also state in the following Logos, basically what guarantees 
men a better state regarding a certain subject. The more education in the subject one has, the 
better one will be about the subject. Also, by looking at the fact that well-educated people 
have better lives in general and are more influential in a community, others may want to be 
educated as well. Just like education that aims at promising a better life, punishment, 
according to Protagoras, is oriented toward leading people into a better life with a better 
political character in a community. Protagoras says that when educating a youth if he does 
not willingly obey his teachers and acts ‗like a piece of warped and crooked wood, the 
teachers must direct him straight with threats and beatings (ὥζπεξ μύινλ δηαζηξεθόκελνλ θαὶ 
θακπηόκελνλ εὐζύλνπζηλ ἀπεηιαῖο θαὶ πιεγαῖο)‘ (325d6–7).50 In this respect, it is quite 
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 For further discussion on the concept of punishment and its application for correction, as well as the manner 
of its justification, in relation to the modern view on it, cf. Taylor (1991), 90–6. 
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 Allen (1996, 98) argues that Protagoras here seems not to make a distinction between a descriptive concept of 
justice, i.e. for example, a theory on legal system, and a normative idea on the application of punishment, i.e. for 
instance, case by case articles of the laws. The sophist simply insists that whoever lacks the political qualities to 
handle political matters must be punished, and that those qualities can be fairly taught. Thus, the fact that there 
is no such distinction in Protagoras‘ speech paradoxically shows that ―Protagoras identified the justification of 
punishment in individual case with what he thinks ought to be its institutional aim: to correct and deter, to 
prevent future wrongs.‖ If Protagoras indeed considered them identical, he obviously committed ―a fallacy of 
division‖, since a theory on legal system is one by which case by case articles of the law can be determined to 
apply to a certain case of wrongdoing, not what is the same as those articles. For instance, ―the legal order 
punishes theft to deter it, and Jones because he has committed theft; the rule [i.e. the theory on legal system] is 
justified by its purpose, but the punishment by Jones‘s breach of the rule.‖ 
However, Allen‘s argument seems somewhat rash, if we bear in mind the purpose of Protagoras‘ Myth. 
What Protagoras aims by presenting the Myth is not to identify a theory of a legal system with a manual on the 
application of punishment, but to show what he was asked to show, that is, the teachability of political virtues, 
and also that even the wise Athenians think so, against Socrates‘ first objection. Protagoras has not been 
required to clarify the difference between a theory of legal system and a manual on the application of 
punishment to each case, but to demonstrate the rationale and role of punishment as a sort of education for those 
who lack non-natural qualities such as political virtues. It is remarkable that throughout the passages in the 
Myth, Protagoras, expressing his own thought on the teachability of political virtues, never fails to appeal to the 
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understandable why in this passage the most severe and harshest punishment that man can 
have, i.e. the death penalty or banishment, is not taken into consideration at all. 
According to Zeus‘ command, the death penalty and banishment from a city must be 
inflicted on anyone who entirely lacks the civic senses, namely, a non-human being in 
Protagoras‘ eyes. But, all human beings, so long as they are supposed to be capable of living 
together with each other in a community since they have already shared those senses, do not 
deserve to receive these kinds of most severe and harsh punishment, but to receive 
punishment by which they can be reformed to pursue a better life in the community. The 
death penalty and banishment cannot be considered reformation of someone who has 
committed wrongdoings, because they do not aim to correct him and his life, although they 
may lead others who see him put to death or exiled to a better life. On the basis of an idea of 
punishment as a type of education, therefore, Protagoras concludes that against Socrates‘ first 
objection, the Athenians indeed think that all who share in the civic senses must get involved 
in debate on political issues, and that political virtues can be taught on the basis of those 
senses.
51
 
 
2.2. The Logos 
 
Protagoras now turns to the Logos in order to answer to Socrates‘ second objection. Socrates 
had earlier (319d7–320b3) pointed out that those who are thought of as great politicians, such 
as Pericles, neither teach their sons political virtues themselves nor have any other specialist 
educate them in political virtues. From this Socrates inferred that political virtues are, thus, 
not teachable. For the answer to the second objection, Protagoras first utilises a sort of 
hypothetical method to demonstrate that those who are considered good at political virtues 
certainly care for their sons on the ground of the teachability of political virtues; and then he 
                                                                                                                                                        
Athenians‘ common belief. Refuting, or answering to, one‘s adversary‘s argument by using the same source on 
which he relies is in fact a very effective rhetorical strategy. When utilising this rhetorical strategy, no further 
argument—in this case, particularly, for the division between a theory of legal system and a manual for the 
application of punishment depending on each case—may be needed, if an answer, or refutation, is sufficiently 
given. At this stage Protagoras thus may not, though he may have an idea on such division, feel the need to 
make such distinction and demonstrate it to Socrates. In addition, pace Allen, not giving a distinction between 
two different things at a certain stage is not the same as considering them identical at that stage. There is no 
need to rashly conflate Socrates‘ (or Plato‘s) thought with the Athenians‘ belief about the non-teachability of 
political virtues (at least in the Protagoras) when he brought the objection based on this belief to Protagoras‘ 
profession, simply because he does not give his detailed account of it. 
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 For more analyses of the Myth and its argumentative structure, cf. Taylor (1927), 241–7; Heinimann (1945), 
115–6; Kerferd (1949), 20–6, (1953), 42–5 and (1981a), 142–3; Guthrie (1971), 63–8 and 255ff.; Dodds (1973), 
9–23; Adkins (1973), 3–12; Blumenberg (1979), 299 ff.; Schiappa (1991), 181–7; Nussbaum (2001), 100–6; 
Taylor (2007), 9–20; Denyer (2008), 99–109. Cf. also Vernant (1965), esp. ch. 4; Vernant and Detienne (1974); 
Brisson (1975), 7–37. 
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utilises a sort of analogical method for the argument that not only good men, but indeed 
everyone teaches political virtues to their sons. Both methods throughout the Logos aim to 
prove that all men as well as the wise Athenians try to teach political virtues. It first goes as 
follows: 
 
ὧδε γὰξ ἐλλόεζνλ· πόηεξνλ ἔζηηλ ηη ἓλ ἠ νὐθ 
ἔζηηλ νὗ ἀλαγθαῖνλ πάληαο ηνὺο πνιίηαο 
κεηέρεηλ, εἴπεξ κέιιεη πόιηο εἶλαη; ἐλ ηνύηῳ γὰξ 
αὕηε ιύεηαη ἟ ἀπνξία ἡλ ζὺ ἀπνξεῖο ἠ ἄιινζη 
νὐδακνῦ. εἰ κὲλ γὰξ ἔζηηλ, θαὶ ηνῦηό ἐζηηλ ηὸ ἓλ 
… δηθαηνζύλε θαὶ ζσθξνζύλε θαὶ ηὸ ὅζηνλ 
εἶλαη, θαὶ ζπιιήβδελ ἓλ αὐηὸ πξνζαγνξεύσ εἶλαη 
ἀλδξὸο ἀξεηήλ—εἰ ηνῦη' ἐζηὶλ νὗ δεῖ πάληαο 
κεηέρεηλ θαὶ κεηὰ ηνύηνπ πάλη' ἄλδξα, ἐάλ ηη θαὶ 
ἄιιν βνύιεηαη καλζάλεηλ ἠ πξάηηεηλ, νὕησ 
πξάηηεηλ, ἄλεπ δὲ ηνύηνπ κή, ἠ ηὸλ κὴ κεηέρνληα 
θαὶ δηδάζθεηλ θαὶ θνιάδεηλ θαὶ παῖδα θαὶ ἄλδξα 
θαὶ γπλαῖθα, ἕσζπεξ ἂλ θνιαδόκελνο βειηίσλ 
γέλεηαη, ὃο δ' ἂλ κὴ ὑπαθνύῃ θνιαδόκελνο θαὶ 
δηδαζθόκελνο, ὡο ἀλίαηνλ ὄληα ηνῦηνλ 
ἐθβάιιεηλ ἐθ η῵λ πόιεσλ ἠ ἀπνθηείλεηλ—εἰ 
νὕησ κὲλ ἔρεη, νὕησ δ' αὐηνῦ πεθπθόηνο νἱ 
ἀγαζνὶ ἄλδξεο εἰ ηὰ κὲλ ἄιια δηδάζθνληαη ηνὺο 
ὑεῖο, ηνῦην δὲ κή, ζθέςαη ὡο ζαπκαζίσο 
γίγλνληαη νἱ ἀγαζνί. ὅηη κὲλ γὰξ δηδαθηὸλ αὐηὸ 
἟γνῦληαη θαὶ ἰδίᾳ θαὶ δεκνζίᾳ, ἀπεδείμακελ· 
(324d7–325b4) 
Consider it this way; is there or is there not one 
thing in which all citizens are of necessity to 
share, if there is to be a city at all? In this [one 
thing] and this alone, not anything else, the very 
problem with which you are in trouble [i.e. 
Socrates‘ second objection that those who seem 
to hold political art neither teach their sons 
political art themselves nor have teachers of it for 
them] is solved. For if it exists, and it is one 
thing … to be justice and moderation and 
holiness, I call this one collectively human 
virtue—if this is what all must share in, and what 
all men must act with, even if [this is] whatever 
else one wants to learn or to do, and anyone who 
is without it or does not share in it must be taught 
and punished, whether man or woman or child, 
until they become better through punishment, 
and anyone who does not respond to punishment 
and teaching must be regarded as incurable and 
banished from the city or put to death—if that is 
the way things are, and if this is natural, but good 
men have their sons taught other things, but not 
this, then think how surprising it is that they 
became good men. For we have shown that this 
thing [i.e. political virtue] is thought to be 
teachable both privately and publicly. 
 
Protagoras here utilises a kind of hypothetical method in which by a sort of modus ponens he 
tries to demonstrate that good men indeed teach their sons political virtues, or at least care for 
them in relation to political virtues. First he sets up a premiss that ‗there must be one thing in 
which all men in a city must share, if there is to be the city.‘ This premiss is justified by the 
Myth that everyone in a city must share in a sense of what is right and a sense of shame on 
which everyone is capable of building up political virtues, and by a fact that they all (i.e. 
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Protagoras, Socrates, Hippocrates, the others in Callias‘ house, and the Athenians as well) 
now really live in the city of Athens, thus it is true that there is a city in which they live. 
Setting up this premiss, Protagoras puts forth the following hypotheses: (1) the one thing that 
all men in a city must have is not a particular technique but justice (dikaiosynē), moderation 
(sōphrosynē), and holiness (hosios), i.e. collectively human virtue (aretē andros), and without 
this one thing being held by all, there can be no city and thus no man; (2) if someone does not 
have it, the others need to concentrate on reforming or correcting him, by way of punishment; 
(3) someone who is diagnosed as incapable of being reformed at all, cannot be considered 
‗man‘ due to the complete absence of ability of gaining this virtue, and he must be banished 
from the city or put to death. After proposing these hypotheses Protagoras argues that if they 
all are the case, it is obvious that good men in their city indeed teach their sons political 
virtues. At this point, Protagoras seems to appeal to a common belief to which Socrates does 
not bring any objection that no one who is good wishes to leave their sons banished from 
their city or dead, believing that this is not good at all. If good men do not care for their sons 
in regard to teaching them political virtues, then, how can they be considered ‗good‘ men? 
This hypothetical method can be briefly reformulated as follows: 
 
 A premiss that is justified by the Myth and a fact: There must be one thing in which all men 
[in a city] must share, if there is to be a city. 
 A proposition that needs to be justified: (If those who are regarded as good are really ‗good‘ 
because they have political virtues,) those who are regarded as holding political virtues teach 
their sons political virtues. 
 Hypothesis (1): The one thing that everyone in a city must have is political virtues. 
 Hypothesis (2): If one does not have political virtues, one must be reformed or corrected by 
punishment or instruction. 
 Hypothesis (3): If one is not able to be reformed at all, one must be banished from a city or 
put to death. 
 A common belief (4): Those who are regarded as holding political virtues are indeed 
considered good, and they do not want their sons to be banished from their city or put to 
death. 
 Conclusion (the proposition justified): (Since (1), (2), (3) are justified by the Myth and (4) is 
commonly accepted,) those who are regarded as holding political virtues do teach their sons 
political virtues. 
 
According to Protagoras, good men in a city offer their sons care and teaching of political 
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virtues from their youth and as long as they live. As soon as their sons begin to understand 
language, i.e. as soon as they begin to exercise properly their human rational nature (the 
Promethean gifts), people try to implant political virtues into their sons‘ minds by showing 
them ‗by every word and deed that this is right, and that wrong, this praiseworthy and that 
shameful, this holy and that unholy, and by saying ―do this‖ and ―do not do that‖ (παξ' 
ἕθαζηνλ θαὶ ἔξγνλ θαὶ ιόγνλ … ὅηη ηὸ κὲλ δίθαηνλ, ηὸ δὲ ἄδηθνλ, θαὶ ηόδε κὲλ θαιόλ, ηόδε δὲ 
αἰζρξόλ, θαὶ ηόδε κὲλ ὅζηνλ, ηόδε δὲ ἀλόζηνλ, θαὶ "ηὰ κὲλ πνίεη", "ηὰ δὲ κὴ πνίεη")‘ (325d2–
5). Later they send their sons to school, where more attention is paid to the education of well-
ordered behaviour (eukosmia). The school education thus focuses on, for the improvement of 
their minds, learning the works of good poets by heart and developing the skill in a musical 
instrument like the lyre. When their minds are properly formed by those ways of education, 
their bodies will be in a better condition to act under their directions, and finally the school 
education turns to physical training. Reading the works of good poets which entail a lot of 
exhortation, praises, eulogies, and panegyrics helps their sons to realise what a good and 
worthwhile life is. The development of instrumental musical skill, which helps their sons to 
uplift moderation (sōphrosynē) in their minds, makes them habituated to the rhythms and 
melodies by which they become more civilised (hēmeroteros), well-balanced (eurythmoteros) 
and better adjusted (eu[h]armostoteros), and so useful (chrēsimos)52 in speaking and acting. 
And the physical training helps them not to be forced by physical deficiency to act cowardly 
in battle or in any other situation.
53
 After this school education, the sons are forced by the 
city to learn the laws and to consider them as their life paradigms and live along with them 
not to go astray and lose their life goals. Like the outlines of letters drawn by teachers with a 
stylus in writing-notebooks for children by which they do not go out of the proper lines when 
writing letters, the laws are laid down by the city for the purpose of guiding them not to go 
out of proper life in their city. ‗The city that drew the laws, the discoveries of good and 
ancient lawgivers, compels them to rule and to be ruled according to them [i.e. the laws], and 
punishes anyone who steps outside them (἟ πόιηο λόκνπο ὑπνγξάςαζα, ἀγαζ῵λ θαὶ παιαη῵λ 
λνκνζεη῵λ εὑξήκαηα, θαηὰ ηνύηνπο ἀλαγθάδεη θαὶ ἄξρεηλ θαὶ ἄξρεζζαη, ὃο δ' ἂλ ἐθηὸο βαίλῃ 
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 Chrēsimos is ―a key Protagorean term‖ reminiscent of a significant term, chrēmata, in the sophist‘s Man-
Measure Doctrine. Here Protagoras implicitly reveals his idea of chrēmata: one‘s soul‘s fineness as being more 
civilised, well-balanced, and better adjusted through proper education enables one to act and speak well in one‘s 
community. This implication is very much suitable for the education of political virtues as well. Cf. Dillon and 
Gergel (2003), 350, n. 103. 
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 Note the similarity between Protagoras‘ purpose of school education here and that of Plato‘s in the Republic 
III and the Laws II and VII where Plato has Socrates argue for the importance of musical and physical practices 
for soul‘s and body‘s self-controlled state, i.e. harmony. Cf. Kerferd (1981a), 146–7; Dillon and Gergel (2003), 
350, n. 103. 
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ηνύησλ, θνιάδεη)‘ (326d5–8). The punishment inflicted by the city in the name of the laws is 
called in many places, including Athens, ‗straightening (euthynai)‘,54 since ‗the penalty 
(dikē)55 straightens [wrongdoers] (ὡο εὐζπλνύζεο η῅ο δίθεο)‘ (326e1). 
Protagoras continues demonstrating that good men in their city teach—and indeed have 
taught—their sons political virtues. For this demonstration, the sophist, by means of a sort of 
analogical method, argues that in a city no one is absolutely ignorant of or lacking political 
virtues. In the analogy Protagoras‘ view on the possibility of different levels or degrees of 
political virtues depending on different education and circumstances is also revealed: 
 
εἰ κὴ νἷόλ η' ἤλ πόιηλ εἶλαη εἰ κὴ πάληεο αὐιεηαὶ 
ἤκελ ὁπνῖόο ηηο ἐδύλαην ἕθαζηνο, θαὶ ηνῦην θαὶ 
ἰδίᾳ θαὶ δεκνζίᾳ πᾶο πάληα θαὶ ἐδίδαζθε θαὶ 
ἐπέπιεηηε ηὸλ κὴ θαι῵ο αὐινῦληα, θαὶ κὴ 
ἐθζόλεη ηνύηνπ, … νἴεη ἄλ ηη, ἔθε, κᾶιινλ, ὦ 
Σώθξαηεο, η῵λ ἀγαζ῵λ αὐιεη῵λ ἀγαζνὺο 
αὐιεηὰο ηνὺο ὑεῖο γίγλεζζαη ἠ η῵λ θαύισλ; 
νἶκαη κὲλ νὔ, ἀιιὰ ὅηνπ ἔηπρελ ὁ ὑὸο 
εὐθπέζηαηνο γελόκελνο εἰο αὔιεζηλ, νὗηνο ἂλ 
ἐιιόγηκνο εὐμήζε, ὅηνπ δὲ ἀθπήο, ἀθιεήο· θαὶ 
πνιιάθηο κὲλ ἀγαζνῦ αὐιεηνῦ θαῦινο ἂλ ἀπέβε, 
πνιιάθηο δ' ἂλ θαύινπ ἀγαζόο· ἀιι' νὖλ αὐιεηαί 
γ' ἂλ πάληεο ἤζαλ ἱθαλνὶ ὡο πξὸο ηνὺο ἰδηώηαο 
θαὶ κεδὲλ αὐιήζεσο ἐπαΐνληαο. (327a4–c4) 
Suppose that there could not be a city unless all 
played the flute to the best of their ability, and 
each taught all these things both privately and 
publicly, and punished one who played badly and 
refused [to share with all others in] it, … do you 
think, he [sc. Protagoras] said, Socrates, that the 
sons of good flute-players would become better 
flute-players than the sons of poor players? I 
think not, but if one‘s son happened to become 
well-suited for flute-playing, the son would grow 
highly reputed, while if one‘s son [happened to 
become] unsuited [for flute-playing], the son 
[would grow] inglorious. And often the son of a 
good flute-player would turn out poor, and the 
son of a poor flute-player good. But they all 
would play the flute [sufficiently] enough as 
against those particular individuals who never 
play it at all. 
 
Likewise: 
 
νὕησο νἴνπ θαὶ λῦλ, ὅζηηο ζνη ἀδηθώηαηνο Similarly, too now, whoever appears to you as 
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 Euthynai is the technical term indicating the public review and examination to audit officials‘ behaviour, 
taken at the end of their term of service. On the use of this term in ancient texts, cf. Pol. 1274a17–18 and Ath. 
48.4–5. On this term, cf. Sauppe and Towel (1889), 79; Dillon and Gergel (2003), 350, n. 104; Denyer (2008), 
118; Schofield and Griffith (2010), 163, n. 40. 
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 Dikē here means, not literally a sense of what is right as previously meant, but ‗the penalty‘ established on 
this sense as a customised legal punishment process. Translations of this word here are ―the penalty‖ (Guthrie, 
1956), ―the prosecution‖ (Lamb, 1964), ―the law‖ (Taylor, 1991), ―the just penalty‖ (Allen, 1996), ―legal action‖ 
(Lombardo and Bell in Cooper, 1997), ―Justice‖ (Dillon and Gergel, 2003), ―the legal process‖ (Schofield and 
Griffith, 2010). 
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θαίλεηαη ἄλζξσπνο η῵λ ἐλ λόκνηο θαὶ ἀλζξώπνηο 
ηεζξακκέλσλ, δίθαηνλ αὐηὸλ εἶλαη θαὶ 
δεκηνπξγὸλ ηνύηνπ ηνῦ πξάγκαηνο, εἰ δένη αὐηὸλ 
θξίλεζζαη πξὸο ἀλζξώπνπο νἷο κήηε παηδεία 
ἐζηὶλ κήηε δηθαζηήξηα κήηε λόκνη κεδὲ ἀλάγθε 
κεδεκία δηὰ παληὸο ἀλαγθάδνπζα ἀξεη῅ο 
ἐπηκειεῖζζαη, ἀιι' εἶελ ἄγξηνί ηηλεο νἷνίπεξ νὓο 
πέξπζηλ Φεξεθξάηεο ὁ πνηεηὴο ἐδίδαμελ ἐπὶ 
Λελαίῳ. (327c4–d4) 
the wickedest among those men who have been 
brought up in the laws, is just and skilled in this 
thing [i.e. political virtues], if he is to be 
compared to men who have never had education, 
or courts, or laws, or any coercion at all to force 
them to care for virtue, but rather they would be 
savages like those in the poet Pherecrates‘ play at 
last year‘s Lenaea. 
 
If the ability of playing the flute were necessarily required for all men in a city to maintain its 
existence, they would all teach it to others as much as they could, and the city would be better 
if all its members were better able to play the flute. Analogously, if the possession of political 
virtues is of necessity required for everyone in a city to maintain its existence, all those in the 
city would teach it to others as much as they could, and the city would be a better city if all 
its members possessed political virtues at a better and higher level. Yet, not everyone can 
reach the same level at the art of flute-playing; some may become the best players if they are 
well-suited for this, some may not if they are not. Analogously, not everyone can reach the 
same degree of political virtue. Nonetheless, all men who have been taken care of by 
promoting their ability to play the flute in their city are good enough at this skill compared to 
those who have never received any education in it. Analogously, all men who have been 
taken care of for the possession of political virtues in their city are good enough at it 
compared to those who have never been forced by education, courts, laws, or any coercion 
for it. Three main points, united as an answer to Socrates‘ second objection, are vividly made 
in this analogy: (1) all men take care that others possess political virtues, including, of course, 
the good politicians with their sons, because this is the only way for them to keep their city 
existent; (2) political virtues are found in varying degree in men; and (3) all men in a city are 
indeed good at and aware of political virtues (when compared to those with no education at 
all). 
Together with this, Protagoras draws one more analogy between teaching political 
virtues and learning a language. He says that ‗all are teachers of [political] virtue to the best 
of their ability, but no one will appear [as a teacher of it] to you; why, it is as if you were 
seeking who is a teacher of speaking Greek, no one would appear [as the teacher of it] 
(πάληεο δηδάζθαινί εἰζηλ ἀξεη῅ο θαζ' ὅζνλ δύλαληαη ἕθαζηνο, θαὶ νὐδείο ζνη θαίλεηαη· εἶζ', 
ὥζπεξ ἂλ εἰ δεηνῖο ηίο δηδάζθαινο ηνῦ ἑιιελίδεηλ, νὐδ' ἂλ εἷο θαλείε)‘ (327e1–328a1). Men, 
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while not holding a fully actualised power to speak their native language from the very 
beginning of their individual life, can learn it from everyone while growing up and 
associating with others, both at home and at school. But, to learn it, they are at least required 
beforehand to have the capacity for learning and using it, namely, the rationality that came 
from Prometheus‘ gifts. Analogously, men, while not having full political virtues from the 
very beginning of their social life, can learn them from everyone while growing up and 
associating with others in their city. But, to learn political virtues, they are at least required in 
advance to hold the capacity for learning them, namely the civic senses, Zeus‘ gifts, thanks to 
which such virtues can be educated and established. Therefore, Protagoras concludes that the 
sons of those with great political virtues, like the sons of Polycleitus, are not as bad as 
Socrates initially described in his objection; it is too early to blame them for being bad since 
they are still young with more chances to learn political virtues, and there is still hope (elpis) 
for them (328c3–d2). With this conclusion, Protagoras finishes his Great Speech, adding that 
in teaching political virtues, that is to say, in making people fine and good, he surpasses 
others,
56
 so that he deserves to receive as large fees as he wants (cf. n. 7 in Chapter I above), 
or according to the oath made by his students on how much they think that what they have 
learned is worth (328b1–c2). 
The points made throughout the Great Speech can then be summarised as follows (with 
slightly modified order): 
 
(1) Prometheus‘ gifts (human nature): technical wisdom (entechnon sophia) and [the use of] 
fire (pyr). 
(2) Zeus‘ gifts (disposition with which human beings are equipped afterwards): a sense of 
what is right (dikē) and a sense of shame (aidōs). 
(3) Parents, teachers, and neighbours (by rational education and punishment): political 
virtue/art such as justice, moderation, and holiness (politikē aretē/technē: dikaiosynē, 
sōphrosynē, hosios), to some extent. 
(4) Protagoras (by rational education): good deliberation (euboulia) on public and domestic 
affairs, i.e. political virtue/art, to the best extent. 
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 What is not proved in the Great Speech is ironically the claim that Protagoras himself is the best one who can 
teach political virtues. In the following passages of the dialogue, Socrates, not bringing further objections to the 
Great Speech, rather focuses on examining whether Protagoras is really the best in this subject, by questioning 
him how he understands and clarifies virtues, especially whether all different types of virtues are in fact the 
same or not, i.e. the unity of virtue. Probably, Socrates would believe that if Protagoras were indeed the best, he 
could have answered all his questions, without being refuted, throughout the dialogue. 
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3. A claim about objective civic senses and the relativity of ethical application 
 
All men in human communities are given the same civic sense, i.e. a sense of what is right 
and a sense of shame, by which they are able to rightly practise their actions and speeches in 
order to preserve their community and secure their survival. Protagoras‘ profession of 
teaching initially targets not the improvement of the same civic senses that all share but the 
improvement of political virtues by adding good deliberation to the senses—indeed, the 
sophist never claims in the Great Speech that he does or can teach the civic senses. In this 
regard, I suggest, Protagoras‘ teaching profession seems firmly grounded on the common 
objective civic senses as the ethical and political principles. 
 
3.1. A claim of ethical relativism or a form of ethical relativity? 
 
Under the dominant influence of reading Protagoras‘ works viewed as a radical relativist, 
mostly on the grounds of the Platonic reading of the Man-Measure Doctrine in the Theaetetus, 
modern scholars have attempted to read the Great Speech as a theory of ethical relativism. 
Such attempts are basically supported by two points. First, as Kerferd (1953, 43 and 1981a, 
143) and Woodruff (2001, 58–9) suggest, the civic senses were unequally, i.e. relatively, 
distributed to men—since in the Great Speech Protagoras does not explicitly state that 
everyone was given the civic senses equally by Zeus—and thus, in this regard, Protagoras 
still holds fast to a notion of ethical relativism. Second, as Zilioli (2007, 101–2) argues, in the 
Great Speech Protagoras would not deny the view that people have different political virtues 
in different communities and times, i.e. relativised political values, depending on various 
factors, and adopt them as their political and ethical principles in their societies. 
The first point, pace Kerferd and Woodruff, however, seems to overlook Zeus‘ intention 
to distribute the civic senses to all human beings. Zeus, looking at the risk of the extinction of 
human race, orders Hermes to distribute a sense of what is right and a sense of shame to all 
men. Here Zeus explicitly orders that, unlike other technical arts that are unequally given, all 
human beings must possess the civic senses, so that they can construct their community and 
live there with others. Zeus‘ order shows that all men at a fundamental level are equally, i.e. 
in the same degree, given the civic senses. For, if men were unequally given these senses and 
thus some had them at a higher degree while others at a lower degree, some deeds practised 
by those with the civic sense at the lower degree, although they themselves may consider 
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their deeds appropriate for the preservation of their community, could perhaps be regarded as 
inappropriate to practise, i.e. as wrongdoings, by those with the civic senses at the higher 
degree. If this kind of situation indeed occurred at the fundamental stage of constructing a 
human community, it would be impossible for men to live together, and hence the human 
community would face the danger of demolition again. Zeus, the god of friendship, who is 
pictured as caring for the preservation of human race in the Great Speech, does not seem to 
want to take such a risk. Protagoras may have not felt the need to state explicitly and directly 
that ‗the civic senses are equally distributed to all men‘, because this idea is already and 
clearly included in Zeus‘ order; Socrates also does not doubt this in the dialogue. 
The suggestion that education in political virtues is especially needed for those who are 
given the civic senses at the lower degree is also implausible in the Great Speech. Protagoras 
neither states that education in political virtues should particularly target those with a 
relatively lower degree of the civic senses, nor professes to offer education in the subject only 
to them. And further, as we have seen above, the aim of Protagoras‘ education is to elevate 
his students‘ political virtues, not to promote their civic senses. Political virtues that are 
initially given to men through the very first private education by parents at home can be 
further developed via proper public education in the subject at school or court on the basis of 
the civic senses; but the civic senses are not what can be enhanced through education—they 
can be given to human beings only by Zeus, according to the Great Speech. 
Zilioli (2007, 101–2) supplies an argument in support of the second point on Protagoras‘ 
ethical relativism, which runs as follows: 
 
But this [i.e. the fact that all men shared in the idea of justice and respect] does not mean that the 
shared idea of justice and respect is objectively valid in any given society. In the light of the strict 
parallel that Protagoras draws between practical arts and political technique [cf. Prot. 322a5–b8], it 
follows that the same technique, if applied by different people and in different contexts, will produce 
quite different results (in the case of political technique, it will produce rather different political 
virtues). Although all human beings are provided with the practical capacity to speak, they speak in 
fact different languages, according to the geographical place where they happen to live or to the 
historical time when they happen to live. … It may easily be inferred that things will go the same way 
as far as political technique is concerned. Although all human beings are given the capacity to live 
together, to cohabit politically, they build their communal life on different conceptions of political 
virtue, namely on different ideas of what is just and respectful. 
 
The argument continues: 
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The concept of technique that was historically predominant in the fifth century BC helps us to 
understand that for those Greeks living at that time, such as Protagoras, the employment of a 
technique just meant following some codified procedures; no assumption was ever made about the 
objectivity of the result obtained through the application of those codified procedures. To apply the 
same technical procedure in different contexts and by different individuals did not mean that the 
excellence or virtue obtained through the application of such a procedure needed to be objectively the 
same one in all cases and, above all, that the performing of such an excellence amounted to obtaining 
the same results [See Kube (1969); Cambiano (1991: pp. 15–28)]. … Since in Protagoras‘ Myth, 
respect and justice (specifically), political virtue (in general) are best seen as the result of the 
application of a technique, this does not leave much space for an objectivist reading of such a Myth. 
… Applied in different contexts and by different people, political technique produces different 
political virtues, that is, different conceptions of justice and respect. 
 
In his argument Zilioli claims that the fact that all human beings are equipped with the idea of 
justice (dikē) and respect (aidōs) does not necessarily produce the same results in political 
affairs due to the different applications of political virtue, just like other technical arts that 
yield different results in their areas depending on the users‘ characters and locations and 
times. Given these different and also relative results both in particular arts and in political 
actions and speeches, the argument concludes that the Great Speech makes a relativist claim 
about ethical values. 
It may be true that, depending on geographical and chronological differences or on 
differences of personal characters and education, people may act and speak differently. 
Especially, in some particular cases, like the subject of Protagoras‘ teaching profession, the 
application of the civic senses would be relativised depending on various circumstances. But 
this does not necessarily entail a form of ethical relativism but merely a form of relativity of 
ethical principles. Zilioli‘s argument seems to be a result of confusion between a relativist 
claim of ethical values and relative results from the application of a non-relative notion on 
them. Bett (1989, 141–7) argues that a form of relativity which seems to appear as a type of 
relativism is ―only superficially relativistic‖, and indeed should be distinguished from a claim 
of relativism in a deep sense in which ―statements in a certain domain can be deemed correct 
or incorrect only relative to some framework ‖ (Bett‘s italics). 
A claim of ethical relativism, on the one hand, represents the position that there are no 
such absolute and objective ethical norms, such as an objective concept of justice accepted by 
all everywhere, and thus that the ethical norms are (believed to be) relatively true in each 
society. On the other hand, ethical relativity is based on the objectivist position of ethical 
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principles that apply to all people everywhere, and it simply entails the idea that the 
application of the same and objective ethical-political principles to particular political cases is 
relative and different, considering the production of proper or better results of the application, 
since the same, objective ethical-political principles are never relativised (cf. Cook (1999), 7–
12). In such cases of ethical relativity, when people apply these principles in their community, 
mutual influence occurs to both the applicants and the others; hence, the members of the 
community are affected by the results of the application, such as their political actions and 
speeches. The significantly different features between a claim of ethical relativism and ethical 
relativity can be clearly formulated as follows: 
 
(1) A claim of ethical relativism: 
x [e.g. an ethical norm] is F [e.g. right] for/in A [e.g. a city (or people in the city) that 
believes x to be right]  
and ¬F [e.g. not-right] for/in B [e.g. a city (or people in the city) that believe x to be wrong], 
thus, x is relative, and F for/in A and ¬F for/in B. 
 
(2) Ethical relativity: 
not x [e.g. a sense of what is right (as an ethical norm)] itself,  
but application of x [e.g. actions and speeches for political issues] for a certain purpose [e.g. 
preservation of a community and human race] is F [e.g. just] (depending upon certain 
circumstances) for/in A [e.g. a city (or people in the city) that knows x to be right]  
and ¬F [e.g. unjust] (depending upon certain circumstances) for/in B [a city (or people in 
the city) that also knows x to be right], 
thus, x itself is not relative, but application of x is relative, and F for/in A and ¬F for/in B. 
 
Thus, relativists ―deny that there is anything to be known about x which they do not know: 
they know that x is F in A, ¬F in B,‖ on the contrary, those who hold a position of relativity 
do not deny the possibility of acquiring (or knowing) x in itself without reference to any 
relations of it to other things.
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An example will clarify a case of ethical relativity: in a desert area people may conserve 
water by barely taking showers, while in a forest area people may use too much of water 
taking showers as often as needed. In the former area people do not consume water because 
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 Annas and Barnes (1985), 98 and 132–4. On the difference between relativism and relativity in a 
philosophical stance, cf. Okrent (1984), 341–58; Bett (1989), 139–69, esp. 141–7. Cf. also Cerroni (2001), 356–
65, for the difference between ethical relativism and ethical relativity in the light of social theory. 
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consuming water may bring some conflict—one‘s consumption of water may block others 
from using it— and destroy their friendship, and it may be hard for them to preserve their 
society. On the contrary, in the latter area not consuming water—i.e. not taking showers 
often—may cause the possible outbreak of infectious diseases and thus undermine their 
community. In this example, the actions of those who live in the desert area and those in the 
forest area both should be practised along with a certain and objective ethical and political 
principle for the preservation of their communities and indeed their friendship and race. The 
application of the principle to a case of using water, however, is considered a just action in 
the forest area, while it is an unjust action in the desert area—but only the application of the 
principle is relative. In this regard, ―different cultures express the same human potential, and 
they try to meet the same human needs,‖ as Woodruff (2005, 130) claims. 
Two more points can be shortly made against the point on language difference offered in 
Zilioli‘s argument above. First, Zilioli exemplifies different languages in different areas: 
different people in different places at different times use different languages although they all 
have the same capacity of speaking a language. However, this example shows no more than 
the variance in the usage and development of language in different conditions. People with 
the same capacity of speaking a language in the same place at the same time indeed use 
language differently, and also their levels of utilising the language are not entirely the same. 
This is, however, rather because of their different education in the language or their different 
capacities for learning and using the language, than because of the relativistic nature of 
language. Someone who admits the possibility of alternative and relative use of language due 
to various education or capacities is not necessarily a linguistic relativist; he is only adopting 
a form of linguistic relativity in relation to different factors. A linguistic relativist, if it were 
even possible for one to be such, may be one who argues that there is no such universal 
language and that a language is by nature indeterminate and also relative in relation to 
various factors. Whoever tries to acquire and use a language must grasp for different and 
relative stages of the language, in comparison with others, due to various factors and its 
relative nature. And further, one who holds the idea that people need to use language 
correctly cannot be a relativist, since a radical linguistic relativist, as Woodruff (2005, 158–9) 
rightly states, ―would encourage students to use language as they pleased.‖ In this case, 
strictly speaking, no linguistic agreement can be established, and thus it would be as 
impossible as the construction of cities (cf. Plato‘s criticism of perceptual relativism in the 
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Theaetetus in Appendix 3 below).
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Second, Zilioli in his argument distinguishes technique, i.e. art, from virtue in order to 
argue that virtue comes from the application of technique and so the different application of 
technique results in different virtue. This distinction seems inconsistent with Protagoras‘ 
thought in the Great Speech, since he does not make such a distinction at all; rather, as 
discussed above, together with Socrates, the sophist equates art (technē) with virtue (aretē), 
believing that both are acquired through education on the basis of the objective and common 
civic senses that are equally distributed to all men (cf. 320b4–5; cf. also n. 35 and pages 33–5, 
n. 46 above). Thus, having acquired a certain technique regarding political matters will be, by 
Protagoras as well as Socrates in the discussion, considered equivalent to having learned 
political virtues by which men can deal with political matters in a better way. 
 
3.2. Protagorean dikē, aidōs, and political virtues 
 
As a form of ethical relativity, in Protagoras‘ Great Speech the principles which people apply 
to their actions and speeches in relation to political and ethical cases for the preservation of 
their race and community are the civic senses that are equally given to all human beings. On 
the grounds of the civic senses, human beings can further pursue political virtues. What 
exactly are then the civic senses in Protagoras‘ view? In order to gain an answer to this 
question, it would be helpful for us first to look briefly at the common understanding of a 
sense of what is right (dikē) and a sense of shame (aidōs) in antiquity when the Homeric 
ethical and political views were dominant (esp. from 8
th
 to 5
th
 century BCE, before the 
influence of philosophical concepts), and then to examine Protagoras‘ view of them in the 
Great Speech. 
At a primitive stage, aidōs was used in antiquity as a naturalistic and pathological 
explanation to indicate a certain type of psychological sense by which men are able to feel 
and further understand embarrassment. The fundamental experience connected with a sense 
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 As I will discuss in Chapter V below, Protagoras is known to have emphasised the correct use of language. In 
this emphasis the sophist, insisting the correctness of words (orthoepeia), the correct usage of the genders of 
words—masculine, feminine, and neuter—and division of the tenses of verb, argues for the naturalism of 
languae on the grounds of ‗the grammatical genders on the basis of natural gender‘ and ‗the morphological 
consistency‘ of the words based on their grammatical genders. For the sources of Protagoras‘ correct use of 
language, cf. Phdr. 267c4–d4 (DK80 A26); Crat. 391c2–4 (DK80 A24); Rhet. III.5.1407b6–8 (DK80 A27); 
Soph. Elen. XIV.173b16–25 (DK80 A28); Poet. XIX.1456b15 ff. (DK80 A29); D.L. 9.52 (DK80 A1); Per. 36 
[Stesimbrotos, FGrHist. 107 F 11 ii 519] (DK80 A10). On Protagoras‘ interest in language, cf. Steinthal (1891), 
135–9; Porzig (1950), 353–5; Guthrie (1971), 205 and 219–21; Kerferd (1981a), 68–9; Schiappa (1991), 57 and 
164; Donovan (1993), 43–6; Di Cesare (1996), 87–118; Woodruff in Long (1999), 295 and 309, n. 3; Dillon and 
Gergel (2003), 341, n. 10. 
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of shame comes from being seen inappropriately, in the wrong conditions such as being 
‗naked‘; ―the word aidoia, a derivative of aidōs, ―shame‖, argues Williams (1993, 77–9), is a 
standard Greek word for the genitals,‖ … thus ―The reaction‖ to avoid feeling embarrassed 
―is to cover oneself or to hide, and people naturally take steps to avoid the situations that call 
for it: Odysseus would be ashamed to walk naked with Nausikaa‘s companions‖ (cf. Od. 
6.221–222 for Odysseus naked).59 
In order to avoid feeling ashamed, people were required to anticipate how they would 
feel if someone saw them when they were in a wrong condition and talked about it. Such a 
primitive stage of aidōs, as Williams (1993, 79) argues, expanded further to various kinds of 
public and social embarrassment or similar emotions by which man can understand guilt, 
such as inappropriate actions that may have a bad influence upon humanity and human 
relationship. In this sense, the lack of aidōs conveys a significant sign of the absence of 
humanity. The suitors of Penelope in Homer‘s Odyssey can be taken as a good example of 
this case. 
When the Greeks came to enlist Odysseus‘ support in the Trojan War, Odysseus at first 
pretended to be insane. Palamedes, however, tricked Odysseus in order to reveal his deceit; 
finally Odysseus was forced to enter the war. When there was no sign of Odysseus‘ return to 
his place even though the war was over, many suitors came to seek Penelope‘s hand in 
marriage. As time went on, the smaller the chance that Odysseus would return became, the 
more the suitors behaved badly and inappropriately, and they began to take control of the 
palace, consuming Odysseus‘ property at their feasts during his absence. They became more 
and more bold; for instance, one of them, Antinous, proposed to the other suitors that they 
should kill Telemachus, son of Odysseus and Penelope, saying that while he was alive, it 
would be difficult or impossible for the suitors to accomplish their purpose. They tried to 
murder him in the open sea during Telemachus‘ homeward trip but failed; Antinous now 
believed that it would be best for them to murder him in some road of Ithaca, before he 
denounced them in front of the assembly. After that, Antinous said that the suitors could 
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 The following is Williams‘ etymological explanation of aidōs (1993, 194, n. 9): ―[T]here are two Greek roots 
bearing the sense of ―shame‖: αἰδ-, as here and in the noun αἰδώο, and αἰζρπλ-, as in the noun αἰζρύλε. I have 
not been generally concerned to separate uses of the two kinds of word. Not much turns on the distinction, for 
my purposes, and, in particular, many of the variations are diachronic: in most connections, αἰζρπλ- terms tend 
to replace αἰδ- ones. G. P. Shipp (Studies in the Language of Homer, 2nd ed., p. 191) points out that the middle 
αἰζρύλνκαη occurs only three times in Homer, and only in the Odyssey: ―This is the beginning of the 
replacement of αἰδένκαη, completed in Attic prose.‖ Cf. Il. 22.105–6, discussed later in the text (p. 79), with Od. 
21.323–4. Herodotus, Shipp continues, uses both verbs, with a differentiation of sense: αἰδένκαη + acc., to 
―respect the power etc. of'‖; αἰζρύλνκαη, to ―be ashamed‖. In Attic, αἰζρύλνκαη took over both these senses: cf. 
Eur. Ion 934 αἰζρύλνκαη κὲλ ζ‘, ὦ γέξνλ, ιέμσ δ‘ ὅκσο with HF 1160 αἰζρύλνκαη γὰξ ηνῖο δεδξακέλνηο 
θαθνῖο.‖ 
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divide Odysseus‘ property among them all, letting Penelope and his new husband keep the 
house (cf. Od. Book 4). Eurymachus, whom Odysseus long ago had taken on his knees, 
feeding him with meat and letting him taste the wine, felt compelled to instigate other suitors 
to kill Odysseus, when failing to persuade him into forgiving the suitors (cf. Od. Book 22). 
Odysseus‘ exclamation to Telemachus shows how unacceptable the suitors‘ bad and 
inappropriate actions were in human society: 
 
βνπινίκελ θ' ἐλ ἐκνῖζη θαηαθηάκελνο κεγάξνηζη 
ηεζλάκελ ἠ ηάδε γ' αἰὲλ ἀεηθέα ἔξγ' ὁξάαζζαη, 
μείλνπο ηε ζηπθειηδνκέλνπο δκῳάο ηε γπλαῖθαο 
ῥπζηάδνληαο ἀεηθειίσο θαηὰ δώκαηα θαιά, 
θαὶ νἶλνλ δηαθπζζόκελνλ, θαὶ ζῖηνλ ἔδνληαο 
κὰς αὔησο ἀηέιεζηνλ, ἀλελύζηῳ ἐπὶ ἔξγῳ.60  
(Od. 16.106–111) 
I would rather die by the sword in my own house 
than witness the perpetual repetition of these 
outrages, the brutal treatment of visitors, men 
hauling the maids about for their foul purposes, 
and wine running like water, and those rascals 
gorging themselves, just for the sport of the 
thing, with no excuse, no rational end in sight. 
 
Telemachus saw those who pestered his mother with unwanted attentions and wasted his 
father‘s property as a disease and an outrage to decency. The suitors never realised that their 
actions were bad and inappropriate and thus understood the embarrassment that they should 
have felt—Homer repeatedly describes them as anaidēs, ‗lacking of a sense of shame‘, i.e. 
‗shameless‘ (cf. Od. 1.254). In the end, when Odysseus came back to Ithaca, he killed all of 
the suitors, as in Protagoras‘ Great Speech Zeus orders to ‗put a law from me that he who 
cannot share in aidōs (as well as dikē) must be killed as a disease of the city (λόκνλ γε ζὲο 
παξ' ἐκνῦ ηὸλ κὴ δπλάκελνλ αἰδνῦο (θαὶ δίθεο) κεηέρεηλ θηείλεηλ ὡο λόζνλ πόιεσο)‘ (Prot. 
322d4–5). If the suitors had a sense of shame, they could have felt embarrassed for what they 
had done in Odysseus‘ palace, and they could have avoided it by anticipating how they would 
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 Similarly, in Ovid, Heroides I.87–94, Penelope writes a letter to tell Odysseus of the suitors‘ 
inappropriateness and the pressure she is under (although this passage comes from Ovid (43 BCE to CE 17/18), 
Homer is believed to be his direct source for this work): 
 
Dulichii Samiique et quos tulit alta Zacynthos 
turba ruunt in me luxuriosa proci, 
inque tua regnant nullis prohibentibus aula; 
viscera nostra, tuae dilacerantur opes. 
Quid tibi Pisandrum Polybumque Medontaque 
dirum 
Eurymachique avidas Antinoique manus 
atque alios referam, quos omnis turpitor absens 
ipse tuo partis sanguine rebus alis? 
Those of Dulichium and Samos and those whom 
lofty Zacynthus bore, an extravagant mob of 
nobles presses on me, and in your own palace 
they play the part of king with none prohibiting; 
our body and your wealth are being torn [from 
you]. Why report to you of Pisander, and of 
Polybus, and of dreadful Medon, and the greedy 
hands of Eurymachus and Antinous, and of 
others, you yourself being disgracefully absent 
are sharing other things with all of them by 
means of your own blood? 
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feel if someone saw them when they committed such behaviours. And most of all, by means 
of aidōs, the suitors could have preserved their lives: 
 
ὦ θίινη ἀλέξεο ἔζηε, θαὶ αἰδ῵ ζέζζ' ἐλὶ ζπκῶ, 
ἀιιήινπο η' αἰδεῖζζε θαηὰ θξαηεξὰο ὑζκίλαο. 
αἰδνκέλσλ δ' ἀλδξ῵λ πιένλεο ζόνη ἞ὲ πέθαληαη· 
(Il. 15.561–564) 
Dear friends, be men, and let a sense of shame 
(aidōs) be your hearts, and have shame each of 
the other in the fierce conflict. Of men who feel 
ashamed (aidomenōn), more are saved than are 
killed. 
 
Aidōs, which is based on our understanding of ourselves, basically ‗expressed inner personal 
conviction.‘ Further, as this requires people to anticipate how to feel by being seen and talked 
about, it is true that it involves an objective measure of political and ethical ‗heteronomy‘, i.e. 
human social relations, following ―public opinion.‖ Thus, such an anticipation internalises 
social ideas. Yet, it is better to have some measure of heteronomy than to have a completely 
lack of social morality, as Penelope‘s suitors show.61 Aidōs, which conveys a significant sign 
of inhumanity when it is absent, dominated people‘s political and ethical consciousness, and 
they measured things to do and avoid by means of this sense during the Homeric period and 
later; ―[T]here is some truth in the idea that Homeric society was a shame culture, which 
persisted certainly into later antiquity and no doubt longer than that,‖ insists Williams (1993, 
78). 
While Homer insists upon the importance of aidōs in humanity, the role of dikē is also 
emphasised in his works. As Havelock argues in his studies of the Greek concept of justice 
(1978), dikē in Homeric usage has two senses, one ‗normative‘ and the other ‗corrective‘. In 
the first sense dikē is related with traditional rules of behaviour; while in the second sense the 
process of correcting violations of these rules and restoring traditional order is taken under 
dikē—the correction accompanies ‗punishment‘ as well, if punishment is required for such a 
process. The normative sense of dikē is mostly found in the treatment of guests and strangers: 
 
μεῖλ', νὔ κνη ζέκηο ἔζη', νὐδ' εἰ θαθίσλ ζέζελ 
ἔιζνη,  
μεῖλνλ ἀηηκ῅ζαη· πξὸο γὰξ Δηόο εἰζηλ ἅπαληεο 
μεῖλνί ηε πησρνί ηε. δόζηο δ' ὀιίγε ηε θίιε ηε 
γίλεηαη ἟κεηέξε· ἟ γὰξ δκώσλ δίθε ἐζηίλ, 
αἰεὶ δεηδηόησλ, ὅη' ἐπηθξαηέσζηλ ἄλαθηεο νἱ λένη. 
Stranger, although coming in a worse shape than 
you, it is not right (themis) for me to dishonour a 
stranger; for all strangers and beggars are from 
Zeus. Even if a gift is small, they must be 
welcomed by us; for there is a sense of what is 
right (dikē) for servants who always live in fear 
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 Cf. Williams (1993), 75–102, esp. 95–6. 
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(Od. 14.57–61) when they have young lords for their masters. 
 
This passage enables us to see a Homeric rule of treatment; any stranger and guest, even a 
beggar, whoever he is and however poor he is, must be honoured because anyone who hosts 
him must treat him as his servant according to a sense of what is right. Mistreating him is a 
violation of the sense of dikē, and further an attempt to violate the rule of hospitality in Zeus‘ 
name.
62
 
In the Iliad, Homer shows a correcting case of violation of such rule, i.e. dikē. Book 1 of 
the epic tells the original reason of Achilles‘ fury, as Smith (2001, 5–6) argues that ―[W]hen 
Achilles helps to show how deadly divine intervention requires Agamemnon to give back 
Chryseis, a woman he had taken as a spoil of war, Agamemnon retaliates by taking Achilles' 
woman, Briseis, as a replacement for Chryseis. Naive readers might be inclined to think that 
Achilles‘ extreme reaction is a result of his love for Briseis, but the remainder of the story 
shows very clearly that it is not the anguish of lost love that leads Achilles into his madness, 
but the wild rage of a man unjustly dishonored.‖ Treating Achilles in an unjustly dishonoured 
way causes his insane fury that makes him refuse to fight, and this in the end brings a 
catastrophe to everyone who was involved in treating him in such a manner. 
In ancient Greece, people considered burial customs very important; they believed that 
any dead victim of war must be rightly buried. Ancient Greeks often even ceased wars 
temporarily, simply in order to have time to bury dead soldiers.
63
 A passage from the Iliad 
shows us the importance of this custom. After killing Hector, Achilles mutilates Hector‘s 
body, continuously dragging it around Troy until the gods intervene and force Achilles to 
cease and desist. Homer, through the mouth of the god, Apollo, clearly states how much it is 
not ‗righteous (enaisimon)‘, i.e. violating dikē, to commit such mutilation: 
 
ἀιι' ὀινῶ Ἀρηι῅τ ζενὶ βνύιεζζ' ἐπαξήγεηλ, 
ᾧ νὔη' ἂξ θξέλεο εἰζὶλ ἐλαίζηκνη νὔηε λόεκα 
γλακπηὸλ ἐλὶ ζηήζεζζη, … 
ὣο Ἀρηιεὺο ἔιενλ κὲλ ἀπώιεζελ, νὐδέ νἱ αἰδὼο.64 
But, destructive Achilles whom you gods wish to 
aid, who has neither righteous mind nor bending 
thoughts in his breast, …  
So Achilles has lost all pity, nor even is a sense 
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 In the 5
th
 century BCE, this normative sense of dikē was more firmly conceptualised, associated with nomos. 
For instance, in Sophocles‘ Electra l.1031–1043, Electra, interchanging dikē with nomos, believes dikē to be a 
kind of natural law. Still, the fundamental idea that dikē comes from Zeus (or the gods) seems to have been 
generally accepted by people at that period (cf. Aristophanes‘ Clouds 904). 
63
 One of the notorious trials in Athens, which was to charge seven generals for the defeat in the Arginusae 
battle, was sought by the grieving families of the dead soldiers whose bodies sank into the sea so that they could 
not be buried. On this, cf. Woodruff (2005), 121–3. 
64
 In this passage, Homer explicitly shows how dikē and aidōs are related; one who dares to commit something 
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(Il. 24.39–45) of shame (aidōs) in his heart. 
 
Needless to say, we know what happens in the end to Achilles who lost dikē and aidōs in his 
mind; anyone, even the one who is blessed by the gods, if his mind turns out to be incurably 
adikos and anaidēs, must be put into the death, because: 
 
νὐ κὲλ ζρέηιηα ἔξγα ζενὶ κάθαξεο θηιένπζηλ, 
ἀιιὰ δίθελ ηίνπζη θαὶ αἴζηκα ἔξγ' ἀλζξώπσλ. 
(Od. 14.83–84) 
The blessed gods do not love reckless deeds, but 
they honour a sense of what is right (dikē) and 
the right (asimos) deeds of men. 
 
Under the dominant Homeric influence in antiquity, these two senses, a sense of what is right 
and a sense of shame, helped people to discern what is ‗just (dikaios)‘ and what is ‗ashamed 
(aidomenōn)‘ from what is ‗unjust (adikos)‘ and what is shameless (anaidēs)‘. Further, by the 
aid of these senses, human beings could maintain humanity in their society, correcting those 
who committed unjust and shameless actions, and inflicting the death penalty on those who 
could not hold these senses. In this regard, these senses can be understood as the ancient 
ethical and political principles;
65
 a society built up with these senses may be a result of the 
aim of those who first tried to establish social agreement or conventions which were later 
developed as the laws or constitutions established in written forms. 
Protagoras in the Great Speech expresses an idea on dikē and aidōs related to that of 
Homer‘s. According to the sophist, Zeus, when distributing the civic senses to all men, states 
that by means of these senses they are capable of constructing a city, living there with others, 
binding themselves to one another with friendship, protecting themselves from external 
attacks of wild beasts, preventing themselves from doing wrong to each other, and finally 
avoiding the danger of extinction. In this regard, the civic senses, as what all human beings 
must possess to survive and exist as human beings in their community, can be basically 
                                                                                                                                                        
adikos is the one who is anaidēs. 
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 Havelock (1978, 137 and passim) especially characterises dikē in antiquity (esp. under Homeric influence) as 
‗a procedure‘, not ‗a principle‘; his characterisation of dikē in such manner seems to be grounded on his idea 
that possessing a firmly conceptualised principle of anything must be able to produce a philosophical 
satisfactory definition of it (cf. Adkins, 1980, 267–8). Havelock (1969, 51) thus claims that, as distinguished 
from a firmly conceptualised philosophical concept dikaiosynē, ―[D]ikē and dikaios refer to the maintenance of 
reciprocal relations of right: they connote ‗rights‘ rather than ‗righteousness‘; they were indexes of purely 
external behaviour whether of gods or of men.‖ However, Havelock‘s idea does not seem to be necessarily the 
case; as Solmsen (1979, 431) argues, in antiquity before the era of philosophy dikē (as well as aidōs) existed as 
a firm ―idea or conception‖, as we have examined through Homeric corpus above. Even in the societies where 
there are no philosophical concepts established at all, such as a purely religious society or a primitive society in 
Amazon, it is not hard to see that people still have conceptualised principles by which they can measure their 
actions for ethical and political purposes. 
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understood as the fundamental political and ethical principles for the preservation of human 
community and race. People living in a community with others form their actions and 
speeches on the basis of these principles, whenever political issues are in the business of their 
practice. The successful preservation of their city guarantees their safe survival and a 
harmonious life. In this city no one is willing to, or should, threaten this preservation and 
their survival (cf. Protagoras‘ argument at 323a5–c2 that ‗someone who claims to be unjust is 
considered mad because he sentences himself to death‘). And all these things are only and 
firmly secured by the civic senses. 
Taking into consideration the common understanding of a sense of what is right and a 
sense of shame in antiquity as Protagoras represents them in the Great Speech, the civic 
senses are thus understood as the most important and fundamental ‗need‘ for human life and 
survival in a community; they enable men to discern what they should do from what they 
should not do, and practise the former and avoid the latter in their society. In this respect, a 
sense of what is right (dikē) is considered an active and encouraging political criterion by 
means of which men measure right things to do, while a sense of shame (aidōs) is a reactive 
(or passive) and regulative political criterion by means of which men measure shameless 
things to avoid and they feel ashamed whenever they commit something unjust.
66
 In short, 
the civic senses are the fundamental political and ethical principles in Protagoras‘ thought by 
which men can preserve and secure their community and race. 
According to Protagoras, people still act and speak on the basis of the same objective 
civic senses, but they choose different actions and speeches. Their different practices bring 
forth alternative results in their community regarding the political issues they are dealing 
with. What makes those people who share in the common objective civic senses and act and 
speak on their basis behave differently? 
Earlier Protagoras said in the Myth that when Hermes asked Zeus whether he should 
give the civic senses to few people, in the way in which the medical art is distributed, or to all 
men, Zeus ordered him to distribute them to all (322c3–d5). As doctors have the art of 
medicine, human beings have the civic senses; yet, the difference is that only a few people 
have the art of medicine and thus are doctors, while all men have the civic senses and thus 
are political and ethical beings (at a fundamental level). Doctors treat patients with their art of 
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 As we can see from the Homeric passages in which mistreating Achilles brings the catastrophic end to those 
who were involved in treating him in such manner (Book 1 of the Iliad), of course, a sense of what is right 
(dikē) also has a retributive role. The role of this sense as the active encouraging political criterion, in my 
suggestion, is stressed in comparison with the role of a sense of shame (aidōs) as a reactive and regulative 
political criterion. 
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medicine, and human beings manage political affairs in their community with their civic 
senses. The doctors‘ art of medicine is the objective principle by means of which they 
produce bodily excellence, i.e. health, in their patients‘ bodies; human beings‘ civic senses 
are their objective principles by means of which they produce political excellence (virtue), i.e. 
justice, regarding political issues in their community. 
However, doctors treat their patients, not always in the same way, but differently, 
considering their different bodily states; for instance, they may prescribe a patient more 
medicine than other patients if he is heavier or lighter than others or has a medical history, 
although his age and symptoms are the same as those of others. Likewise, human beings 
manage all political issues in their community, not always in the same way, but differently, 
considering the different factors of the community involved with those issues; for example, 
as we saw in the example above, people manage the problem of using water, considering 
their geographical and environmental circumstances. 
As doctors‘ application of the art of medicine to the treatment of their patients alters 
depending on their patients‘ bodily states, people‘s application of the civic senses, i.e. the 
ethical and political principles, to the management of political matters in their community is 
practised differently, depending on a number of particular factors and circumstances. Doctors 
will have a better way to apply their medical art to their patients, if they know better about 
the patients‘ different bodily states, and then reduce the risk of mistakes. Similarly, people 
apply these principles in a better way when they understand the different factors more clearly. 
For instance, someone in the community in a desert area will apply the basic political and 
ethical principles in a better way if he knows that in his community water is very valuable 
and needs to be saved because natural sources are deficient in supplying water; on the 
contrary, if he lacks proper knowledge of the different factors, namely, the unique 
characteristic of his community, he may perhaps overuse water to take showers, simply 
supposing that it is good to keep his body clean not only for himself but also for others in the 
light of the civic senses. 
All the different benefits produced in relation to political issues are the results of 
people‘s different applications of the objective civic senses to those issues. Some results may 
bring benefits and thus be taken as justice; some bring disadvantage and thus injustice. In 
other words, the appropriate application of the civic senses will produce some benefits 
regarding political matters and thus be considered justice (in particular) or political virtue (in 
general) in a community; the inappropriate application of the senses, injustice (in particular) 
or political vice (or evil state, i.e. ‗collectively everything that is contrary to political virtue‘, 
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according to Protagoras‘ words at 323a1) (in general). In the case of overusing water (as an 
application of the civic senses), this action yields benefits in a forest community and so there 
it can be regarded as just, but the same action causes harm and disadvantage in a desert 
community and therefore must be regarded as unjust. People are required to hold knowledge 
of different factors and circumstances in order to apply the civic sense as properly as possible, 
if they intend to bring forth benefits in their community; otherwise they may be unable to 
properly perform their political and ethical actions and speeches for the preservation of their 
community and survival. 
The civic senses are, as Zeus‘ gifts, not teachable; yet, the application of the civic senses 
to particular political cases, as requiring knowledge of different factors, is by itself a sort of 
technique (art), which thus can be taught.
67
 It can be taught in a better way especially by 
those who know more about the different factors that affect the application, in the best way 
by those who know most. People gather together to debate on political matters, and they offer 
different opinions regarding given political issues. The various opinions are the results of 
their different applications of the objective civic senses to the given political issues, 
depending on their different knowledge of diverse factors that influence their application of 
the civic senses. Those whose consideration for given political issues is supported by better 
knowledge about different circumstances and factors with which the political issues are 
concerned will propose better counsels than those who do not know these factors. Also, those 
who propose better advice which brings benefits (i.e. justice in the case of political issues) 
will be regarded as possessing political technique/virtues. On the contrary, those who offer 
damaging advice which causes misfortune and disadvantage (i.e. injustice in the case of 
political issues) will be deemed to lack political technique/virtues, and people will think that 
they need to be educated in political virtues. Thus, in Protagoras‘ view, knowledge of 
different factors and circumstances, which promotes the application of the civic senses in a 
better way and thus produces political and ethical benefits, is political virtue.
68
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 Note the difference between my suggestion that ‗the application of the civic senses‘, which bears political 
virtues, is in itself a sort of ‗art (technique)‘and Zilioli‘s argument (as quoted above on pages 43–4) that the 
application is ‗the application of technique‘ that produces political virtues. Cf. also page 47 above. 
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 Here, we can see the difference between Protagoras‘ views on the civic senses and political virtues and 
Plato‘s concepts of political virtues. Briefly stating, in Plato‘s ethical theory, political virtues such as justice 
(dikaiosynē) are themselves the objective and absolute moral and political norms that all members of a city must 
follow in order to keep the city just. Taking justice as the principle of morality and politics, there is no difference 
in Plato‘s ethical idea between dikaiosynē and dikē, as Socrates immediately interchanges the latter with the 
former as soon as Protagoras‘ Great Speech finishes (329c2–3)—without asking for agreement on this 
interchange of dikaiosynē and dikē from Protagoras, Socrates instantly changes the topic from the teachability 
from the unity of virtues. As Siep (2005, 85–6) says, in Plato virtues are thus ―the right order of the functions of 
the soul‖ which consist of ―the rule of reason (logos) over the forces of the emotions, drives, and needs,‖ and 
56 
The idea of such ethical relativity in the application of the civic senses reflects 
Protagoras‘ profession of teaching good deliberation (euboulia) on how best to manage 
domestic and public affairs (Prot. 318e5–319a2). At a fundamental level, the management of 
domestic and public affairs is supported on the basis of the civic sense given to all by Zeus; if 
human beings are educated in political virtues (and indeed they are, as Protagoras has argued 
for in the Great Speech, especially in the Logos), they manage those affairs on the basis of 
the virtues, i.e. knowledge of different factors and circumstances, which promotes the 
application of the civic senses in a better way and thus produces political and ethical benefits. 
Political virtues are taught and established by all to some extent, and by Protagoras to the 
greatest extent. Protagoras‘ profession of teaching good deliberation was immediately 
equated with teaching political virtues by Socrates, and the sophist agreed. In the light of this 
viewpoint on ethical relativity in the application of the civic senses as discussed above, good 
deliberation on how to manage public affairs can be counted as good consideration of how to 
apply the civic senses to particular political issues; in this regard, knowing and teaching how 
to apply the civic senses is, or is achieved through, knowing and teaching how to manage 
public and domestic affairs well. The establishment of political virtues on the basis of the 
civic senses is then accomplished through the acquisition of knowledge of different factors 
and circumstances, which promotes the application of the civic senses in a better way and 
thus produces political and ethical benefits. 
Those who have received education in different factors by which they have better advice 
on political issues, of course, as Protagoras‘ professed task emphasises (312d6–7), will 
become clever at speaking (legein) on the political issues as well. For their advice will be 
regarded as better, more beneficial and just, and finally more influential in their community. 
On an issue—especially on politics—someone with education presents his advice in a form 
of logos as a result of his application of the civic senses along the education, while someone 
                                                                                                                                                        
―this order corresponds to the rule of logos in the external world‖ as the political paradigms such as the Forms. 
True value of the political virtues is neither changeable nor affected by any variant circumstances. In a Platonic 
society, not anyone but only qualified teachers of political virtues (e.g. the philosopher kings) can and must 
teach political virtues, and further run the city (for the systematic structure of Plato‘s ethical universality and its 
linkage with objectivity, cf. Gill (2005), 19–40, esp. 21–35). On the contrary, although Protagoras‘ civic senses 
are too taken to be the absolute and objective ethical and political principles, in the sophist‘s idea, political 
virtues are rather products of the application of the civic senses. People do not follow political virtues, but apply 
the civic senses to particular cases in order to cause certain types of benefits in their community for the purpose 
of the preservation of their community and race; these benefits are the political virtues. And in a Protagorean 
society, everyone does and can teach political virtues, as everyone who already shares in the civic senses knows 
basically how to apply the civic senses. In this sense, Protagoras should not be counted as a virtue ethicist; rather 
he is an ethical-political principles practitioner who insists upon the practice of the application of the civic 
senses to particular cases, and at the same time a virtue producer who emphasises that political virtues are 
produced (and also established) as a result of the (practice of the) application. 
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else without education, or with education at a lower degree, suggests another counsel also in 
a form of logos as a result of his application of the civic senses. If the former advice (logos) 
is formulated as ‗x is F (e.g. x = using water in a forest community, F = a good way to 
preserve a community)‘, then the latter ‗x is ¬F‘; the former would certainly be considered 
beneficial and just, and the one who suggests the latter would be deemed to need education in 
different factors in order to be capable of making better, more beneficial and just decisions 
for the preservation of the community. 
Since all human beings have from the very beginning shared in the common objective 
civic senses, the main focus of Protagoras‘ teaching would weigh on how to apply them to 
particular political cases, caring for the different types of cultural and geographical 
backgrounds on which their application must be based and affected. In this view, it is highly 
likely that through experiencing a broad range of cultures and religions one will gain more 
knowledge on how to better and more appropriately apply the civic senses to particular 
political cases in different areas; and one‘s largest number of experiences (compared to 
others) about almost all various cultural and geographical factors reflects on one‘s profession 
that one can teach people ‗how best to manage one‘s household, and how to be the most 
influential in the affairs of the city, both in action and speech.‘69 
In the discussion above on the Great Speech, Protagoras argues basically for three main 
points: first, everyone shares in a sense of what is right and a sense of shame, i.e. the 
common objective civic senses, from the very beginning of their social life; second, political 
virtues, i.e. knowledge of different factors and circumstances, which promotes the application 
of the civic senses in a better way and thus produces political and ethical benefits, can and 
must be taught; third, men, as political and social beings, become better citizens through 
education in political virtues. Only on the grounds of these objective civic senses, i.e. the 
common ethical and political principles, can human beings construct and maintain their first 
community. Further, on the basis of the civic senses, they can educate each other in political 
virtues. Men will become better citizens by receiving good education. The appropriate 
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 Protagoras is said to have been born in Abdera in Thrace under Persian cultural influence, and later to have 
travelled around many places both in Asia and Greece, having associated with many different types of people 
like religious instructors, thinkers, and politicians, and having accumulated a great amount of experiences of all 
different types of socio-cultural backgrounds. Protagoras would probably consider himself one who had 
accumulated the greatest number of experiences about different socio-cultural circumstances, compared to 
others in Athens. In this sense, Protagoras could emphasise himself to be the best teacher of political virtues. On 
Protagoras‘ various experiences about political and cultural issues via his travels, cf. cf. D.L. 9.50 (DK80 A1); 
V.S. 1.10 (DK80 A2); Onomatol. bei Schol. Plat. De Rep. 600c (DK80 A3); Per. 36 [Stesimbrotos, FGrHis
t. 107 F 11 ii 519] (DK80 A10), and Cons. ad Apoll. 33 (118e) (DK80 B9); Section 1 in Chapter I above. 
On Protagoras‘ association with Pericles, cf. Muir (1981), 19; O‘Sullivan (1995), 15–23. 
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application of the civic senses will cause benefits as a result in a political-ethical context, and 
thus be considered justice; the most appropriate, or the best, application will cause the best 
benefits, thus be considered the best justice. Knowing how to apply most appropriately the 
civic senses to particular political cases—i.e. in Protagoras‘ terms, having good deliberation 
on how best to manage political and domestic affairs and how to be the most influential in 
them—is the very subject of Protagoras‘ teaching. Here, Protagoras maintains a firm idea of 
the objective civic senses, i.e. the ethical and political principles, rather than radically 
relativising them; on the basis of these senses he safely claims to teach political virtues. 
Kerferd (1981a, 144–5) argues that in the Protagorean society, the objective political 
principles, i.e. the civic senses, of how to preserve human communities and live all together, 
distributed by Zeus‘ command, are required for the choice of advice on political issues, and 
thus the city is, in Protagoras‘ thought, designed to be led by those who hold those 
principles.
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 I shall add one more point to Kerferd‘s argument: people who share in the 
objective civic senses can be improved through education in their community. Such 
improvement, i.e. the development of deliberative capacities concerning how best to preserve 
their city and on dealing with political issues, proceeds by adding knowledge of how most 
properly to apply the civic senses to particular political matters with the consideration of 
different factors that may affect the application of the civic sense. This improvement is 
achieved only by the education in political virtues/art in Protagoras‘ view. When men become 
better citizens with wisdom on how to manage public and domestic affairs, i.e. how to apply 
the civic senses, then they will come to run their city in a better way, securing their survival 
and the preservation of their city to a better extent. And Protagoras claims to make them best. 
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 Similarly, Levi, throughout his article (1940b), argues for Protagorean political and ethical objectivity in 
terms of utilitarianism. For further suggestions of the Great Speech to expound the objective ethical values, cf. 
Kerferd (1949), 20–6; Vlastos (1956), xx–xxiv; Schiappa (1991), 170–1; Taylor (1991), 100 and 133–5. 
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Chapter III 
 
Political-Ethical Claim 2: The Man-Measure Doctrine 
 
 
Protagoras‘ best-known claim, the Man-Measure Doctrine (hereafter the MMD), has been 
reported and transmitted to us by various ancient sources. Despite some different wordings, 
the basic formulation of the MMD generally reads as follows: 
 
πάλησλ ρξεκάησλ κέηξνλ ἐζηὶλ ἄλζξσπνο,  
η῵λ κὲλ ὄλησλ ὡο ἔζηηλ, η῵λ δὲ νὐθ ὄλησλ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ.71 
Of all things (chrēmata) the measure is man, 
Of the things that are that/how they are, of the things that are not that/how they are not. 
 
The MMD has been read in a philosophical context as a thesis of radical relativism based on 
perceptual epistemology by Plato (Theaet. 152a–186c) and hence Sextus Empiricus who 
seems to have been much influenced by Plato for the interpretation of the MMD (P.H. I.216–
219 and M. VII.60–64, 388–397),72 or as an infallibilist claim (Met. IV.4.1007b18 ff., 
IV.4.1007b18 ff. and XI.1062b11–19) or a modified relativist claim on sophistic and 
rhetorical scheme utilised to win in the battle of argument (Met. IV.6.1011a20–23 and Rhet. 
II.24.1402a23) by Aristotle. Plato‘s purpose to discuss the MMD is to show the absurdity and 
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 This formulation of the MMD is reported in M. VII.60 (D.L. 9.51). Slightly different formulation of the 
doctrine with different words is also found in other ancient sources: Sextus Empiricus, in a passage of his P.H. 
I.216, puts an article, ho, before anthrōpos (‗πάλησλ ρξεκάησλ εἶλαη κέηξνλ ηὸλ ἄλζξσπνλ, η῵λ κὲλ ὄλησλ ὡο 
ἔζηηλ, η῵λ δὲ νὐθ ὄλησλ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ‘). On this, cf. also Aristocles, fr. 4, line 14–7. Plato (Theaet. 151e) adopts 
mē instead of ouk in order to indicate ‗things that are not‘ (‗πάλησλ ρξεκάησλ κέηξνλ ἄλζξσπνλ εἶλαη, η῵λ κὲλ 
ὄλησλ ὡο ἔζηη, η῵λ δὲ κὴ ὄλησλ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ‘). However, these details seem to make no difference for the 
meaning to the doctrine. 
72
 Regarding Sextus Empiricus‘ interpretation of the MMD, some scholars have suggested that he was 
independent from Plato‘s interpretation of it in the Theaetetus. In support of this suggestion, for instance, 
Burnyeat (1976b, 46) argues that Sextus Empiricus characterises Protagoras as a subjectivist ―whose view is that 
every judgement is true simpliciter—true absolutely, not merely true for the person whose judgement it is‖, 
while Plato understands the sophist as a relativist. However, Burnyeat‘s argument does not prove that Sextus 
Empiricus was thus independent from Plato‘s interpretation of the MMD; it can be simply regarded as Sextus 
Empiricus‘ understanding, or commentary, of Plato‘s interpretation of the doctrine. In fact, Sextus Empiricus 
adopts many views found in the Theaetetus; he interprets the MMD as a relativism of perceptual epistemology 
(P.H. I.216), connects it with the Flux-theory as an ontological basis which occurs only in the Theaetetus (P.H. 
I.217; M. VII.61–63). When Sextus Empiricus deals with the self-refutation of the MMD, he explicitly mentions 
Plato as someone who already discussed this, and implicitly agrees with Plato (M. VII.388–392). In this regard, 
most modern scholars have admitted Plato‘s influence on Sextus Empiricus for his interpretation of the MMD. 
Levi (1940a, 156), for example, argues that Sextus Empiricus‘ text on Protagoras ―adds nothing substantial to 
what is said in the Theaetetus.‖ On this point, cf. also Versenyi (1962), 178; Donovan (1993), 38; Zilioli (2002), 
22, n. 80. 
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self-refutation of radical relativism of the epistemological claim that knowledge is 
perception; Sextus Empiricus attempts to distinguish the MMD from Pyrrhonian scepticism; 
and Aristotle‘s purpose is to reveal the MMD‘s logical fallacy, i.e. the violation of the 
Principle of Non-Contradiction. 
Notwithstanding the slightly different purposes of ancient sources in treating the MMD, 
however, they all agree on one view that the MMD is an epistemological thesis in which 
perceptual appearance of things to human beings are considered true for them. This common 
view of the MMD originates from Plato‘s interpretation of the doctrine in the Theaetetus (i.e. 
the Platonic reading), where he deliberately equates Theaetetus‘ definition of knowledge as 
perception with Protagoras‘ MMD. It is, however, somewhat doubtful whether the MMD, in 
its short form as a single sentence, indeed intends to entail such a reading of epistemological 
relativism, particularly because ―the brevity of the fragment [i.e. the MMD] and the absence 
of direct elaboration by Protagoras gave rise to endless controversy over its meaning,‖ as 
Versenyi (1962, 178) worries. In addition, it is also a matter of controversy as to whether the 
Platonic reading of the MMD is the only possible reading of the doctrine—the Platonic 
reading of the MMD, however, should on a priori ground be regarded as Plato‘s own 
philosophical examination of how a claim in which knowledge equals perception arrives at an 
absurd conclusion, rather than reporting what Protagoras indeed meant by the doctrine. If 
Plato‘s is not the only reading for the MMD, then in what manner can we attempt at an 
alternative reading of the MMD, and through what sources? 
If we closely look at Protagoras‘ MMD, standing outside the Platonic reading of it, and 
considering it on the grounds of the common senses of the key words (chrēmata, metron, 
anthrōpos and hōs) in the semanties of Protagoras‘ time or earlier, an alternative reading of 
the MMD may be possible for us. In this chapter, I will first examine the dramatic 
formulation of Plato‘s Theaetetus to see whether there is any clue left by the philosopher 
himself by which we can infer that Protagoras was not the main target of Plato‘s argument, 
and why then Plato employs the sophist‘s MMD in his dialogue. I shall then look at the literal 
and common usages of those key words in antiquity, and propose an alternative reading of the 
MMD on the grounds of the literal and common meanings of those words and Protagoras‘ 
features as, for instance, pictured in the Protagoras (esp. the Great Speech, 320c8–328d2). In 
this reading, I shall suggest that Protagoras‘ MMD indicates that man as a political being, 
who shares in the common civic senses (as objective ethical and political principles) for the 
purpose of preserving the human race and community, and consequently, learns about 
political virtues, is by himself the measure of all the basic needs for such purpose, i.e. of all 
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political and ethical actions and speeches that he and others practise in the community; all 
these actions and speeches are measured as to whether and how they are appropriate to be 
practised in the light of the civic senses at the primary level, and in the light of political 
virtues at the secondary level. 
 
 
1. Is the Platonic reading of the Man-Measure Doctrine in the Theaetetus Protagorean? 
 
Plato wrote many works concerning significant philosophical issues; needless to say, it is the 
scholarly consensus that the philosopher wrote most of his works in the form of dialogue. In 
his dialogues in which the protagonist is mostly Socrates, many different characters appear, 
advancing philosophical issues that draw Socrates‘ philosophical attention and involve him in 
examination (and in most cases, refutation) of them. The form of dialogue has thus been 
understood as explicitly representing Plato‘s assessment of the validity of philosophical 
theses supplied by the thinkers before and in his time, and implicitly—not in a clear way, in 
many cases, especially when the dialogues end with aporia—offering his own views on the 
issues.
73
 
Among Plato‘s dialogues, the Theaetetus is written to seek the definition of knowledge. 
At the beginning of the dialogue, as soon as Theaetetus answers that ‗knowledge is nothing 
but perception‘ to Socratic question ‗what is knowledge?‘, Socrates equates this answer with 
Protagoras‘ MMD. For this equation, Plato assumes that metron, chrēmata and anthrōpos in 
the MMD mean respectively ‗the standard of truth‘, ‗any things (as objects of perception)‘, 
and ‗each individual human being with perceptual power‘; with this assumption he argues 
that ‗each appearing to me is being for me (ὡο νἷα κὲλ ἕθαζηα ἐκνὶ θαίλεηαη ηνηαῦηα κὲλ 
ἔζηηλ ἐκνί)‘, ‗appearance (from ‗appearing‘) is perception (from ‗to be perceived‘) (ηὸ δέ γε 
θαίλεηαη αἰζζάλεηαί ἐζηηλ)‘, and thus ‗to be perceived by each person (e.g. me) is to be for 
him (e.g. me) (νἷα γὰξ αἰζζάλεηαη ἕθαζηνο, ηνηαῦηα ἑθάζηῳ θαὶ θηλδπλεύεη εἶλαη)‘ (Theaet. 
152a–c, esp. 152b5–7). In this formulation, the Greek verb einai in the following hōs clauses 
in the MMD, in connection with metron, is understood as ‗is the case‘ or ‗is true‘ in a 
veridical sense (cf. Kahn, 1966, 250).
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 On the philosophical significance of the form of dialogue in Plato, cf. Gill (2002), 145–70. 
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 Simply, in the Platonic reading of the MMD, the key words in the doctrine, (1) ‗chrēmata‘, (2) ‗metron‘, (3) 
‗anthrōpos‘, (4) ‗hōs‘, and (5) ‗einai‘, mean respectively as (1) things that appear to men in the case of first-
order belief, and further opinions, thoughts and beliefs in the case of second-order belief, (2) the 
criterion/standard of the truth (as the result of perception that is equivalent to infallible knowledge), (3) an 
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Through setting up the condition for knowledge that it must be infallible (apseudes) and 
concern what is (being, to on) (152c5–6), Plato finally reads the MMD as to meaning that ‗I 
am the measure, i.e. the standard of truth, of all things that appear to/are perceived by me; 
whilst you are the measure of all things that appear to/are perceived by you‘. A standard 
illustration of the Platonic reading MMD has been drawn as follows: ‗a thing which 
appears/is perceived as F to/by a is F for a, while the same thing which appears/is perceived 
as ¬F to/by b is ¬F for b.‘ And in this illustration the same thing can be considered—truly to 
be—both F and ¬F (relatively for a and b, respectively). To clarify this, Plato gives an 
example that when the wind appears cold to a perceiver (or, when a perceiver perceives wind 
to be cold), it is true (or, the case) for him that the wind is cold (cf. Theaet. 152a6–c6) (for a 
full analysis and discussion of the Platonic reading of the MMD in the Theaetetus, cf. 
Appendix 3 below). 
The Platonic reading of the MMD as an epistemological claim of perceptual relativism 
is thus supported by his argument for the identification of appearing, perceiving, and being 
with each other, as well as the assumption regarding the meanings of the key words of the 
doctrine. However, in the dialogue Plato does not provide any proof of the validity of his 
assumption and argument; rather he seems to take them for granted. Is it then necessary to 
accept Plato‘s argument and assumption for the reading of the MMD? Or, are they what the 
MMD indeed implies in itself? 
Plato, when writing the Theaetetus, may have intended to attempt an extreme thought 
experiment to show the absurd conclusion of the epistemological claim that only perception 
is knowledge and what is perceived is what is known. Probably, to Plato‘s eyes, the MMD—
especially its short form without supplying further context—may have been seen as a good 
exemplary slogan for the discussion on an epistemological idea of perception. If Plato took 
the MMD as a good exemplary slogan for an epistemological idea of perception, who are 
                                                                                                                                                        
individual human being who has a faculty of perception, i.e. a human perceiver (cf. Theaet. 152a, 158a, 161d, e, 
166c, 171e, etc.), (4) a relative adverb, i.e. ‗that‘, and (5) einai with a predicate use in the hōs clauses to indicate 
the case of appearances of perceived qualities (i.e. ‗a thing that is F, that this thing is F‘, as Plato immediately 
replace hōs with hoia in Theaet. 152a6 ff.). Sextus Empiricus in P.H. I.216 also explicitly clarifies metron, 
chrēmata, and anthrōpos respectively as to kritērion (the standard of truth), ta pragmata (things), and hekastos 
(each person). 
Regarding anthrōpos, one may argue that Plato seems to occasionally understand it as mankind, namely 
‗all men‘ as well, because Socrates refers to all men, many men, and mass (hoi polloi, to plēthos, hapantas, and 
pantōn) by the word while dealing with the MMD (cf. Theaet. 170a, e, and 171a, b, c). But, it seems still more 
likely to assume that Plato‘s initial understanding of Protagoras‘ anthrōpos is each individual since his basic 
interpretation of the MMD is taken by exemplifying each individual‘s perceptual cognition. In addition, it is also 
remarkable that what Socrates is trying to mean by mentioning all men, many men, and mass (in the passages 
above), is those as an individual group with its own and unified perceptual function as compared to other 
individual groups. This point is more obvious from Socrates‘ example of a state in which the right is so as long 
as it appears so to the state, that is compared to other states in which the right is different (cf. Theaet. 166d ff.).  
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indeed those people who hold fast to such idea, and whom does Plato really mean to dispute 
concerning the nature of knowledge in the Theaetetus? I shall suggest that Plato‘s main target 
in the dialogue, especially the first part of the dialogue where he throughout interprets the 
MMD as a radical relativism of perceptual epistemology, would be the Megarians. 
In Book IX of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle discusses ‗potentiality (dynamis)‘ in 
relation to change/motion and arts/knowledge, he deals with the Megarian idea of the 
admission of actuality and the denial of potentiality. He first states that since potentiality has 
a principal role not only as a starting-point of change/motion but also as an agent or 
art/knowledge that brings forth certain products (1045b28–1046a36), ‗all arts and all 
productive kinds of knowledge are potentialities (πᾶζαη αἱ ηέρλαη θαὶ αἱ πνηεηηθαὶ ἐπηζη῅καη 
δπλάκεηο εἰζίλ)‘ (1046b2–3); immediately thereafter, he argues against the Megarian 
conceptualisation of potentiality. In his argument Aristotle shows how the Megarian denial of 
potentiality arrives at Protagoras‘ MMD. He first says that the Megarians claims that a thing 
can act only when it is acting, and that it cannot act when it is not acting: 
 
εἰζὶ δέ ηηλεο νἵ θαζηλ, νἷνλ νἱ Μεγαξηθνί, ὅηαλ 
ἐλεξγῆ κόλνλ δύλαζζαη, ὅηαλ δὲ κὴ ἐλεξγῆ νὐ 
δύλαζζαη, νἷνλ ηὸλ κὴ νἰθνδνκνῦληα νὐ 
δύλαζζαη νἰθνδνκεῖλ, ἀιιὰ ηὸλ νἰθνδνκνῦληα 
ὅηαλ νἰθνδνκῆ· ὁκνίσο δὲ θαὶ ἐπὶ η῵λ ἄιισλ. 
(Met. 1046b29–32: DK80 A17) 
There are some, like the Megarians, who say that 
a thing can act only when it is acting, and that it 
cannot act when it is not acting, for instance, if a 
man is not building, he cannot build, but if a man 
is building, [he can build] when he is building; 
and so for all other things as well. 
 
According to the Megarian school, says Aristotle, a thing‘s capacity for doing or being 
something, i.e. its potentiality for something, exists only in the state of actuality—i.e. a thing 
which is in a state of actually acting can act and be, but it cannot act and be if it is not in a 
state of actually acting. A man, for instance, is indeed considered one with the art/knowledge 
of house-building, i.e. a house-builder and able to build a house actually, only when he is 
actually building the house at the present moment. As soon as he stops building, he is no 
longer a house-builder, and his attribute or art/knowledge of building is no longer in him. The 
Megarians thus claim that potency exists only if there is actuality.
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 Aristotle further states: 
 
θαὶ ηὰ ἄςπρα δὴ ὁκνίσο· νὔηε γὰξ ςπρξὸλ νὔηε 
ζεξκὸλ νὔηε γιπθὺ νὔηε ὅισο αἰζζεηὸλ νὐζὲλ 
And [this view is applied] in the same way to 
inanimate things; for nothing will be either cold 
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 Cf. Ross (1924, vol. II), 243 ff. 
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ἔζηαη κὴ αἰζζαλνκέλσλ· ὥζηε ηὸλ Πξσηαγόξνπ 
ιόγνλ ζπκβήζεηαη ιέγεηλ αὐηνῖο. ἀιιὰ κὴλ νὐδ' 
αἴζζεζηλ ἕμεη νὐδὲλ ἂλ κὴ αἰζζάλεηαη κεδ' 
ἐλεξγῆ. εἰ νὖλ ηπθιὸλ ηὸ κὴ ἔρνλ ὄςηλ, πεθπθὸο 
δὲ θαὶ ὅηε πέθπθε θαὶ ἔηη ὄλ, νἱ αὐηνὶ ηπθινὶ 
ἔζνληαη πνιιάθηο η῅ο ἟κέξαο, θαὶ θσθνί. 
(1047a4–10: DK80 A17) 
or hot or sweet or perceptible at all if not 
perceived; so that those [of this view] will agree 
with Protagoras‘ account (logos). But, in fact, 
nothing will possess perception if it is not 
perceiving and acting. If, then, what is blind does 
not possess sight although it would by nature 
[have sight], when it would by nature [have 
sight] and when [sight] still is, the blind people 
themselves will be often blind for a day, and also 
be deaf too. 
 
In the passage above Aristotle states that those who follow the Megarian idea will agree with 
Protagoras‘ account (logos), arguing that a thing can be cold or hot or sweet or perceptible 
only when this thing is being perceived so (n.b. its similarity to the argument supplied by 
Socrates to identify Theaetetus‘ definition of knowledge as perception with Protagoras‘ 
MMD at Theaet. 152a–c, esp. 152b5–7, quoted above). For, if someone says that a thing can 
be cold or hot or sweet only when this thing is perceived so, he is denying potentiality. A 
thing is not cold when it is not perceived so; without perception of it, thus, nothing will be 
either cold or hot or sweet.
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 Here Aristotle seems to argue that such a point in which only 
perception and perceptual data at the present moment are regarded to be the actual perception 
and perceptual data must amount to radical relativism of perception, because someone‘s 
perception of something at the present moment would be the actual perception only to him 
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 Aristotle‘s criticism of the Megarian idea goes as follows: there are only two cases possible for a man to 
acquire and to lose a certain capacity such as an art: the first case is to acquire an art by having learnt it; the 
second case is to lose it by having forgotten it or by some accident, since it is not possible to lose by the 
destruction of a thing itself in a soul that lasts forever. If one states that a man who has an art of building has 
ceased building so that he has no longer engaged in this art, one is claiming that he has lost his art of building 
without having forgotten it or without any accident. This is a violation of the second case. If one states again 
that a man, who starts building again, has now an art of building again, one is saying that he has acquired this art 
without having learnt it. This is a violation of the first case. As only two cases are possible about acquiring and 
losing a certain art, Aristotle concludes the Megarian viewpoint to be incorrect. 
A potentiality is what produces perception of certain qualities. The wind can be potentially cold (or hot as 
well) even if it is not being perceived so by anyone. If the same argument is applied to this point, it needs to be 
said that to have an attribute, one thing needs to have acquired it previously, and not to have it, it needs to have 
lost it before, just like the cases of acquiring and losing an art. Aristotle, on the contrary, implies that it is more 
likely to think that attributes or predicates of a thing, although they are not actualised since they are not being 
perceived at the present moment, still potentially exist in the thing (cf. IV.5.1010b33–1011a2 where Aristotle 
asserts that things which are not being perceived exist prior to perception or being perceived). In addition, this 
claim results in a point that ‗nothing will possess perception if it is not perceiving.‘ Aristotle points out the 
absurdity of this claim by stating that in a day people will be blind and deaf on many occasions, as long as they 
are actualising their perception of sight and hearing—they will be blind while they are not utilising their power 
to see, for instance, by closing their eyes, but they will become again non-blind as soon as they use their sight 
opening their eyes and seeing. But, this does not make sense Aristotle insists; rather it is more likely to think 
that the power of sight, i.e. a visual perception, always exists in a person, as a potential power when it is not 
utilised and actualised, but as an actual power when it is used. 
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who is actually perceiving it and this would not be any perception to someone else, or even to 
himself at a different moment. In this regard, Aristotle claims that the Megarian idea is 
connected with Protagoras‘ account (logos), which would be the Platonic reading of the 
MMD according to which each appearing to me is being for me, appearance is perception, 
and thus to be perceived by me is to be for me, as Plato argues. 
Anyone who follows the Megarian idea of the admission of actuality and the denial of 
potentiality must reach Protagoras‘ MMD, argues Aristotle. However, Aristotle does not state 
that those who follow Protagoras‘ MMD must admit the Megarian idea. The MMD never 
radically denies that it is possible for one to perceive something in the future because one has 
a capacity to perceive while not perceiving now. Accordingly, when Aristotle treats the MMD 
in the Metaphysics IV.4.1007b18 ff. (DK80 A19b) and IV.5.1009a6 ff. as an infallibilist claim 
(that ‗everything is true simpliciter‘) and in the Metaphysics IV.6.1011a19–25 as a relativist 
claim (that ‗x is F to a at t1‘), he there never brings the Megarian idea into discussion. His 
focus lies chiefly in showing how the MMD as an infallibilist claim violates the Principle of 
Non-Contradiction (hereafter the PNC)
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 in the former passages, and in revealing that the 
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 Aristotle‘s PNC which is characterised as the strongest, i.e. the most secure principle (bebaiotatē archē) of all 
(Met. IV.3.1005b17–18) is established in the following passages as follows: 
 
ηὸ γὰξ αὐηὸ ἅκα ὑπάξρεηλ ηε θαὶ κὴ ὑπάξρεηλ 
ἀδύλαηνλ ηῶ αὐηῶ θαὶ θαηὰ ηὸ αὐηό. 
(IV.3.1005b19–20) 
 
The same thing cannot belong and not belong to 
the same thing at the same time. 
ἀδύλαηνλ γὰξ ὁηηλνῦλ ηαὐηὸλ ὑπνιακβάλεηλ 
εἶλαη θαὶ κὴ εἶλαη. (IV.3.1005b23–24) 
 
It is impossible to hold (hypolambanein) the 
same thing to be and not to be. 
ὅηη κὲλ νὖλ βεβαηνηάηε δόμα παζ῵λ ηὸ κὴ εἶλαη 
ἀιεζεῖο ἅκα ηὰο ἀληηθεηκέλαο θάζεηο, … ἐπεὶ δ' 
ἀδύλαηνλ ηὴλ ἀληίθαζηλ ἅκα ἀιεζεύεζζαη θαηὰ 
ηνῦ αὐηνῦ. (IV.6.1011b13–20) 
The most secure belief is that contradictory 
statements, no matter what, cannot be true at the 
same time, … since it is impossible for opposites 
to be true of the same thing at the same time. 
 
The first formulation of the PNC treats how the world and things in the world are (i.e. an ontological 
formulation), while the second discusses what we can think about things in the world (i.e. an epistemological 
and psychological formulation), and the third deals with the matter of the truth-value of the statements, in 
relation to the corresponding objects to the statements (i.e. a logical/semantic formulation). 
The formulations of the PNC are not entirely independent of one another; as Aristotle himself describes, if 
all contradictory statements are true, then everything will be one and the same. But it is absurd to consider 
everything one and the same, thus all contradictory statements are not true. That is, how things are enables a 
logical/semantic conclusion to be correctly established. Then, he again demonstrates that if the same thing is 
judged to be and not to be simultaneously, then anything can be both affirmed and denied, and thus everything 
will be one again. However it is not the case that everything is one and the same. Therefore, it is not the case 
that anything can be both affirmed and denied of everything. From this point of view, the same thing is not 
judged to be and not to be at the same time. The logical and semantic truth of a statement is thus indeed truth 
only when the predicate in a statement is correctly corresponding to and describing the object which occupies 
the subject position in the statement. This shows that logical/semantic principles, which are established on the 
basis of ontological considerations, regulate psychological and epistemological principles for human beings: 
‗ontological formulation‘ → ‗logical/semantic‘ → ‗epistemological and psychological‘ (Gottlieb claims them to 
be an ontological formulation, a doxastic version, and a semantic version, respectively). On this, Bonitz (1848) 
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MMD as a relativist claim does not indeed violate the PNC, if relativised judgements are 
fully equipped with proper qualifiers in the latter. 
Let us now look at Plato‘s characteristic dramatic formulation of the Theaetetus. The 
dialogue has a form of story-within-a-story structure; Socrates‘ discussion with his main 
interlocutors, Theaetetus and Theodorus, the subject of which is, is framed by the 
conversation between Euclides and Terpsion. Interestingly, these external conversants are 
representatives of the Megarian school; Euclides is even known to have been the founder of 
the school. In addition, the location at which their conversation takes place is the gate of 
Megara. Such a dramatic formulation of the Theaetetus enables us to assume that Plato, as a 
clever and deliberate dramatist, may have hinted to the readers that the characters whose 
philosophical idea is taken into Plato‘s consideration in the dialogue are not really (the 
historical) Protagoras himself, but those who deliver to the readers Socrates‘ discussion with 
Theaetetus and Theodorus, i.e. Euclides and Terpsion as the Megarians.
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 Plato may have 
intended to paradoxically show that those Megarians do not even realise that in fact Socrates 
aims to discuss and refute their own thoughts—i.e. the admission of actuality and the denial 
of potentiality which result in radical relativism of perception. By doing so, Plato may have 
wanted to reveal how absurd the Megarian idea of radical relativism of perception should be. 
Those who take merely actuality to be as an actual arts/knowledge and admit only what is 
being perceived at the present moment cannot confide in remembrance, because 
remembrance (a type of potentiality, according to Aristotle, by which men can have 
arts/knowledge) and what is now being remembered are not the same as what is being 
perceived (cf. Theaet. 163d–164b and Section 2 in Appendix 3 below for Plato‘s criticism of 
this point). Plato cleverly and clearly makes Euclides, who is narrating Socrates‘ discussion 
with Terpsion and thus delivering it to the readers of the Theaetetus too, refute himself (and 
thus the Megarian idea as well) by saying that about the discussion he ‗later wrote it out 
while remembering it at leisure (ὕζηεξνλ δὲ θαηὰ ζρνιὴλ ἀλακηκλῃζθόκελνο ἔγξαθνλ)‘ and 
                                                                                                                                                        
suggests that the ontological formulation is conditional for the epistemological formulation. Similarly, 
Łukasiewicz (1970–1, 489–90) argues that Aristotle, regarding the ontological formulation and the 
logical/semantic formulation to be equivalent, establishes the epistemological on the basis of the 
logical/semantic formulation. Maier (1896, 43) also understands that Aristotle infers the subjective certainty of 
the PNC (the epistemological formulation) from the objective truth of the logical/semantic formulation. Ross 
(1971, 159) says that from the ontological formulation Aristotle concludes the epistemological formulation. For 
further discussion on the three formulations of the PNC and their relation, cf. Irwin (1977), 210–29; Code 
(1986), 341–58; Cohen (1986), 359–70 (cited in Gottlieb (1992), 187–98, n. 6, 7, and 8). 
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 Similarly, in the Euthydemus Plato clearly alludes to Protagoras‘ association with the sophist brothers, 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, by stating that the sophist brothers once went to Thurii to learn the art of 
sophistry, for which Protagoras is known to have exercised his influence and established a colonial law, and that 
they used to be wrestlers as once Protagoras wrote a book entitled On Wrestling. 
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so that he ‗has written almost all of the whole discussion (ὥζηε κνη ζρεδόλ ηη πᾶο ὁ ιόγνο 
γέγξαπηαη)‘ (Theaet. 143a1–5). In Plato‘s strategy of dramatic framing, the absurdity of the 
Megarian idea would be shown to the readers (or to the audiences if we remember that this 
dialogue is a type of play) in the most effective way, when Euclides himself, while fracturing 
his own philosophical idea, does not realise the situation. 
When he wrote the Theaetetus, was Plato aware of the Megarian idea concerning the 
denial of potentiality, as Aristotle was when he wrote the Metaphysics? Theaetetus (417–369 
BCE) is known to have been a classical Greek Mathematician with many academic 
contributions like the discovery of irrational lengths and the five regular convex polyhedral. 
In the outer conversation between Euclides and Terpsion at the beginning of the Theaetetus, 
Theaetetus is illustrated as being badly wounded in a battle, sick and taken to Athens from the 
camp at Corinth (142a). Two Athenian battles at Corinth are possible, one in 394 BCE, i.e. the 
Battle of Nemea in the Corinthian war between Sparta and the allied cities of Argos, Corinth, 
Thebes, and Athens, and the other in 369 BCE between Athenians and Corinthians. The latter 
seems more reasonable; Euclides says that not long before his death Socrates met and had a 
talk with Theaetetus who was a boy at that time (142c). If the battle in which Theaetetus is 
stated by Euclides to have engaged was the battle of Nemea, he was just around 22 years old 
and presumably too young to have much contributed to mathematics as a famous 
mathematician. In the later battle in 369 BCE, Theaetetus was about 48 years old, having been 
finely grown up and presumably accomplished sufficient mathematical contributions. As far 
as these historical backgrounds are concerned, the dramatic date of the outer conversation 
between Euclides and Terpsion in the Theaetetus would probably be around, or later than, 
369 BCE (the dramatic date of the inner conversation between Socrates, Theaetetus and 
Theodorus would be 399 BCE, as Socrates says at the end of their dialogue (210d1–4) that ‗he 
must go to the court (basileus stoa) to meet the indictment brought against him by Meletus‘). 
The Megarian school was founded at the beginning of the fourth century BCE by 
Euclides of Megara (435–365 BCE); Euclides may have founded this school after Socrates‘ 
death in 399 BCE. In the year of Socrates‘ death, Euclides was about 34, and in 369–370 BCE, 
the dramatic date of the Theaetetus, around 66 years old, presumably having led the other 
Megarians such as Terpsion, Ichthyas, Eubulides, and Clinomachus (all from the fourth 
century BCE). Considering Euclides‘ age in the dramatic date of the Theaetetus (the 
composition date of the dialogue would be, of course, no earlier than that), it seems plausible 
to assume that by that time Euclides had already developed his philosophical positions and 
Plato (424/3–348/7 BCE), who was about 55 years old at the dramatic date, may have targeted 
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it in his philosophical discussion. Plato was probably aware of the Megarian philosophical 
position as Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was.79 
In the Theaetetus, we can find one more passage of Plato‘s clever dramatic set-up 
according to which Plato himself seems to admit that his reading of the MMD is not really 
referring to (the historical) Protagoras‘ idea but to someone else‘s. In the passage Socrates, 
after interpreting the MMD as a radical thesis of epistemological relativism of perception and 
refuting it, immediately states: 
 
ἀιιά ηνη, ὦ θίιε, ἄδεινλ εἰ θαὶ παξαζένκελ ηὸ 
ὀξζόλ. εἰθόο γε ἄξα ἐθεῖλνλ πξεζβύηεξνλ ὄληα 
ζνθώηεξνλ ἟κ῵λ εἶλαη· θαὶ εἰ αὐηίθα ἐληεῦζελ 
ἀλαθύςεηε κέρξη ηνῦ αὐρέλνο, πνιιὰ ἂλ ἐκέ ηε 
ἐιέγμαο ιεξνῦληα, ὡο ηὸ εἰθόο, θαὶ ζὲ 
ὁκνινγνῦληα, θαηαδὺο ἂλ νἴρνηην ἀπνηξέρσλ. 
(171c9–d3) 
But it is not clear at all, my dear [sc. Theodorus], 
whether we are running along the right path 
[about what Protagoras said in his MMD]. At any 
rate, it is indeed likely that he [sc. Protagoras], 
being older than us, is wiser [than us]; and if he 
forthwith lifted up his head from down there [i.e. 
underworld] [to here where we are] as far as the 
neck, he would in all likelihood convict me in 
many times and ways of talking nonsense [about 
what Protagoras said in his MMD], and you too 
of agreeing [with Socrates], and ducked down to 
rush off again. 
 
Modern commentators have attempted to offer plausible suggestions regarding why 
Protagoras should appear all of a sudden in this way, popping up only as far as the neck and 
then sinking down to run off. For instance, Campbell (1883, 109), noticing the dramatic date 
of the conversation of the Theaetetus, claims that Plato portrays Protagoras here as a kind of 
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 It may be suggested that Plato‘s main target in the Theaetetus was not the Megarians but the Cyrenaics 
founded by Aristippus of Cyrene, appealing both to the textual evidence that they are known to have indeed 
claimed that all we can know with certainty is instant sense-experiences (Theaetetean definition of knowledge as 
perception) and that we never reach to knowledge of true nature of the objects that cause our sense experiences 
(cf. M. 7.196–197; D.L. 2.87–88; Reale and Catan, 1986, 274–5; Gill, 2006, 405–6), and to the historical 
evidence that Theodorus, one of Socrates‘ main interlocutors and Protagoras‘ pupil was originally from Cyrene. 
Particularly, according to Sextus Empiricus (M. 7.196–197), the Cyrenaics were those who maintained that 
‗everyone grasps his own feelings (pathē). Whether a particular feeling (pathos) comes to him and his neighbour 
from something white neither he nor his neighbour can say, since neither receives the other‘s feelings. Since 
there are no feelings common to us all, it is rash to say that what appears thus-and-so to me also appears thus-
and-so to my neighbour (ἕθαζηνο γὰξ ηνῦ ἰδίνπ πάζνπο ἀληηιακβάλεηαη, ηὸ δὲ εἰ ηνῦην ηὸ πάζνο ἀπὸ ιεπθνῦ 
ἐγγίλεηαη αὐηῶ θαὶ ηῶ πέιαο, νὔη' αὐηὸο δύλαηαη ιέγεηλ κὴ ἀλαδερόκελνο ηὸ ηνῦ πέιαο πάζνο, νὔηε ὁ πέιαο κὴ 
ἀλαδερόκελνο ηὸ ἐθείλνπ. κεδελὸο δὲ θνηλνῦ πάζνπο πεξὶ ἟κᾶο γηλνκέλνπ πξνπεηέο ἐζηη ηὸ ιέγεηλ ὅηη ηὸ ἐκνὶ 
ηνῖνλ θαηλόκελνλ ηνῖνλ θαὶ ηῶ παξεζη῵ηη θαίλεηαη)‘ (trans. Brunschwig, 1999, 254). However, there is no 
evidence that Theodorus, although coming from Cyrene, indeed joined the Cyrenaic school. It may be possible 
that Plato did not discern the Megarians from the Cyrenaics; for him they both could seem to have been simply a 
group of Socrates‘ disciples who argued for radical relativism of perception. 
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stage ghost, rising up on ―Charon‘s steps‖—i.e. a flight of steps from the middle of the stage 
to the orchestra, used by characters from the underworld in the early Greek theatre. Lee (1973, 
249 ff.), pinpointing philosophical importance of the passage, argues that the imagery of the 
passage proposes Protagoras to be a plant, rooted in a world created by his solipsistic doctrine 
and unable to ―leap out‖ and join the exchange of other views. Similarly, Burnyeat (1976b, 
191–3, n. 23), attributing Protagoras‘ silence to the fact that he has no argument to offer to 
Socrates‘ previous interpretation and refutation of the MMD and pinpointing the sophist‘s 
solipsism, claims that Protagoras‘ ―only reply left amounts to a refusal to submit to dialectical 
discussion‖, and if the sophist ―does not speak to the human condition, does not put forward 
his claim that each of us lives in our own relativistic world as something we can all discuss, 
and, possibly, come to accept, but simply asserts solipsistically that he, for his part, lives in a 
world in which this is so, then indeed there is no discussing with him. His world and his 
theory go to the grave with him, and Socrates is fully entitled to leave them there and get on 
with his inquiry‖.80 
Despite the value of those suggestions, it is still possible for us to take the passage as a 
dramatic formulation in a literal sense; Plato has Socrates intend to confess that his reading of 
the MMD is not really referring to Protagoras‘ doctrine. An external authority is required to 
appear in a scene of the dialogue in order to reprove such an incorrect attribution of the 
dictum. This authority, if possible, needs to be the one whose dictum is a topic of the 
discussion. Obviously, the only one who can appear as the appropriate authority in the 
dialogue is Protagoras since his MMD is under discussion. The authority cannot be replaced 
with other characters like Theodorus because such a replacement will perhaps make the same 
problem of attributing the dictum to a wrong person in the discussion recurrent, unless the 
replacement can fully be representative for the authority. Since he portrayed as already dead, 
however, Protagoras cannot physically appear in the dialogue. Plato may utilise a clever 
dramatic device in order to make the external authority appear by making him pop up from 
the underground as far as his neck. This dead Protagoras does not need to bring his whole 
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 McCabe (2000, 46–51 and 90–2) suggests two points regarding the short and limited appearance of dead 
Protagoras until his neck from the ground, one dramatically, the other philosophically. She says that by having 
Protagoras appear in such way, Plato sets up a dramatic formulation to show that he ―is constructing historical 
fictions‖ for his own philosophical works, and ―uses a (merely) literary device, that is to say, to avoid a direct 
argument with Protagoras.‖ At the same time, his dramatic formulation, argues McCabe, reveals the contrast 
between Socrates‘ and Protagoras‘ accounts of what it is to believe; Socrates‘ account is that belief is ―sincere, 
reflective, public and differential‖, while Protagoras‘ account is that ―belief, like sincerity, is undifferentiated‖ 
both logically and epistemologically (in one‘s subjectivist world). As an alternative suggestion, Castagnoli 
(2010, 63–7) views this passage as a further self-refutation argument. On Protagoras‘ head popping up until his 
neck from the ground and rushing off immediately, cf. also Waterfield (1987), 65, n. 1; Ford (1994), 199–218. 
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body out of the underground in the scene, but only the part by which he can speak and 
rationalise, i.e. his head. 
Plato, however, must make Protagoras‘ head disappear as soon as the correction is 
completed; otherwise, the dialogue would be astray between discussing Theaetetus‘ 
definition of knowledge as perception which is read as radical relativism of perception and 
seeking again what Protagoras indeed intended to say by his MMD. The appearance and 
disappearance of dead Protagoras‘ head in the scene in this way successfully meets its 
dramatic role in the dialogue. 
Protagoras‘ MMD in itself as a slogan in a form of short single sentence does not seem 
to prove or entail the premiss and argument supplied by Plato for his reading of the doctrine 
as a claim of perceptual relativism; Plato would have probably taken this slogan for a 
convenient reason for his discussion on the theory of perceptual relativism, leaving some 
dramatic clues that (the historical) Protagoras‘ view is not really taken in the discussion—it is 
remarkable that besides the Theaetetus, Plato does not seem to consider Protagoras a radical 
relativist in his other works, such as the Protagoras, the Euthydemus and the Phaedrus, as we 
examined in the previous chapter and will see in the following chapters too. Taking into 
consideration such character of Plato‘s dramatic formulation in the Theaetetus as discussed 
above (according to which we can assume that Plato presumably intended to examine the 
Megarian philosophical idea, not Protagoras‘ idea),81 now we may be able to attempt at an 
alternative reading of the MMD, standing outside the Platonic reading of it, but considering it 
on the grounds of the primary literal and common senses and Protagoras‘ features as mostly 
pictured in the Great Speech in the Protagoras (320c8–328d2). (I mean by ‗an alternative 
reading of the MMD‘ a possible reading of it on the basis of Protagoras‘ ideas found in other 
sources that seem to give us some clues for understanding it; in this regard, this alternative 
reading is not necessarily incompatible with its Platonic reading.) 
 
 
                                                 
81
 When Socrates brings the MMD into discussion as soon as Theaetetus defines knowledge as perception, he 
says that ‗Protagoras said the same thing in a somewhat different way (tropon tina allon). For, I suppose (pou), 
he said that ―man is the measure of all things, of things that are that/how they are, of things that are not that/how 
they are not‖ (ηξόπνλ δέ ηηλα ἄιινλ εἴξεθε ηὰ αὐηὰ ηαῦηα. θεζὶ γάξ πνπ "πάλησλ ρξεκάησλ κέηξνλ" ἄλζξσπνλ 
εἶλαη, "η῵λ κὲλ ὄλησλ ὡο ἔζηη, η῵λ δὲ κὴ ὄλησλ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ")‘ (Theaet. 151e8–152a5). The expression and 
particle adopted in Socrates‘ saying, tropon tina allon and pou, according to a general usage of Greek grammar 
(cf. Smyth‘s Greek Grammar and Denniston‘s Greek Particles), are used to weaken the certainty of the 
speaker‘s idea. In this regard, it is also assumable that by adopting the expression and particle, Plato does not 
really intend to equate Theaetetus‘ definition of knowledge as perception with the MMD of (the historical) 
Protagoras. 
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2. An alternative reading of the Man-Measure Doctrine in the light of the Great Speech 
 
2.1. Chrēmata and metron 
 
According to the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG), the words chrēmata and metron were 
very common and widely used in antiquity—nearly 3,600 occurrences of chrēmata and 
approximately 305 occurrences of metron in various texts from the eighth century BCE 
Homeric epics to philosophical commentaries such as Clearchus‘ and Theophrastus‘ corpus in 
the fourth century BCE. 
The usage of metron, usually translated as ‗measure‘, in ancient texts very clearly means 
‗that by which anything is measured‘ (cf. LSJ. s.v.). The authors in antiquity had employed 
this word to indicate something that one can use as a means or tool to measure things, mostly 
for their magnitude or length, sometimes for contents or actions and speeches. For instance, 
in Works and Days 719–721, Hesiod says that ‗the tongue‘s best treasure among men is when 
it is sparing, and its greatest charm is when it goes in measure. If you speak ill, you may well 
hear greater yourself (γιώζζεο ηνη ζεζαπξὸο ἐλ ἀλζξώπνηζηλ ἄξηζηνο θεηδσι῅ο, πιείζηε δὲ 
ράξηο θαηὰ κέηξνλ ἰνύζεο· εἰ δὲ θαθὸλ εἴπνηο, ηάρα θ' αὐηὸο κεῖδνλ ἀθνύζαηο)‘ (trans. West, 
1988). Here Hesiod employs metron explicitly to indicate a measure by which one‘s speech is 
rightly measured to speak. Similarly, Aëtius states (I.22.6: DK87 B9) that ‗Antiphon and 
Critolaus say that time is a thought or measure and not a substance (Ἀληηθ῵λ θαὶ Κξηηόιανο 
λόεκα ἠ κέηξνλ ηὸλ ρξόλνλ, νὐρ ὑπόζηαζηλ)‘ (trans. Pendrick, 2002). By comparison with the 
term, substance (hypostasis), metron in this sentence clearly means, not a thing that exists in 
itself, but a thing as a measure by which things can be measured in terms of a sort of length, 
i.e. the duration of their existence. In Plato‘s Timaeus, metron is adopted to indicate a 
measure by which the fastness and slowness of speed is properly measured and by which the 
proportions of colours are measured so that things can be called by the names of colours: ‗and 
so that there might be a conspicuous measure of their relative slowness and quickness with 
which they move along in their eight revolutions (ἵλα δ' εἴε κέηξνλ ἐλαξγέο ηη πξὸο ἄιιεια 
βξαδπη῅ηη θαὶ ηάρεη θαὶ ηὰ πεξὶ ηὰο ὀθηὼ θνξὰο πνξεύνηην)‘ (39b2–4), ‗as the fire shines 
through the moisture with which it is mixed with red and white, we get orange. But it would 
be unwise to state the proportions among them, even if one could know them. It is impossible, 
even approximately, to provide a proof or a likely account on these matters (ιακπξόλ ηε 
ἐξπζξῶ ιεπθῶ ηε κεηγλύκελνλ μαλζὸλ γέγνλελ· ηὸ δὲ ὅζνλ κέηξνλ ὅζνηο, νὐδ' εἴ ηηο εἰδείε, 
λνῦλ ἔρεη ηὸ ιέγεηλ, ὧλ κήηε ηηλὰ ἀλάγθελ κήηε ηὸλ εἰθόηα ιόγνλ θαὶ κεηξίσο ἄλ ηηο εἰπεῖλ 
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εἴε δπλαηόο)‘ (68b5–8) (all trans. Zeyl in Cooper, 1997).82 
On the contrary, chrēmata is not as easily read as metron, mostly due to its multiple 
meanings. The principal meanings of chrēma (according to LSJ. s.v.), are ‗need‘ that ‗a thing 
that one needs or uses‘ or ‗material‘ ‗in use by/from which something can be constructed‘, 
and ‗goods and property‘, as well as simply ‗money‘, i.e. the basic ‗need‘ for human life in 
communities. Yet, this word is also used to mean ‗things‘ in a general sense like pragmata (cf. 
Sextus Empiricus‘ clarification of this word in relation to the MMD in P.H. I.216); and to 
simply but abstractly mean ‗matter‘ or ‗affair‘. Sometimes this word is utilised to substitute 
for ti. Despite such multiple meanings of chrēma, however, the word in antiquity seems to 
have mostly been used in any contexts in which the things referred to are related with the 
meaning of ‗need‘ and ‗use‘, or ‗material‘, of their users, either directly or indirectly. In other 
words, chrēmata always refers to the things that lie in some specific relation with others or 
their users, basically for the users‘ ‗need‘ or as their ‗material‘ in use. This becomes clearer if 
we note the etymological connection of chrēmata to chrē (‗there is need‘) and chraomai (‗to 
use‘). The understanding of chrēmata in this way can easily be found in ancient texts. 
In the Odyssey, Homer, utilising the word 13 times,
83
 adopts it mostly to refer to ‗needs‘, 
‗wealth‘, ‗belongings‘, ‗fortune‘, and ‗properties‘. In book II, for instance, Homer recites that 
‗we should simply hound you up and down the town for the restitution of our needs till every 
item was repaid (ηόθξα γὰξ ἂλ θαηὰ ἄζηπ πνηηπηπζζνίκεζα κύζῳ ρξήκαη' ἀπαηηίδνληεο, ἕσο 
θ' ἀπὸ πάληα δνζείε)‘ (76–78). And in book XIII, he has Odysseus say ‗but now I had better 
count my belongings and make sure that the crew have not robbed me and gone off with 
anything in their hollow ship (ἀιι' ἄγε δὴ ηὰ ρξήκαη' ἀξηζκήζσ θαὶ ἴδσκαη, κή ηί κνη 
νἴρσληαη θνίιεο ἐπὶ λεὸο ἄγνληεο)‘ (215–216). Again, a few lines later in the same book, he 
says ‗and now I have come here myself with all this booty, leaving the other half of my 
fortune to my children (λῦλ δ' εἰιήινπζα θαὶ αὐηὸο ρξήκαζη ζὺλ ηνίζδεζζη)‘ (257–258) (all 
trans. E. V. Rieu and D. C. H. Rieu, 1946).
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 For metron appearing in ancient texts with the reference to Protagoras‘ MMD, cf. Theaet. 152a3 (DK80 B1), 
161c5 (DK80 B1), 166d2 (DK80 A21a); Crat. 385e6 (DK80 A13), Met. XI.6.1062b14 and b19 (DK80 A19); 
P.H. 216 lines 2 and 4 (DK80 A14), M. 60 line 7 (DK80 B1). In Plato, the word appears 40 times; 1 time in the 
Cratylus (38ca1), 13 in the Theaetetus (152a3, 160d9, 161c5, 162c5, 166d2, 168d3, 169a3, 170d2, 170e8, 171c2, 
178b3, 179b2, 183c1), 2 in the Statesman (269c6, 284b1), 4 in the Philebus (25b1, 25b2, 56a5, 66a6), 1 in the 
Gorgias (502c6), 3 in the Republic (504c1, 504c3, 621a6), 2 in the Timaeus (39b2, 68b6), another 13 in the 
Laws (692a8, 698b1, 716c4, 719e2, 744e3, 756b6, 836a6, 843e4, 846c8, 947b2, 957a4, 959a3, 959d6). And, 3 
more occurrences of the word in Ps-Platonic corpus; 1 occurrence in the Definitiones (411b3), and 2 in the 
Spuria (373c5, 373d8). 
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There are 5 occurrences of chrēmata in Hesiod‘s Works and Days,85 and in all cases the 
word particularly indicates ‗property‘, ‗benefit‘, and ‗utility‘: for instance, ‗property is not for 
seizing, far better God-given (ρξήκαηα δ' νὐρ ἁξπαθηά, ζεόζδνηα πνιιὸλ ἀκείλσ)‘ (320); 
‗twice, three times you may be successful, but if you harass them further, you will achieve 
nothing [i.e. no benefit], all your speeches will be in vain, and however wide your words 
range it will be no use (δὶο κὲλ γὰξ θαὶ ηξὶο ηάρα ηεύμεαη· ἠλ δ' ἔηη ιππῆο, ρξ῅κα κὲλ νὐ 
πξήμεηο, ζὺ δ' ἐηώζηα πόιι' ἀγνξεύζεηο, ἀρξεῖνο δ' ἔζηαη ἐπέσλ λνκόο)‘ (401–403); ‗first, a 
household, a woman, and a ploughing ox, [a chattel woman, not wedded, one who could 
follow the herds,] the utilities in the house must all be got ready, lest you ask another, and he 
refuse, and you be lacking, and the right time go past, and your cultivation suffer (νἶθνλ κὲλ 
πξώηηζηα γπλαῖθά ηε βνῦλ η' ἀξνη῅ξα, [θηεηήλ, νὐ γακεηήλ, ἣηηο θαὶ βνπζὶλ ἕπνηην,] ρξήκαηα 
δ' εἰλ νἴθῳ πάλη' ἄξκελα πνηήζαζζαη, κὴ ζὺ κὲλ αἰηῆο ἄιινλ, ὃ δ' ἀξλ῅ηαη, ζὺ δὲ ηεηᾷ, ἟ δ' 
ὥξε παξακείβεηαη, κηλύζῃ δέ ηνη ἔξγνλ)‘ (405–409); ‗and maintain a dog with sharp teeth, 
not stinting his food, in case a couchbyday [i.e. a burglar who works at night] robs you of 
your property (θαὶ θύλα θαξραξόδνληα θνκεῖλ, κὴ θείδεν ζίηνπ, κή πνηέ ζ' ἟κεξόθνηηνο 
ἀλὴξ ἀπὸ ρξήκαζ' ἕιεηαη)‘ (604–605); ‗because property is as life to wretched mortals 
(ρξήκαηα γὰξ ςπρὴ πέιεηαη δεηινῖζη βξνηνῖζηλ)‘ (686) (all trans. West, 1988). 
Even in a tradition of philosophical thoughts, the word still seems to have been 
employed to indicate more than mere ‗things‘ in a general sense, i.e. ‗things that lie in need 
and use for the production of benefit and usefulness, or that are materials of substances‘. For 
instance, in Simplicius‘ Commentary on Aristotle‘s Physics 155.26–30 (DK59 B1), 
Anaxagoras is reported to have said that ‗together were all things, limitless both in quantity 
and in smallness—for the small too was limitless. And when all were together, none was clear 
by reason of smallness; for air and ether covered all things, both being limitless—for in all 
things these are the greatest both in quantity and in size (ὁκνῦ ρξήκαηα πάληα ἤλ ἄπεηξα θαὶ 
πι῅ζνο θαὶ ζκηθξόηεηα· θαὶ γὰξ ηὸ ζκηθξὸλ ἄπεηξνλ ἤλ. θαὶ πάλησλ ὁκνῦ ἐόλησλ νὐδὲλ 
ἔλδεινλ ἤλ ὑπὸ ζκηθξόηεηνο· πάληα γὰξ ἀήξ ηε θαὶ αἰζὴξ θαηεῖρελ ἀκθόηεξα ἄπεηξα ἐόληα· 
ηαῦηα γὰξ κέγηζηα ἔλεζηηλ ἐλ ηνῖο ζύκπαζη θαὶ πιήζεη θαὶ κεγέζεη)‘. And a few lines later, in 
the same book (In Phys. 163.20–24: DK59 B17), Anaxagoras is reported again to have stated 
that ‗the Greeks do not have a correct view of generation and destruction; for no thing is 
generated or destroyed; rather, they are mingled and dissociated from existing things. And for 
this reason they would be correct to call generation mingling and destruction dissociation (ηὸ 
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δὲ γίλεζζαη θαὶ ἀπόιιπζζαη νὐθ ὀξζ῵ο λνκίδνπζηλ νἱ Ἕιιελεο· νὐδὲλ γὰξ ρξ῅κα γίλεηαη 
νὐδὲ ἀπόιιπηαη, ἀιι' ἀπὸ ἐόλησλ ρξεκάησλ ζπκκίζγεηαί ηε θαὶ δηαθξίλεηαη. θαὶ νὕησο ἂλ 
ὀξζ῵ο θαινῖελ ηό ηε γίλεζζαη ζπκκίζγεζζαη θαὶ ηὸ ἀπόιιπζζαη δηαθξίλεζζαη)‘ (all trans. 
Barnes, 2001
2
). Anaxagoras, in whose fragments and testimonies chrēmata occurs 23 times,86 
adopts the word particularly to refer to the homoiomereis that are what have parts in things 
like each other and the whole—simply expressed as ‗in everything there is a portion of 
everything‘ (cf. Aristotle‘s On the Heavens 302a31–b3: DK59 A43; On Generation and 
Corruption 413a18: DK59 A46). The homoiomereis are, thus, as Barnes (1982, 322) suggests, 
read as ―stuffs‖ from which matters can be individually formed, ―the material of which 
substances are composed.‖ The Anaxagorean chrēmata, though not directly related with 
human use, is still not missing its fundamental sense as ‗need‘ and ‗use‘ for the things in this 
world to be composed and thus existent; without it, nothing can exist.
87
 
Above all, it would be meaningful to observe the usage of this word chrēmata by Plato, 
the first and chief reporter of the MMD, in the Theaetetus, since he might have had a certain 
view on the usage and meaning of the word when treating Protagoras‘ doctrine. The word 
appears approximately 435 times in Platonic corpus, and 11 times in the Theaetetus.
88
 Let us 
take some passages from the dialogue in which Plato uses chrēmata, outside those passages 
in which he discusses the MMD, in order to see the Platonic usage of the word (all trans. 
Levett in Cooper, 1997): 
 
ΘΕΟ. Θεαίηεηνο, ὦ Σώθξαηεο, ηό γε ὄλνκα· ηὴλ 
κέληνη νὐζίαλ δνθνῦζί κνη ἐπίηξνπνί ηηλεο 
δηεθζαξθέλαη. ἀιι' ὅκσο θαὶ πξὸο ηὴλ η῵λ 
ρξεκάησλ ἐιεπζεξηόηεηα ζαπκαζηόο, ὦ 
Σώθξαηεο. (144d1–4) 
THEOD. His name, Socrates, is Theaetetus. As for 
the property, that, I think, has been made away 
with by trustees. All the same, he is wonderfully 
open-handed about money, Socrates. 
 
ὁ ζνθηζηὴο … ἄμηνο πνιι῵λ ρξεκάησλ ηνῖο 
παηδεπζεῖζηλ. (167c7–d1) 
The professional teacher [i.e. the sophist]… is 
worth his large fees [i.e. money] to them [i.e. his 
disciples]. 
                                                 
86
 A1 line 4; A13 line 6; A45 line 25; A45 line 27; A46 line 15; A46 line 16; A52 line 9; A59 line 4; A60 line 2; 
B1 line 5; B4 line 8; B4 line 22; B4 line 34; B4 line 40; B7 line 2; B9 line 6; B9 line 7; B12 line 5; B12 line 8; 
B12 line 11; B12 line 12; B17 line 4; B17 line 5 (all in DK59). 
87
 For further discussion on Anaxagoras‘ chrēmata as ‗stuffs‘, i.e. ‗material that is the need for composition and 
existence of the things in the world‘, cf. Barnes (1982), 323–41; KRS (19832), 376–8. 
88
 144d3; 152a3 (reference to the MMD); 153d4 (a quote from Il. in interpreting the MMD); 156e6 
(interpretation of the MMD); 160d9 (interpretation of the MMD); 161c5 (reference to the MMD); 165e3 
(refutation of the MMD); 167d1; 170d2 (refutation of the MMD: self-refutation); 183c1 (reference to the 
MMD); 201b1. 
75 
 
ΣΩ. Ἡ η῵λ κεγίζησλ εἰο ζνθίαλ, νὓο δὴ 
θαινῦζηλ ῥήηνξάο ηε θαὶ δηθαληθνύο. νὗηνη γάξ 
πνπ ηῆ ἑαπη῵λ ηέρλῃ πείζνπζηλ νὐ δηδάζθνληεο 
ἀιιὰ δνμάδεηλ πνηνῦληεο ἃ ἂλ βνύισληαη. ἠ ζὺ 
νἴεη δεηλνύο ηηλαο νὕησ δηδαζθάινπο εἶλαη, ὥζηε 
νἷο κὴ παξεγέλνληό ηηλεο ἀπνζηεξνπκέλνηο 
ρξήκαηα ἢ ηη ἄιιν βηαδνκέλνηο, ηνύηνηο 
δύλαζζαη πξὸο ὕδσξ ζκηθξὸλ δηδάμαη ἱθαλ῵ο 
η῵λ γελνκέλσλ ηὴλ ἀιήζεηαλ; (201a7–b3) 
SOC. The art of the greatest representatives of 
wisdom—the men called orators and lawyers. 
These men, I take it, use their art to produce 
conviction not by teaching people, but by making 
them judge whatever they themselves choose. Or 
do you think there are any teachers so clever that 
within the short time allowed by the clock they 
can teach adequately the truth of what happened 
to people who have been robbed money or 
properties or assaulted, in a case where there 
were no eye-witnesses? 
 
Plato evidently utilises the word chrēmata, outside the passages in which he refers to or 
interprets the MMD, in order to indicate goods that are fundamental ‗need‘ for human life, 
such as ‗money‘ or ‗property‘. Moreover, in a sentence from the Laws (IV.716c4–6) in which 
the main character, the Athenian, states that ‗to us God would be the measure of all things 
most, and much more so than any man, as they [probably the Protagoreans] say (ὁ δὴ ζεὸο 
἟κῖλ πάλησλ ρξεκάησλ κέηξνλ ἂλ εἴε κάιηζηα, θαὶ πνιὺ κᾶιινλ ἢ πνύ ηηο, ὥο θαζηλ, 
ἄλζξσπνο)‘, Plato by chrēmata means, not merely things in a general sense such as wind (an 
example of chrēmata in the Theaetetus), but things that are somehow connected to human 
affairs such as justice or moderation as well as all ethical and constitutional matters that must 
be derived from and ruled by the mighty power, God, of which he is indeed the measure. In 
this context, it would be highly likely that Plato‘s use of chrēmata for the most part occurs in 
the Republic (around 100 occurrences) and in the Laws (around 90 occurrences), in which he 
chiefly deals with the ethical and moral and political issues in relation to human affairs in 
communities under certain normative ideas such as articles of the laws. 
Given that the fundamental and common usages of chrēmata and metron in antiquity, 
before and after Protagoras‘ and Plato‘s time, are thus illustrated above, a way for an 
alternative reading of the MMD along the literal and basic senses of the key words seems 
now open to us. But, in what context shall chrēmata and metron in the MMD be read? In 
other words, in which context is man involved with chrēmata so as to be metron of it? 
Unfortunately, the MMD itself, as given as a very short single sentence, does not offer any 
further promising context regarding what the Protagorean chrēmata and metron could 
possibly mean. However, as far as the primary and literal meaning of those words is 
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concerned, the Great Speech in the Protagoras can be taken as a literal and contextual source 
to us for an alternative reading of the MMD. For, in the speech, as we have seen in Chapter II 
above, Protagoras expresses a clear idea about what the basic ‗need‘ is [for human beings to 
live in human communities, i.e. to survive as human beings], and how man is the measure [of 
the basic ‗need‘]. 
According to the Great Speech, the fundamental need for man who can survive and exist 
as ‗man‘ in a community (since outside it no one can survive), is an ability to practise what 
he should do and to avoid what he should not do in the community; otherwise the community 
will collapse, and no one will survive and exist. In this sense, Protagoras‘ chrēmata can be 
understood as human political and ethical actions and speeches in the community that are the 
fundamental condition for the preservation and survival of the human race and community. 
These political and ethical actions and speeches must be, however, ‗measured‘ before 
being practised so that their practitioner can appropriately preserve his community and 
human race, and avoid any possible danger to all members, including himself, of his 
community. In this regard, Protagoras‘ metron can be understood at the primary level as ‗a 
sense of what is right (dikē) and a sense of shame (aidōs), i.e. the civic senses‘ by which 
human political actions and speeches are properly measured, and at the secondary and 
improved level as ‗political virtues added to the senses‘. In other words, measuring an action 
or speech to find whether it is appropriate to practise in the community, i.e. discerning what 
should be done from what should not be done, can be primarily accomplished by the civic 
senses; if a man lacks them, he is unable to distinguish ‗rightdoings‘ from ‗wrongdoings‘ and 
commits wrongdoings to others, finally perishes with his community. 
As Protagoras highlights the role of education and punishment in a human community 
throughout the Great Speech (esp. 323c8–324b1 and 324d7–325d7), if a man has received 
proper education in political virtues, or has been suitably punished (i.e. corrected and 
reformed) for his past misdeeds, his mind and perspective with regard to public affairs and 
civic life will be improved. In this regard, the education in political virtues plays a significant 
role for the improvement of metron, and Protagoras‘ education thus aims to its improvement. 
The improvement of metron, i.e. man‘s becoming a better anthrōpos (or a better citizen), is 
achieved through Protagoras‘ education in good deliberation concerning how best to manage 
domestic and public affairs: the good deliberation is accordingly a deliberation that 
guarantees men more influential or useful and beneficial power to give better counsels on 
chrēmata, i.e. political and ethical actions and speeches as the basic and fundamental need to 
practise for the preservation of human society and human race, in relation to others in their 
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city. 
In the Great Speech Protagoras states that all men with the civic senses in a human 
community receive education in political virtues as soon as they can understand language, by 
parents, nurses, neighbours, and teachers, privately at home and publicly at school and the 
court (Prot. 325c6–d5). Education in political virtues aims to widen people‘s perspective 
concerning different factors in their community that affect the application of the civic senses. 
Those who have received education in different factors by which they have better counsel on 
political issues, of course, as Protagoras‘ professed task emphasises (312d6–7), will become 
‗more useful (ōphelimōteron)‘, ‗more beneficial (chrēsimōteron)‘, and ‗most influential 
(dynatōtatos)‘ at actions and speeches in relation to political issues (Prot. 318e5–319a2). 
With a widened perspective, men who become more useful, more beneficial, and most 
influential at actions and speeches in relation to political issues are citizens better suited to 
handle political matters. The educated men are, in Protagoras‘ opinion, improved in this way, 
as their metra are improved; ‗man is himself the measure of all right and wrong actions and 
speeches that are discerned and encouraged, initially by the civic senses and further by 
political virtues, to pursue or avoid.‘ In this sense, Protagoras‘ metron is understood at the 
secondary and improved level as political virtues established on the civic senses through 
education and punishment for the purpose of preserving a human community and maintaining 
human survival in a better way. 
 
2.2. Anthrōpos and hōs 
 
There has also been controversy as to what Protagoras exactly means by anthrōpos in his 
MMD; some understand it as individual, others as universal, but both with a power of 
perception. Another reading is that Protagoras‘ anthrōpos is the social human being 
distinguished from man in an individual and biological sense. This reading is divided again 
into two: an individual social man or the social human beings as a group. 
The reading of the Protagorean anthrōpos as an individual is first proposed by Plato in 
the Theaetetus: more precisely, Plato limits ‗individual‘ to the individual with powers of 
sense-perception (cf. 152a6–b7, 158c8–160a1, and 170a3–c8). Aristotle‘s and Sextus 
Empiricus‘ readings of the Protagorean anthrōpos are not much different from Plato‘s, since 
―they are following rather than corroborating Plato on this point.‖89 
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The suggestion that anthrōpos is the human species, as distinguished from other species, 
i.e. man in a generic sense, is endorsed by Gomperz. He (1901, 451, cited in Balaban (1999), 
299) asserts that ―[T]he phrase about man as the measure of things—the homo mensura tenet, 
as it has been suitably abbreviated—was a contribution to the theory of cognition. Moreover 
‗man,‘ as opposed to the totality of objects, was obviously not the individual, but mankind as 
a whole. No unprejudiced reader will require to be convinced that this is at least the more 
natural and the more obvious meaning.‖ Levi (1940a, 149), on Gomperz‘ behalf, says that for 
Protagoras things are relative to the ―physiological and psychological structure of humanity.‖ 
The reading of anthrōpos as the social human being has also been widely suggested by 
various scholars in modern scholarship on Protagoras. For instance, Nestle (cited in Zeller 
(1869–81), I, 26, 389, n. 101) once affirms that the Protagorean anthrōpos gives ―a foretaste 
of the Aristotelian doctrine that man is by nature a social animal.‖ Later, Dupréel (1948, 19) 
also emphasises that ―le siohiste d‘Abdèra fut, à coup sûr, le moins ≪individualiste≫, le 
plus ≪social≫ de tous les penseurs de l‘Antiquité,‖ and that ―la phrase sur l‘Homme-
mesure, ... enveloppe aussi—et c‘est l‘essentiel—une conception sociologique de la 
connaissance et de sa valeur.‖ Similarly, Donovan (1993, 38; cf. also Levi (1940b), 296), 
despite pinpointing the individuality of anthrōpos, argues that Protagoras‘ man probably 
―coexists with at least a social or civic sense.‖ 
Protagoras, as we examined in the previous chapter, expresses his idea of anthrōpos, just 
as he does regarding the ideas of chrēmata and metron, in the Great Speech. The idea of 
anthrōpos expressed by Protagoras himself in the Great Speech can be taken as a contextual 
source to us for understanding what the sophist would probably mean by the word when he 
stated ‗man‘ is the measure. Principally, in the Great Speech Protagoras characterises a ‗man‘ 
as a mortal being created by the gods who is given the Promethean gifts, technical wisdom 
(entechnon sophia) and fire (pyr), and the Zeusian gifts, a sense of what is right and a sense 
of shame, i.e. the civic senses (Prot. 321b6–322d5), for survival. Protagoras, however, puts 
more weight on the civic senses than technical wisdom and fire, emphasising the fundamental 
importance on the Zeusian gifts for human survival. 
According to Protagoras, men would not survive if they lack technical wisdom and fire 
(Prot. 321d3–4b). But, although they are equipped with them, they are still unable to survive 
due to their physical weakness. Men started gathering together to live together, constructing a 
city, hoping to protect themselves from the wild beasts‘ attack. But initially they did not know 
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how to live all together in the city. So they did wrong to each other, and finally scattered 
again, facing extinction. In short, without senses concerning how to live all together in a city, 
they could not survive. For man‘s survival and thus existence, Zeus gives to all men a sense 
of what is right and a sense of shame, i.e. the civic senses. Only with these civic senses on 
how to live together in a city, can men preserve their race, in Protagoras‘ thoughts discovered 
in the Great Speech. 
Protagoras further stresses that man as man who possesses the civic senses can be 
educated in political virtues. Ever since having learned political virtues from parents and 
school teachers from the very beginning of their social lives, on the basis of a sense of what 
is right and a sense of shame, both privately and publicly, all men share in justice and 
moderation to some extent (Prot. 322d5–323a3). Also, anyone who absolutely lacks them is 
not among men (Prot. 323b7–c2). Man is one who punishes others with reason for the sake 
of the future, while wild animals do this for blind vengeance (Prot. 324b). Thus, man is 
rational, or at least able to receive education in political virtues with reason—i.e. in a rational 
way—for the sake of future. Even the wickedest man in a city is indeed good at and aware of 
political virtues, compared to those with no education at all, who are considered by 
Protagoras not to be human (Prot. 327c4–d4).  
Although men differ from each other at the level of political virtues due to different 
circumstances and education, at the level of the civic senses everyone is equal. With this 
equal foundation of the civic senses they live all together, not differentiating from each other, 
but sharing a common social life in their community at the primary level; yet, simultaneously, 
this common social life secures them their survival in their community as well. Taking the 
discussion in the Great Speech into consideration, Protagoras‘ idea of anthrōpos can thus be 
understood as man as a social being who shares in the common objective civic senses, as well 
as political virtues learned through private and public education, who can live and coexist 
with others in a human community. Here, no substantial distinction between man as 
individual and man in a universal sense is found; rather, as far as man is understood as one 
living in a human community, such distinction seems pointless, since this man or that man, or 
all men, are simply man, as long as they all have the same objective civic senses to measure 
things that are among what is right to do and live together for the purpose of survival. 
Protagoras‘ man is the measure; in the light of metron, namely, the civic senses and 
further political virtues, man as a social being in Protagoras‘ thought practises his political 
actions and speeches. His political actions and speeches are measured whether they are 
appropriate to be practised in his society. They are measured by the civic senses and political 
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virtues ‗that‘ they are (hōs estin) proper, i.e. just, courageous, temperate, pious, and needful 
and so on, to practise, or ‗that‘ they are not (hōs ouk estin). In this regard, the basic sense of 
hōs in the MMD can be understood as meaning ‗that‘. 
Yet, hōs can be also read as ‗how‘; all men have the same objective civic senses by 
which they can measure their civic activities. This implies that all men can know ‗how‘ their 
political actions and speeches are proper to practise in their community (hōs estin), and ‗how‘ 
they are not (hōs estin), by measuring them with the civic senses in given political contexts. 
Thus, unlike scholars‘ debate over the reading of hōs, in determining whether it means 
‗that‘ or ‗how‘ Protagoras does not seem to have intended this sort of distinction; rather he 
may have used hōs to mean both the present factual state of chrēmata (‗that they are 
appropriate actions and speeches to practise in the light of the civic senses for the 
preservation of human society and human race‘) and the modal state of chrēmata (‗how they 
are appropriate actions and speeches to practise‘). In this understanding, the role of estin in 
the hōs clauses is, thus, predicative, since its function in the context is to describe the state, 
both factual and modal, of chrēmata in the light of the civic senses for the preservation of 
human society and race, i.e. ‗needful (useful/beneficial)‘ in a political and ethical context.  
On this reading, the reformulated form of the MMD can be conjectured as: ‗anthrōpos 
estin metron tōn men ontōn chrēsimōn90 hōs esti chrēsima, tōn de ouk ontōn chrēsimōn hōs 
ouk estin chrēsima (man is the measure of the things that are needful (i.e. useful/beneficial) 
that/how they are needful, and of the things that are not needful that/how they are not 
needful)‘, and in this regard, ‗pantōn chrēmatōn metron estin anthrōpos (man is the measure 
of all the needful things)‘. And, in the context of the Great Speech, Protagoras, by his MMD, 
thus argues that man, as a social being, who shares in the common objective civic senses, as 
well as political virtues learned through private and public education, with others, whoever 
he is, as far as he lives in a human community with others, is by himself the measure of all 
the basic needs for his (and others‘) survival and the preservation of the community, i.e. of 
all political and ethical actions and speeches that he and others do and make; all these are 
measured as to whether and how they are appropriate (i.e. just, courageous, temperate, pious, 
and needful and so on) things to practise in the light of the civic senses and political virtues. 
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 Chrēsimōn, an adjective form of chrēmata, as we saw in the previous chapter, is the key Protagorean term 
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Chapter IV 
 
Epistemology: The peri theōn (‘on the gods’) fragment 
 
 
Ancient sources report that Protagoras made a pronouncement regarding the gods, known as 
the peri theōn (‗on the gods‘) fragment (hereafter the PTH fragment) in which he confesses 
his ignorance of the gods. According to Diogenes Laertius, the PTH fragment was the incipit 
of Protagoras‘ book entitled On the Gods (To Peri Theōn) which Protagoras first read 
publicly; Diogenes Laertius (D.L. 9.54) says that ‗according to some Protagoras read it in the 
house of Euripides in Athens, or in the house of Megacleides, as some say, and according to 
others the sophist might have read it at the Lyceum, where one of his pupils, Archagoras, lent 
his voice to him for the readings.‘ Except for the PTH fragment, however, the contents of the 
book are not known to us. 
The major part of the PTH fragment is quoted in Diogenes Laertius (D.L. 9.51: DK80 
A1), while its supplementary parts are reported in Theophilius of Antioch (Ad Autol. III.28: C. 
A23), Sextus Empiricus (M. 9.56: DK80 A12), Eusebius of Caesarea (P.E. 14.3.7: DK80 B4), 
and Theodoret of or Cyrrhus (Gr. aff. II.112.2–114.1: C. A23). Despite the reports‘ difference 
in wording,
91
 the fragment generally reads: 
 
πεξὶ κὲλ ζε῵λ νὐθ ἔρσ εἰδέλαη νὔζ' ὡο εἰζίλ, νὔζ' ὡο νὐθ εἰζίλ, νὔζ' ὁπνῖνί ηηλεο ἰδέαλ· πνιιὰ γὰξ 
ηὰ θσιύνληα κε εἰδέλαη, ἣ η' ἀδειόηεο θαὶ βξαρὺο ὢλ ὁ βίνο ηνῦ ἀλζξώπνπ. 
On the one hand, on the gods I am not able to know either that/how they are or that/how they are not, 
or what they look like in shape. For many are the things preventing me from knowing [the gods]; 
the obscurity [of the gods]
92
 and the shortness of human life.
93
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 Concerning the ‗obscurity‘ (adēlotēs) in the PTH fragment, it has been suggested that what is obscure to 
Protagoras is the subject concerning knowledge of the gods, translating it as ‗the obscurity of the subject‘ (cf. 
Guthrie, 1971, 234–5), or the matter, as ‗the obscurity of matter‘ (cf. Curd, 20112, 146). This suggestion is, 
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subject or matter regarding knowledge of the gods is to be inferred from the gods‘ uncertainty, i.e. obscurity. It is 
somewhat awkward to assume that the subject or matter of the gods is obscure while the gods themselves are not 
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93
 For the traditional translation of the PTH fragment in this way, cf. Gomperz (1901), 457; Dupréel (1948), 58; 
Untersteiner (1954), 27; Dumont (1969), 46; O‘Brien in Sprague (1972), 4; Kerferd (1981a), 166; Barnes (1982), 
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The PTH fragment consists of two parts. In the first part there are two sentences by which 
Protagoras confesses the contents of his ignorance of the gods, and in the second part he 
offers two epistemological obstacles impeding knowledge of the gods. Despite the 
controversy regarding the interpretation of the fragment in modern scholarship, four points 
have been traditionally and largely agreed. First, the fragment represents Protagoras‘ 
agnosticism about both the gods‘ existence and nature, not atheism. Second, in his agnostic 
view Protagoras makes a distinction between a question about the gods‘ existence by the first 
sentence of the first part of the fragment (νὔζ' ὡο εἰζίλ, νὔζ' ὡο νὐθ εἰζίλ) and about the gods‘ 
essence or nature by the second sentence (νὔζ' ὁπνῖνί ηηλεο ἰδέαλ) (cf. Kahn (20032), 302). 
Third, ‗the gods‘ in the fragment are not objects of human experience (cf. Untersteiner (1954), 
27 ff.)—it seems that scholars, in support of their agreement, relate the first and second points 
to the third point, presuming that Protagoras held an agnostic view of the gods‘ existence and 
nature on the grounds that for the sophist the gods are beyond human experience. Lastly, the 
PTH fragment represents Protagoras‘ own personal opinion that he is unaware of the gods, 
not a general statement arguing for all human beings‘ ignorance concerning them in general 
(cf. Mansfeld (1981), 40; Woodruff (1985), 496; Gagarin (2002), 115–6).94 
In this chapter, yet, I shall first suggest that Protagoras seems to have expressed his 
agnosticism only about the gods‘ nature: his agnostic view regarding the gods‘ nature is 
expressed in general by the first sentence, and the gods‘ shape in particular by the second 
sentence. I will then show that the sophist does not seem to have taken the gods as something 
beyond human experience and that the obscurity of the gods results from various human 
experiences about them. Further, close examination of the obstacles will reveal, I believe, 
Protagoras‘ idea that human knowledge of any given object is constructed through previous 
experiences and judgments of it, namely a type of synthesis through inferences. My 
interpretation of the epistemological obstacles will also shed light on the point that the 
fragment needs to be read as a general statement, since no human being, in Protagoras‘ eyes, 
is able to escape from such obstacles. Together with this, I shall argue that the sophist‘s 
interests were limited to the study of human affairs, since Protagoras seems to have delimited 
the scope of objects of which human beings can acquire knowledge, separating it from that of 
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objects about which human beings cannot know. 
 
 
1. The peri theōn fragment 
 
1.1. Atheism or agnosticism? 
 
With regard to Protagoras‘ confession of his ignorance concerning the gods, there has been an 
ancient tradition according to which the sophist made an atheistic claim, i.e. disbelief in, or 
denial of, the existence of the gods. Sextus Empiricus (M. 9.54–56: DK80 A12) says that 
there was a group of people who held atheistic views, such as Diagoras, Prodicus, Critias, 
and Theodorus. Critias, for instance, is reported to have said that the ancient lawgivers 
invented God as a kind of overseer of the right and wrong actions of men, in order to make 
sure, through fear of vengeance at the hands of the Gods, that nobody injured his neighbours 
(cf. DK88 B25). Then Sextus Empiricus states that, according to some, Protagoras agreed 
with those who held an atheistic view.
95
 Eusebius (P.E. 14.3.7: DK80 B4) suggests that 
Protagoras held an atheistic view when he introduced the PTH fragment. Among modern 
scholars, Dumont (1969, 39) seems to understand the sophist as an atheist, as he categorises 
the PTH fragment as an atheistic statement.
96
 From a passage of Diogenes of Oenoanda‘s 
work (fr. 12c.2.1.19W: DK80 A23), it might be inferred why Protagoras has been counted as 
an atheist by some sources in antiquity and by some modern scholars. In this passage 
Diogenes of Oenoanda says that Protagoras said that he did not know if there were any gods, 
and then argues as follows: 
 
ηνῦην [i.e. κὴ εἰδέλαη, εἰ ζενὶ εἰζίλ] δ' ἐζηὶλ ηὸ 
αὐηὸ η῵η ιέγεηλ εἰδέλαη ὅηη κὴ εἰζίλ. 
This [i.e. not-knowing if there are any gods] is 
the same as saying that he [sc. Protagoras] knows 
that there are no gods. 
 
This is, however, surely unacceptable. For, as Barnes (1982, 449–50) rightly points out, 
Diogenes of Oenoanda here seems to rashly conflate a profession of knowledge with a 
confession of ignorance; the profession of knowledge that I know that not-P (e.g. an atheistic 
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 It is remarkable that the textual evidence of Protagoras‘ PTH fragment in Theophilus (Ad Autol. III.28: C. 
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claim) is not the same as the confession of ignorance that I do not know that P (e.g. an 
agnostic claim). 
 
1.2. The peri theōn fragment as an agnostic statement 
 
Scholarship on the PTH fragment has suggested that Protagoras, making a distinction 
between the question of the existence of the gods and that of their nature, expresses his 
agnostic view about both the gods‘ existence and nature, and that the first sentence of the first 
part of the fragment (outh‘ hōs eisin outh‘ hōs ouk eisin) represents the former question and 
the second sentence (outh‘ hopoioi tines idean) the latter question.97 In order to support this 
suggestion, scholars rely on a reading of the Greek verb eisin in the hōs clauses as working in 
the existential use. Kahn (2003
2
, 302), for instance, arguing that the PTH fragment first 
distinguished the questions of existence from those of nature in antiquity, asserts that ―here in 
what is perhaps the earliest surviving ‗technical‘ use of eimi as existential predicate we see 
that questions of existence are explicitly distinguished from what will later be called 
questions of essence. And we also see that the latter would typically be formulated by 
sentences with ‗be‘ as copula: hopoioi eisi idean.98 This distinction between the existence 
and the essence or nature of the gods corresponds in logical terms to the syntactic contrast 
between esti as existential operator and as first-order copula.‖ Schiappa (1991, 142) supports 
Kahn‘s reading by arguing that ―the construction of Protagoras‘ statement identifies two 
issues: the question of existence (hōs estin) and the question of the gods‘ idean—‗form [i.e. 
shape]‘, ‗nature‘, or ‗appearance‘. Even a veridical reading would juxtapose the question of 
whether ‗they are the case‘ or ‗they are not the case‘ with ‗what they are like in shape.‘ 
Clearly the existence/essence distinction is nascent if not explicit in such a juxtaposition.‖ 
These interpreters seem convinced that the verb einai in the fragment must be intended in an 
existential use since the question concerning the gods‘ essence or nature is referred to by the 
following phrase, hopoioi tines idean. Most modern scholars, accepting Kahn‘s suggestion, 
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 Cicero (De Nat. Deor. I.12.29: DK80 A23) may probably be regarded as the first to suggest this view on 
Protagoras‘ agnosticism. He writes that ‗nor indeed does Protagoras, who himself denies entirely having clear 
knowledge concerning the gods, whether they are (or, they exist) or are not (or, they do not exist), and what their 
nature is, seem to have any concept on the nature of the gods (nec vero Protagoras, qui sese negat omnino de 
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introduction of the fragment in another passage from the same work (I.23.63) and corresponds to the Greek 
adverbial relative hōs, as Protagoras‘ attempt at distinguishing the question of existence from that of nature. 
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 Kahn here restores the omitted verb, eisi, in the original phrase of hopoioi tines idean, which comes from 
Eusebius‘ evidence. 
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thus read the first part of the fragment as follows: ‗on the gods I am not able to know whether 
they exist or they do not exist, or what they are like in nature.‘99 
However, some problems with this suggestion can be pointed out. First, pace Kahn, it is 
not necessary to read the verb eisin in the hōs clauses in an existential sense simply because 
the same verb is read as copula in the following sentence, hopoioi–eisin–tines idean; the 
same verb can still be read in the same way in different clauses. In addition, Kahn‘s argument 
seems to partly commit the fallacy of petitio principii. He, in support of reading the einai in 
the hōs clauses in an existential sense, argues that the same verb in the hopoioi clause is used 
in the copulative sense because it is followed by predication. This argument is based on a 
premiss that the einai must be read as copula when it is followed by predication and as 
existential without predication. However, this premiss does not seem to be entirely the case, 
since, for instance, in a sentence ‗how is he (hōs estin autos)?‘, the verb einai, though not 
followed by predication, is not used in an existential sense. Second, the expression hopoioi 
tines idean most likely implies a question of shape (appearance) in a more literal sense, 
differing from that of nature in general. The Greek word idea, which is etymologically 
connected to eidos (shape), especially in the fifth century BCE, as Untersteiner (1954, 37, n. 
39) pinpoints, was used to mean primarily ‗shape‘, rather than ‗true nature‘ or ‗essence‘. In 
one of Xenophanes‘ famous satires, for example, against those who held anthropomorphic 
views of the gods, the word idea surely indicates the physical shape of the gods, not the 
essence or nature of the gods. This satire goes: ‗if bulls [and horses] and lions had hands so as 
to draw and perform works of art as human beings do, then horses would draw the shapes of 
the gods like horses, and bulls like bulls, and would indeed make their [sc. the gods‘] bodies 
as the bodily frame that each of them has (ἀιι' εἰ ρεῖξαο ἔρνλ βόεο <ἵππνη η'> ἞ὲ ιένληεο ἠ 
γξάςαη ρείξεζζη θαὶ ἔξγα ηειεῖλ ἅπεξ ἄλδξεο, ἵππνη κέλ ζ' ἵππνηζη βόεο δέ ηε βνπζὶλ ὁκνίαο 
θαί <θε> ζε῵λ ἰδέαο ἔγξαθνλ θαὶ ζώκαη' ἐπνίνπλ ηνηαῦζ' νἷόλ πεξ θαὐηνὶ δέκαο εἶρνλ 
<ἕθαζηνη>)‘ (Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies (Stromata), V.110 (II.400.1.St.): DK21 
B15). It is apparent that in the satire Xenophanes refers to the exterior shape of the gods by 
the word idea. It is not difficult to find the use of idea to refer to the shape or the appearance 
of things in other Greek texts in this period.
100
 Thus it does not seem conclusive that 
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Plutarch, On the Birth of the Spirit in Timaeus 1023c10 ff. and Summary of the Birth of the Spirit in Timaeus 
1031b1 ff.; Clemens Romanus (Pope Clement I) et Clementina Theol., Homily XVI.10.4.2. ff.; Hippolytus, 
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Protagoras employed the word idea in order to refer to essence or nature, or to raise a 
question concerning that of the gods. If Protagoras, a father of Greek grammar and the 
correct usage of language, indeed had wanted to express his ignorance of the whole ‗nature‘ 
of the gods, he then would have rather employed the word which refers to it more naturally, 
literally and directly (in accordance with his emphasis on the correct use of language):
101
 for 
example, hopoioi tines (pasan) physin eisin.
102
 
The idea (shape) of one thing is, of course, a part of its nature. However, still a 
particular question concerning a single part of gods‘ nature, i.e. the question of their shape, 
cannot fully be counted as equivalent to a general question concerning their whole nature. 
Shape is just one aspect of the nature which the gods hold. Besides the shape, there must be 
other aspects of nature of the gods such as their characters or divine powers. As far as this 
point is concerned, it is not adequate to take the first part of the sentence to be a question 
concerning the gods‘ existence simply because a question concerning a part of the gods‘ 
nature immediately follows. 
Ancient sources report that Protagoras had learned and spoken of the gods in various 
ways (cf. D.L. 9.55: DK80 A1; V.S. 1.10: DK80 A2; and Prot. 320c8–322d5: DK80 C1). It 
does not seem quite likely to assume that someone who has learned about the gods 
(especially by the professional religious teachers such as Persian Magi in Protagoras‘ case) 
and spoken about them too completely doubts the gods‘ existence, even though the possibility 
for him to be ignorant of the gods‘ nature still remains. He can say something about the gods‘ 
nature to some extent as much as he knows, but at the same time he can admit that he is 
ignorant of the gods‘ whole nature as long as he does not fully know about it. In this respect, I 
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87 
propose that Protagoras may have not intended to question about the gods‘ existence in his 
fragment; rather the sophist attempted to bring a question concerning the gods‘ nature by the 
hōs clauses and a question concerning the gods‘ shapes by the hopoioi clause, as Kerferd 
(1981a, 167) carefully argues that ―all that can properly be inferred from Protagoras‘ 
surviving words is that he gave expression to the view that it was not possible to discover the 
nature of the gods.‖ 
After confessing to be ignorant of the gods‘ nature, confessing again to be ignorant of 
the gods‘ shape may sound somehow redundant. Presumably, however, confession of 
ignorance of the gods‘ shape would be as striking and discomforting as that of ignorance of 
the gods‘ nature to those who live in strong religious culture, building up many religious arts 
and works of the gods such as their statues, like the Greeks (of course including the 
Athenians) in antiquity; their religious works and arts would probably be dependent upon 
their certain ideas on the physical and exterior shape of the gods. In this case, the confession 
of the ignorance of the gods‘ shape might have been considered a serious provocation to 
attack their ideas about the gods‘ shape that are believed to be certain and utilised all the time 
for such art and religious works. People who lived in Greek religious culture, for example, 
would take it insulting and impious if someone said ‗I am not able to know who he is‘ when 
he was looking at a statue that wears a crown and holds a trident or a statue that holds in his 
left hand a shining sceptre, on top of which an eagle perches, ready to take off at any moment 
and do the god‘s bidding. Questioning or confessing ignorance of the gods‘ shape, in this 
regard, is not necessarily taken to be redundant, but rather emphasising and strengthening the 
question of the gods‘ nature. Accordingly, again, there remains some scope for believing that 
Protagoras questions the gods‘ nature in a general sense by the first sentence and the gods‘ 
shape in a particular sense by the second sentence. 
 
 
2. The epistemological obstacles 
 
In the second part of the PTH fragment, Protagoras introduces the things that prevent him 
from knowing the gods, i.e. the so-called ‗epistemological obstacles‘.103 He says that the 
obstacles are many (polla ta kōluonta), but presents only two such obstacles, the obscurity of 
the gods and the shortness of human life. It is dubious whether two obstacles can be 
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considered many. It would seem possible to assume that there were indeed more than two 
obstacles offered by Protagoras when he read in public (the book in which) the PTH fragment 
(was its incipit), yet these others have been omitted in the transmission. This assumption, 
however, may well be gratuitous; we should rather depend solely on the remaining 
testimonies. Mansfeld (1981, 40, n. 6) gives a plausible suggestion in this regard, arguing that 
the phrase ‗polla ta kōluonta‘ appears to have been an idiomatic expression, perhaps best 
rendered as ‗there is more than one thing in the way‘. 
 
2.1. The obscurity (adēlotēs) of the gods 
 
2.1.1. Are the gods objects of human experience? 
 
Regarding the first epistemological obstacle, the obscurity of the gods, scholars have 
suggested that the gods are not objects of human experience and thus obscure to Protagoras. 
Untersteiner (1954, 26–8), for instance, proposes that the gods are obscure to Protagoras 
because in Protagoras‘ eyes the gods by their nature are not objects of human (‗perceptual‘ or 
‗sensory‘) experience. He then argues that Protagoras who cannot experience the gods due to 
their nature beyond human experience cannot know about them. Untersteiner, taking ‗the 
obscurity‘ in the PTH fragment to mean ‗the impossibility of having an experience of the 
gods‘, concludes that as the gods are obscure, Protagoras has to confess that he himself is 
―not in position to experience the gods‘ phenomenal existence or otherwise, nor their nature 
with regard to their external manifestation.‖ The suggestion that the gods are not objects of 
human experience because they are beyond human experience, then, means that they have 
never been experienced by men, and also will never be experienced by them at all, in 
accordance with their nature. Gomperz (1901, 457) similarly suggests that ―hitherto no one 
has seen gods; but human life is too short, and the field of our observation too restricted, to 
affirm or deny with certainty the traces of their activity in the world of nature and man. 
Accordingly, Protagoras withheld his verdict‖ on the gods. 
The expression ‗beyond human experience‘ in Untersteiner‘s suggestion, however, needs 
further clarification in two regards; experience could mean either all types of experience, 
both direct and indirect, or only direct experience; likewise, ‗beyond human experience‘ can 
mean either (a) ‗beyond all types of experience, both directly and indirectly‘, in general, or 
(b) ‗only beyond direct experience‘ in particular. Let us take a passage from the Apology 
20e8–21a7 as an example to explain the difference between direct and indirect experiences of 
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the gods: ‗this man [sc. Chaerephon] was my [sc. Socrates‘] friend from youth … and went to 
Delphi at one time and ventured to interrogate the oracle and, … he asked if any man was 
wiser than I [sc. Socrates], and the Pythian replied that no one was wiser (νὗηνο ἐκόο ηε 
ἑηαῖξνο ἤλ ἐθ λένπ … θαὶ δή πνηε θαὶ εἰο Δειθνὺο ἐιζὼλ ἐηόικεζε ηνῦην καληεύζαζζαη θαί, 
… ἢξεην γὰξ δὴ εἴ ηηο ἐκνῦ εἴε ζνθώηεξνο. ἀλεῖιελ νὖλ ἟ Ππζία κεδέλα ζνθώηεξνλ 
εἶλαη).‘104 From this passage we can explicitly see two different types of experiences of the 
gods. It would amount to a case of indirect experience of the gods that Chaerephon and 
Socrates heard of the god‘s saying from the Pythian oracle that Socrates was the wisest 
among human beings; while the oracle‘s direct interaction with the god would be considered 
a case of direct experience of the gods. 
Taking this difference between a direct experience of the gods and an indirect one into 
consideration, if Untersteiner‘s expression ‗beyond human experience‘ concerns case (a), 
then his suggestion means that Protagoras argues that the gods are beyond all types of human 
experience, both directly and indirectly. On the contrary, if his expression concerns case 
(b)—Untersteiner seems to clearly mean this—then, he means that Protagoras argues that the 
gods are beyond only human direct experience and that it is still possible to experience the 
gods indirectly but impossible to know something through indirect experience. 
It does not seem plausible to apply case (a), ‗beyond all types of experience, both 
directly and indirectly‘, to Protagoras, since it is not congruent with ancient sources‘ reports 
that the sophist received education about the gods by the professional religious teachers (cf. 
V.S. 1.10: DK80 A2) and that he was well aware of ancient mysterious religions and 
prophecy as well those in his time (cf. Prot. 316d–e). In addition, Protagoras seems to 
express his views on the gods, when offering the second epistemological obstacle impeding 
knowledge of the gods, i.e. the shortness of human life. The concept ‗shortness‘ is acquired in 
comparison with others in length or duration; Protagoras would gain the concept of the 
shortness of human life, I propose, probably in comparison with something of ‗longer‘ (or 
‗permanent‘) duration, particularly with the gods‘ long or permanent life.105 From this point 
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 On human direct and indirect contact with the gods in Attic period, cf. Coulet (1999), 78–9. 
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 The human life can be considered short in relation with the difficulty of the task of knowing the gods, not 
with the longer or permanent length of the gods‘ life. For instance, fully understanding Plato‘s philosophy or 
knowing the political system and history in the UK, or in the history of human race, is a difficult task, and thus 
someone might say that he is not able to know it, acknowledging it to be a difficult task. Nevertheless, he will 
not blame the shortness of human life for his inability to know it; rather he will simply and evidently blame the 
difficulty of the task. In other words, the difficulty of a task does not necessarily make him say that human life is 
too short to know it, but that the given task is too difficult to know it, no matter how long his life is. If the 
difficulty of the task is the reason for him to be unable to know the task, the shortness of human life is no longer 
an obstacle at all. Protagoras would have said that he was not able to know the gods because of the difficulty of 
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of view, Protagoras seems to express at least a certain idea about the gods that they have a 
longer or permanent life (than that of human beings‘). If the sophist had a certain type of 
concept of the gods, i.e. the concept of their longer (or permanent) life duration, he would not 
take them to be absolutely beyond all types of human (or at least his) experience, both direct 
and indirect. 
Applying case (b), ‗only beyond direct experience‘, to Protagoras also does not seem 
appropriate. This case means that in the PTH fragment Protagoras argues that the gods are 
beyond human direct experience and thus it is impossible to know them, although it is still 
possible to experience them indirectly through hearing about them from poets or prophets, or 
learning about them from religious teachers. Thus, this case pinpoints that in Protagoras‘ 
view acquiring knowledge of something is possible only through direct experience of it, such 
as direct interaction with it by seeing or hearing it; while it is impossible to know it through 
indirect experience, like hearing about it from someone else like teachers or educators. 
This case, however, at the same time, seems to attempt to demolish Protagoras‘ feature 
as a teacher, although such demolition may not be Untersteiner‘s purpose as he repeatedly 
emphasises Protagoras‘ role as an educator (cf. Untersteiner (1954), 3–5 and 64–5), because 
direct experience is taken to be the only source for knowledge in this case. As we have seen 
in the previous chapters, Protagoras is said to have professed to teach political virtues, i.e. 
‗good deliberation concerning domestic affairs, how best to manage one‘s household, and 
concerning the affairs of the city, how to be the most influential in the affairs of the city, both 
in action and speech (ηὸ δὲ κάζεκά ἐζηηλ εὐβνπιία πεξὶ η῵λ νἰθείσλ, ὅπσο ἂλ ἄξηζηα ηὴλ 
αὑηνῦ νἰθίαλ δηνηθνῖ, θαὶ πεξὶ η῵λ η῅ο πόιεσο, ὅπσο ηὰ η῅ο πόιεσο δπλαηώηαηνο ἂλ εἴε θαὶ 
πξάηηεηλ θαὶ ιέγεηλ)‘ (Prot. 318e5–319a2). Also, the historical event that Protagoras, having 
kept a close relationship with Pericles, had advised him about political affairs and taken a 
task to establish a colonial law for Thurii at the request of the politician (Heraclides Ponticus, 
fr. 150 and D.L. 9.50: DK80 A1),
106
 seems to fairly prove Protagoras‘ role as an expert of 
political virtues.
107
 As far as his profession and task are concerned, it is surely right to 
assume that Protagoras both claims to be and is a professional in doing and teaching political 
                                                                                                                                                        
the task, if he really thought it to be an obstacle, instead of offering the shortness of human life as an obstacle. 
Even if it is possible for someone to say that the human life is too short to know a difficult task, in this case still 
he obviously expresses some views about the task, such as its toughness or inaccessibility, i.e. difficulty. If he 
does have no views at all about the task, he cannot take the task to be difficult. 
106
 Cf. Muir (1982), 17–24; Barrett (1987), 10; De Romilly (1992), viii and 21. Cf. also Section 1 in Chapter I 
above. 
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 For the genuine character of Protagoras‘ profession, cf. Men. 91d–92a; Maguire (1977), 104–5 in Zilioli 
(2007), 94, n. 12; Kerferd (1981a), 25–6. 
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art and political affairs in the city. If so, then, how can one who emphasises direct experience 
of any given object as the only source for knowledge and neglects the role of indirect 
experience in constructing knowledge, profess to teach such issues? Protagoras professes to 
educate his disciples in political virtues, that is to say, he promises them knowledge of 
political virtues, by means of offering indirect experiences of such subject to them. Taking 
this point of view into consideration, Protagoras does not seem to intend to make such 
distinction between direct experiences and indirect ones with regard to reaching knowledge. 
Despite his profession of teaching, one may conjecture, Protagoras may insist upon the 
importance of direct experience about certain types of objects, such as political virtues, and 
emphasise that only by the direct experiences of political virtues men can acquire knowledge 
of how to manage public affairs and be good citizens. However, no extant textual evidence of 
Protagoras supports such conjecture. In addition, as we have briefly looked at above, this 
conjecture does not seem to fit what Protagoras professes; he is illustrated to have simply 
professed that, unlike other teachers who have abused their students by forcing them to learn 
what they do not want to learn, he will teach only what his pupils want to learn from him, 
that is to say, political art and how to be a good citizen. (cf. Prot. 318d7–319a2: DK80 A5). 
Protagoras‘ profession here does not seem to entail that the sophist indeed admits that some 
political knowledge can be acquired only through direct experience. 
Furthermore, the second obstacle, the shortness of human life, offered by Protagoras in 
the PTH fragment, again implies that if human beings had a longer (or permanent) life they 
could know the gods.
108
 If Protagoras indeed intended to mean by ‗obscurity‘ human innate 
impossibility of experiencing the gods due to their nature beyond human experience, then the 
second obstacle becomes, of course, entirely hollow, since he could not yet know their nature 
even if the human life were longer, or even permanent (cf. the following section of this 
chapter for the detailed discussion on the role and meaning of the second obstacle). Inasmuch 
as the second obstacle is to be taken as an obstacle to knowledge of the gods, in Protagoras‘ 
eyes the gods are found as something that still lies in the realm of human experience. 
Regarding the gods‘ obscurity, instead of suggesting that the gods are beyond human 
experience, Guthrie (1971, 234) proposes a relativist reading of the PTH fragment in the light 
of the Platonic reading of the MMD in the Theaetetus 151d–186e, i.e. a relativist 
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 Against this implication, one may argue that although human life is not short but long enough, still 
Protagoras cannot know the gods. However, this argument works only if it is fairly assumed that Protagoras 
would admit other types of obstacles that may possibly prevent him from knowing the gods, such as human 
limited rationality. Yet, Protagoras does not offer any other obstacles than those that he introduced in the PTH 
fragment. 
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epistemological claim, arguing that ―some believed in gods and some did not, and so, in 
accordance with the ‗man the measure‘ principle, gods existed for some and not for others; 
but for Protagoras himself suspension of judgement was the only possible course.‖ In 
Guthrie‘s argument the gods are existent or good for those to whom they appear existent or 
good, while they are not existent or good for those to whom they do not appear existent or 
good. 
This proposal may be a convenient way to understand Protagoras‘ agnosticism of the 
gods, but indeed inappropriate and careless, if we take into account the distinctive meaning 
and structure of the PTH fragment in comparison with the MMD. The MMD runs that ‗man 
is the measure of all things, of things that are that/how they are and of things that are not 
that/how they are not (πάλησλ ρξεκάησλ κέηξνλ ἐζηὶλ ἄλζξσπνο, η῵λ κὲλ ὄλησλ ὡο ἔζηηλ, 
η῵λ δὲ νὐθ ὄλησλ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ)‘, and its Platonic reading is that a thing which appears/is 
experienced as F to/by a is F for a (at t
1
), while the same thing which appears/is experienced 
as ¬F to/by a is ¬F for a (at t
2
). If we apply the Platonic reading of the MMD to the PTH 
fragment, it is inferred that the gods‘ nature which appears/is experienced as F to/by 
Protagoras is F for him (at t
1
), and the gods‘ nature which appear/is experienced as ¬F to/by 
him is ¬F for him (at t
2
). In this case, however, his judgements about the gods are rather a 
profession of knowledge or certain belief than a confession of ignorance. Paradoxically the 
relativist reading of the PTH fragment in the light of the MMD makes the fragment unable to 
be agnostic, as Gomperz (1901, 457, cited in Guthrie (1971), 234, n. 2) points out that ―if 
Protagoras had believed, as Plato said he did, that ‗every man‘s truth is the truth which 
appears to him‘, he could not have said what he did about the gods.‖109 
 
2.1.2. The obscurity as a result of various experiences of the gods 
 
Yet, Protagoras said what he did about the gods, clearly confessing his ignorance of them. If 
Protagoras took the gods not to be beyond human experience but to be objects of human 
experience, and if he did not proceed with a relativist viewpoint concerning the gods, why 
did Protagoras then not claim his profession of knowledge or certain belief of the gods in the 
PTH fragment, rather than confessing that ‗I am not able to know (ouk echō eidenai)‘ them? 
In seeking an answer to this question, it would be helpful to review Woodruff‘s suggestion 
(1985, 496). Woodruff first admits that for Protagoras man can have experiences of the gods. 
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Then, distinguishing ‗what is not experienced [his term, ‗perceived‘] yet‘ from ‗what is not 
experience-able [his term, ‗perceivable‘]‘ and applying the former to the case of Protagoras‘ 
PTH fragment, he argues that since the gods have never appeared to and thus been 
experienced by Protagoras, they are obscure to him. The implication here is that the gods are 
obscure to those who have no experience of them, while to those who have experienced them 
they are not obscure, but apparent. Hence Woodruff concludes that Protagoras can say ―I 
don‘t know the gods‖ because he has had no experience of the gods yet. 
His suggestion, especially the expression ‗what is not experienced yet‘ in particular, 
however, seems to result in the same problem as Untersteiner‘s suggestion did above; 
Woodruff‘s suggestion can mean either (a) that Protagoras had no kind of experience of the 
gods yet, both directly and indirectly, and thus the sophist was not able to know the gods, or 
(b) that Protagoras had merely indirect experiences of them, through, for instance, hearing 
about them from poets or prophets, or learning about them from religious teachers, but no 
direct experience of the gods and thus was unable to know the gods—like Untersteiner, 
Woodruff also seems to considers case (b). And, like Untersteiner‘s suggestion, Woodruff‘s 
expression in both cases does not seem plausible: again, Protagoras‘ education that he 
received about the gods by the professional religious teachers (cf. V.S. 1.10: DK80 A2) and 
his knowledge about ancient religion and prophecy (cf. Prot. 316d–e) become incongruent 
with case (a); and under case (b), Protagoras‘ profession of teaching (cf. Prot. 318e5–319a2) 
becomes meaningless, ironically against Woodruff‘s high evaluation of the sophist‘s 
education in political virtues (2005, 158–9 and 195–201; 2007, 1–11). 
Further, the phrase ‗I don‘t know (ouk oida)‘, which Woodruff adopts as Protagoras‘ 
expression of ignorance,
110
 in fact differs in meaning from the expression ‗I am not able to 
know (ouk echō eidenai)‘ in the fragment. Although both specify someone‘s ignorance of 
something at a certain moment, the latter refers to his inability to attain knowledge of it, 
whereas the former points to the mere fact of his present ignorance. The former does not 
impinge on his capability of coming to know the thing at some other times. Inasmuch as in 
the fragment Protagoras states that ‗I am not able to know‘, he most likely intends by this to 
convey both his ignorance at the moment of making his claim and his inability to acquire 
knowledge of the gods. 
In view of the discussion above, Woodruff‘s suggestion notwithstanding, it remains 
plausible that Protagoras himself had experiences, either direct or indirect, of the gods to 
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some extent, while confessing his ignorance of them. The question immediately arises here 
on what grounds he may make his confession of ignorance, ‗I am not able to know‘, 
concerning the gods. The compatibility between a view that Protagoras has experience of the 
gods and a view that he confesses to be ignorant of them also needs to be addressed. As for a 
possible answer to these matters, I shall exemplify two relevant cases, the gods‘ different 
character and shapes when they appear to human beings at different times. 
If a thing is experienced by someone in different ways and shapes at different times, he 
must have difficulties to attain certainty, or knowledge in a general sense, about the thing. In 
other words, if a person experiences a thing x as F at t
1
 and as G at t
2
, it is difficult for him to 
know in which way he should determine x, whether as F and as G, on account of its 
uncertainty, namely, its ‗obscurity‘. The obscurity brought from different—and perhaps 
sometimes conflicting—experiences may lead him to a state of ignorance in which he cannot 
be sure about the thing at all. We can easily find this sort of obscurity applying to the gods in 
ancient texts, especially in epics and poems. In the Odyssey, for instance, mortals do not 
experience the gods in merely one shape or character. Telemachus experiences the goddess 
Athena appearing as a stranger from another country at one time, and as Mentor, one of 
Telemachus‘ friends, at the other. Once, Telemachus sees her flying away from his house in 
the shape of an eagle. Odysseus encounters the same goddess appearing as a little girl. 
Likewise, at one time the goddess appears good, generous and caring, while appearing strict, 
harsh and threatening at the other times.
111
 When Athena appears generous in the shape of a 
stranger from another country to Telemachus, he must have an experience of her character 
and shape as she appears, so then he will probably have a view on her character and shape as 
a generous stranger from another country at that time. But when Athena appears strict in the 
shape of Mentor to Telemachus, it is obvious that he experiences her character and shape as 
she appears, so he must have a view of her shape and character as strict Mentor that time. 
With two different views regarding the goddess‘ character and shape, Telemachus, if asked 
                                                 
111
 Respectively, Od. I.113, II.267, I.319, and VII.31–33. Indeed, according to some, Protagoras is said to have 
been well aware of epics and poems. In one place (Prot. 338e6–339a3, 339a6 ff.), Protagoras emphasises the 
importance of poems for education, saying that ‗the greatest part of a man‘s education is to be skilled in poetry; 
that is, to be able to understand the words of poets, what has been rightly and what wrongly composed, and to 
know how to distinguish them and to give an account when questioned (ἀλδνὶ παηδείαο κέγηζηνλ κέξνο εἶλαη 
πεξὶ ἐπ῵λ δεηλὸλ εἶλαη· ἔζηηλ δὲ ηνῦην ηὰ ὑπὸ η῵λ πνηεη῵λ ιεγόκελα νἷόλ η' εἶλαη ζπληέλαη ἅ ηε ὀξζ῵ο πεπνίεηαη 
θαὶ ἃ κή, θαὶ ἐπίζηαζζαη δηειεῖλ ηε θαὶ ἐξσηώκελνλ ιόγνλ δνῦλαη)‘ and quotes a poem of Simonides for 
elaborated discussion. In another place (Poet. 19.1456b15: DK80 A29), he criticises Homer for his incorrect use 
of moods (ηί γὰξ ἄλ ηηο ὑπνιάβνη ἟καξη῅ζζαη ἃ Πξσηαγόξαο ἐπηηηκᾷ, ὅηη εὔρεζζαη νἰόκελνο ἐπηηάηηεη εἰπὼλ 
"κ῅ληλ ἄεηδε ζεά"; ηὸ γὰξ θειεῦζαη, θεζίλ, πνηεῖλ ηη ἠ κὴ ἐπίηαμίο ἐζηηλ). Protagoras is also said to have 
indulged in literary criticism of Homer (cf. Ammonius, Scholium on Homer (POxy II no. 68) col. XII.20 on 
Iliad XXI.240: DK80 A30). 
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about it, may suspend his decision about it, and then confesses his ignorance of it. Simply, he 
is not able to determine her shape and character due to her different appearances at different 
times. 
 
2.1.3. Synthesis in Protagoras‘ epistemology 
 
From the point of view that one‘s various experiences of a given object lead one to a state of 
ignorance, we can infer an interesting but significant aspect in Protagoras‘ epistemology, 
which I call a ‗synthesis‘, that is not found in the Platonic reading of the MMD in the 
Theaetetus. This synthesis is an epistemological result of judgements, i.e. a newly 
constructed intelligent judgement from previous judgements and beliefs gained through 
experiences. 
Protagoras (or Telemachus), by merely juxtaposing the judgements from his experiences 
about Athena that he gained through hearing the Odyssey (or via Telemachus‘ direct 
interactive experiences of her in the text), could have stated that he is able to know her shape 
and character. However, Protagoras ends up confessing his ignorance. This type of ignorance 
is a sort of result of synthesis of previously gained various judgements. This synthesis is not a 
mere juxtaposition of judgements and experiences, because, concerning Athena‘s shape or 
character there has been no Protagoras‘ (or Telemachus‘) experience at all which coincides 
with his final statement that ‗I am not able to know her shape or character‘; that is to say, no 
experiential situation corresponds to such confession of ignorance. The confession of this 
type of ignorance derives neither from an individual and single judgement (e.g. ‗x = F (at t1)‘ 
or ‗x = G (at t2)‘), nor from mere juxtaposition (e.g. ‗x = F + G‘); it is rather inferred from 
two or more different statements made through previous experiences, namely, a synthesis of 
various statements like ‗x = F‘ and ‗x = G‘. The difference between a statement ‗x = F‘ and a 
statement ‗x = G‘ brings forth a new statement ‗x = ?‘, which does not correspond to any 
particular experience. This point can be briefly explained as follows: 
 
(1) ‗x is F‘. (a case of a particular experience of x) 
(2) ‗x is G‘. (another case of a particular experience of x) 
(3) Therefore, ‗x is F and G‘. (a case of expanded knowledge of x via a juxtaposition of (1) and (2)) 
(4) Or, ‗x is …?‘. (a case of ignorance of x via a synthesis of (1) and (2)) 
 
Case (3) is composed through juxtaposing (1) and (2) and thus, of course, includes the 
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contents of (1) and (2) in it, corresponding the cases (1) and (2) particularly as well; whereas 
case (4), albeit composed also via synthesising (1) and (2), is newly concluded from the 
contents of (1) and (2), not corresponding to the cases (1) and (2). After synthesising previous 
judgements, one comes to reach a conclusion of ignorance. Again, ignorance of something, a 
unique cognitive state, results from the synthesis of previous different judgements about it. 
The implication here is that neither Telemachus, having direct experiences of Athena, 
nor Protagoras (or the readers of the Odyssey), having indirect experiences of her, can 
identify Athena‘s character and shape, on account of her capricious manifestations to mortals 
in different shapes at different times. This sort of obscurity can be fairly applied to one of 
Protagoras‘ statements regarding the gods. 
As seen above in Chapter II above, Protagoras presents the Myth in the Protagoras to 
explain the origins of living creatures and human societies. There he characterises Zeus as a 
just and generous god caring for human beings and distributing to them a sense of what is 
right (dikē) and a sense of shame (aidōs) to save them from extinction. At the same time, 
however, in Greek mythology Zeus is also illustrated as an immoderate god satisfying his 
own desires by, for example, having an affair with Io, and also an unjust god by cheating on 
Hera, his wife (cf. Pr. 589–592, 640–686). In this case it is not easy for human beings to hold 
a certain and concrete judgment about the nature and character of Zeus.
112
 
Moreover, it is also remarkable that Protagoras is said to have been born in Abdera in 
Thrace under Persian culture and spent his youth with education by the Persian magi (V.S. 
1.10: DK80 A2; cf. also Section 1 in Chapter I above), and later travelled much not only 
around Greece but also in Asia and Persia during his adult life. He would, presumably, have 
been exposed to, and thus accumulated, a number of different ideas about different types of 
gods, encountering various and contradictory views concerning them with the Hellenic gods 
characterised as good, just, and generous by the Greeks, while as evil, unjust, and hostile by 
the Persians, and vice versa (cf. Pers. 350). Under such circumstance, the most likely way to 
make a statement about the gods for Protagoras would probably be to confess that ‗I am not 
able to know them‘ on account of various experiences of their uncertain and obscure shapes 
and nature. 
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 Not only the case that in some passages of a poem a god might be said to be F, but in other passages of the 
same poem, Y, but also the case of learning about the gods through hearing different poems of different poets, 
will be regarded in the same way. A poet might speak about a god as F; on the contrary another poet might speak 
about the same god as G. In this case too, of course, F and G can refer not only to the gods‘ shapes but also to 
their characters or nature. We can apply the same interpretation to the case of oracles as well. Although oracles 
interact with the gods directly and play a role as messengers (or mediums) in delivering the gods‘ voice to 
people, this does not mean that they thus have knowledge of them. 
97 
Two or more various judgements may result not in ignorance but in juxtaposed and 
extended knowledge, namely, ‗x = F + G + …‘; in relation to the case of knowing Athena, for 
instance, Protagoras‘ (or Telemachus‘) knowledge of the goddess‘ character and shape would 
presumably amount to the judgement that she is both good and strict, and has both the shapes 
of a stranger and Mentor. Likewise, his knowledge of Zeus could result in the judgement that 
the god is sometimes just and generous, and at other times is unjust and greedy. Protagoras 
would thus have had to say that ‗I (am able to) know the gods‘, expressing extended 
knowledge of them acquired through his previous and extensive experiences and judgements 
about them. But, as we know from the PTH fragment, Protagoras does not profess knowledge 
of the gods. Why not? Does synthesis in Protagoras‘ epistemology all the time result only in 
ignorance? 
To gain an answer to these matters, I shall argue that Protagoras may intend to divide 
objects into two realms; the objects of which human beings can attain knowledge, for 
instance, the subjects that Protagoras professes to teach such as political virtues, and the 
objects of which human beings cannot obtain knowledge, while having some judgements of 
them on the basis of their experience of them, for example, the gods. This division seems to 
be caused in Protagoras‘ eyes by the difference between those things which can be 
sufficiently synthesised and those which are insufficiently synthesised, for a construction of 
knowledge through human experiences about them. Hence, when aiming at the objects in the 
knowable realm, of course, synthesis in Protagoras‘ epistemology helps people to reach a 
positive level of certainty or knowledge. On what grounds, then, does Protagoras design such 
division? Or, by what criteria does Protagoras discern the possibility of sufficient synthesis 
from that of insufficient synthesis? As I shall clarify shortly, the division seems grounded on 
the second epistemological obstacle, the shortness of human life. 
 
2.2. The shortness of human life (brachys ōn ho bios tou anthrōpou) 
 
Protagoras‘ use of obscurity, however, does not only apply to the case of the gods. Whatever 
is experienced by man in different ways at different times is naturally obscure. In fact, 
Protagoras is not likely to have said that there are some things of which man can have 
experiences always only in one certain and single way. In this regard, everything is 
considered obscure. Even political virtues would probably be experienced differently by 
98 
different men under different circumstances in different cities and times.
113
 But Protagoras 
does not claim that he is not able to know political virtues; rather he claims to know them, 
professing to teach them to his disciples. For Protagoras, thus, there seems to be a division 
between things that man can know and things that man cannot know. Such division is, I 
suggest, made on a condition of the shortness of human life. 
In clarifying the term ‗shortness‘ more closely, it may help us to compare it with 
‗redness‘. These two differ from each other, though they both are acquired from experience: 
the latter is conceived absolutely and independently, while the former is conceived from 
comparison under a certain condition (e.g. the length or duration in the case of shortness) 
between two or more things; that is, ‗short‘ is a relative of some kind (cf. Cat. VII.6a37–
8b24). Let us consider the case of an apple that is experienced to be small and red. In this 
case, one who sees the apple can directly experience its redness by itself. On the contrary, 
one will not be able to directly experience its smallness without reference to other items. One 
can experience, and further cognise, the smallness of the apple only when comparing it in 
size with something bigger than the apple, such as other bigger apples or watermelons; one 
can experience the bigness of the same apple as well when comparing it with something 
smaller than it, such as small strawberries.
114
 
Likewise, the ‗shortness‘ of human life is what is cognised not from direct experience 
but from comparison with other things in length or duration. Then what should we think 
Protagoras compares human life with to confirm it to be short in length? It would be most 
probable that in the fragment Protagoras indeed makes a case for the shortness of human life, 
in comparison with, if implicitly, the long, or likely permanent, length of the gods‘ life—in 
this respect, Protagoras is seen to hold a clear and positive idea of the length of the gods‘ life. 
It sounds much less plausible that the sophist is confessing that he is not able to know about 
the gods since human life is shorter than a turtle‘s life—he does not seem to argue that he 
cannot know the gods while turtles can. 
Regarding the shortness of human life, this epistemological obstacle literally implies 
that human beings do not live long enough to know the gods, and thus that human beings 
would be able to know them if their lives were long enough, particularly as long as the 
duration of the gods‘ life—in Protagoras‘ thought, however, no human being can live as long 
as the gods do, since human beings were designed as mortals when they were created by the 
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gods (cf. Prot. 320c8–d1). In order to attain knowledge of an object, in the PTH fragment 
Protagoras implicitly but evidently argues that the length of human life must be as long as, or 
capable of covering, the duration of the object. Even though all things are experienced by 
men, only things that last shorter than, or as long as, the length of human life, can be 
known—by synthesising various data and judgements of them previously attained through 
experiences, as Protagoras‘ confession of ignorance itself paradoxically proves. 
On the contrary, of things that last longer than human beings, such as the gods, the 
universe, and the natural things investigated by natural philosophers or astronomers, human 
beings cannot reach certainty or knowledge. In Protagoras‘ opinion, the length of human life 
would probably not be sufficiently long and thus fails to reach a certain position to collect all 
the different types of judgements for a proper and full synthesis. In making such division, 
Protagoras seems to quite possibly draw a sharp line of demarcation between things which 
are knowable and things which are unknowable, while at the same time claiming that 
anything longer than human beings‘ lives, although we can experience it, is unknowable to 
us; in case of the gods‘ shapes and character, as well as their other attributes and nature such 
as their being just and generous, although we can experience them, they are too many and 
wide to be fully collected and synthesised, so that no human being can acquire knowledge of 
them. 
Synthesis, however, does not always result in ignorance. In relation to things that human 
beings can know, such as political virtues, synthesis seems to guarantee knowledge in 
Protagoras‘ thought. Protagoras professed that he himself knew political virtues and was able 
to teach them to those who came to him, and make them good citizens. His profession of 
teaching political virtues would be grounded in the various experiences that he had gained 
around many areas in Greece and Asia, while having associated with professional politicians. 
In this respect, the Protagorean synthesis can further be characterised as a type of knowledge 
which Protagoras intends to teach through various experiences and inferences that can offer 
human beings suitable judgements, namely good deliberation (euboulia), in each situation in 
human life. In doing so Protagoras seems to have founded the warrant for knowledge of the 
subjects of his teaching; yet such a kind of teaching or knowledge about those subjects is 
counted as a mere type of inductive conviction, i.e. a type of epagōgē (cf. Rhet. I.2.1356b8 
and Top. VIII.156a4), whose boundary lies in the range of human experiences in human life. 
Human life, which is considered relatively short, has a twofold meaning: an individual 
human life and the sum of the life of all human beings in human history. Both are regarded as 
short in comparison with the length of the gods‘ life. As well known, Protagoras‘ interest lies 
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mostly in human matters in human communities. Human affairs such as political virtues can 
be accessed through direct practice (e.g. personally engaging in political actions) and indirect 
experience (e.g. learning about them from teachers). While it is not possible for anyone to 
attain knowledge of the gods, it is possible for man to attain knowledge of things related to 
human affairs that have lasted as long as human history. 
 
2.3. A personal opinion or a general statement? 
 
As previously mentioned, some scholars, noticing that the omitted subject in the PTH 
fragment, the first singular ‗I (egō)‘, refers to Protagoras himself, suggest that the fragment 
was designed to express the sophist‘s personal opinion regarding the gods, applying it only to 
his own individual ignorance, not to make a general statement applying to all men.
115
 They 
argue that it is not man in general, but Protagoras himself in particular, who is not able to 
know about the gods, and thus demand that the fragment should not be treated as a general 
philosophical statement. Indeed, in the fragment, taking ‗I (egō)‘ as a subject, Protagoras 
confesses his ignorance of the gods, while in the MMD he employs a word which refers to 
man in general, anthrōpos, to indicate the subject of the doctrine. 
The character of the two epistemological obstacles which justify his ignorance, however, 
proves that the PTH fragment should be understood as a general epistemological statement. 
The gods‘ obscurity, i.e. the fact that they appear differently at different moments, is their 
character which is not a private epistemological obstacle that applies only to Protagoras. It is 
not true that the gods are experienced in a certain single shape and with a certain character by 
every human being except for Protagoras, whereas they are experienced in an obscure way 
only by the sophist. Protagoras, as we have seen above, although he says that he himself is 
not able to know the gods, implicitly emphasises that the reason for his ignorance lies not in 
his own inability to know them, but in the gods‘ characteristic obscurity. Such obscurity of 
the gods is in Protagoras‘ view an obstacle that objectively and universally applies to all 
human beings in general. Also, the shortness of human life is not something applicable only 
to Protagoras, but to all men, since this shortness of human life, as discussed above, is the 
concept acquired in comparison with the very long or eternal life of the gods. As the term 
‗shortness‘ of human life is compared with the length of the gods‘ life, this obstacle turns out 
to be a human intrinsic impediment to knowledge of the gods. Protagoras clearly expresses 
                                                 
115
 On this suggestion, cf. Mansfeld (1981), 40; Woodruff (1985), 496. Cf. also Gagarin (2002), 115–6. 
101 
the shortness of ‗human (anthrōpou)‘ life in a general sense, not the shortness of ‗my (emou)‘ 
life in a private sense. No human being can have a long life in comparison with the gods. 
To sum up, the epistemological obstacles, which equally apply to all human beings, are 
thus considered, at least to Protagoras‘ eyes, a universal and objective epistemological 
condition; no one can know the things beyond this condition. In this regard, it seems, 
therefore, most reasonable to believe that in the PTH fragment Protagoras argues for the 
human intrinsic inability of knowledge of certain objects, here the gods.
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3. Protagoras‘ attempt at anthropological concerns 
 
Despite Protagoras‘ confession of his ignorance of the gods in the PTH fragment, some 
modern scholars have endeavoured to extract from the fragment a positive point, the so-
called Protagorean anthropological concerns, according to which the sophist encourages a 
sort of humanist study focusing on human affairs, turning people‘s interest into them. This 
positive point is first proposed by Jaeger (1947, 176), who calls it an ‗anthropological 
attempt‘. He argues that the first part of the fragment in which Protagoras states that ‗on the 
one hand, on the gods I am not able to know either how they are or how they are not, or what 
they look like in shape‘ points to the sophist‘s intention to change the aim and object of 
human study and interest from physical and cosmological and theological concerns to the 
consideration of human affairs, encouraging ―an anthropological fact to be understood in the 
light of its meaning and function in human civilization and social structure.‖ Schiappa (1991, 
145–6) adds two more points in support of Jaeger‘s suggestion: first, Protagoras at his time 
had contributed, along with Socrates and his followers, towards the beginning of a new epoch 
of philosophy, namely a conversion from natural philosophy to philosophy concerning human 
affairs; second, since he claimed in the fragment that there are many—but, two as all in fact 
(cf. n. 116 above)—obstacles impeding knowledge of the gods, the study of the gods is a 
fruitless attempt which does not bring any benefit to men in Protagoras‘ view. 
More scholars have emphasised Protagoras‘ anthropological concerns drawn from the 
PTH fragment. Dupréel‘s attempt (1948, 58) to read a positive point from the fragment 
focuses on Protagoras‘ intentional emphasis upon human educational practice. Although he 
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does not explicitly use the term ‗anthropology‘ in his argument, he suggests that what 
Protagoras indeed insisted on through the fragment and what followed it must have been the 
important role of pedagogy concerning human affairs, not about things that are unknowable 
to human beings, such as the gods. Barnes‘ suggestion (1982, 450) regarding the positive 
anthropological point of the PTH fragment is grounded on Greek linguistic usage. Observing 
that the fragment begins with the particle men, he suggests that the first words of the 
fragment, peri men theōn (‗on the one hand, on the gods …‘), enable us to presume that the 
discussion may have continued with a sentence introduced by de (‗on the other hand, on …‘). 
Then he stresses that ―the significant part of the fragment is the part we do not possess‖, that 
is to say, the ‗de clause‘. The content of this supposed subsequent part must be a matter of 
speculation; but from the familiar use of men and de we can legitimately suppose that there 
Protagoras may have dealt with human affairs or other things of which he himself would say 
‗I am able to know‘. Barnes thus presumes that the de clause which is answering to the men 
clause ―asserted the possibility of knowledge about men: ‗Of the gods I know nothing; about 
men I speak thus.‘‖ Finally he proposes that in the original complete work Protagoras 
announced that ―theology is to be abjured, and replaced by anthropology,‖ and that as an 
anthropologist he aimed at explaining ―the origins of man, and more particularly, the origin 
of human skills, of human customs, and of human social and moral conventions.‖ Recently, 
Lavery in O‘Grady (2008, 39), arguing that the PTH fragment ―appears not to be irreligious 
or radically sceptical, even if it rules out speculative theology,‖ similarly posits a positive 
position, namely, a Protagorean study on human‘s own affairs. Boys-Stones‘ proposal (2009, 
1–8) to read the PTH fragment as a practically, not theoretically and analytically, atheistic 
claim, on the grounds that Protagoras does not intend to utilise ―the language of God‖ in his 
occupation and activities, can be also seen in relation to the sophist‘s attempt of 
anthropological concerns. 
Indeed, in the light of the practice of humanism, i.e. human activities such as political 
virtues, domestic science, and human language, it seems very likely that Protagoras would 
probably intend to accentuate and encourage anthropological concerns through the PTH 
fragment, rather than a study of natural philosophy or the gods. Certainly, Protagoras‘ 
anthropological concerns resonate with his profession that he is in charge of making people 
clever at speaking (as Socrates and Hippocrates portray the sophist‘s profession in this way in 
the Protagoras), and that unlike other teachers who teach subjects which their students do not 
want to learn, he only teaches the subjects that his pupils want to learn from him, namely 
good deliberation (euboulia) concerning domestic affairs and the affairs of the city, how to be 
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the most influential, both in action and speech, i.e. political art and how to be a good citizen 
and politician (cf. Prot. 312d3–8 and 318d7–319a2: DK80 A5, respectively). It is obvious 
that in Protagoras‘ view these practical subjects producing benefit are experienced throughout 
human life, and the accumulated judgements and ideas about them enable human beings to 
arrive at knowledge of them for a better life in a human community, as the sophist 
emphasises in the Great Speech. 
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Chapter V 
 
Linguistics: The correct use of language 
 
 
According to some ancient sources, Protagoras is said to have paid much attention to the 
study on language, laying down his interest in the correctness of words and names 
(orthoepeia) and correct linguistic and grammatical usage. Modern scholars, crediting him 
with the status of being the first Greek theorist of grammar and linguistics,
117
 have valued 
Protagoras‘ insights on language. In this chapter, I will first present the sources of the 
sophist‘s interest in the correct use of language, and then examine its character and propose 
Protagoras‘ purpose of the linguistics. 
 
 
1. The ancient sources of Protagoras‘ interest in the correct use of language 
 
Some ancient sources have reported Protagoras‘ interest in language. According to the 
sources, his concerns for this topic lie not only in systematic grammatical consistency, but 
also in the correct use of words and names, i.e. collectively language, about objects, in 
accordance with their nature. 
Plato speaks about Protagoras‘ profession of the correctness of words (orthoepeia). In a 
passage from a dialogue on the nature and correctness of words, the Cratylus 391c2–4 (DK80 
A24), Plato briefly mentions that Protagoras taught the correctness of words.
118
 And later in 
a passage from a dialogue on the true meaning and function of rhetoric, the Phaedrus 266d7–
267d4 (DK80 A26), where Socrates and Phaedrus talk about the art of speaking and the 
specialist of speeches, Plato says again that the sophist was a specialist in the same topic: 
 
ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ Πώινπ π῵ο θξάζσκελ αὖ κνπζεῖα 
ιόγσλ—ὡο δ η π ι α ζ η ν ι ν γ ί α λ  θαὶ 
γ λ σ κ ν ι ν γ ί α λ  θαὶ ε ἰ θ ν λ ν ι ν γ ί α λ—
SOC. And what shall we say about Polus‘ gallery 
of discourse (logoi)—speaking with repetition, 
speaking in maxims, and speaking in images—
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ὀλνκάησλ ηε Ληθπκλίσλ ἃ ἐθείλῳ ἐδσξήζαην 
πξὸο πνίεζηλ εὐεπείαο; 
and Licymnius‘ words (onomata) that he gave to 
him for making eloquence? 
ΦΑΙ. Πξσηαγόξεηα δέ, ὦ Σώθξαηεο, νὐθ ἤλ 
κέληνη ηνηαῦη' ἄηηα; 
PHDR. But Socrates, were there not some similar 
things of Protagoras? 
ΣΩ. ὆ ξ ζ ν έ π ε η ά  γέ ηηο, ὦ παῖ, θαὶ ἄιια 
πνιιὰ θαὶ θαιά. 
SOC. Yes, correctness of words, my boy, and 
other many wonderful things too. 
 
In the Rhetoric III.5.1407b6–9 (DK80 A27), Aristotle says that Protagoras distinguished the 
gender of words: 
 
Πξσηαγόξαο ηὰ γέλε η῵λ ὀλνκάησλ δηῄξεη,119 
ἄξξελα θαὶ ζήιεα θαὶ ζθεύε· δεῖ γὰξ ἀπνδηδόλαη 
θαὶ ηαῦηα ὀξζ῵ο· "἟ δ' ἐιζνῦζα θαὶ δηαιερζεῖζα 
ᾤρεην". 
Protagoras has divided the kinds of words, 
masculine, feminine, and neuter: these also must 
be correctly accounted. ‗She, having come and 
having conversed, went away‘. 
 
And in the Sophistical Refutations XIV.173b16–25 (DK80 A28), Aristotle states that 
Protagoras said that some female nouns, such as mēnis (wrath) and pēlēx (helmet) should be 
‗corrected‘ into masculine nouns: 
 
Σνινηθηζκὸο δ' νἷνλ κέλ ἐζηηλ εἴξεηαη πξόηεξνλ· 
ἔζηη δὲ ηνῦην θαὶ πνηεῖλ θαὶ κὴ πνηνῦληα 
θαίλεζζαη θαὶ πνηνῦληα κὴ δνθεῖλ, θαζάπεξ, ὃ 
Πξσηαγόξαο ἔιεγελ, εἰ "ὁ κ῅ληο" θαὶ "ὁ πήιεμ" 
ἄξξελά ἐζηηλ· ὁ κὲλ γὰξ ιέγσλ "νὐινκέλελ" 
ζνινηθίδεη κὲλ θαη' ἐθεῖλνλ, νὐ θαίλεηαη δὲ ηνῖο 
ἄιινηο, ὁ δὲ "νὐιόκελνλ" θαίλεηαη κέλ, ἀιι' νὐ 
ζνινηθίδεη. 
It has been said earlier what sort of thing 
solecism is. It is possible both to commit it, and 
to seem to do so without doing so, and to do so 
without seeming to do so. Let us suppose that 
mēnis and pēlēx are masculine, as Protagoras 
used to say: according to Protagoras, a man who 
calls mēnis a ‗destructress (oulomenē)‘ commits 
a solecism, although he does not seem to do so to 
other people, whereas a man who calls mēnis a 
‗destructor (oulomenon)‘ seems to commit 
solecism, but he does not indeed. 
 
Again, in the Poetics XIX.1456b15–18 (DK80 A29), Aristotle says that Protagoras censured 
Homer for using grammatical moods in an inappropriate way: 
 
ηί γὰξ ἄλ ηηο ὑπνιάβνη ἟καξη῅ζζαη ἃ For who could see the fault in a passage [from 
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Πξσηαγόξαο ἐπηηηκᾷ, ὅηη εὔρεζζαη νἰόκελνο 
ἐπηηάηηεη εἰπὼλ "κ῅ληλ ἄεηδε ζεά"; ηὸ γὰξ 
θειεῦζαη, θεζίλ, πνηεῖλ ηη ἠ κὴ ἐπίηαμίο ἐζηηλ. 
 
Homer] in which [the poet has] a prayer use the 
imperative mood when saying ―Sing, goddess, 
the wrath‖, which Protagoras censures? Because 
to order one to do or not, he says, is a command. 
 
Diogenes Laertius in 9.52 (DK80 A1) describes Protagoras as the first who distinguished the 
tenses of verbs, and in 9.53–54 (ibid.) reports that the sophist divided discourse (logos) into 
four, or even seven according to some, types: 
 
θαὶ πξ῵ηνο κέξε ρξόλνπ δηώξηζε… Also [Protagoras] was the first to distinguish the 
tenses of verbs… 
 
δηεῖιέ ηε ηὸλ ιόγνλ πξ῵ηνο εἰο ηέηηαξα· 
εὐρσιήλ, ἐξώηεζηλ, ἀπόθξηζηλ, ἐληνιήλ (νἱ δὲ 
εἰο ἑπηά· δηήγεζηλ, ἐξώηεζηλ, ἀπόθξηζηλ, 
ἐληνιήλ, ἀπαγγειίαλ, εὐρσιήλ, θι῅ζηλ), νὓο θαὶ 
ππζκέλαο εἶπε ιόγσλ. 
[Protagoras] was the first to divide discourse 
(logos) into four types: entreaty, question, 
answer and command (others say, into seven 
types: narration, question, answer, command, 
report, entreaty, and invitation), and he called 
them the foundations of discourse. 
 
We see that Diogenes Laertius uses an expression ‗merē chronou‘ in 9.52. This expression 
which literally translates ‗the parts of time‘ could have various meanings, but most modern 
scholars have agreed that Protagoras meant by the expression ‗the tenses of verb‘. Pfeiffer 
(1968, 280–1) argues that in order to mean ‗the division of the tenses of verbs‘ this requires 
the plural ‗κέξε ρξόλσλ‘ rather than the singular ‗κέξε ρξόλνπ‘. However, this argument 
does not seem correct, if we understand that the division of the tenses of verbs is grounded on 
the fact that there are parts of time, the past, the present, and the future. A thing which has 
parts in it can be divided into parts without requiring the plural form. For example, it is not 
necessary to say ‗κέξε ἀλζξώπσλ‘ in order to mean that there are parts of a human being 
such as legs and arms and a head—simply by saying with the singular form ‗κέξε ἀλζξώπνπ‘, 
it can be meant that a human being has parts. Dunn (2001, 547–50) suggests that Protagoras‘ 
division of the tenses of verbs is not a formal grammatical idea but a general epistemological 
distinction between the past, the present, and the future, and that Protagoras might have 
insisted that man has ―direct experience of the present, limited memory of the past, and no 
access whatever to the future.‖ This suggestion, however, does not seem convincing. 
In a passage from the Clouds 658–679 (DK80 C3), where Socrates and Strepsiades have 
a talk about the correct word-endings on the basis of the natural gender of things, 
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Aristophanes satirises Protagoras‘ correctness of words: 
 
ΣΩ. ἀιι' ἕηεξα δεῖ ζε πξόηεξα ηνύηνπ 
καλζάλεηλ, η῵λ ηεηξαπόδσλ ἅηη' ἐζηηλ ὀξζ῵ο 
ἄξξελα. 
SOC. But you must learn other things before 
these, like which quadrupeds are correctly 
masculine. 
ΣT. ἀιι' νἶδ' ἔγσγε ηἄξξελ', εἰ κὴ καίλνκαη· 
θξηόο, ηξάγνο, ηαῦξνο, θύσλ, ἀιεθηξπώλ. 
STREP. But I know the masculine ones, if I am not 
mad: ram, billy goat, bull, dog, fowl (alektryōn). 
ΣΩ. ὁξᾷο ἃ πάζρεηο; ηήλ ηε ζήιεηαλ θαιεῖο 
ἀιεθηξπόλα θαηὰ ηαὐηὸ θαὶ ηὸλ ἄξξελα. 
SOC. See what is happening? You are calling the 
female a fowl and the male the same thing. 
ΣT. π῵ο δή, θέξε; STREP. How? Tell me. 
ΣΩ. π῵ο; ἀιεθηξπὼλ θἀιεθηξπώλ. SOC. How? Like this: fowl and fowl. 
ΣT. λὴ ηὸλ Πνζεηδ῵. λῦλ δὲ π῵ο κε ρξὴ θαιεῖλ; STREP. By Poseidon, I am doing! But now how 
should I call them? 
ΣΩ. ἀιεθηξύαηλαλ, ηὸλ δ' ἕηεξνλ ἀιέθηνξα. SOC. She-fowl (alektryaina) for one, he-fowl 
(alektror) for the other. 
ΣT. ἀιεθηξύαηλαλ; εὖ γε λὴ ηὸλ Ἀέξα· ὥζη' 
ἀληὶ ηνύηνπ ηνῦ δηδάγκαηνο κόλνπ δηαιθηηώζσ 
ζνπ θύθιῳ ηὴλ θάξδνπνλ. 
STREP. She-fowl? By Aër, how great! For this 
lesson alone I will fill your barely bowl to the 
brim. 
ΣΩ. ἰδνὺ κάι' αὖζηο, ηνῦζ' ἕηεξνλ. ηὴλ 
θάξδνπνλ ἄξξελα θαιεῖο ζήιεηαλ νὖζαλ. 
SOC. See, you are doing it again! You call the 
bowl (tēn kardopon) masculine, although it is 
feminine. 
ΣT. ηῶ ηξόπῳ; ἄξξελα θαι῵ 'γὼ θάξδνπνλ; STREP. But how? Am I calling it masculine? 
 ······ 
ΣΩ. ὅπσο; ηὴλ θαξδόπελ, ὥζπεξ θαιεῖο ηὴλ 
Σσζηξάηελ. 
SOC. How? The she-bowl (tēn kardopēn), just 
like the way you call the she-Sostrates. 
ΣT. ηὴλ θαξδόπελ ζήιεηαλ; STREP. The she-bowl, feminine? 
ΣΩ. ὀξζ῵ο γὰξ ιέγεηο. SOC. You are [now] speaking correctly. 
 
In this satire Aristophanes has only Socrates and Stepsiades as interlocutors for discussion on 
the correctness of words, and these interlocutors do not even mention Protagoras in their 
conversation; no Protagorean character is presented. For this reason of the absence of 
Protagoras from the scene in the satire, some recent editions of the Protagorean fragments, 
such as Dillon and Gergel‘s edition in 2003, or recent introductions of Protagoras, such as 
Lavery in O‘Grady in 2008, exclude it. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the linguistic niceties 
in the passage can hardly be attributed to Socrates himself. Guthrie (1971, 221) says that 
Aristophanes‘ play ―contains, under the name of Socrates, an attack on Protagoras‘ claim … 
about names, which of them are masculine and which feminine.‖ In this regard, Rademaker 
(2007, 1) also argues that ―[W]hat Aristophanes seems to have done is to produce a—
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comically distorted—amalgam of various elements of Sophistic thought, and attribute it all to 
the most notorious sophist around in Athens about 423 BCE. In case of Socrates‘ theory of 
word genders, there seems to be some reason to think that Aristophanes may have been 
parodying linguistic ideas from Protagoras; in some of the ‗serious‘ sources on Protagoras‘ 
ideas on language, Protagoras is indeed credited with a theory of word genders.‖120 
On account of the ancient sources on Protagoras‘ linguistic interest quoted above, 
modern scholarship, valuing the sophist‘s idea of the correct linguistic and grammatical usage, 
have labelled him the first Greek scholar of grammar and linguistics. For example, Steinthal 
(1891, 136) describes Protagoras‘ distinction between the word genders as ―the discovery of 
the first grammatical fact‖; Porzig (1950, 353) calls Protagoras as ―the first scholarly student 
of language‖; Di Cesare (1996, 104) calls the sophist as ―the founder of grammatical 
research‖; Dillon and Gergel (2003, 341, n. 10) likewise describe him as ―substantially the 
father of Greek grammar‖. But, on what grounds did Protagoras attempt to pursue research on 
language and grammar, and what was Protagoras‘ exact claim regarding this topic? 
 
 
2. The naturalism of language 
 
Plato‘s statements regarding Protagoras‘ correct use of language, as quoted above, show that 
the sophist was concerned with linguistic issues, using an art of language called ‗the 
correctness of words (orthoepeia)‘. His statements, however, do not clearly reveal what the 
art exactly was. Aristotle‘s testimonies seem to offer some clues about Protagoras‘ 
correctness of words, more vividly addressing the sophist‘s observation of the distinction 
between the word genders. Aristotle says that Protagoras divided the kinds of words into 
masculine, feminine, and neuter (Rhet. III.5.1407b6–9), and provides an example of the 
sophist‘s clarification of the gender of words; ‗἟ δ' ἐιζνῦζα θαὶ δηαιερζεῖζα ᾤρεην (she, 
having come and having conversed, went away)‘. Aristotle offers one more example, the 
correction of genders of the nouns mēnis (wrath) and pēlēx (helmet) into masculine (Soph. 
Elen. XIV.173b16–25), and explains that according to Protagoras someone who calls mēnis a 
destructress commits a solecism because of the incongruence between mēnis and its feminine 
modifier (oulomenē), whereas someone who calls mēnis a destructor does not on the grounds 
of the congruence between the word and its masculine modifier (oulomenon). In this example 
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 Cf. also Kanavou (2010), 78–9, where she suggests that Aristophanes in this passage is indeed targeting not 
only Protagoras but also Prodicus. 
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Aristotle clearly shows that Protagoras indeed thought that mēnis which was commonly 
accepted as a feminine word on the grounds of customary background should be corrected 
into a masculine word. 
Aristophanes‘ satire, as quoted above, seems to hint at Protagoras‘ criterion of 
determination of the gender of words. Aristophanes satirises those who maintain the 
correctness of words (and Protagoras secretly standing behind them), by stating that they 
strive to correct fowl (alektyōn) into ‗she-fowl (alektryaina)‘ and ‗he-fowl (alektor)‘, and 
bowl (tēn kardopon) as ‗she-bowl (tēn kardopen)‘. In this satire, the speakers endeavour to 
correct the words in accordance with their natural genders, by correcting their word-endings. 
The correct word-endings are provided by the speakers on the grounds of the morphological 
consistencies between female endings and male ones. 
Inspecting the ancient sources on Protagoras‘ interest in language, we can assume that 
the sophist mainly concerned ‗the grammatical genders on the basis of natural genders of 
things‘ and ‗the morphological consistency‘ of the words based on their grammatical 
genders.
121
 Aristophanes‘ satire exemplifies ‗the grammatical genders on the basis of natural 
genders of things‘; a female fowl is by her nature female, while a male one is male by his 
nature. The correct word for a female fowl must be consistent with its female gender, and 
thus have a feminine form, alektryaina. This is the same for the correct word for a male fowl, 
alektror. Also, as Aristotle testifies, Protagoras said that the feminine mēnis (wrath) and pēlēx 
(helmet) should be corrected into masculine nouns; Protagoras probably viewed that mēnis 
and pēlēx are naturally ‗unfeminine‘ in character, being especially associated with the male 
gender,
122
 thus these words should be masculine ‗ὁ κ῅ληο‘ and ‗ὁ πήιεμ‘.123 Protagoras‘ 
criticism of Homer for using an incorrect mood also reveals a similar point; the sophist points 
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 Cf. Lana (1950), 56 ff.; Kerferd (1981a), 68–9. 
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 Indeed these words were mostly used with reference to male warriors, especially in epic tradition; for 
example, as well known even as a famous simile, mēnis went with a male hero in Homer‘s Iliad, Achilles, and 
pēlēx was what male soldiers wore in battles. 
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 Regarding Protagoras‘ correction of mēnis and pēlēx, Lougovaya and Ast (2004, 274–7) suggest that Mēnis 
would probably be a personal name and Πήιεμ could mean a citizen from the Attic deme Peleces. And further 
they argue that in that case, Aristotle‘s phrase ‗Let us suppose that mēnis and pēlēx are masculine, as Protagoras 
used to say (θαζάπεξ, ὃ Πξσηαγόξαο ἔιεγελ, εἰ "ὁ κ῅ληο" θαὶ "ὁ πήιεμ" ἄξξελά ἐζηηλ)‘ seems to simply state 
something that was indeed used in the actual world, not a theory of language according to which Protagoras 
seriously tried to correct wrong linguistic and grammatical usages; ―if you call Mr. Mēnis oulomenos, the whole 
world will suppose that you made a mistake while in fact you did not, and if you call him oulomenê, you make a 
grammatical mistake that escapes notice (cf. Rademaker, 2007, 2).‖ The suggestion proposed by Lougovaya and 
Ast, however, does not explain other examples of Protagoras‘ correct use of language, such as the division of the 
tenses of verbs and the correction of Homer‘s usage of moods (both are from Aristotle‘s testimonies). In 
addition, although it is admitted that Πήιεμ could mean a person from the Attic deme Peleces, the person does 
not have to be only a (male) citizen of the deme; even a woman who is originally from the deme can be called a 
Πήιεμ. A mere point that there are some male citizens from the Attic deme Peleces does not support a general 
linguistic idea of solecism. 
110 
out that the poet uses the imperative mood in saying ‗Sing, goddess, the wrath (mēnin aeide 
thea)‘, and emphasises that it should not be a command but a prayer, using the optative mood. 
Protagoras‘ criticism, then, seems to be grounded on a view that human beings are by nature 
inferior to the gods and thus they should not issue commands to the gods; something whose 
nature is inferior should not command but pray, and the correct mood for a prayer, Protagoras 
argues, is not ‗imperative‘ but ‗optative‘. Here Protagoras seems to insist upon ‗the 
grammatical genders on the basis of natural gender‘. 
The examples of ‗the morphological consistency‘ of the words based on their 
grammatical genders are found first in Aristotle‘s example of Protagoras‘ division of genders 
(἟ δ' ἐιζνῦζα θαὶ δηαιερζεῖζα ᾤρεην), and then in Aristophanes‘ satire again (the correction 
of ηὴλ θάξδνπνλ into ηὴλ θαξδόπελ). In Aristotle‘s example, the participles (ἐιζνῦζα and 
δηαιερζεῖζα) have feminine forms, and are corresponding to their subject (the feminine 
article ἟, which is used as a feminine pronoun). Likewise, a word θάξδνπνλ, which is indeed 
a feminine word, has a more typically masculine ending (-ον) and does not morphologically 
correspond to its feminine article ηὴλ. In order to make the word morphologically consistent 
with its article, the masculine ending should be modified into a feminine ending (-ην) and 
thus as ‗ηὴλ θαξδόπελ‘. These examples of grammatical congruence between the articles and 
the corresponding words clarify Protagoras‘ views that the morphology of words must be 
used correctly in accordance with their grammatical genders.
124
 
Protagoras‘ interest in language can simply be understood as a linguistic research on the 
grounds of observation of the nature of things. Protagoras seems to have believed that things 
have objective and universal natural features, such as natural genders or superior and inferior 
natures. The morphological consistency of words is also grounded on the natural genders of 
words—the gender of θάξδνπνλ (bowl) was probably believed to be feminine in Protagoras‘ 
opinion, because this was what usually women used in the house. Diogenes Laertius‘ report 
about Protagoras‘ division of the tenses of verbs (9.52) and discourse (logos) into four types 
(entreaty, question, answer and command) (or seven types: narration, question, answer, 
command, report, entreaty, and invitation) (9.53–54), although he does not explicitly state in 
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 In the light of ‗the consistency of morphology‘, Protagoras‘ correction of mēnis (wrath) and pēlēx (helmet) 
(Soph. Elen. XIV.173b16–25) may perhaps be understood as a correction of these words by giving them word-
endings that are unequivocally masculine. However, this does not seem to match with Aristotle‘s explanation 
that ‗according to Protagoras, a man who calls mēnis a ‗destructress (oulomenē)‘ commits a solecism, although 
he does not seem to do so to other people, whereas a man who calls mēnis a ‗destructor (oulomenon)‘ seems to 
commit solecism, but he does not indeed.‘ In this explanation, Protagoras clearly points out that the solecism 
occurs by the violation of ‗the grammatical genders on the basis of natural gender‘ on the basis of nature of 
things, not by the violation of the morphological consistency. 
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what sense Protagoras thus divided them, can also be understood in a similar way. Protagoras 
would probably argue that what happened in the past should be described by using the past 
tense of verbs, because this is the correct way to describe what happened in the past by its 
nature; what happened in the past is naturally a past event and does grammatically 
corresponds to the past tense of verbs. The sophist would also perhaps argue that the types of 
discourse must be distinguished on the basis of their purpose; if one asks a question one must 
use a discourse type of question, and if one gives an answer one must use a discourse type of 
answer. A question is by its natural character different from an answer. In addition, as 
Aristotle‘s report of Protagoras‘ criticism of Homer (Poet. XIX.1456b15–18) shows, the 
division of the discourse types reflects on the sophist‘s concerns about language on the basis 
of the naure of things.
125
 One whose nature is inferior (e.g. a human being) should not 
command someone whose nature is superior (e.g. a goddess) to do or not to do, but pray. In 
this regard, it seems fair to believe that as Plato mentions Protagoras by name in the middle 
of discussion on the naturalism of language in the Cratylus,
126
 the sophist‘s linguistic interest 
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 Cf. Rademaker (2007), 2. Regarding Aristotle‘s understanding of Protagoras‘ criticism of Homer, he 
suggests that ―Aristotle‘s point in this passage is that the poet, unlike the performing artist, does not need 
specialised knowledge concerning the ζρήκαηα ηνῦ ιόγνπ or text types [i.e. discourse types]. The thought seems 
to be that the performing artist runs the risk of making mistakes in reciting the text if he does not take account of 
differences between text types, and the various performance styles connected with them; the poet, on the other 
hand, as a competent native speaker of his language, will not make serious mistakes in this respect in composing 
his poetry.‖ 
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 In fact, we can find Plato‘s contradictory references to Protagoras in the Cratylus. In 385e4–386a4 of the 
dialogue, Socrates, listening to Hermogenes‘ idea about names on the basis of the conventionalism of language 
according to which each city has their conventions to give names to things, asks him whether ‗he holds fast to 
the same position regarding also things that are (ta onta), accepting that ‗the essence (ousia) [of each] of them is 
private for each person, as Protagoras tells that man is ―the measure of all things‖—as things are to me as they 
appear to me, and are to you as they appear to you (ἰδίᾳ αὐη῵λ ἟ νὐζία εἶλαη ἑθάζηῳ, ὥζπεξ Πξσηαγόξαο 
ἔιεγελ ιέγσλ "πάλησλ ρξεκάησλ κέηξνλ" εἶλαη ἄλζξσπνλ—ὡο ἄξα νἷα κὲλ ἂλ ἐκνὶ θαίλεηαη ηὰ πξάγκαηα 
[εἶλαη], ηνηαῦηα κὲλ ἔζηηλ ἐκνί· νἷα δ' ἂλ ζνί, ηνηαῦηα δὲ ζνί).‘ And Hermogenes, who maintains the 
conventionalism of language immediately rejects Protagorean idea. In this passage, Plato seems to state that 
according to Protagoras‘ MMD, names of things would be relativised by the users of those names, whoever they 
are. On the basis of the Platonic reading of Protagoras‘ MMD in the Theaetetus, Sedley (2003, 54–5) argues that 
―[I]t must be made very clear that in no way is it insinuated that Hermogenes‘ linguistic conventionalism entails 
Protagorean relativism, so that the rejection of relativism will lead to that of conventionalism. ··· the rejection of 
Protagoreanism will entail that things have their own intrinsic natures and hence that there are naturally correct 
and incorrect ways of acting with regard to each of them.‖ Such radical relativism of language, however, is quite 
different from Plato‘s reference to Protagoras‘ correctness of words on the basis of naturalism of language in the 
passage quoted above (390d7–391c4). On Plato‘s contradictory references to Protagoras in the dialogue, Sedley 
(ibid., 77) proposes that ―what Socrates is about to try his hand at is the current intellectual fashion. But we must 
not assume that this small army of intellectuals were all attempting the same kind of systematic approach as 
Socrates offers. There is every reason to assume that Prodicus and Protagoras meant by ‗correctness of words‘ 
something closer to an improved command of vocabulary than research into words‘ hidden origins.‖ However, 
Sedley‘s proposal does not really solve Plato‘s contradictory references to Protagoras in the dialogue. If Plato 
simply wanted to show that the sophists were interested in language issues but did not consider any systematic 
theory of language, he might have not needed to refer to Protagoras when talking about the correctness of words 
on the basis of naturalism of language; Plato could have just mentioned any other sophists than Protagoras by 
name, such as Prodicus who is also described by Plato as endeavouring to distinguish names and words (cf. Men. 
75e2–3), instead of taking a risk by contradictory references. While Plato clearly mentions Protagoras‘ 
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lies in the naturalism of language. And, Protagoras‘ concerns regarding the correctness of 
words, ‗the grammatical genders on the basis of natural gender‘ and ‗the morphological 
consistency‘ of the words based on their grammatical genders, seem to be established on the 
grounds of this basic idea of the naturalism of language.
127
 
 
 
3. Serious linguistics or an epideictic performance of rhetoric? 
 
Some modern scholars have doubted the seriousness of Protagoras‘ linguistics; they suggest 
that the sophist‘s linguistic interest would probably be an epideictic performance of rhetoric 
in order to dazzle his audiences. For instance, Robins (1997
4
, 32) argues that although 
Protagoras‘ views on language may have triggered the study of language for its own sake, the 
sophist himself made his observations on language mostly within the framework of his views 
on rhetoric. Robins‘ view implies that Protagoras did make some observations on grammar 
and language as an instrument of persuasion, but was not interested in a systematic theory of 
language for its own sake. Fehling (1965, 214) also argues, even in a stricter way, that the 
sophist‘s division of grammatical usages was not really any kind of systematic treatise on 
language but simply a sample of his criticism of poetry, and this was ―developed even there 
in a cursory manner.‖ In support of his argument, Fehling points out that both Protagoras‘ 
distinction between the word genders and his criticism of Homer are illustrated by examples 
taken from the very first verse of the Iliad, and implies that it would be an effective rhetorical 
way of dazzling or persuading audiences if Protagoras took the well known passages in order 
to attack. Rademaker (2007, 3–4) emphasises that considering the sophist‘s interests in 
                                                                                                                                                        
correctness of words on the basis of the naturalism of language in his second reference to the sophist (390d7–
391c4), in his first reference to Protagoras, Plato does not explicitly states that Protagoras indeed argued for 
radical relativism of language; he simply states that the sophist says that things that are (ta onta), not names 
(onomata), are as they appear to each person, and according to this idea one may argue that names can also be 
given to things as they appear right to each person (385e4–386a4). In this regard, I propose that although he 
knew about Protagoras‘ correctness of words on the basis of the naturalism of language (second reference), 
Plato may have intended to say that if one really takes the conventionalism of language in a radical way (as 
Hermogenes‘ suggestion implies that names of things which are taken to be correct by each city on the grounds 
of their own conventions), this would amount to a relativist viewpoint about language, as Protagoras by his 
MMD says that ‗things are to me as they appear to me, and are to you as they appear to you‘ (first reference). In 
the first reference, Plato does not really mention any Protagorean ideas on language, and thus Plato‘s two 
references to Protagoras in the dialogue are not contradictory in this sense. For a construction of radical 
relativism of language in the Cratylus and Socrates‘ and Hermogenes‘ rejection of it, cf. Sedley (ibid., 54–8); 
Barney (2001, 28–33). 
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 On Protagoras‘ interest in language, cf. further Steinthal (1891), 135–9; Porzig (1950), 353–5; Guthrie 
(1971), 205 and 219–21; Kerferd (1981a), 68–9.; Schiappa (1991), 57 and 164; Donovan (1993), 43–6; Di 
Cesare (1996), 87–118; Woodruff in Long (1999), 295 and 309, n. 3. 
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natural language, even though he made some serious observations concerning grammar and 
language, Protagoras‘ linguistic concerns ―may belong to an epideictic piece of Homeric 
criticism.‖ 
The suggestions of Protagoras‘ linguistic interest as an epideictic performance of 
rhetoric are supported basically by two main points: first, the sophist did not develop the 
substantial body of theory of language; second, the sophist took the examples of incorrect 
linguistic and grammatical usages only from Homeric works. Both points, however, seem 
doubtful. It is true that we do not have a systematic body of linguistic theory that is fairly 
attributed to Protagoras by the ancient sources; nevertheless, the absence of direct evidence 
for Protagoras‘ theory of language in our hands does not necessarily prove that he never 
established some conceptualisation of it. Given that all his works have not survived and we 
do now have only few fragments, we cannot know whether Protagoras did not actually 
develop his ideas on language. It is not entirely impossible to conjecture that Protagoras may 
have established a theory of language and even written a book about it, but this book too is 
lost as the other books are. Or we may perhaps assume that in a book entitled The art of 
Eristic (Technē Eristikōn), or in another book entitled On Learning (Peri tōn Mathēmatōn), 
that Diogenes Laertius attributes to Protagoras (9.55: DK80 A1), the sophist might have 
discussed his ideas on language in a substantial way. 
In addition, although Protagoras‘ correction of the imperative mood into the optative 
mood indeed comes from the very first verse of Homer‘s Iliad, at the same time other 
testimonies prove that Homer‘s texts were not the only exemplary cases of the sophist‘s 
correct use of language and grammar. The example from Aristophanes‘ Clouds (alektryaina 
and alektror) and the example from Aristotle‘s Sophistical Refutations (mēnis and pēlēx, 
albeit these words were used also by Homer in his poems) were not necessarily believed to be 
extracted only from Homeric corpus. Even though it were true that all the examples of 
Protagoras‘ linguistic interest were indeed from the Homeric corpus, it does not necessarily 
mean that Protagoras really intended merely to perform an epideictic performance while 
criticising the poet. If Homer‘s poems were the chief and most significant texts of general 
education (especially for the people of the 5
th
 century BCE in Greece), observing the linguistic 
and grammatical problems in the texts and attempting to correct those problems would be the 
most effective method of a theory of language. In this case, a rhetorical effect would 
accompany that method (as a sort of by-product), but not be the primary or only purpose. 
Protagoras‘ criticism of Homeric usage of language and grammar can be understood in this 
way too. 
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Protagoras‘ orthoepeia is provided to correct wrong linguistic and grammatical usages. 
Correcting is based on his naturalism of language, that is to say, correcting words and 
grammar is supported by the nature of things. Any attempt to use wrong language is an 
attempt to violate the nature of things. It is apparent that one whose linguistics lies in the 
correct usage of language according to the objective nature of things must be reflecting an 
objectivist view of language. Indeed, Protagorean linguistic correction does not require any 
human artificial or individually relative modification upon it; as Woodruff (2005, 158–9) 
strongly points out, ―a radical relativist‖ who values every judgement in a way of relativising 
it on the basis of his own standard of truth ―would encourage students to use language as they 
pleased, and Protagoras did not do that,‖ but encouraged his students ―to use language 
correctly‖. Protagoras‘ encouragement thus seems to be grounded on the nature of things. 
And one who insists on the naturalism of language should emphasise the objectivist usage of 
language. Protagoras‘ ideas of the correct use of language, in this respect, seems to be a 
linguistic-normative claim by which the sophist endeavours to set up certain linguistic norms 
that everyone should objectively follow in order to correctly use language according to the 
nature of objects. 
Why then did Protagoras argue for such naturalism of language according to which he 
expressed the objective linguistic and grammatical usage on the basis of the nature of things? 
Unfortunately, we do not have any textual evidence which directly sheds light upon 
Protagoras‘ purpose of his linguistic interest. A passage from the Great Speech in the 
Protagoras, however, provides us with a clue from which we can infer, albeit indirectly, why 
the sophist emphasised the importance of the correct use of language. As we have examined 
earlier in Chapter II, at 321b6–322b1 of the Protagoras (the ‗Myth‘ part), Protagoras says 
that Prometheus‘ gifts, i.e. technical wisdom and the use of fire enable human beings to 
develop the use of articulate speech, namely language. 
Then, at 325d2–326e1 (the ‗Logos‘ part), when Protagoras emphasises the importance of 
the laws of a city as a method of maintaining the city well preserved, he argues that as soon 
as children in a human community begin to understand language, adults in the community try 
to implant political virtues into the children‘s minds by every word (and deed) that this is 
right, and that wrong, this praiseworthy and that shameful, this holy and that unholy, and by 
saying ‗do this‘ and ‗do not do that‘ (esp. 325d2–5, and cf. pages 37–9 above). Perhaps, in 
Protagoras‘ thought, it is important that people should be able to understand what is said and 
written, namely language, in a correct way, i.e. the way in which all people in a community 
can correctly communicate about and educate in political virtues, keeping themselves away 
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from misunderstanding and misleading one another; if people tend to use language relatively, 
such communication about and education in political virtues would be impossible. The best 
manner of using language correctly would probably be the way of using it in accordance with 
the nature of things, without any human artificial or individually relative modification upon it. 
Protagoras would probably have insisted upon the importance of grammatical and linguistic 
correctness on the grounds of the naturalism of language, avoiding relative usages of 
language, for such a purpose. 
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Chapter VI 
 
Rhetorical Sophistry: The ouk estin antilegein (‘it is not possible to contradict’) doctrine 
 
 
An ancient claim, the so-called ouk estin antilegein doctrine which states that ‗it is not 
possible to contradict‘ (hereafter the OEA doctrine), has been transmitted by ancient sources 
(Isocrates, Helen 1; Euthyd. 285e9–286a3; Top. I.11.104b12–21, Met. V.29.1024b32–4; D.L. 
9.53 and 3.35). According to some of those sources, the doctrine is said to have been used by 
Protagoras (cf. Euthyd. 286c6–7; D.L. 9.53), according to others, by Antisthenes (cf. Top. 
I.11.104b19–21 and Met. V.29.1024b32–34). 
In modern scholarship, due to conflicting reports in antiquity, three different 
assumptions have been made: first, the OEA doctrine must be attributed to Protagoras who 
made great use of it (cf. Kerferd (1981a), 89–90); second, although it is not certain that the 
doctrine must be attributed to Protagoras, it is obvious that he made use of it (cf. Taylor 
(1926), 96; Levi (1940a), 166; Schiappa (1991), 134; Lavery in O‘Grady (2008), 31 and 40); 
and third, the doctrine should not be attributed to Protagoras who did not really use it (cf. 
DK80; Untersteiner (1954), 49 ff.; Gomperz (1965), 225ff.; Dupréel (1948), 39; Lee (2005), 
72–3). 
Those who support the first and second assumptions, again, have suggested three 
interpretations of the OEA doctrine. The first and the most dominant one is to read the OEA 
doctrine as a relativist claim in which it is argued that since every judgement is true to its 
maker no contradiction occurs, in connection with the Platonic reading of Protagoras‘ MMD 
in the Theaetetus. According to this interpretation, Protagoras would have claimed that if 
every judgement is relatively true, then no judgement can be false, and thus that every 
judgement is incorrigible and not to be corrected, therefore no one is contradicted by others 
and contradiction is impossible (cf. Levi (1940a), 166; Kerferd (1981a), 88; Lavery in 
O‘Grady (2008), 40). The second interpretation is that Protagoras‘ OEA doctrine implies 
Heraclitus‘ theory of the unity of opposites (cf. again Levi (1940a), 166, n. 1; Guthrie (1971), 
182, n. 2; Diels in DK80 A19). The last interpretation is that the OEA doctrine is an 
anticipation of Aristotle‘s Principle of Non-Contradiction (cf. Schiappa (1995), 138). 
In this chapter, I first examine whether or not there is any plausibility in those ancient 
sources that says that Protagoras utilised the OEA doctrine. Then, I shall analyse the doctrine 
and the argument in its support as presented in the Euthydemus 285e9–286a3, revealing the 
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objectivist assumption of the argument for the OEA doctrine. Finally, I will propose that the 
OEA doctrine is a Protagorean rhetorical device, in connection with the sophist‘s other 
rhetorical fragments, such as the weaker/stronger logoi fragment and the two-logoi fragment. 
 
 
1. Protagoras‘ use of the ouk estin antilegein doctrine 
 
As briefly stated above, due to the discordance in ancient sources, it has been a matter of 
controversy in modern scholarship as to whether the doctrine should be ascribed to 
Protagoras, or whether the sophist even used it. The first reporter of the OEA doctrine in 
antiquity, Isocrates, who is about a decade earlier than Plato, while discussing the doctrine in 
his Helen 1.1–10, does not refer to its users by name: 
 
εἰζί ηηλεο νἳ κέγα θξνλνῦζηλ, ἠλ ὑπόζεζηλ 
ἄηνπνλ θαὶ παξάδνμνλ πνηεζάκελνη πεξὶ ηαύηεο 
ἀλεθη῵ο εἰπεῖλ δπλεζ῵ζη· θαὶ θαηαγεγεξάθαζηλ 
νἱ κὲλ νὐ θάζθνληεο νἷόλ η' εἶλαη ςεπδ῅ ιέγεηλ 
νὐδ' ἀληηιέγεηλ νὐδὲ δύσ ιόγσ πεξὶ η῵λ αὐη῵λ 
πξαγκάησλ ἀληεηπεῖλ, νἱ δὲ δηεμηόληεο ὡο ἀλδξία 
θαὶ ζνθία θαὶ δηθαηνζύλε ηαὐηόλ ἐζηηλ θαὶ θύζεη 
κὲλ νὐδὲλ αὐη῵λ ἔρνκελ, κία δ' ἐπηζηήκε θαζ' 
ἁπάλησλ ἐζηίλ, ἄιινη δὲ πεξὶ ηὰο ἔξηδαο 
δηαηξίβνληεο ηὰο νὐδὲλ κὲλ ὠθεινύζαο, 
πξάγκαηα δὲ παξέρεηλ ηνῖο πιεζηάδνπζηλ 
δπλακέλαο. 
There are some who take great pride in being 
able to discuss in a tolerable manner any out of 
the way or paradoxical subject they may propose 
to themselves; and men have grown old, some 
asserting that it is impossible to say what is false, 
to contradict, or even to give two opposite 
accounts of the same things, others declaring that 
courage, wisdom, and justice are identical, and 
that none of them are natural qualities, but that 
one kind of knowledge alone is concerned with 
them all; while others waste their time in 
discussions that are perfectly useless, and whose 
only effect is to cause annoyance to their 
followers. (trans. Freese, 1894) 
 
Later, however, some sources, such as Plato (Euthyd. 286c) and Diogenes Laertius (taking 
Plato as his source, as he clearly refers to the philosopher and the dialogue when introducing 
the doctrine in the section on Protagoras) (D.L. 9.53), say that Protagoras made use of the 
doctrine. Other sources, like Aristotle (Top. I.11.104b12–21 and Met. V.29.1024b32–34; cf. 
also D.L. 3.35), report that Antisthenes, not Protagoras, stated the doctrine. With conflicting 
records of the ancient sources, as stated earlier, three assumptions have thus been made. Let 
us first see the textual evidence on which those who support the third assumption rely: 
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έζηο δέ ἐζηηλ ὑπόιεςηο παξάδνμνο η῵λ γλσξίκσλ 
ηηλὸο θαηὰ θηινζνθίαλ, νἷνλ ὅηη νὐθ ἔζηηλ 
ἀληηιέγεηλ, θαζάπεξ ἔθε Ἀληηζζέλεο. (Top. 
I.11.104b19–21) 
A thesis is a paradoxical assumption of some 
people eminent in philosophy; for instance, the 
view that it is not possible to contradict (ouk 
estin antilegein), as Antisthenes said.  
 
δηὸ Ἀληηζζέλεο ᾤεην εὐήζσο κεζὲλ ἀμη῵λ 
ιέγεζζαη πιὴλ ηῶ νἰθείῳ ιόγῳ, ἓλ ἐθ' ἑλόο· ἐμ 
ὧλ ζπλέβαηλε κὴ εἶλαη ἀληηιέγεηλ, ζρεδὸλ δὲ 
κεδὲ ςεύδεζζαη. (Met. V.29.1024b32–34) 
 
Hence Antisthenes foolishly thought that nothing 
is worthy to be spoken of except by its 
proprietary logos, one [logos] for one [thing]; 
from which it resulted that it is not possible to 
contradict (mē einai antilegein), and nearly so 
that it is not possible to speak falsely (mēde 
pseudesthai). 
 
Diogenes Laertius‘ report (D.L. 3.35) on an episode in which Antisthenes is mentioned as a 
user of the doctrine also seems to strengthen the third position: 
 
ιέγεηαη δ' ὅηη θαὶ Ἀληηζζέλεο κέιισλ 
ἀλαγηλώζθεηλ ηη η῵λ γεγξακκέλσλ αὐηῶ 
παξεθάιεζελ αὐηὸλ παξαηπρεῖλ. θαὶ ππζνκέλῳ ηί 
κέιιεη ἀλαγηλώζθεηλ, εἶπελ ὅηη πεξὶ ηνῦ κὴ εἶλαη 
ἀληηιέγεηλ. 
And it is said that Antisthenes, when he was 
about to read in public something of what he had 
composed, demanded him [sc. Plato] to attend. 
And hearing the question about what he was 
about to read, Antisthenes said that it concerned 
the impossibility of contradiction. 
 
Here both Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius clearly say that it was Antisthenes who stated the 
doctrine. On the basis of these texts, Diels and Kranz seem not to regard the doctrine as 
Protagoras‘. As they collected and arranged the fragments and testimonies on Protagoras 
from ancient sources, they did not list the doctrine as an authentic Protagorean one; rather 
they put just two references about the doctrine into the ‗Life and Teaching‘ section (DK80 A1, 
A19). Untersteiner and Gomperz do not discuss the OEA doctrine in their research on 
Protagoras, assuming that this doctrine is not a tenet of Protagoras himself, since Aristotle 
presents it as an inference from what he said.
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 Dupréel and Lee make a stronger denial of 
Protagoras‘ use of the doctrine, arguing that the doctrine clearly originates with Antisthenes. 
Dupréel (1948, 39) asserts that ―[l]‘impossibilité de la contradiction (νὐθ ἔζηηλ ἀληηιέγεηλ) 
est une thèse qu‘on trouve soutenue par Antisthènes,‖ not by Protagoras; ―et les Cyrénaïques 
ont exploité l‘idée de l‘isolement radical des connaissances.‖ Lee (2005, 72–6), briefly 
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 On this suggestion, cf. Guthrie (1971), 182, n. 3. 
119 
discussing the OEA doctrine in an appendix, argues that ―[T]he slogan ‗it is not possible to 
contradict‘ is securely attributed to Antisthenes, but the evidence for attributing it to 
Protagoras as well is weak.‖ 
However, the third assumption seems somewhat dubious. Of course it can be admitted 
that to Aristotle‘s eyes Antisthenes is the most important name for the OEA doctrine. 
Nonetheless, although Aristotle says that Antisthenes stated the doctrine, as Kerferd (1981a, 
89) points out, he does not assert that Antisthenes is the doctrine‘s originator or the only user. 
Nor does the passage from Diogenes Laertius (D.L. 3.35) support the third assumption; it just 
pictures an episode involving Plato and Antisthenes, without attributing the origin of the 
doctrine to Antisthenes. Had Diogenes Laertius thought that the doctrine was originally from 
Antisthenes, one might have expected him to have mentioned it in the section on Antisthenes‘ 
life and works (D.L. 6). 
Kerferd argues for the first assumption that the OEA doctrine must be attributed to 
Protagoras who made great use of it. He primarily relies on a passage from Plato in support 
of this assumption. He begins with citing the Euthydemus 286c where Plato has Socrates say 
that he has heard ―this argument [i.e. the argument for the OEA doctrine] from many people 
on many occasions—for Protagoras and those associated with him used to make great use of 
it, as did others even earlier than him (νὐ γάξ ηνη ἀιιὰ ηνῦηόλ γε ηὸλ ιόγνλ πνιι῵λ δὴ θαὶ 
πνιιάθηο ἀθεθνὼο ἀεὶ ζαπκάδσ θαὶ γὰξ νἱ ἀκθὶ Πξσηαγόξαλ ζθόδξα ἐρξ῵λην αὐηῶ θαὶ νἱ 
ἔηη παιαηόηεξνη)‖ (trans. Kerferd (1981a), 89). Kerferd adds some more textual evidence to 
support his argument. According to him, a statement in the Cratylus 429c9–d3, which says 
that ‗there are many both now and in the past who say that it is impossible to say false things 
(ἆξα ὅηη ςεπδ῅ ιέγεηλ ηὸ παξάπαλ νὐθ ἔζηηλ, ἆξα ηνῦηό ζνη δύλαηαη ὁ ιόγνο; ζπρλνὶ γάξ 
ηηλεο νἱ ιέγνληεο, θαὶ λῦλ θαὶ πάιαη),‘ hints at Protagoras‘ paternity of the OEA doctrine. He 
uses two additional sources to strengthen his account, the Commentary on Aristotle‘s 
Categories 81.6–8 by Joannes Philoponus, a Christian philosopher and Aristotelian 
commentator (ca. 490–570), and a passage from a papyrus commentary on the Ecclesiastes. 
Some questions can be raised about Kerferd‘s account. First, the passage from the 
Euthydemus simply states that Protagoras and those associated with him ‗used to make great 
use‘ of the OEA doctrine (and the argument in its support), not that it originated from the 
sophist. In fact the passage explicitly says that even people earlier than Protagoras had used 
the OEA doctrine. Secondly, the passages from the Cratylus and the Commentary on 
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Aristotle‘s Categories129 both talk about the impossibility of falsehood, not about the 
impossibility of contradiction, hence Kerferd needs to prove that falsehood and contradiction 
are entirely equivalent to each other in Protagoras‘ view; otherwise he commits the fallacy of 
petitio principii (for the difference between the impossibility of falsehood and that of 
contradiction, cf. Appendix II below). Moreover, the passage from the Cratylus does not refer 
to anyone by name with regard to the OEA doctrine, so it is hard to accept this passage as 
crucial evidence for the first assumption. 
A passage from a papyrus commentary on the Ecclesiastes, which is believed to have 
been written by Didymus the Blind, an ecclesiastical writer in the fourth century CE, 
discovered in 1941, published by G. Binder and L. Liesenborghs (1966, 37–43), and reprinted 
with a revision by C. J. Classen (1976a, 452–62), reads: 
 
παξ[άδνμ]όο ηηο γλώκε θέξεηαη Πξνδίθνπ ὅηη 
‗νὐθ ἔζηηλ [ἀλ]ηηιέγεηλ‘. [π῵ο] | ιέγεη ηνῦην; 
παξὰ ηὴ[λ γλ]ώκελ θαὶ ηὴλ δόμαλ η῵λ πάλησλ 
ἐζηίλ· πάληεο γὰξ δη[αιέ]|γνληαη ἀληηιέγνπζη[λ 
θ]αὶ ἐλ ηνῖο βησηηθνῖο θαὶ ἐλ ηνῖο θξνλνπκέλνηο. 
δνγκαηηθ῵ο [ιέγεη] | ἐθεῖλνο ὅηη ‗νὐθ ἔζηηλ 
ἀ[ληη]ιέγεηλ‘. εἰ γὰξ ἀληηιέγνπζηλ, ἀκθόηεξνη 
ιέγνπζηλ· ἀδύλαηνλ [δέ] | ἐζηηλ ἀκθνηέξνπο 
[ιέγεη]λ εἰο ηὸ αὐηὸ πξᾶγκα. ιέγεη γὰξ ὅηη κόλνο 
ὁ ἀιεζεύσλ θαὶ ὡο ἔρ [εη ηὰ] | πξάγκαηα 
ἀγγέιισλ αὐηὰ νὗηνο ιέγεη. ὁ δὲ ἐλα[λ]ηηνύκελνο 
αὐηῶ νὐ ιέγεη ηὸ πξᾶγκα νὐθ α ∙∙∙∙∙∙∙[?] 
A paradoxical thought that it is not possible to 
contradict is brought by Prodicus. How does he 
say this? This is contrary to the thought and 
opinion of all men; for all men discuss and 
contradict both in everyday matters and in 
matters of thought. But he says dogmatically that 
it is not possible to contradict. For if they 
contradict, they both speak; yet it is impossible 
for both of them to speak in regard to the same 
thing. For he says that only the one who is saying 
the truth and who is reporting things as they 
really are speaks of them. The other, who is 
opposing to him, does not speak of that thing 
…… 
 
Here the passage explicitly states that the OEA doctrine is ‗brought by Prodicus‘. Prodicus is 
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 In fact, the passage from Joannes Philoponus that refers to Protagoras is not 81.6–8, but 103.31–104.3. Here 
Philoponus says that according to Protagoras it is not possible for people to speak falsely, since each one has 
what appears and seems (phainomenon kai dokoun) to him about the things: ηηλὲο δὲ ἐθ δηακέηξνπ ηνύηνηο 
ἔρνληεο πάληα ηὰ πξάγκαηα πξόο ηη ἔιεγνλ, ὧλ εἷο ἤλ Πξσηαγόξαο ὁ ζνθηζηήο· ἔιεγε γὰξ νὗηνο ὅηη νὐδὲλ η῵λ 
πξαγκάησλ ὡξηζκέλελ ἔρεη θύζηλ, δηὸ θαὶ ἔιεγελ ὅηη νὐθ ἔζηη ηηλὰ ςεπδ῅ ιέγεηλ· ἕθαζηνο γὰξ θαηὰ ηὸ 
θαηλόκελνλ αὐηῶ θαὶ δνθνῦλ πεξὶ η῵λ πξαγκάησλ ἀπνθαίλεηαη νὐθ ἐρόλησλ ὡξηζκέλελ θύζηλ ἀιι' ἐλ ηῆ πξὸο 
἟κᾶο ζρέζεη ηὸ εἶλαη ἐρόλησλ. The passage Kerferd quoted for his account, 81.6–8, is about the capacity of a 
logos and a doxa to be either true or false: ὁ γὰξ ιόγνο ὁ ιέγσλ ‗Σσθξάηεο θάζεηαη,‘ εἰ κὲλ ηύρνη θαζήκελνο ὁ 
Σσθξάηεο, ἀιεζεύεη, ἀλαζηάληνο δὲ πάιηλ αὐηνῦ ὁ αὐηὸο νὗηνο ςεύδεηαη. ὁκνίσο δὲ θαὶ ἟ δόμα ἟ πεξὶ 
θαζεκέλνπ Σσθξάηνπο, εἰ κὲλ ηύρνη θαζήκελνο, ὀξζ῵ο δνμάδεη, ἀλαζηάληνο δὲ αὐηνῦ ἟ αὐηὴ ςεπδ῵ο δνμάδεη. 
ὥζηε ὁ αὐηὸο ιόγνο θαὶ ἟ αὐηὴ δόμα ἓλ θαὶ ηαὐηὸλ κέλνληα δεθηηθά εἰζηλ ἀιεζείαο θαὶ ςεύδνπο. 
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said to have been a pupil (mathētēs) of Protagoras.130 From this point of view, Kerferd 
(1981a, 89–90) seems to believe that the document of the papyrus commentary on the 
Ecclesiastes ―vindicates completely the attribution of the doctrine that it is not possible to 
contradict to the sophistic period in general and in particular to Protagoras and his followers.‖ 
It may be true to assume that Prodicus, as a pupil of Protagoras, must have been influenced 
by the sophist in many ways. However, the mere fact that Prodicus was a pupil of Protagoras 
does not necessarily imply that all statements and thoughts of Prodicus can be fairly ascribed 
to Protagoras. There is no need to believe that all of Plato‘s philosophical thoughts must be 
attributed to Socrates since Plato was a pupil of Socrates. In addition, it is also remarkable 
that, as Dillon and Gergel (2003, 362, n. 2) point out, although Prodicus was credited by 
some later ancient sources as a pupil of Protagoras (cf. n. 130 above), ―he is not portrayed as 
such by Plato, or any other authority.‖ The lack of Platonic evidence that Prodicus associated 
with Protagoras as his pupil at some stage indeed weakens further Kerferd‘s argument in 
support of the first assumption. 
Our textual evidence on the issue as to whether the OEA doctrine must be attributed to 
Protagoras is inconclusive; nevertheless, this evidence seems sufficient to assume that 
Protagoras made use of the doctrine. Since Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius do not state that 
the doctrine originated from or was used only by Antisthenes, while connecting the doctrine 
with him, the possibility that both Antisthenes and Protagoras used it cannot be excluded. 
Plato, at the Euthydemus 286c, utilising a Greek preposition ‗ἀκθὶ‘ in order to refer to 
someone by name and to his followers or those like him, clearly states that Protagoras and 
those associated with him (νἱ ἀκθὶ Πξσηαγόξαλ) made much use of the OEA doctrine (and 
the argument for it). Diogenes Laertius (D.L. 9.53), although he seems quite dependent upon 
Plato‘s Euthydemus, too states that ‗also the argument of Antisthenes which attempts to prove 
that it is not possible to contradict, he [sc. Protagoras] had first discussed it (θαὶ ηὸλ 
Ἀληηζζέλνπο ιόγνλ ηὸλ πεηξώκελνλ ἀπνδεηθλύεηλ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ ἀληηιέγεηλ νὗηνο πξ῵ηνο 
δηείιεθηαη)‘—again, Diogenes Laertius‘ reference to Antisthenes here would be based on his 
idea that the doctrine was mostly used by Antisthenes, not that it was created or used only by 
him. As far as these texts are concerned, only the second assumption that Protagoras used the 
OEA doctrine remains safely acceptable.
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 Cf. Suda, s.v. Prodikos (DK84 A1); Onomatol. bei Schol. Plat. De Rep. 600c (DK80 A3). 
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 Against the second assumption, Lee (2005, 73) argues that it seems possible to understand that Plato‘s 
purpose in the passage of the Euthydemus 286c is to discredit Euthydemus and Dionysodorus by claiming that 
they got all their arguments from other people. Her suggestion, yet, immediately meets the following questions. 
Why did Plato have to show that their arguments were not original? Why not in other passages such as 275d7 
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The multiple usage of the Greek word ‗ἀκθὶ‘ can be taken as a counterargument to the 
second assumption. The phrase ‗Protagoras and those associated with him‘ in the Euthydemus 
286c translates the original Greek phrase ‗νἱ ἀκθὶ Πξσηαγόξαλ‘. There is another possible 
way to translate this phrase: ‗the people around Protagoras‘ or ‗the followers of Protagoras‘. 
According to its usage, the word ‗ἀκθὶ‘, when it takes the accusative, could be translated 
either so as to refer to someone whose name is mentioned in the accusative after ἀκθὶ 
together with his followers, for instance, ‗νἱ ἀκθὶ Χεηξίζνθνλ‘ (cf. Xenophon, Anabasis 
IV.3.21) as ‗Chirisophus and his men‘; or, so as to indicate only his followers, excluding the 
one whose name appears after ἀκθὶ, for example, ‗νἱ ἀκθὶ Εὐζύθξνλα‘ (cf. Crat. 399e) as 
‗Euthyphro‘s friends‘. And, according to Smyth‘s Greek Grammar (1920, 372, section 1681. 
3; cf. also the relevant section in the LSJ. s.v.), the former usage is common in the Homeric 
period, but rare in Attic Greek. Indeed, many translators of the Euthydemus have translated 
the phrase νἱ ἀκθὶ Πξσηαγόξαλ as ‗the followers of Protagoras‘, excluding Protagoras 
himself from those who used the doctrine.
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 Thus, one may argue that the phrase in the 
Euthydemus 286c does not decisively prove that the sophist even used the OEA doctrine. 
However, if we notice that Plato uses ‗νἱ ἀκθὶ‘ again in the Euthydemus 305d in order to 
refer both to someone whose name follows it and to his followers, such counterargument will 
appear unacceptable. There he writes that ‗they [sc. those who attack philosophy and are 
lying in the boundary between philosophers and politicians] think they really are the wisest, 
but whenever they are entangled in private conversations, they are thwarted by Euthydemus 
and his followers (or, Euthydemus and those like him) (἟γνῦληαη … εἶλαη κὲλ γὰξ ηῆ ἀιεζείᾳ 
ζθᾶο ζνθσηάηνπο, ἐλ δὲ ηνῖο ἰδίνηο ιόγνηο ὅηαλ ἀπνιεθζ῵ζηλ, ὑπὸ η῵λ ἀκθὶ Εὐζύδεκνλ 
θνινύεζζαη).‘ In fact, this passage is part of a conversation between Socrates and Crito on 
the day after Socrates had discussed various sophisms with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. 
                                                                                                                                                        
where Euthydemus and Dionysodorus begin their sophisms? And why did it have to be Protagoras while there 
were other sophists like Gorgias or Prodicus whose names are as much mentioned as that of Protagoras in the 
Platonic corpus? It is plausible to accept the suggestion that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus got their arguments 
by associating with others. However the suggestion that this passage is designed by Plato to show that they are 
not original in their arguments does not give any proper answer to those questions. Although Plato does not 
explicitly say that they were disciples of Protagoras or they learnt their sophisms from him, he leaves some clues 
in the dialogue, which aid us to notice that they and their arguments are strongly influenced by Protagoras. For 
instance, it is remarkable that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus once went out as colonists to Thurii (Euthyd. 271c, 
283e). According to Heraclides of Pontus, Thurii, one of the last Greek colonies in Italy, is known as a place 
where Protagoras established a colonial law at the request of Pericles (D.L. 9.50: DK80 A1). This scene enables 
readers of the dialogue to assume that Plato‘s purpose is to establish a relationship between Protagoras and 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. In addition, this aspect seems to fit the character of Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus that they learnt their arts late in life (Euthyd. 272b), assuming that they were able to learn the 
eristic art when they went to Thurii. 
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 Cf. Lamb (1964), 431; Dumont (1969), 36; O‘Brien in Sprague (1972), 13; Sprague in Cooper (1997), 723; 
Dillon and Gergel (2003), 19. 
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Thus, when Socrates makes this conversation with Crito, Euthydemus is already out of the 
scene. One might argue that due to the absence of Euthydemus in the scene, it is not 
necessary to determine the use of ‗ἀκθὶ‘ here as referring to both Euthydemus and his 
followers, but only to the followers of Euthydemus. However, it must be recalled that the 
dialogue was written to examine Euthydemus‘ and Dionysodorus‘ sophisms. The targets of 
Socrates‘ examination and refutation in this dialogue are obviously the eristic arguments 
suggested by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as well as their followers. Plato would probably 
have utilised ‗πεξὶ‘ instead of ‗ἀκθὶ‘, as νἱ πεξὶ Εὐζύδεκνλ, if he really wished to mean only 
the followers of Euthydemus, as he says ‗the followers of philosophy (ηνὺο πεξὶ θηινζνθίαλ 
ἀλζξώπνπο)‘ by adopting πεξὶ at 305d of the same work, just a few lines before the above 
passage. The same usage of ‗ἀκθὶ‘ by Plato is found again in the Theaetetus at 170c6, where 
Socrates says ‗ηηο η῵λ ἀκθὶ Πξσηαγόξαλ‘ in order to mean ‗anyone of the followers of 
Protagoras or even Protagoras himself‘. This expression appears in the passage where 
Socrates, revealing the problems of the MMD, attempts to refute it. Thus, it is obvious that 
Protagoras himself, who is chiefly responsible for the doctrine as its originator, must be 
included among those who are referred to. Although the usage of ‗νἱ ἀκθὶ x‘ to refer both to x 
himself and to x‘s followers (or those like x) was rare in Attic Greek, this does not mean that 
there was no use of the phrase in such way at all. From this point of view, now it seems 
plausible to assume that in the Euthydemus at 286c Plato intends to refer both to Protagoras 
and to his followers by ‗νἱ ἀκθὶ Πξσηαγόξαλ‘ as those who made great use of the OEA 
doctrine.
133
 Taking this point into consideration, although the passage from the Euthydemus 
does not clarify whether the OEA doctrine should be ascribed to Protagoras, it is still likely 
that the sophist indeed made use of it. Therefore, the second assumption remains acceptable. 
 
 
2. The ouk estin antilegein doctrine in Plato‘s Euthydemus 
 
The OEA doctrine and an argument in its support are presented by Dionysodorus in Plato‘s 
Euthydemus. The dialogue aims to distinguish the philosophical ideas and practice of 
Socrates from the sophists‘ art of eristic (technē eristikōn), pointing out some logical fallacies 
of the arguments established by sophists. The Euthydemus has the form of story-within-a-
story; Socrates tells Crito about the discussion he had in the previous day with Euthydemus, 
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124 
Dionysodorus, Ctesippus, and Cleinias. Socrates‘ main interlocutors are the sophist brothers, 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus—the latter is older than the former, and presumably both are 
older than Socrates.
134
 They are described as having started learning their art of eristic 
relatively late in life (geronte onte) in Thurii (272b–c), where Protagoras is said to have 
established its colonial law at Pericles‘ request (cf. Section 1 in Chapter I and n. 131 above). 
 
2.1. The impossibility of contradiction 
 
In the Euthydemus 285d7–8, Dionysodorus asks Ctesippus whether he is assuming that 
contradiction exists when he says that ‗abuse‘ is different from ‗contradiction‘, and Ctesippus 
assents. Then, Dionysodorus immediately proposes an argument for the OEA doctrine in 
order to show that such a thing as contradiction does not exist and thus it is not possible to 
contradict (286a4–b6):135 
 
Πόηεξνλ νὖλ, ἤ δ' ὅο, ἀληηιέγνηκελ ἂλ <ηὸλ>136 
ηνῦ αὐηνῦ πξάγκαηνο ιόγνλ ἀκθόηεξνη ιέγνληεο, 
ἠ νὕησ κὲλ ἂλ δήπνπ ηαὐηὰ ιέγνηκελ; 
Now, he [sc. Dionysodorus] said, would we 
contradict [each other] if we both speak the logos 
of the same pragma, or in this way we would 
surely say the same [pragma]? 
Σπλερώξεη. He [sc. Ctesippus] agreed. 
Ἀιι' ὅηαλ κεδέηεξνο, ἔθε, ηὸλ ηνῦ πξάγκαηνο 
ιόγνλ ιέγῃ, ηόηε ἀληηιέγνηκελ ἄλ; ἠ νὕησ γε ηὸ 
παξάπαλ νὐδ' ἂλ κεκλεκέλνο εἴε ηνῦ πξάγκαηνο 
νὐδέηεξνο ἟κ῵λ; 
But when neither of us, he [sc. Dionysodorus] 
said, speaks the logos of a pragma, at that time 
then would we contradict [each other]? Or even 
in this way would neither of us be making 
mention of the pragma at all? 
Καὶ ηνῦην ζπλσκνιόγεη. He [sc. Ctesippus] agreed to this too. 
Ἀιι' ἄξα, ὅηαλ ἐγὼ κὲλ ηὸλ ηνῦ πξάγκαηνο 
ιόγνλ ιέγσ, ζὺ δὲ ἄιινπ ηηλὸο ἄιινλ, ηόηε 
ἀληηιέγνκελ; ἠ ἐγὼ ιέγσ κὲλ ηὸ πξᾶγκα, ζὺ δὲ 
νὐδὲ ιέγεηο ηὸ παξάπαλ; ὁ δὲ κὴ ιέγσλ ηῶ 
ιέγνληη π῵ο <ἂλ> ἀληηιέγνη; 
[Ctesippus said] But then, if I speak the logos of 
a pragma whereas you speak another [logos] of 
another [pragma], at that time do we contradict 
[each other]? Or I speak of the pragma, while 
you do not even speak [of it] at all, right? Then 
how would a person who does not speak [of it] 
contradict someone who does speak [of it]? 
Καὶ ὁ κὲλ Κηήζηππνο ἐζίγεζελ· And then Ctesippus held silent. 
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 In order to scrutinise the structure of the argument for the OEA doctrine, I will not translate two important 
words, logos and pragma, here; the translations and problems of these words will be discussed in Section 3 in 
this chapter below. 
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 ηὸλ add. Heindorf. 
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At the end of the argument, as we see, Ctesippus holds silence and does not know how to 
respond to Dionysodorus‘ argument for the OEA doctrine. Here Dionysodorus establishes 
three possible cases of human linguistic performance. These three cases are: 
 
(1) Two speakers both speak the [same] logos of the same pragma. 
(2) Neither speaker speaks the logos of a given pragma, keeping silent regarding it. 
(3) Of two speakers, one speaks the logos of one pragma, while the other speaks another logos 
of another pragma; the latter therefore does not speak at all of the pragma of which the 
former speaks. 
 
In none of these three cases does contradiction occur, argues Dionysodorus. (1) It is very 
obvious that contradiction between two speakers cannot happen if they speak the same logos 
about the same pragma. (2) It is also manifest that there can be no contradiction if no speaker 
speaks of a given pragma. They do not even share anything to create contradiction. (3) If the 
objects of which two different speakers speak are different, although they speak different 
logoi, i.e. they speak differently from each other, contradiction does not occur. 
 
2.2. The impossibility of speaking of what is not (to mē on) 
 
Dionysodorus established three cases of communicative exchange in which human beings 
engage when speaking about given things (pragmata), and showed that in all three cases 
contradiction is impossible. Are only these three cases possible? Are there not any other 
possibilities? Generally it is said that contradiction occurs when two or more speakers speak 
differently—more specifically, contradictorily—about the same thing. This sort of case could 
be counted as a fourth case of human linguistic performance. However, there is no such case 
in Dionysodorus‘ list of possibilities, and Ctesippus does not contest this. Why do 
Dionysodorus and Ctesippus not take the fourth case into consideration when arguing for the 
OEA doctrine? 
The reason for this lies in Dionysodorus‘ argument proposed just before the argument 
for the OEA doctrine. There Dionysodorus argued that human logos concerns only what is (to 
on), and no one can speak of what is not (to mē on) (285e9–286a3): 
 
Τί νὖλ; ἤ δ' ὅο· εἰζὶλ ἑθάζηῳ η῵λ ὄλησλ ιόγνη; Well then what? He [sc. Dionysodorus] said, are 
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there logoi for each of the things that are? 
Πάλπ γε. [Ctesippus said] Certainly. 
Οὐθνῦλ ὡο ἔζηηλ ἕθαζηνλ ἠ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ; [Dionysodorus said] Then [are those logoi] as 
each is or as [it] is not? 
Ὡο ἔζηηλ. [Ctesippus said] As [each] is. 
Εἰ γὰξ κέκλεζαη, ἔθε, ὦ Κηήζηππε, θαὶ ἄξηη 
ἐπεδείμακελ κεδέλα ιέγνληα ὡο νὐθ ἔζηη· ηὸ γὰξ 
κὴ ὂλ νὐδεὶο ἐθάλε ιέγσλ. 
Ctesippus, he [sc. Dionysodorus] said, if you 
remember also a moment ago (284c2–5) we 
displayed that no one speaks [of a thing] as it is 
not; for it was apparent that no one speaks of 
what is not (to mē on). 
 
Dionysodorus says that ‗there are logoi for each of the things that are (eisin hekastōi tōn 
ontōn logoi)‘. That is to say, the logoi have each of the things that are, i.e. what is (to on), as 
their objects. As it is not possible to speak of what is not (to mē on), each of the things that 
are is always spoken of as it is (hōs estin) by these logoi; speaking of something as it is not 
(hōs ouk estin) is the same as speaking of what is not. In this case contradiction cannot be 
possible. For instance, a logos of F as it is (F) does not contradict another logos of G as it is 
(G) (but as it is not (F)) (the third case of human linguistic performance listed by 
Dionysodorus). Two (or more) different or opposite logoi about one and the same thing (i.e. a 
possible case of human linguistic performance as the fourth case in which contradiction 
occurs) are not possible, because, as Dionysodorus argues, logoi of something as it is not are 
impossible since speaking of what is not is impossible. Accordingly, human beings are able to 
speak of each of the things that are, namely, of what is, only as it is. 
Dionysodorus‘ claim that ‗there are logoi for each of the things that are‘ means that 
―everything has its own logos‖137 by which its object is spoken of as it is, not as it is not. No 
pragma can be spoken of by a logos of another pragma. Only one logos corresponds to one 
pragma. Human beings, when they succeed in speaking about the same thing, use one and the 
same linguistic expression, i.e. the same logos as explained in the case of the first linguistic 
performance (286a), and hence do not contradict each other. The same pragma thus admits 
only one and the same logos by which the pragma is spoken of as it is: hēn kai autos logos 
peri hēn kai autou pragmatos hōs esti. 
Therefore, on the basis of the argument above, the cases of human linguistic 
performances must be set up only as Dionysodorus established. The fourth case in which two 
speakers speak differently of the same pragma is equivalent to the case in which one person 
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speaks of what is as it is (hōs estin), while the other speaks of it in a different way from the 
former, namely, as it is not (hōs ouk estin). As already shown, however, Dionysodorus argues 
that speaking of what is as it is not is impossible, because, in this case one who speaks of 
what is as it is not, in fact speaks of what is not, and not speaking at all; this case is the third 
case of human linguistic performance involving two speakers, one speaks the logos of one 
pragma, while the other speaks another logos of another pragma—the latter therefore does 
not speak at all of the thing of which the former speaks. The OEA doctrine and its argument 
are established in this way, driving Ctesippus into silence. 
The OEA doctrine and its argument are thus established on the basis of the idea that 
what is not cannot be spoken of, as Dionysodorus argues that ‗it is apparent that no one 
speaks of what is not.‘ As Taylor (1926, 96) suggests, the OEA doctrine thus denies the 
possibility of approaching what is not. No human being does or can speak of what is not in 
any case. Since speaking of what is not is excluded all along, what is is only described as 
what is. In this regard, the possibility of the fourth case of human linguistic activity is 
excluded from the OEA doctrine and its argument. 
The idea of the impossibility of speaking of what is not is, however, not new in the 
history of philosophy. A similar, albeit not identical, idea is found in Parmenides‘ fragments: 
 
εἰ δ' ἄγ' ἐγὼλ ἐξέσ, θόκηζαη δὲ ζὺ κῦζνλ 
ἀθνύζαο, αἵπεξ ὁδνὶ κνῦλαη δηδήζηόο εἰζη 
λν῅ζαη· ἟ κὲλ ὅπσο ἔζηηλ ηε θαὶ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηη κὴ 
εἶλαη, πεηζνῦο ἐζηη θέιεπζνο (Ἀιεζείεη γὰξ 
ὀπεδεῖ), ἟ δ' ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ ηε θαὶ ὡο ρξεώλ ἐζηη 
κὴ εἶλαη, ηὴλ δή ηνη θξάδσ παλαπεπζέα ἔκκελ 
ἀηαξπόλ· νὔηε γὰξ ἂλ γλνίεο ηό γε κὴ ἐὸλ (νὐ 
γὰξ ἀλπζηόλ) νὔηε θξάζαηο. (In Tim. 1.345. 18–
27; In Phys. 116.28–32: DK28 B2)138 
Come now, I will tell you the story, and listening 
to it you should carry away as to preserve what 
the only ways of enquiry are for thought. The 
one is as it is and as it is not possible not to be, 
and is a path of persuasion (for it follows the 
truth); the other, as not to be and as to be 
necessary not to be, I tell you, is a path that is 
wholly unknown; for you can neither know what 
is not (to mē eon), for it is not possible, nor tell 
it. 
 
ρξὴ ηὸ ιέγεηλ ηε λνεῖλ η' ἐὸλ ἔκκελαη· ἔζηη γὰξ 
εἶλαη, κεδὲλ δ' νὐθ ἔζηηλ· ηά ζ' ἐγὼ θξάδεζζαη 
ἄλσγα. (In Phys. 86.27–28: DK28 B6) 
It is necessary for what is to be in order to speak 
and think of [it], for it is to be, but nothing is not; 
I command you to heed these things. 
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 In Coxon‘s edition (1986, 52–3): εἰ δ' ἄγε, η῵λ ἐξέσ, θόκηζαη δὲ ζὺ κῦζνλ ἀθνύζαο, αἵπεξ ὁδνὶ κνῦλαη 
δηδήζηόο εἰζη λν῅ζαη· ἟ κὲλ, ὅπσο ἔζηηλ ηε θαὶ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηη κὴ εἶλαη, πεηζνῦο ἐζηη θέιεπζνο, ἀιεζείεη γὰξ ὀπεδεῖ, 
἟ δ', ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ ηε θαὶ ὡο ρξεώλ ἐζηη κὴ εἶλαη, ηὴλ δή ηνη θξάδσ παλαπεπζέα ἔκκελ ἀηαξπόλ· νὔηε γὰξ ἂλ 
γλνίεο ηό γε κὴ ἐὸλ, νὐ γὰξ ἀλπζηόλ, νὔηε θξάζαηο. 
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νὐδ' ἐθ κὴ ἐόληνο ἐάζζσ θάζζαη ζ' νὐδὲ λνεῖλ· 
νὐ γὰξ θαηὸλ νὐδὲ λνεηόλ ἔζηηλ ὅπσο νὐθ ἔζηη. 
(In Phys. 78.21–22: DK28 B8) 
I shall not let you speak or think from what is 
not, for it is neither spoken nor thought of 
inasmuch as it is not. 
 
In the above fragments Parmenides warns not to speak or think of what is not, but only of 
what is (to eon), since what is not cannot be spoken or thought of at all. Dionysodorus seems 
to have implicitly utilised Parmenides‘ ideas of the sole possibility of speaking of what is and 
the impossibility of speaking of what is not, in order to facilitate his argument for the OEA 
doctrine. Plato also seems to have been aware of this connection, as he says that ‗also 
Protagoras and his followers have made much use of it [i.e. the OEA doctrine and the 
argument for it], as well as people earlier than Protagoras (θαὶ γὰξ νἱ ἀκθὶ Πξσηαγόξαλ 
ζθόδξα ἐρξ῵λην αὐηῶ θαὶ νἱ ἔηη παιαηόηεξνη)‘ (286c2–3), as soon as Dionysodorus finishes 
displaying the doctrine. Those who also are said by Plato here to have used the doctrine are, 
as Sprague (1962, 17), Hawtrey (1981, 110–1), and Rankin (1981, 25) affirm, Parmenides 
and his followers, i.e. the Eleatic thinkers. Observing this point of view, Sprague (1962, xiii) 
further suggests that the Eleatics and their ideas had some influence on some sophists‘ views 
such as Protagoras as well as Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as presented in the Euthydemus, 
and further strongly argues that such sophists utilising the OEA doctrine were indeed a sort of 
―neo-Eleatics‖.139 
However, it is very doubtful whether those sophists were really influenced by the Eleatic 
thinkers and could be fairly called ‗neo-Eleatics‘. The OEA doctrine does not seem to follow 
the Parmenidean view on the denial of the otherness and difference. According to Parmenides, 
briefly speaking, otherness and difference occur when motion is assumed to come to be. 
Motion brings change into one and the same [being], and makes it other and different. The 
exclusion of motion and change makes everything one and the same [being]. Thus in his 
world, only the One is, and plurality is entirely denied. Yet Dionysodorus does not assert that 
only one thing is; rather he seems to admit plurality, by referring to ‗each of the things that 
are (hekaston tōn ontōn)‘. The Parmenidean influence upon the sophists and the OEA 
doctrine, if such influence really exists, seems to be only adopted in a sophistic and rhetorical 
way for the establishment of the argument for the OEA doctrine; each of the things that are is 
spoken by its own logos as it is, on the basis, of course, of the Parmenidean idea of the 
impossibility of speaking of what is not. But, there is no Parmenidean ontological odour in 
the OEA doctrine, and the plurality that Parmenides evidently denied is clearly presupposed 
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in the argument. 
In addition, if Eusebius‘ report is reliable, Protagoras is also said to have attacked the 
Eleatic thinkers. A passage from Eusebius‘ P.E. X.3.25 (DK80 B2) testifies that ‗in a passage 
[of plagiarisms, klopas] that I [sc. Prosenes, the character speaking], by chance, came upon 
while reading Protagoras‘ book On What Is (Peri tou Ontos), I find him [sc. Protagoras] using 
an argument in the opposite way against those who propose what is as one [sc. the Eleatic 
thinkers] (ἐγὼ δ' νὖλ, ᾗ θαηὰ ηύρελ πεξηπέπησθα, Πξσηαγόξνπ ηὸλ Πεξὶ ηνῦ ὄληνο 
ἀλαγηλώζθσλ ιόγνλ πξὸο ηνὺο ἓλ ηὸ ὂλ εἰζάγνληαο ηνηαύηαηο αὐηὸλ εὑξίζθσ ρξώκελνλ 
ἀπαληήζεζηλ).‘ 140  Furthermore, we do not have any sources which will support that 
Protagoras and the sophist brothers seriously took the influence from Parmenidean 
philosophy. In this respect, pace Sprague, the sophists are hard to be taken as ‗neo-
Eleatics‘—as Schmitt (2007, 121) argues that the sophists‘ reception of the Eleatic ideas 
would be merely superficial; rather they seem to have been cunning adopters of the 
Parmenidean idea of what is not, i.e. non-being, as well as other ancestors‘ ideas, simply for 
their own success of arguments in a rhetorical and sophistic way. 
 
2.3. The objectivist use of logos in the ouk estin antilegein doctrine 
 
Besides the argumentative structure of the OEA doctrine as examined above, it should also be 
noticed that in the doctrine logos is utilised in an absolutely objective way to speak of a 
pragma that corresponds to it as it is. In other words, a logos about a pragma is always 
objectivised, not relativised with qualifiers. As seen above, according to the OEA doctrine, 
only one logos corresponds to one pragma, and human beings speak of it through one and the 
same logos that is spoken of it only as it is. In this regard, contradiction is absolutely 
impossible. For instance, regarding a pragma, my logos and your logos, if they are really one 
and the same logos that corresponds to the pragma, are always the same. There is no 
difference between my logos and your logos. A logos is completely objectivised on the basis 
of its object, and does not ask for any qualifiers, such as ‗by/for me‘ or ‗by/for you‘, to be 
correct and true about the object. 
Dionysodorus‘ argument for the OEA doctrine, which assumes a similar idea to the 
Parmenidean view on what is not, means that if someone uses a logos, then his logos is 
always about what is as it is under a condition that only one logos corresponds to one pragma. 
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 In fact, the passage comes from a series of quotations by Eusebius from Porphyry‘s Lecture on Literature 
(book 1). On this, cf. Lee (2005), 28. 
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According to the argument for the OEA doctrine, thus, the only way to contradict this logos is 
through another logos which is about what is not, but speaking of what is not is impossible. 
Here, no contradiction occurs in any case of human linguistic performance. The argument for 
the OEA doctrine is thus reformulated briefly as: 
 
(1) Only one logos corresponds to one pragma. 
(2) It is not possible for a logos to be of what is not (to mē on) (or to speak of what is as it is 
not). 
(3) A logos is always one and the same when applied to a pragma which is what is (to on), 
speaking of it only as it is (hōs estin). 
(4) Therefore, contradiction is impossible. 
 
Protagoras is, of course, most known for his MMD in which he asserts that anthropōs (man) 
is metron (measure) of panta chrēmata (all things), of ta onta (things that are) hōs esti 
(that/how they are) and of ta mē onta (things that are not) hōs ouk estin (that/how they are 
not). The interpretation of the MMD has been controversial for scholars both in antiquity and 
modern times; however, according to a standard illustration of the doctrine which has been 
widely admitted ever since Plato‘s Theaetetus where Protagoras‘ MMD is first closely 
examined in the history of philosophy, the doctrine is believed to be an epistemological view 
expressing perceptual relativism. On this view, the MMD declares that each individual man is 
the criterion of the truth of a judgement about a given thing that appears to him as he 
perceives it. In other words, a thing which appears/is perceived as F to/by a is F for a, while 
the same thing which appears/is perceived as ¬F to/by b is ¬F for b. The same thing can be 
considered (to be truly) both F and ¬F (relatively for a and b, respectively) (cf. Appendix 3 
below for my analysis of Plato‘s interpretation of the MMD in the Theaetetus). In this case, 
both judgements about the same thing, which are opposite to each other, are equally true for 
those who made the judgements. Taking notice of this point, some modern scholars have 
proposed to read the OEA doctrine as argued in the Euthydemus as a radical relativist claim in 
the light of the MMD as interpreted in the Theaetetus. They argue that if all judgements are 
true, then no judgement can be false; and if all judgements are incorrigible then they are not 
to be corrected, and therefore no one is refuted or contradicted by others; that is to say, 
contradiction is impossible, as Protagoras insists by the OEA doctrine and the argument in its 
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support.
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As Protagoras‘ main philosophical position is believed to have been a form of relativism, 
the reading of the OEA doctrine as a radical relativist claim in relation to his MMD may seem 
to be a probable and convenient approach. Indeed, the fact that those two doctrines both 
argue for the impossibility of contradiction seem to strengthen this reading. However, if we 
bear in mind a significant difference between the OEA doctrine (and its argument) and the 
MMD (and its standard interpretation), it is not hard to reject the validity of this reading. 
As already examined above, the argument for the OEA doctrine shows that the doctrine 
appears to hold fast to an objectivist use of logos in which a logos that is made to speak of a 
pragma by anyone who speaks of it is not relativised, but absolute—there is only one logos 
for one pragma, and this logos is spoken of the pragma as it is in any circumstances. My 
logos and your logos, or my logos at one time and my logos at another time, about a pragma 
always amount to one and the same logos. Under this argument, thus, the OEA doctrine 
claims that contradiction is impossible. On the contrary, the Platonic reading of the MMD 
argues that the truth of a logos is always relativised to its holder; for example, ‗it is the case 
that x is F for a‘ or ‗it is the case that x is ¬F for b‘. In this case, every judgement made of a 
thing is taken to be true, but only relatively, and such a judgement (logos) is not the only one 
and the same corresponding one to the thing. 
Both the OEA doctrine and the MMD argue that it is not possible to contradict. Their 
arguments for the impossibility of contradiction, however, are entirely different; the former 
utilises an objectivist assumption to show such impossibility, while the latter utilises a 
relativist one. As far as this different feature in their arguments is concerned, the OEA 
doctrine in the Euthydemus and the (Platonic reading of the) MMD in the Theaetetus should 
not be taken in the same relativist way; the reading of the former as a radical relativist claim 
in the light of the latter, although convenient for scholarship on Protagoras, is invalid, and a 
result of focusing merely on the literal expression ‗impossibility of contradiction‘. 
 
 
3. Fallacies of the ouk estin antilegein doctrine 
 
Dionysodorus utilises a strategy to block the possibility of contradiction, by arguing that 
contradiction is impossible, because speaking a logos of something as it is not is impossible 
                                                 
141
 On this suggestion, cf. Levi (1940a), 166; Kerferd (1981a), 88; Rankin (1981), 30–1; Lavery in O‘Grady 
(2008), 40. 
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since speaking of what is not is impossible. In this case, his strategy is that it is not possible 
to speak of what is not and speaking of what is not is the same as speaking of something as it 
is not (cf. (2) in the reformulation of Dionysodorus‘ argument for the OEA doctrine above). 
However, it is not valid at all to equate speaking of something just as it is not with 
speaking of what is not. The Greek word ‗einai‘, as Kahn (1966, 245–65) points out, has 
multiple senses, the predicative sense (e.g. ‗Socrates is wise‘), the existential sense (e.g. 
Socrates exists‘), and the veridical sense (e.g. ‗it is the case that two plus two is four‘). As 
einai has multiple senses, its negation ‗mē (ouk) einai‘, of course, means both ‗not to be‘ 
(predicative) (e.g. ‗Socrates is not vicious‘), ‗not to exist‘ (existential) (e.g. ‗Socrates does not 
exist‘), and ‗not to be true‘ (veridical) (e.g. ‗it is not the case that two plus two is five‘) too. 
And evidently, Dionysodorus seems to utilise the equivocation of the negation of einai, 
conflating ‗not to be‘ with ‗not to exist‘. 
The negation of ‗a thing (that is) to exist (einai)‘ (in the existential sense) is ‗a thing 
(that is) not to exist (mē einai)‘, namely, ‗a thing that does not exist‘. According to 
Dionysodorus‘ argument, it is impossible to speak of a thing that does not exist, because 
speaking of such thing is the same as speaking nothing and amounts to not speaking at all. 
However, the negation of ‗a thing (that is) to be (einai)‘ (in the predicative sense) is ‗a thing 
(that is) not to be (mē einai) (the same as the thing), i.e. ‗another thing (that is) to be‘. This 
‗another thing (that is) to be‘ is, of course, a different thing (from the thing). Speaking of a 
different thing as it is not the same as something else (mē einai hauton tōi pragmati), that is 
to say, speaking of it as it is different from something else (einai heteron tou pragmatos), is 
not impossible. In this case contradiction can happen. Therefore, the OEA doctrine works 
only when the equation of speaking of what is as it is not with speaking of what is not is valid 
under the existential sense of einai, and in this regard Dionysodorus clearly commits the 
fallacy of equivocation of einai.
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 Such fallacy of the equivocation of einai for the argument, however, is not pointed out by Plato in the 
dialogue; he simply has Socrates utilise argumentum ad hominem in order to refute the OEA doctrine in 286b7–
288a7, after equating it with the impossibility of falsehood (cf. Appendix 2 below for Plato‘s equation of the 
OEA doctrine with the impossibility of falsehood). Socrates‘ refutation targets the following points: 
1) The OEA doctrine and the argument in support of it is already used by Protagoras (Euthydemus‘ and 
Dionysodorus‘ teacher) and his followers, as well as those earlier than Protagoras—thus, the doctrine 
and the argument are not genuinely of the sophist brothers‘, and they simply adopt someone else‘s 
doctrine for their own sake. 
2) (If the OEA doctrine, as equated with the impossibility of falsehood, is right,) False judging (doxazein), 
false judgement (doxa), ignorance (amathia), and ignorant people (amatheis) do not exist—but, this is 
very unlikely. 
3) Refutation does not exist if the impossibility of falsehood (as equated with the OEA doctrine) is 
right—thus, Dionysodorus‘ order to Socrates to refute Dionysodorus self-refutes. 
4) If making mistakes (hamarthanein) does not exist (since there is no false judging, false judgement, 
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One more logical fallacy of the OEA doctrine also needs to be addressed; like the Greek 
verb einai, the Greek words logos and pragma have various senses. First, logos can mean 
either ‗statement or proposition‘ (e.g. ‗Socrates is wise‘ or ‗Socrates is a wise Athenian‘) or 
‗description‘ (e.g. ‗wise Socrates‘ or ‗wise Athenian Socrates‘), or even ‗word or name‘ (e.g. 
‗Socrates‘ or ‗wisdom [of Socrates]‘). And, pragma can mean simply ‗a thing‘ (e.g. Socrates 
or wisdom [of Socrates] as a single thing) or ‗a state of affairs (or a fact)‘ (e.g. a case (or fact) 
that Socrates is wise or that Socrates is a wise Athenian). 
The argument for the OEA doctrine, as examined above, operates with a condition that 
only ‗one logos corresponds to one pragma‘. If logos means only ‗word or name‘ and pragma 
refers to ‗a single thing‘ that indeed exists, then the argument for the OEA doctrine fairly 
works. About Socrates or wisdom [of Socrates] as a thing, there is only one logos, ‗Socrates‘ 
or ‗wisdom [of Socrates]‘ that corresponds to the thing. Other logoi, such as ‗Plato‘ or 
‗viciousness‘, will certainly correspond to something else than Socrates or wisdom [of 
Socrates] as the thing—in this sense, the translations of logos and pragma for the success of 
the argument for the OEA doctrine can be suggested as ‗word or name‘ and ‗a (single) thing‘  
However, bearing in mind the multiple senses of logos and pragma, if logos means 
‗description‘ or ‗statement or proposition‘ and pragma ‗a state of affairs (a fact)‘, there can be 
an absurd situation in which one logos does not correspond to any existing pragma. For 
example, if there is a logos as a description ‗vicious Socrates‘ or a logos as a statement 
‗Socrates is vicious‘, this logos must be corresponding to a thing (pragma) viciousness [of 
Socrates] or a state of affairs (pragma) that Socrates is vicious, as long as it exists as a logos. 
But, if such pragma is not the case at all, then it does not exist, and thus is not an existing 
pragma. Here a logos ‗Socrates is vicious‘ or a logos ‗vicious Socrates‘, which does not 
                                                                                                                                                        
ignorance, or ignorant people, as the OEA doctrine as equated with the impossibility of falsehood is 
accepted), Euthydemus and Dionysodorus who have claimed to be excellent in teaching cannot teach 
anything to anyone—thus, the sophists contradict what they have claimed to be. 
All the points above made by Socrates for the refutation of the OEA doctrine, as McCabe (1998, 155) notices 
that the impossibility of falsehood ―does not directly imply its own falsehood … it needs, indeed, a more 
complex dialectical context to be overthrown‖, tackle the context of the sophist‘s claim such as their claim to be 
teachers and Dionysodorus‘ order to Socrates to refute him, rather than attacking the problem of equivocation of 
(the negation of) einai (i.e. the total identification of speaking of what is not with speaking of something as it is 
not) which the doctrine details in itself. 
On Socrates‘ refutation of the OEA doctrine (and the impossibility of falsehood) in the Euthydemus, cf. 
Sprague (1962), 16–20; Hawtrey (1981), 109–18; Chance (1992), 100–7; Burnyeat (2002), 40–60; Castagnoli 
(2010), 32–40. 
Plato‘s criticism of the ambiguous use of einai appears in the Sophist, 263d ff., where he endeavours to 
define falsehood. There he makes an ontological distinction between the meanings of mē einai, ‗not being‘ and 
‗being different‘, and argues that falsehood occurs if one makes a wrong combination of predicates (verbs: 
rhēmata) and subjects (names: onomata) in cases of speaking of different things as the same things and speaking 
of what is not as what is. 
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corresponds to any existing pragma, happens to exist—this does not coincide with the 
condition of the OEA doctrine at all. In this case, the only pragma about which the logos 
‗vicious Socrates‘ or ‗Socrates is vicious‘ is will be Socrates (as a thing) which exists, not 
viciousness [of Socrates] (as a thing) or the fact that Socrates is vicious (as a state of affairs) 
which both do not exist; still the logos does not correspond to the pragma. As far as such 
equivocation of logos and pragma is concerned, contradiction is not impossible.
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In fact, in the Euthydemus, such ambiguity of logos and pragma is also found; when 
Ctesippus said that he wanted his beloved Cleinias to be wiser, Dionysodorus accused 
Ctesippus of wishing Cleinias to be dead. Listening to Dionysodorus‘ accusation, Ctesippus 
said that such state of affair (pragma) did not exist, and he wished that death may fall onto 
the sophist‘s head (283e1–6). In this case, Dionysodorus‘ logos that ‗Ctesippus wants 
Cleinias to be dead‘ is a logos that does not correspond to any pragma (as Ctesippus denied). 
And in order to defend Dionysodorus, Euthydemus intervenes and switches the meaning of 
pragma as a state of affair into its meaning as a single thing (283e9–284a5); he argues that 
speaking has to always be about a pragma, and this pragma must be considered one of the 
things that are and distinct from other things, thus must be what is (to on) (Πόηεξνλ ιέγνληα 
ηὸ πξᾶγκα πεξὶ νὗ ἂλ ὁ ιόγνο ᾖ, ἠ κὴ ιέγνληα; Οὐθνῦλ εἴπεξ ιέγεη αὐηό, νὐθ ἄιιν ιέγεη η῵λ 
ὄλησλ ἠ ἐθεῖλν ὅπεξ ιέγεη; Ἓλ κὴλ θἀθεῖλό γ' ἐζηὶλ η῵λ ὄλησλ, ὃ ιέγεη, ρσξὶο η῵λ ἄιισλ. 
Οὐθνῦλ ὁ ἐθεῖλν ιέγσλ ηὸ ὄλ, ἔθε, ιέγεη;).144 This passage where the sophist is altering the 
sense of pragma is therefore the very moment of utilising the ambiguity of the Greek word. 
 
 
4. A rhetorical device 
 
In the Euthydemus 286c, Plato states that Protagoras and his followers made great use of the 
OEA doctrine and the argument in its support. Why did Protagoras use such doctrine and 
argument? In other words, what was Protagoras‘ purpose in utilising them? 
A passage from Plato‘s Theaetetus 152c–157d, provides a clue to the secret but close 
connection between Protagoras‘ and Heraclitus‘ philosophy in which the sophist‘s 
epistemology (interpreted by Plato as a radical relativist thesis based on perception) is 
diagnosed to entail a famous Heraclitean ontological claim, the Flux-theory. Noticing this 
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 On the logical fallacies of the argument for the OEA doctrine, cf. Denyer (1991), 8–19. 
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 This strategy by Euthydemus is taken in the argument for the impossibility of falsehood (283e7–284c6). On 
my analysis of the impossibility of falsehood and the argument in its support, cf. Appendix 2 below. 
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philosophical connection between those two thinkers, some modern scholars, such as Diels in 
DK80 A19, Guthrie (1971, 182, n. 2) and Levi (1940a, 166, n. 1), have proposed that 
Heraclitus‘ other ideas such as a theory of the unity of opposites might have greatly 
influenced Protagoras; and moreover, on this proposal, they have argued that in Protagoras‘ 
philosophy, everything, including every judgement, indeed concerns the same and unitary one 
without conflict. Seemingly contradictory aspects of things and the judgements about them 
are in fact not contradictory because they all indeed are part of the unity of all opposites in 
the world. In this case no real contradiction occurs; things and judgements are merely seen to 
contradict each other in a superficial way. When Protagoras‘ OEA doctrine is read as a unity 
thesis in the light of the Heraclitean theory of the unity of opposites, as the scholars who 
propose this reading insist, the theory guarantees the contradictory-less unity and single 
identity of conflicting and opposing things. They further argue that that those anonymous 
people who are described by Plato to ‗have used the OEA doctrine and the argument for it 
before Protagoras‘ (Euthyd. 286c) are indeed Heraclitus and his followers, not Parmenides 
and the Eleatics. 
A problem for this reading, however, must be pointed out. The account of the 
Heraclitean unity of opposites is that the seeming conflict in the world is not really 
contradiction between things since they are controlled by a fundamental entity that gathers 
and combines them into a unit. In brief, Heraclitus is known to have held a view that this 
fundamental entity lies in divine fire-like Logos which is/exists (tou de logou toud’ eontos) 
(M. VII.132: DK22 B1), and to have claimed that indeed all is one (hen panta einai) 
(Hippolytus of Rome, Refutation of all Heresies IX.9: DK22 B50). All opposites gather 
together, and from the quarrellings there comes the finest harmony (antixoun sympheron kai 
ek tōn diapherontōn kallistēn harmonian) (Eth. Nic. 1155b4: DK22 B8) under the rule of the 
Logos. The Heraclitean theory of unity of opposites is thus grounded on the thinker‘s 
assumption of an absolute ontological entity. On the contrary, as examined above, the OEA 
doctrine, which argues that a logos of a pragma is spoken of it as it is (n.b. the different 
usages of logos in each position), does not entail any such ontological view, especially 
regarding what is (to on), the object of speech. In this respect, it seems that those who suggest 
this reading go somewhat too far by trying to expect or extract a definite ontological account 
from the OEA doctrine in which no such account is really found or suggested, in order to set 
up a connection of it with another theory (the Heraclitean theory of unity of opposites). 
Moreover, Heraclitus is not reported to have clearly been committed to an idea of the 
impossibility of speaking of what is not (which secures the argumentative success for the 
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OEA doctrine and the impossibility of falsehood)—he is rather known to have violated the 
Principle of Non-Contradiction (hereafter the PNC). Thus, it still remains more likely to 
understand ‗those earlier people who have used the OEA doctrine and its argument‘ as 
Parmenides and the Eleatics who are indeed known to have adopted the idea of the 
impossibility of speaking (and thinking) of what is not through the same expressions as those 
found in the OEA doctrine and its argument, at least to Plato‘s eyes. In addition, it also must 
be noticed that a closer connection, provided by Plato at the relevant passage in the 
Theaetetus, between Protagoras‘ epistemological relativism and Heraclitus‘ ontology refers to 
the connection of the MMD with the Flux-theory, not the MMD with the unity of opposites. 
The tenet of Heraclitus‘ unity of opposites is in fact not found at all in the Theaetetus (or even 
in any of Protagoras‘ thoughts). 
Schiappa (1995, 138), attempting to read the OEA doctrine as anticipation of Aristotle‘s 
PNC, suggests that this was Protagoras‘ logical accomplishment. According to the OEA 
doctrine, says Schiappa, no one can make two true but contradictory judgements about the 
same thing at the same time; the same judgement cannot be both true and false at the same 
time to the judgement maker. Thus, he suggests that ―in fact, the principle of non-
contradiction espoused by Aristotle was, in a very preliminary way, anticipated by 
Protagoras… Aristotle‘s principle of non-contradiction apparently fleshed out the rationale 
underlying Protagoras‘ own statement ouk estin antilegein.‖ 
The suggestion above implies that Plato, whose Euthydemus (in which the OEA is 
discussed) deals with various types of sophisms, was aware of such a point or the logical 
connection between the doctrine and the PNC. However, as Lee (2005, 74–5) properly points 
out, Plato, whom Schiappa considers to be a reliable source for ascribing the OEA doctrine to 
Protagoras, does not seem aware of that, nor does he treat the OEA doctrine in the dialogue as 
an antecedent of the PNC; he, instead, as seen above, just turns it immediately into the 
impossibility of falsehood (286c). Later, Plato himself presents a version of the PNC in the 
Republic 436b, 436e–437a, and 439b where Socrates says that ‗the same thing cannot do or 
undergo opposite things, at any rate, in the same respect, and also in relation to the same 
thing, at the same time (ηαὐηὸλ ηἀλαληία πνηεῖλ ἠ πάζρεηλ θαηὰ ηαὐηόλ γε θαὶ πξὸο ηαὐηὸλ 
νὐθ ἐζειήζεη ἅκα).‘ Even in these passages, Plato does not treat the PNC in connection with 
the OEA doctrine, nor does he give any hint of any connection. 
Besides, in the Metaphysics V.29.1024b ff., Aristotle, whom Schiappa criticises for 
supposing that Protagoras rejected the PNC, although he was aware of the OEA doctrine, 
associates it with Antisthenes, and when he introduces the doctrine he does not discuss the 
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PNC. In the Metaphysics IV.4.1007b19–1011b23, where Aristotle discusses the PNC 
regarding Protagoras, he criticises Protagoras for the reason that the sophist‘s MMD, 
according to which every judgement and appearance is true, infringes the PNC. There the 
OEA doctrine is not discussed.
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Moreover, it is worth noting that in fact the OEA doctrine and the PNC are not dealing 
with the same issues. Aristotle formulates the PNC as ‗the same thing cannot at the same time 
belong to and not belong to the same thing in the same respect (ηὸ αὐηὸ ἅκα ὑπάξρεηλ ηε θαὶ 
κὴ ὑπάξρεηλ ἀδύλαηνλ ηῶ αὐηῶ θαὶ θαηὰ ηὸ αὐηό)‘ (Met. IV.3.1005b19–20). The subject and 
the object in this formulation, both to auto, are different from each other in meaning; the verb 
in the formulation, hyparchein, reveals this difference. As translated literally, hyparchein 
means that something ‗belongs to‘ the something. If here the subject, the same thing, to auto, 
indicates the same thing as what the object, the same thing, to auto, refers to, then the 
meaning of the verb becomes awkward; because it could mean, for example, that X belongs 
to X. In this case, the qualifiers, ‗at the same time‘, hama, and ‗in the same respect‘, kata to 
auto, would be meaningless. The phrase ‗something belongs to (hyparchein) something else‘, 
therefore, means that a thing, or an object, has (echein) its attributes or properties and 
furthermore means that an attribute or property is predicated (katēgoreisthai) of a thing, or an 
object. Thus this formulation claims that the same attribute cannot both belong to and not 
belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect.
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 The argument for the 
OEA doctrine, however, as seen above, does not concern itself with such a point. Rather it 
seems explicit that Aristotle‘s focus in relation to the PNC is not the OEA doctrine, but surely 
the MMD. 
Regarding the question why Protagoras used such a doctrine and argument, I suggest 
that the sophist used it for a rhetorical reason. As we have examined above, the OEA doctrine 
does not seem to maintain any promising philosophical-ontological ideas. In addition, it does 
not seem to absolutely pursue the impossibility of contradiction. If contradiction is really 
impossible, as Socrates points out immediately after the argument for the OEA doctrine at 
286b7–288a7 in the dialogue (cf. n. 142 above), Protagoras and the sophist brothers 
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 It is also noticeable that here Aristotle‘s own term for ‗contradiction‘ is ‗antiphasis‘, not ‗antilegein‘. 
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 Like Aristotle‘s PNC, Plato‘s version of it (Rep. 436b, 436e–437a, and 439b) also concerns the attributes and 
properties that things hold. At Republic 436c he adopts the cases of ‗moving (kineisthai)‘ and ‗standing still 
(estanai)‘ in order to describe the opposite things that the subject, i.e. the same thing, cannot undergo at the 
same time: ‗it is not possible for the same man to stand still and move at the same time in the same respect 
(ἑζηάλαη θαὶ θηλεῖζζαη ηὸ αὐηὸ ἅκα θαηὰ ηὸ αὐηὸ ἆξα [νὐθ] δπλαηόλ).‘ It is apparent that in this phrase ‗moving‘ 
and ‗standing still‘ are not the existent things themselves, but certain attributes of things. While proposing his 
version of PNC in the Republic, Plato does not take the OEA doctrine into discussion. 
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(Dionysodorus and Euthydemus) must abandon their teaching occupation, because no one 
needs to learn from them. Yet, none of them seems to indeed pursue it; also, as the sources of 
the historical activities of Protagoras prove (cf. Section 1 in Chapter I above), the sophist 
himself does not seem to have tried to discard his role as a teacher. 
Protagoras is known to have been influential not only in politics (by teaching political 
virtues and associating with politicians) but also in rhetoric (by teaching the art of eristic and 
speech and making people clever at speaking) (cf. Guthrie (1971), 181–2). The ancient 
sources do not exactly state how Protagoras expressed his rhetorical skills and what type of 
skill he actually taught to his pupils. Nevertheless, the sophist‘s interest in rhetoric is still 
found in some fragmentary passages; Diogenes Laertius (9.55: DK80 A1) reports that the 
sophist wrote The Art of Eristic (Technē Eristikōn) and Opposing Arguments in two books 
(Antilogiōn A B), and Aristotle and Eudoxus report that Protagoras was capable of ‗making a 
weaker argument (logos) stronger (ηὸ ηὸλ ἣηησ δὲ ιόγνλ θξείηησ πνηεῖλ)‘ (the 
weaker/stronger logoi fragment) (Rhet. II.24.1402a23: DK80 A21, B6b; Eudoxus, fr. 307 
Lasserre in Stephanus Byzantius, Ethikon s.v. Abdera: DK80 A21). Again, Diogenes Laertius 
says that Protagoras was the first to say that ‗on all issues there are two arguments (logoi) 
opposed to each other (δύν ιόγνπο εἶλαη πεξὶ παληὸο πξάγκαηνο ἀληηθεηκέλνπο ἀιιήινηο)‘ 
(the two-logoi fragment) (9.51: DK80 A1 and B6a; Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies 
VI.65 and Seneca, The Moral Letters to Lucilius 88.43: DK80 A20).
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In Protagoras‘ time people in Athens all the time contradicted each other, bringing 
different and contradictory opinions for a counsel on political issues in the Assembly. Writers 
and thinkers expressed different ideas, attacking and blaming each other, and teachers who 
came to Athens from other city states professed to educate young people in something new 
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 Plutarch (Per. 36: DK80 A10, Stesimbrotos, FGrHist. 107 F 11 ii 519) reports an episode that once 
Protagoras and Pericles spent a whole day discussing when a pentathlete accidentally killed a counter player 
(Epitimus the Pharsalian) with a javelin in a contest, according to the most correct argument (kata ton 
orthotaton logon) where the legal responsibility (aitia) for the players‘ death should lie; whether in the 
pentathlete or in the javelin or in the judges of the contest (πεληάζινπ γάξ ηηλνο ἀθνληίῳ παηάμαληνο ἖πίηηκνλ 
ηὸλ Φαξζάιηνλ ἀθνπζίσο θαὶ θηείλαληνο, ἟κέξαλ ὅιελ ἀλαι῵ζαη κεηὰ Πξσηαγόξνπ δηαπνξνῦληα, πόηεξνλ ηὸ 
ἀθόληηνλ ἠ ηὸλ βαιόληα κᾶιινλ ἠ ηνὺο ἀγσλνζέηαο θαηὰ ηὸλ ὀξζόηαηνλ ιόγνλ αἰηίνπο ρξὴ ηνῦ πάζνπο 
἟γεῖζζαη). We may perhaps assume that in this episode Protagoras was trying to demonstrate that whatever legal 
responsibility is taken as the subject matter, he could make a stronger argument (for Protagoras‘ association with 
Pericles, cf. Muir (1981), 19; O‘Sullivan (1995), 15–23). Similarly, Aristophanes‘ Clouds 889–1104, where Fair 
argument (Dikaios logos) and Unfair argument (Adikos logos) appear, can be seen in this way of rhetorical 
sophistry. In this passage, Fair argument is characterised as ‗stronger (kreittōn)‘, Unfair argument ‗weaker 
(hēttōn)‘; the latter claims that it can make any arguments stronger than Fair argument‘ common and strong 
beliefs. For instance, against Fair argument‘s view that there is a sense of what is right (dikē) with the gods, 
Unfair argument asks ‗how has Zeus not perished for chaining up his father, if there is indeed a sense of what is 
right? (π῵ο δ῅ηα δίθεο νὔζεο ὁ Ζεὺο νὐθ ἀπόισιελ ηὸλ παηέξ' αὑηνῦ δήζαο;)‘ (904–906). For a similar idea to 
the two-logoi fragment, cf. the so-called Twofold Arguments (Dissoi Logoi). 
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and different from traditional customs. In such a situation (and even now) people would 
certainly consider an argument in which contradiction is impossible really weak (or even 
nonsense). Or, they would probably think that there could not be an argument for the 
impossibility of contradiction. As Protagoras said that there are two opposing arguments on 
all issues, however, there was also an argument to be used for the OEA doctrine (as opposed 
to an argument for the possibility of contradiction which people would normally adopt), and 
this argument made Ctesippus silent and unable to know what to say (Euthyd. 286b4)—such 
a weak argument became stronger. After reporting Protagoras‘ making a weaker argument 
stronger, Aristotle adds that ‗hence people were rightly annoyed at Protagoras‘ profession 
(θαὶ ἐληεῦζελ δηθαίσο ἐδπζρέξαηλνλ νἱ ἄλζξσπνη ηὸ Πξσηαγόξνπ ἐπάγγεικα)‘ (Rhet. 
II.24.1402a23: DK80 A21). Ctesippus‘ silence can be counted as a type of one‘s figure who 
is very annoyed at Protagoras‘ argument. 
In a field where fierce battles of argument continue, making an interlocutor silent and 
unable to know what to say is a very effective rhetorical device to gain a victory. In this 
respect, as Rankin (1981, 26) suggests, the OEA doctrine can be considered a forceful 
rhetorical weapon, ―which no well equipped eristic or dialectician could afford not to have,‖ 
namely, ―an argument-choker‖, in Protagoras‘ rhetorical skills. Understanding Protagoras‘ use 
of the OEA doctrine in the light of his rhetorical purposes seems to befit Plato‘s hostile view 
on the sophists that they, including Protagoras, attended debates in order to secure 
argumentative victories and persuade audiences, while seeking money;
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 whereas Socrates 
was willing to argue with his interlocutors in order to seek, and ultimately arrive at, the truth 
and real knowledge. In fact, in the Euthydemus after the argument for the OEA doctrine is 
proposed by the sophist brothers, Socrates does not point out its logical fallacies; instead he 
attempts to turn it into another argument, i.e. the impossibility of falsehood (cf. Appendix 2 
below) and tries to refute it merely by utilising argumentum ad hominem (cf. n. 142 above). 
In this regard, the OEA doctrine, despite its fallacies, thus seems to show argumentative 
virtuosity in a general sense, and be a powerful rhetorical device to stifle opponents‘ 
arguments in a particular sense. 
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 Cf. Men. 91d–e (DK80 A8); D.L. 9.52 (DK80 A1). 
140 
Chapter VII 
 
Conclusion: Protagorean Objectivism 
 
 
Having scrutinised the ancient evidence for Protagoras, we are now at the end of this research 
on the sophist‘s views on politics and ethics, education, epistemology, language, and 
rhetorical sophistry. In this research I have attempted to show that in Protagoras‘ fragments 
and the arguments in their support he seems to hold fast to a position of a certain kind of 
objectivism, rather than that of relativism. In this position of objectivism, Protagoras claims 
that the things that are related to human affairs such as political virtues can and should be 
taught on the basis of the civic senses (the Great Speech and the MMD), because they are 
what human beings can and should known and taught through the human objective 
epistemological condition and a process of synthesis of human experiences (the PTH 
fragment), in a correct linguistic and grammatical manner (the correct use of language). 
Protagoras‘ thoughts can be briefly summarised as below: 
Political-Ethical Claims: In the Protagoras 318e5–319a2, Protagoras professes to teach 
good deliberation (euboulia) concerning domestic affairs, i.e. how best to manage one‘s 
household, and concerning the affairs of the city, i.e. how to be the most influential in the 
affairs of the city, both in action and speech, namely, political virtues. In the Great Speech 
(Prot. 320c8–328d2: DK80 C1) Protagoras demonstrates that political virtues can and should 
be taught, expressing his ideas on the objective civic senses and the relativity of the 
application of those senses. 
According to the Great Speech, in order to gain political virtues one must be equipped 
with a sense of what is right (dikē) and a sense of shame (aidōs), i.e. the common objective 
civic senses. Zeus equally distributes these senses to all human beings so that all men can 
construct a community and live together with others, protecting themselves both from outer 
attacks of wild beasts and from inner misdeeds. Without these senses, asserts Protagoras, 
human beings cannot avoid the extinction or their race. The civic senses enable men to 
discern what they should do from what they should not do and practise the former and avoid 
the latter in their society. For Protagoras a sense of what is right (dikē) is considered an active 
and encouraging political criterion by means of which men measure right things to do for the 
preservation and security of a community, while a sense of shame (aidōs) a reactive (or 
passive) and regulative political criterion by means of which men measure shameless things 
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to avoid for the same purpose and they feel ashamed whenever they commit something unjust. 
In this regard, for Protagoras the civic senses are the fundamental political and ethical 
principles by means of which human beings are able to produce and acquire political virtues 
(excellence), e.g. justice, regarding political issues in their community, and thus necessary 
conditions to bear political virtues. These principles are entirely objective; if they were given 
to human beings relatively, not only the construction of human community but also human 
survival would be impossible. 
As people live in different areas with various cultural backgrounds in different times, the 
civic senses, however, cannot be always applied in the same way. To apply the civic senses 
to particular political cases in an appropriate and better way, people need to have knowledge 
of different types of cultural and geographical backgrounds in their community. The 
application of the civic senses in a better and more appropriate way produces political and 
ethical benefits in the community. This knowledge is viewed as Protagoras‘ idea on good 
deliberation concerning domestic affairs, i.e. how to manage one‘s household, and concerning 
the affairs of the city, i.e. how to be influential in the affairs of the city, both in action and 
speech; hence in Protagoras‘ view such knowledge is knowledge of political virtues and fairly 
teachable. Education in political virtues makes men good citizens with good deliberation, and 
they come to run their city well, securing their survival and the preservation of their city; 
better education makes men better citizens with better deliberation, and the best education, of 
course, the best citizens with the best deliberation. 
Through experiencing a broad range of various cultures and religions, one will gain 
more knowledge of different types of cultural and geographical backgrounds, i.e. knowledge 
on how to apply the civic senses to particular political cases in different areas in a better way; 
and one with the most experience would become the best and most influential. In this regard, 
one‘s largest number of experiences about various situations reflects on one‘s profession to 
teach ‗how best to manage one‘s household, and how to be the most influential in the affairs 
of the city, both in action and speech‘ on political issues into people and a community. In 
Protagoras‘ thought one who knows more about the different factors and hence is able to 
educate people about them, is thus a better and wiser teacher of political virtues; one who 
knows most about them is, of course, the best and wisest teacher of political virtues. 
A reading of the MMD (Theaet. 152a3–4 and M. 7.60: DK80 B1; Crat. 385e6–386a1: 
DK80 A13; Met. X.1.1053a35 and XI.6.1062b12: DK80 A19; P.H. 1.216: DK80 A14; D.L. 
9.51: DK80 A1) in the light of the Great Speech suggests the doctrine itself to be read as a 
political-ethical claim. On this reading, the key terms in the MMD, chrēmata, metron, and 
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anthrōpos, are understood respectively as ‗human actions and speeches in the community‘, ‗a 
sense of what is right and a sense of shame, i.e. the civic sense, by which human political 
actions and speeches are properly measured, and further political virtues educated on the 
basis of the civic senses‘, and ‗man as a social being who shares in the common objective 
civic senses, as well as political virtues learned through private and public education, who 
can live and coexist with others in a human community‘. Thus, the MMD whose form is 
simply that ‗of all things the measure is man, of the things that are that/how they are, of the 
things that are not that/how they are not‘ is now in this suggestion read as follows: ‗man, as a 
social being, who shares in the common objective civic senses, as well as political virtues 
learned through private and public education, with others, whoever he is, as far as he lives in 
a human community with others, is by himself the measure of all the basic needs for his (and 
others‘) survival and the preservation of the community, i.e. of all political and ethical 
actions and speeches that he and others do and make; all these are measured as to whether 
and how they are appropriate (i.e. just, courageous, temperate, pious, and needful and so on) 
things to practise in the light of the civic senses and political virtues.‘ 
Epistemology: in the PTH fragment (D.L. 9.51: DK80 A1; Ad Autol. III.28: C. A23; M. 
9.56: DK80 A12; P.E. 14.3.7: DK80 B4; and Gr. aff. II.112.2–114.1: C. A23), Protagoras 
confesses his ignorance of the gods, stating that ‗on the gods I am not able to know either 
that/how they are or that/how they are not, or what they look like in form‘. Protagoras 
introduces two epistemological obstacles as a reason of his ignorance, the obscurity of the 
gods and the shortness of human life. From these epistemological obstacles, it is possible to 
infer the sophist‘s intention to demarcate the area of what can be known to human beings 
from that of what cannot be known to them. The standard of the demarcation is the range of 
the objects of human experience in the length of human life. This standard, as equally 
applying to all human beings, is considered, at least to Protagoras‘ eyes, a universal and 
objective epistemological condition; no one can know the things beyond this standard. 
Through a filter of the universal and objective epistemological condition, man can acquire 
knowledge only of what lasts shorter than or as long as the amount of human experience in 
human life. 
It is also possible to infer from the PTH fragment Protagoras‘ two ideas, namely, the role 
of ‗synthesis‘ in acquiring knowledge and the importance of ‗anthropological concerns‘. A 
single experience of an object always leads man to making a judgement about the object in a 
certain way, such as a judgement that ‗x is F‘ or that ‗x is G‘. A single experience neither 
yields a type of judgement that ‗I am not able to know either that/how x is F or that/how x is 
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G‘, nor directly corresponds to a judgement of ignorance. Things are experienced by man in 
various, and thus obscure, ways in different times. Hence Protagoras ignorance of the gods 
can be understood as a result of a process of synthesis of his (two or more) various and 
obscure experiences about them, not as a straight response to his experience about them. 
However, if human beings are able to accumulate a good number of different experiences and 
judgements about the objects compared to which human life is not considered short, they can 
know about them, bringing forth a new synthesised judgment about it. In this regard, the role 
of synthesis in the Protagorean epistemology is characterised as a type of knowledge about 
which Protagoras believes to teach and learn. 
Protagoras further encourages human beings to abandon studies on cosmology, natural 
philosophy or theology, but turn their attention into anthropological concerns, i.e. a 
humanistic study that only concerns the human affairs in human life and community. 
Regarding the gods, for instance, on the one hand, human life is too short to accumulate a 
good number of experiences and judgements of them to bring forth a new synthesised 
judgment, i.e. knowledge about them. The things that are related to human affairs, on the 
other hand, can be known to human beings through enough accumulated experiences and 
judgements for a production of a newly synthesised judgement. These things are not anything 
but that of which Protagoras himself professes to teach suitable judgements, namely good 
deliberation (euboulia), in each situation in human life, such as political virtues. Political 
virtues cannot last longer than the length of human life since they are human devices for the 
preservation of human community and race, and thus are knowable and teachable. In 
Protagoras‘ view these practical subjects producing benefit (ōphelimon) in a human society 
are experienced throughout human life, and the accumulated judgements and ideas about 
them enable human beings to arrive at knowledge of them. 
Linguistics: the idea of the correct use of language is also provided by Protagoras to 
correct wrong linguistic and grammatical usages. Correcting is based on the sophist‘s 
naturalism of language, that is to say, correcting words and grammar is supported by the 
nature of things. Protagoras‘ naturalism of language concerns not only the consistency of the 
gender of words but also that of morphological figures. In this regard, his correct use of 
language can be understood as ‗the grammatical genders on the basis of natural genders of 
things‘ and ‗the morphological consistency‘ of the words based on their grammatical genders. 
Protagoras‘ linguistic interest in the correct usage of language according to the nature of 
things reflects an idea of objectivist view of language. Indeed, Protagorean linguistic 
correction does not require any human artificial or individually relative modification upon 
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language. Protagoras‘ correct use of language is hence understood as a linguistic-normative 
claim by which the sophist endeavours to set up certain linguistic norms that everyone should 
objectively follow in order to correctly use language according to the nature of objects, 
avoiding relative usages of language. 
Rhetorical Sophistry: the OEA doctrine (DK80 A1: D.L. 9.53, and also DK80 A19) and 
the argument in its support (Euthyd. 285e9–286a3) are proposed by Dionysodorus on 
Protagoras‘ behalf in Plato‘s Euthydemus, in order to prove that it is impossible to contradict. 
The sophist, adopting and utilising a Parmenidean idea of impossibility of speaking and 
thinking of what is not (to mē eon) (frs. 2, 6, and 8), demonstrates that only what is (to on) 
can be spoken of as it is (hōs esti), while what is not cannot be spoken of because speaking of 
what is not (to mē eon) is impossible and speaking of what is as it is not (hōs ouk esti) is 
equated to speaking of what is not. With such demonstration, the sophist, establishing the 
only three cases of human linguistic performance, concludes that it is impossible for anyone 
to make a description that contradicts not only someone else‘s description but also one‘s own. 
According to the OEA doctrine, contradiction is absolutely impossible because everyone is 
entirely banned from speaking of what is not; hence, it is universally and objectively applied 
to all human beings and their linguistic activity that only what is can be spoken of and just as 
it is. As long as everyone speaks of what is only in the same way as it is, i.e. as ‗what is‘, no 
qualifier such as ‗to or by someone‘, ‗in the case of someone speaking‘, ‗under this 
circumstance‘, or ‗at this time‘ is needed for logos to be true.  
The OEA doctrine, however, does not seem to be taken by Protagoras as a serious 
philosophical claim, as it holds no serious ontological or epistemological issue and commits 
logical fallacies (i.e. the equivocation of the Greek words einai, logos, and pragma). The 
doctrine rather seems to be Protagoras‘ rhetorical sophistry to show that he is able to make 
two opposing arguments about any issues (the two-logoi fragment) (D.L. 9.51: DK80 A1 and 
B6a; Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies (Stromata) VI.65 and Seneca, The Moral Letters 
to Lucilius (Ad Lucilium epistulae morales) 88.43: DK80 A20) and a weaker argument (e.g. 
that ‗it is impossible to contradict‘) stronger at which people of his time were much annoyed 
(the weaker/stronger logoi fragment) (Rhet. II.24.1402a23: DK80 A21, B6b; Eudoxus, fr. 307 
Lasserre in Stephanus Byzantius, Ethikon s.v. Abdera: DK80 A21), as the sophist made 
Ctesippus silent and unable to know what to say (Euthyd. 286b4). 
Under the discussion on Protagoras‘ thoughts above, the sophist‘s fragments are 
classified under certain topics as follows: 
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 Political-Ethical fragments: 
 
The Great Speech: κεγάο ιόγνο. 
 
Protagoras‘ teaching subject (DK80 A5: Prot. 318e5–319a2): εὐβνπιία πεξὶ η῵λ νἰθείσλ, ὅπσο ἂλ 
ἄξηζηα ηὴλ αὑηνῦ νἰθίαλ δηνηθνῖ, θαὶ πεξὶ η῵λ η῅ο πόιεσο, ὅπσο ηὰ η῅ο πόιεσο δπλαηώηαηνο ἂλ εἴε 
θαὶ πξάηηεηλ θαὶ ιέγεηλ. 
Good deliberation concerning domestic affairs, how best to manage one‘s household, and 
concerning the affairs of the city, how to be the most influential in the affairs of the city, both in 
action and speech.  
 
The Man-Measure Doctrine: πάλησλ ρξεκάησλ κέηξνλ ἐζηὶλ ἄλζξσπνο, η῵λ κὲλ ὄλησλ ὡο ἔζηηλ, 
η῵λ δὲ νὐθ ὄλησλ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ. 
Of all things the measure is man, of the things that are that/how they are, of the things that are not 
that/how they are not. 
 
 Fragments on education and practice in relation with Political-Ethical fragments: 
 
A fragment on education (1) (DK80 B3: Anecdota Parisiensia I.171.31): θύζεσο θαὶ αζθήζεσο 
δηδαζθαιία δεῖηαη, … ἀπὸ λεόηεηνο δὲ ἀξμακέλνπο δεῖ καλζάλεηλ. 
Teaching requires nature and practice … one must start learning from early youth. 
 
A fragment on education (2) (DK80 B11: Plutarch On Practice 178.25): Education does not sprout 
in the soul unless one goes to a great depth. (The original Greek is lost, the English version 
translated by O‘Brien in Sprague (1972, 24) is a translation of a German translation of a Syriac 
version by J. Gildemeister and F. Bücheler.) 
 
A fragment on art and practice (DK80 B10: Stob. iii (Flor.) 29.80): κεδὲλ εἶλαη κήηε ηέρλελ ἄλεπ 
κειέηεο κήηε κειέηελ ἄλεπ ηέρλεο. 
Art is nothing without practice and practice nothing without art. 
 
 Epistemological fragment149 
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 The new alleged Protagorean fragment from Didymus the Blind‘s Commentary on Psalms 3, 222.21–22, if 
this fragment can be fairly attributed to Protagoras, would be categorised as an epistemological fragment: 
 
ζνθηζηὴο δὲ ἞λ ὁ Πξσηαγόξαο—ιέγεη, ὅηη ηὸ εἶλαη ηνῖο νὖζηλ ἐλ ηῶ θαίλεζζαί ἐζηηλ. [ι]έγεη ὅηη 
θαίλνκαη ζνὶ ηῶ παξόληη θαζήκελνο· ηῶ δὲ ἀπόληη νὐ θαίλνκαη θαζήκελνο· ἄδεινλ εἰ θάζεκαη ἠ νὐ 
θάζεκαη. 
Protagoras was a sophist—he says that for things that are, being is in appearing. He says that for you 
who are present, I appear as sitting, but for someone who is not present, I do not appear as sitting; 
whether I am sitting or not sitting is obscure. 
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The peri theōn fragment: πεξὶ κὲλ ζε῵λ νὐθ ἔρσ εἰδέλαη νὔζ' ὡο εἰζίλ, νὔζ' ὡο νὐθ εἰζίλ, νὔζ' ὁπνῖνί 
ηηλεο ἰδέαλ· πνιιὰ γὰξ ηὰ θσιύνληα κε εἰδέλαη, ἣ η' ἀδειόηεο θαὶ βξαρὺο ὢλ ὁ βίνο ηνῦ ἀλζξώπνπ. 
On the one hand, on the gods I am not able to know either that/how they are or that/how they are not, 
or what they look like in shape. For many are the things preventing me from knowing [the gods]; 
the obscurity [of the gods] and the shortness of human life. 
 
 Linguistic fragments 
 
The correct use of language (logos) and grammar (DK80 A1: D.L. 9.52): ὀξζνέπεηα, ὀξζόηεο 
ὀλνκάησλ (the correctness of words and names). (For the contents, cf. Phdr. 267c4–d4: DK80 A26; 
Crat. 391c2–4: DK80 A24. Cf. also Rhet. III.5.1407b6–9: DK80 A27; Soph. Elen. XIV.173b16–25: 
DK80 A28; Poet. XIX.1456b15–9: DK80 A29; and Aristophanes, the Clouds 658–679: DK80 C3) 
 
 Rhetorical-Sophistic fragments 
 
The ouk estin antilegein doctrine: νὐθ ἔζηηλ ἀληηιέγεηλ.  
It is not possible to contradict. 
 
The weaker/stronger logoi fragment (DK80 B6b and A21: Rhet. II.24.1402a23; Eudoxus, fr. 307 
Lasserre in Stephanus Byzantius, Ethikon s.v. Abdera: DK80 A21): ηὸ ηὸλ ἣηησ δὲ ιόγνλ θξείηησ 
πνηεῖλ. 
Making a weaker argument (logos) stronger. 
 
The two-logoi fragment (DK80 B6a: D.L. 9.51; DK80 A1; Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies 
(Stromata) VI.65 and Seneca, The Moral Letters to Lucilius (Ad Lucilium epistulae morales) 88.43: 
DK80 A20): δύν ιόγνπο εἶλαη πεξὶ παληὸο πξάγκαηνο ἀληηθεηκέλνπο ἀιιήινηο. 
[Protagoras was the first to say that] on all issues there are two arguments (logoi) opposed to each 
other. 
 
To sum up, according to Protagoras, only the things that properly belong to the range of the 
objects of human experience and the length of human life can be fully synthesised and known 
through human objective epistemological means (the peri theōn fragment). The things that 
are related to human affairs can be known, as the subjects of Protagoras‘ teaching, like 
political virtues, on the grounds of the common objective civic sense. Political and ethical 
actions and speeches in human communities are practised on the basis of the universal and 
objective principles, i.e. the civic senses, which are equally shared by all human beings at a 
fundamental level; and better political and ethical practice will be promised if people possess 
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political virtues that are established on the basis of the civic senses at a secondary and 
improved level (the Great Speech and the MMD). As Protagoras emphasises the importance 
of the laws of a city as a method of maintaining the city as well preserved (cf. Prot. 325d2–
326e1), it is important that people should be able to understand what is said and written in a 
correct way in order to properly practise such actions and speeches; Protagoras insists upon 
grammatical and linguistic correctness on the grounds of the naturalism of language, avoiding 
relative usages of language (the correct use of language). Even in utilising rhetorical sophistry, 
Protagoras, adopting the objectivist use of human logos which is universally given to all 
human beings who have a function to speak, argues that it is possible to speak of each of the 
things that are, namely, what is, only as it is, and thus contradiction is impossible (the ouk 
estin antilegein doctrine). In this aspect, Protagoras strongly advocates a certain type of 
objectivism, namely ‗Protagorean objectivism‘, holding a coherent ‗epistemological‘-
‗political and ethical‘-‗linguistic‘ position according to which his political and ethical ideas 
are supported by the objective views of epistemology and naturalism of language. 
However, it needs to be admitted that Protagorean objectivism does not entail any 
philosophically and systematically structured views on metaphysical, ontological, or 
epistemological details as other philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, do—as Kerferd 
himself (1981a, 173) who devoted his research to a study on the sophists admits, the few 
fragments (and some related arguments in their support) of Protagoras must be 
philosophically ―unimpressive in comparison with the mighty edifices of Plato and Aristotle 
which survive intact or virtually intact.‖ Protagoras objectivism merely presents some 
objectivist viewpoints at an immature level (especially, compared to those philosophers‘ 
ideas), providing no full theoretical account about them. The immaturity of Protagoras‘ 
objectivism can chiefly be pointed to in three places. First, human language must be in use in 
accordance with the nature of things—however, he does not give an account on the nature of 
things, yet he seems to simply take it for granted along with common traditional sense; for 
instance, the noun ‗wrath‘ fits the masculine nature because usually men have wrath, and 
human beings need to use the optative mood whenever they ask for something from the gods 
because ‗the gods‘ are superior to human beings. Second, by experiences and a process of 
synthesis human knowledge is acquired about the things that do not go beyond the objective 
epistemological obstacles—yet, Protagoras does not detail why experience must be the 
necessary, much less the sufficient, source of knowledge, nor does he clarify the exact 
amount of experiences necessary for acquiring knowledge via a process of synthesis. Third, 
the common objective civic senses enable human beings to be political—but, in Protagoras‘ 
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political-ethical viewpoint the objectivity of the civic senses is not demonstrated 
epistemologically or ontologically; the sophist simply states that they are given to all human 
beings by Zeus and work as the political and ethical principles by means of which human 
beings can measure things to do and avoid and further produce and establish political virtues. 
Yet, they are not the objects of knowledge, and the entity and existence of the senses are not 
theoretically discussed but entirely dependent upon divine authority, i.e. Zeus. 
Despite its philosophical weaknesses, still it should be noted that in the cultural Greek 
and Athenian tradition of thought, Protagoras, as distinguished from the traditional 
understanding of the sophist as a radical relativist both in antiquity and modern times, seems 
to have tried to hold fast to an objectivist position, advocating traditional concepts of ethics, 
politics, and epistemology. Protagorean objectivism, presumably as a part of the sophistic 
movement in his time, may be understood as an attempt to turn peoples‘ attention from 
theological and cosmological concerns into humanistic studies, emphasising the importance 
of the traditional ethical and political principles and political virtues for a better life in a 
human community. It is remarkable that Protagoras, albeit admitting the human epistemic 
limit concerning theology and natural philosophy, never abandoned the possibility of 
knowledge; Protagorean knowledge, as based on human experience, is probably counted as a 
type of inductive conviction, namely a kind of epagōgē, whose boundary lies in the range of 
human experiences. But in such knowledge, believes Protagoras, people can have sound 
discussion on the issues about human affairs, using languages to describe things correctly, 
and further deliberating a better, or the best, way of preserving their survival and community. 
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Appendix 1: The ancient sources for the peri theōn fragment 
 
 
According to Diogenes Laertius (9.51 and 9.54), the first of Protagoras‘ books was On the 
Gods (To Peri Theōn) (cf. the section about Protagoras‘ life and works in Chapter I above). 
Unfortunately the entire contents of the book are not known to us, but it is said that the 
opening statement of the book is his confession of ignorance concerning the gods, also 
known as the PTH fragment. Unlike the other parts of the book To Peri Theōn, a number of 
ancient sources record the PTH fragment: 
 
(a) In the Theaetetus 162d6–e7 (DK80 A23), where Socrates criticises Protagoras by stating 
that man could be as wise as the gods if man were the measure of all things, Plato 
illustrates what Protagoras would have said concerning the gods if he had been still alive, 
implying that the sophist would not be happy to drag the gods into the argument: ὦ 
γελλαῖνη παῖδέο ηε θαὶ γέξνληεο [sc. Theaetetus for paides, Theodorus and Socrates for 
gerontes], δεκεγνξεῖηε ζπγθαζεδόκελνη, ζενύο ηε εἰο ηὸ κέζνλ ἄγνληεο, νὓο ἐγὼ [sc. 
Protagoras] ἔθ ηε ηνῦ ιέγεηλ θαὶ ηνῦ γξάθεηλ πεξὶ αὐη῵λ [i.e. ζε῵λ] ὡο εἰζὶλ ἠ ὡο νὐθ 
εἰζίλ, ἐμαηξ῵. This passage is the oldest piece of evidence we can find in relation to 
Protagoras‘ statement about his ignorance of the gods. 
 
(b) Cicero, in his treatise On the Nature of the Gods, introduces Protagoras‘ doubt about the 
gods: velut in hac quaestione plerique, quod maxime veri simile est et quo omnes fere150 
duce natura venimus, deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino 
Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt (I.1.2). And Cicero again reports in 
the same work: nec vero Protagoras, qui sese negat omnino de deis habere quod liqueat, 
sint non sint qualesve sint, quicquam videtur de natura deorum suspicari (I.12.29: DK80 
A23). And then later, in the same work, he reports that Protagoras was banished from 
Athens and his books were burnt in a public assembly by order of the Athenians, and he 
then explains these disastrous happenings by reference to the fragment: Abderites quidem 
Protagoras sophistes temporibus illis vel maximus, cum in principio libri sic posuisset de 
divis neque ut sint neque ut non sint habeo dicere, Atheniensium iussu urbe atque agro est 
exterminatus librique eius in contione combusti (I.23.63: DK80 A23). 
 
(c) In On Piety (col. 22 Gomperz‘s Herculanische Studien II (Leipzig, 1866), 22: DK80 A23), 
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Philodemus suggests that Protagoras would probably be one of those who are ignorant of 
the gods: ἠ ηνὺο ἄγλσζηνλ εἴ ηηλέο εἰζη ζενὶ ιέγνληαο ἠ πνῖνί ηηλέο εἰζηλ.151 
 
Afterwards, during the second and third centuries CE, some writers mention Protagoras‘ 
statement about the gods in their works again: 
 
(d) The Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda, who discusses the history of atheistic views, 
considers Protagoras an atheist: Πξσηαγόξαο δὲ ὁ Ἀβδεξείηεο η῅η κὲλ δπλάκεη ηὴλ αὐηὴλ 
ἢλελθε Δηαγόξαη δόμαλ, ηαῖο ιέμεζηλ δὲ ἑηέξαηο ἐρξήζαην, ὡο ηὸ ιείαλ ἰηακὸλ αὐη῅ο 
ἐθθεπμνύκελνο. ἔθεζε γὰξ κὴ εἰδέλαη, εἰ ζενὶ εἰζίλ· ηνῦην δ' ἐζηὶλ ηὸ αὐηὸ η῵η ιέγεηλ 
εἰδέλαη ὅηη κὴ εἰζίλ (fr. 12c.2.1.19W: DK80 A23). 
 
(e) Maximus of Tyre, in his Dialexeis, refers briefly to Protagoras‘ view on the gods: θἂλ 
ἀγλνεῖλ ηη θῆο [concerning the gods], ὡο Πξσηαγόξαο (11.V.4–5: C. A23). 
 
(f) Theophilus of Antioch, when composing a book on the history of Christianity and the 
defence of it in To Autolycus, reports the PTH fragment: ηί δ' νὐρὶ θαὶ Κξηηίαο θαὶ 
Πξσηαγόξαο ὁ Ἀβδεξίηεο ιέγσλ· Εἴηε γάξ εἰζηλ ζενί, νὐ δύλακαη [sc. Protagoras] πεξὶ 
αὐη῵λ (i.e. ζε῵λ) ιέγεηλ, νὔηε ὁπνῖνί εἰζηλ δει῵ζαη· πνιιὰ γάξ ἐζηηλ ηὰ θσιύνληά κε 
(III.28: C. A23). 
 
(g) Sextus Empiricus, in dealing with some ancient atheistic views, reports that Protagoras 
says he cannot speak about the gods due to many obstacles: πεξὶ δὲ ζε῵λ νὔηε εἰ εἰζὶλ νὔζ' 
ὁπνῖνί ηηλέο εἰζη δύλακαη ιέγεηλ· πνιιὰ γάξ ἐζηη ηὰ θσιύνληά κε (M. 9.56: DK80 A12). 
Then, like Cicero‘s report, he adds that because of this claim the Athenians demanded the 
death penalty for Protagoras. 
 
(h) Flavius Philostratus, in his report about the lives of the various sophists, says: ηὸ δὲ 
ἀπνξεῖλ θάζθεηλ, εἴηε εἰζὶ ζενὶ εἴηε νὐθ εἰζί, δνθεῖ κνη [sc. Philostratus] Πξσηαγόξαο ἐθ 
η῅ο Πεξζηθ῅ο παηδεύζεσο παξαλνκ῅ζαη (V.S. 1.10: DK80 A2). He then suggests that 
Protagoras seems to have made this outrageous statement regarding the gods because of his 
Persian magi teachers, who hid their religious belief from people: κάγνη γὰξ ἐπηζεηάδνπζη 
κὲλ νἷο ἀθαλ῵ο δξ῵ζη, ηὴλ δὲ ἐθ θαλεξνῦ δόμαλ ηνῦ ζείνπ θαηαιύνπζηλ νὐ βνπιόκελνη 
δνθεῖλ παξ' αὐηνῦ δύλαζζαη (ibid.). 
 
                                                 
151
 Omitted in Dumont‘s edition (1969), 39. 
151 
(i) Diogenes Laertius delivers the best known form of the PTH fragment: πεξὶ κὲλ ζε῵λ νὐθ 
ἔρσ [sc. Protagoras] εἰδέλαη νὔζ' ὡο εἰζίλ, νὔζ' ὡο νὐθ εἰζίλ· πνιιὰ γὰξ ηὰ θσιύνληα 
εἰδέλαη, ἣ η' ἀδειόηεο θαὶ βξαρὺο ὢλ ὁ βίνο ηνῦ ἀλζξώπνπ (D.L. 9.51: DK80 A1, B4). 
 
(j) Marcus Minucius Felix, in his dialogue on Christianity between Octavius Januarius the 
Christian and Caecilius Natalis the pagan, gives a very short reference to Protagoras‘ 
banishment from Athens and his books being burnt by the Athenians in a public place due 
to his statement about the gods: Abderiten Pythagoram (read ‗Protagoram‘) Athenienses 
viri consulte potius quam profane de divinitate disputantem, et expulerint suis finibus, et in 
concione eius ecripta deusserint (Octavius 8.3: C. A23). 
 
(k) Lactantius reports Protagoras‘ doubt about the gods in two of his works, The Divine 
Institutions: Sed et antea Protagoras, qui deos in dubium vocavit (D.I. I.2: C. A23), and On 
the Wrath of God: Primus omnium Protagoras extitit, temporibus Socratis, qui sibi diceret 
non liquere, utrum esset aliqua divinitas, necne. Quae disputatio eius adeo impia et contra 
veritatem et religionem iudicata est, ut et ipsum Athenienses expulerint suis finibus, et 
libros eius in concione, quibus haec continebantur exusserint. De cuius sententia non est 
opus disputare, quia nihil certi pronuntiaverit (Ir.D.9: C. A23). 
 
In the fourth and fifth centuries CE, we find other sources for the PTH fragment: 
 
(l) Eusebius of Caesarea, in his Preparation for the Gospel, including Protagoras in the group 
of those who held atheistic views, introduces the PTH fragment when talking about Plato‘s 
exposure of the feud of Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles with Parmenides and his 
school: ὁ κὲλ γὰξ Δεκνθξίηνπ γεγνλὼο ἑηαῖξνο, ὁ Πξσηαγόξαο, ἄζενλ ἐθηήζαην δόμαλ· 
ιέγεηαη γνῦλ ηνηᾷδε θερξ῅ζζαη εἰζβνιῆ ἐλ ηῶ Πεξὶ ζε῵λ ζπγγξάκκαηη· Πεξὶ κὲλ ζε῵λ νὐθ 
νἶδα νὔζ' ὡο εἰζὶλ νὔζ' ὡο νὐθ εἰζὶλ νὔζ' ὁπνῖνί ηηλεο ἰδέαλ (P.E. 14.3.7: DK80 B4). 
 
(m) Epiphanius of Salamis briefly mentions Protagoras‘ statement of the gods: Πξσηαγόξαο ὁ 
ηνῦ Μελάλδξνπ Ἀβδεξίηεο ἔθε κὴ ζενὺο εἶλαη, κεδὲ ὅισο ζεὸλ ὑπάξρεηλ (Adversus 
Haereses III.16: C. A23). 
 
(n) Theodoret of Cyrrhus, in his Cure of the Greek Maladies, while discussing those who held 
views against the gods, introduces Protagoras‘ view on them: νὕησ γάξ ηηο θαὶ η῅ο παιαηᾶο 
θαὶ η῅ο θαηλ῅ο ζενινγίαο ηὴλ μπκθσλίαλ ὁξ῵λ, ζαπκάζεηαη ηὴλ ἀιήζεηαλ θαὶ θεύμεηαη κὲλ 
Δηαγόξνπ ηνῦ Μηιεζίνπ θαὶ ηνῦ Κπξελατθνῦ Θενδώξνπ θαὶ Εὐεκέξνπ ηνῦ Τεγεάηνπ ηὸ 
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ἄζενλ· ηνύηνπο γὰξ ὁ Πινύηαξρνο ἔθεζε κεδέλα λελνκηθέλαη ζεόλ· θεύμεηαη δὲ θαὶ η῵λ 
Σηστθ῵λ ηὴλ ἀπξεπ῅ πεξὶ ηνῦ ζείνπ δόμαλ· ζσκαηνεηδ῅ γὰξ νὗηνη ηὸλ ζεὸλ ἔθαζαλ εἶλαη· 
βδειύμεηαη δὲ θαὶ Πξσηαγόξνπ ηνὺο ἀκθηβόινπο πεξὶ ηνῦ ζενῦ θαὶ ἀπίζηνπο ιόγνπο· 
ἐθείλνπ γάξ ἐζηη ηὰ ηνηάδε· Πεξὶ κὲλ νὖλ η῵λ ζε῵λ νὐθ νἶδα, νὔηε εἰ εἰζίλ, νὔζ' ὡο νὐθ 
εἰζίλ, νὐζ' ὁπνῖνί ηηλεο ηὴλ ἰδέαλ εἰζίλ (Gr. aff. II.112.2–114.1: C. A23). 
 
During the later periods, two more sources for the PTH fragment are found: 
 
(o) Hesychius of Miletus, in his Onomatologus in Scholia on Plato‘s Republic 600c (DK80 
A3), also makes a short reference to Protagoras‘ books being burnt by the Athenians, 
presumably due to his PTH fragment: ἐθαύζε δὲ ηὰ ηνύηνπ βηβιία ὑπ' Ἀζελαίσλ. εἶπε γάξ 
πεξὶ ζε῵λ νὐθ ἔρσ [sc. Protagoras] εἰδέλαη νὔζ' ὡο εἰζίλ, νὔζ' ὡο νὐθ εἰζίλ. 
 
(p) In Suda (Lexicon), Protagoras is described as one who stated about the gods: πεξὶ ζε῵λ νὐθ 
ἔρσ [sc. Protagoras] εἰδέλαη, νὔηε ὥο εἰζηλ, νὔηε ὡο νὐθ εἰζί (letter Π, 2958, line 14: C. 
A3a). And the lexicon also reports that this impious statement about the gods outraged the 
Athenians and so they burnt the books of Protagoras and expelled him.
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In the ancient sources for the PTH fragment, some different wordings are found. Among 
those, the most controversial one is the question about the gods‘ shape and the part about the 
epistemological obstacles. Philodemus (c), Theophilus (f), Sextus Empiricus (g), Eusebius (l), 
and Theodoret (n) add into the PTH fragment the phrases ‗how they are (poioi tines eisin)‘, 
‗of what sort they are (hopoioi eisin)‘, ‗what they are like (hopoioi tines eisin),‘ ‗what they 
look like in shape (hopoioi tines idean),‘ and ‗what their shapes are (hopoioi tines tēn idean 
eisin)‘ respectively, as a part of Protagoras‘ ignorance of the gods. Again, Theophilus (f) and 
Sextus Empiricus (g) present the epistemological obstacles by adding the words, ‗polla gar 
esti ta kōluonta me‘, and Diogenes Laertius (i) explicitly reveals what these epistemological 
obstacles are, i.e. the obscurity (adēlotēs) of the gods and the shortness of human life 
(brachys ōn ho bios tou anthrōpou). Other sources, on the contrary, do not include these 
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 Dates of our sources for the PTH fragment, in chronological order, are as follows: Plato (424/423–348/347 
BCE); Cicero (106–43 BCE); Philodemus (probably first century BCE); Diogenes of Oenoanda (probably second 
century CE); Maximus of Tyre (probably second century CE); Theophilus of Antioch (second century CE, died 
probably between CE 183 and 185); Sextus Empiricus (second to third century CE, probably CE 160–210); 
Flavius Philostratus (CE 170–247); Diogenes Laertius (between second and fifth century CE, probably 
flourished in the first half of the third century); Marcus Minucius Felix (presumably, second century CE); 
Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius (CE 240–320); Eusebius (CE 263–339); Epiphanius of Salamis (CE 
310/320–403); Theodoret of Cyrrhus (CE 393–457/460); Hesychius of Miletus (probably flourished in the sixth 
century CE at Constantinople); Suda (tenth century CE). 
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words.
153
 
With regard to this aspect of the question concerning the gods‘ shape and the 
epistemological obstacles, it might be conjectured that these words could have been added to 
the fragment by later sources, although the original statement Protagoras made did not 
contain them. However, it does not seem plausible to assume that the later sources attached a 
whole new point that Protagoras did not consider at all. In addition, if the point about the 
epistemological obstacles was indeed added by the later sources, then the original fragment, 
when it was read in public, would have been meaningless and considered empty by those 
who heard it. For this point plays a role in the PTH fragment which justifies Protagoras‘ 
ignorance of the gods and persuades his audiences. If the sophist did not offer any persuasive 
and justifying reason to take his statement seriously, who would have been willing to pay a 
large fee to learn from him? This would not fit Protagoras‘ role as a teacher, if he had made a 
declaration without proposing any explanation or support for it. 
In this regard, I presume that despite the chronological gaps between the dates of 
Protagoras and our sources, (c) (f) (g) (i) (l) and (n), this part of the PTH fragment, especially 
the epistemological obstacles, which function as a justification of Protagoras‘ ignorance of 
the gods, formed part of the sophist‘s original statement. Modern scholars too have widely 
suggested that the question of the shape of the gods and the second part of the fragment 
stating the epistemological obstacles, although they have been often omitted in ancient 
testimonies, are likely to have been parts of the original PTH fragment (cf. Kerferd, 1981a, 
166; De Romilly, 1992, 104). 
To sum up, despite the different wordings in the ancient sources, I suggest that the 
original form of the PTH fragment can be conjectured to be—its major part is quoted in 
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 Besides this, three minor differences are also found in our sources. First, Plato (a), Cicero (b), Diogenes 
Laertius (i), Lactantius (k), Eusebius (l), Theodoret (n), Hesychius (o), and Suda (p) employ hōs (or ut), in order 
to address the contents of Protagoras‘ ignorance of the gods; while Philodemus (c), Diogenes of Oenoanda (d), 
Theophilus (f), Sextus Empiricus (g), and Philostratus (h) use ei/eite. However, there does not seem a significant 
change in meaning of contents in the PTH fragment; it is rather a possible interchange between an adverbial 
relative hōs (ut in Latin) and a conjunction ei/eite. Second, Eusebius (l) and Theodoret (n), who categorised 
Protagoras as one holding fast to an atheistic view, employ ‗ouk oida‘ expression; while the rest uses ‗ouk echo 
eidenai‘ expression. As discussed in Section 1.1 in Chapter IV above, however, it seems more plausible to count 
Protagoras as an agnostic. And lastly, Plato (a), Cicero (b), Theophilus (f), and Sextus Empiricus (g), employ 
verbs of speaking and writing, and report that Protagoras says that he is not able to speak (legein, dicere) or 
write (graphein) of the gods; whereas others such as Diogenes of Oenoanda (d), Diogenes Laertius (i), Eusebius 
(l), and Hesychius (o), adopting verb of knowing, report that the sophist says he is not able to know (eidenai) the 
gods. It seems that in antiquity, speaking (legein) and knowing (eidenai) were used interchangeably. For 
instance, in Parmenides‘ fragments 6 and 8, what is spoken (and thought) of is considered the same as what is 
known. Similarly, Aristotle also frequently uses the phrase ‗I say (legō de)‘ (cf. Cat. 1a24, 7a25, 8b25, and Met. 
984a22, 985a5, 986a8, etc.) in order to indicate the speaker‘s state of knowing and understanding about a given 
matter. The interchangeable usage of speaking with knowing in the sources of the PTH fragment can be 
understood in this respect. 
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Diogenes Laertius (i), while Theophilus (f), Sextus Empiricus (g), Eusebius (l), and 
Theodoret (n) report its supplementary parts—as follows: 
 
πεξὶ κὲλ ζε῵λ νὐθ ἔρσ εἰδέλαη (or ιέγεηλ) νὔζ' ὡο εἰζίλ, νὔζ' ὡο νὐθ εἰζίλ, νὔζ' ὁπνῖνί ηηλεο ἰδέαλ· 
πνιιὰ γὰξ ηὰ θσιύνληα κε εἰδέλαη, ἣ η' ἀδειόηεο θαὶ βξαρὺο ὢλ ὁ βίνο ηνῦ ἀλζξώπνπ.154 
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 This reading is thus generally accepted as the original form of the PTH fragment by most modern scholars. 
Cf. Gomperz (1901), 457; Dupréel (1948), 58; Untersteiner (1954), 27; Dumont (1969), 46; Guthrie (1971), 
234; O‘Brien in Sprague (1972), 4; Kerferd (1981a), 166; Barnes (1982), 449; De Romilly (1992), 104; Levett 
in Burnyeat (1990), 286; Schiappa (1991), 142; Gagarin and Woodruff (1995), 186; Gagarin (2002), 115; 
Dillon and Gergel (2003), 3; Kahn (2003
2
), 302; Lee (2005), 25 and 83; Zilioli (2007), 6; Lavery in O‘Grady 
(2008), 31. Capizzi‘s suggestion (1955, 101–2, n. 2, and 207) to add ‗hekaston touton‘ before eidenai on the 
grounds that these added words are quoted by Eusebius referring to Aristocles is not confirmed in Aristocles‘ 
evidence (fr. 4, line 2 ff., and 14 ff.). 
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Appendix 2: Plato’s equation of the ouk estin antilegein doctrine  
with the impossibility of falsehood in the Euthydemus 
 
 
1. The equation 
 
In the Euthydemus Plato equates the OEA doctrine (and the argument in its support) with the 
impossibility of falsehood argued for by Euthydemus. The argument for the impossibility of 
falsehood appears before that of the OEA doctrine in the dialogue. As Dionysodorus finishes 
his argument for the OEA doctrine, Plato has Socrates immediately turn it into the 
impossibility of falsehood, stating that ‗the argument [i.e. the argument for the OEA doctrine] 
implies (dynatai) it [i.e. (the argument for) the impossibility of falsehood]; since [the OEA 
doctrine] is not anything but that it is not possible to speak falsely (ἄιιν ηη ςεπδ῅ ιέγεηλ νὐθ 
ἔζηηλ· ηνῦην γὰξ δύλαηαη ὁ ιόγνο)‘ (286c6–7).155 
At 283e1–6 in the dialogue, as Ctesippus wishes his beloved, Cleinias, to be wiser, 
Dionysodorus accuses him of wishing Cleinias to be no longer who he is now, i.e. to be dead 
and gone. Ctesippus, being upset by such state of affair (toiouto pragma) as the sophist‘s 
false accusation, says that such pragma may fall ‗onto your [sc. Dionysodorus‘] head (soi eis 
kephalēn)‘. Euthydemus then intervenes and argues that it is not possible to speak falsely, in 
order to defend Dionysodorus from Ctesippus‘ charge (283e7–284c6): 
 
Part I 
 
Τί δέ, ἔθε, ὦ Κηήζηππε, ὁ Εὐζύδεκνο, ἤ δνθεῖ 
ζνη νἷόλ η' εἶλαη ςεύδεζζαη; 
 
 
Well then, said Euthydemus, Ctesippus, does it 
seem possible to you to speak falsely? 
Νὴ Δία, ἔθε, εἰ κὴ καίλνκαί γε. Oh god, yes, he [sc. Ctesippus] said, if I am not 
                                                 
155
 Plato‘s philosophical consideration seems to lie more in the impossibility of falsehood than the OEA doctrine 
itself in his works including the Euthydemus. As we will see shortly, the impossibility of falsehood argues 
simply that every logos is true, so that there is no falsehood. If Plato admitted such idea, then he would not be 
able to take a definite stance in the conflict between the true logos of those who seek the truth (like Socrates) 
and the false logos of those who are insidious and eager for victory from the battle of argument and persuasion 
with honeyed words (like Protagoras and the sophist brothers as well as wicked politicians, at least to Plato‘s 
eyes, at his time). To dissolve this difficulty, Plato seems to have gone through a number of passages in several 
dialogues such as Euthydemus, Theaetetus, and Sophist, seeking the definition of falsehood. First, he 
understands that falsehood occurs when speaking or judging of what is not (Euthyd. 283e–284c); later he draws 
a distinction between false judgement and judging things that are not (Theaet. 189b), and finally, defining 
falsehood, he arrives at the solution by making an ontological distinction between the meanings of mē einai, ‗not 
being‘ and ‗being different‘, and arguing that falsehood occurs if one makes a wrong combination of predicates 
(verbs: rhēmata) and subjects (names: onomata) in cases of speaking of different things as the same things and 
speaking of what is not as what is (Soph. 263d ff.). Cf. Schiappa (1995), 135–6; Burnyeat (2002), 40–1. 
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mad at least. 
Πόηεξνλ ιέγνληα ηὸ πξᾶγκα πεξὶ νὗ ἂλ ὁ ιόγνο 
ᾖ, ἠ κὴ ιέγνληα; 
[Euthydemus said] When speaking of the 
pragma which the logos would be about, or 
when not speaking [of it]? 
Λέγνληα, ἔθε. When speaking [of it], he [sc. Ctesippus] said. 
Οὐθνῦλ εἴπεξ ιέγεη αὐηό, νὐθ ἄιιν ιέγεη η῵λ 
ὄλησλ ἠ ἐθεῖλν ὅπεξ ιέγεη; 
[Euthydemus said] Then if someone speaks of 
this [pragma], he does not speak of any other of 
the things that are than the very that [pragma] 
that he is speaking of, does he? 
Π῵ο γὰξ ἄλ; ἔθε ὁ Κηήζηππνο. How would he do that? Said Ctesippus. 
Ἓλ κὴλ θἀθεῖλό γ' ἐζηὶλ η῵λ ὄλησλ, ὃ ιέγεη, 
ρσξὶο η῵λ ἄιισλ. 
[Euthydemus said] And that [pragma] he is 
speaking of is indeed one of the things that are, 
and distinct from other things. 
Πάλπ γε. [Ctesippus said] Certainly. 
Οὐθνῦλ ὁ ἐθεῖλν ιέγσλ ηὸ ὄλ, ἔθε, ιέγεη; [Euthydemus said] Well then, isn‘t he who is 
speaking of that [pragma] speaking of what is? 
Ναί. [Ctesippus said] Yes. 
Ἀιιὰ κὴλ ὅ γε ηὸ ὂλ ιέγσλ θαὶ ηὰ ὄληα ηἀιεζ῅ 
ιέγεη· ὥζηε ὁ Δηνλπζόδσξνο, εἴπεξ ιέγεη ηὰ 
ὄληα, ιέγεη ηἀιεζ῅ θαὶ νὐδὲλ θαηὰ ζνῦ ςεύδεηαη.  
[Euthydemus said] But really a person who is 
speaking of what is and also of things that are
 
is 
speaking the truth; so that Dionysodorus, if he 
speaks of things that are, then speaks the truth 
and does not speak falsely against you. 
Part II 
 
Ναί, ἔθε· ἀιι' ὁ ηαῦηα ιέγσλ, ἔθε ὁ Κηήζηππνο, 
ὦ Εὐζύδεκε, νὐ ηὰ ὄληα ιέγεη.  
 
 
Yes, he said; but Euthydemus, a person who is 
speaking of these things does not speak of things 
that are, said Ctesippus. 
Καὶ ὁ Εὐζύδεκνο, Τὰ δὲ κὴ ὄληα, ἔθε, ἄιιν ηη ἠ 
νὐθ ἔζηηλ; 
And things that are not surely are not? Said 
Euthydemus. 
Οὐθ ἔζηηλ. [Ctesippus said] They are not. 
Ἄιιν ηη νὖλ νὐδακνῦ ηά γε κὴ ὄληα ὄληα ἐζηίλ; [Euthydemus said] Then are things that are not 
nowhere? 
Οὐδακνῦ. [Ctesippus said] Nowhere. 
Ἔζηηλ νὖλ ὅπσο πεξὶ ηαῦηα, ηὰ κὴ ὄληα, 
πξάμεηελ ἄλ ηίο ηη, ὥζηε θαὶ εἶλαη πνηήζεηελ ἂλ 
θαὶ ὁζηηζνῦλ ηὰ κεδακνῦ ὄληα;156 
[Euthydemus said] Then is it possible that 
someone could do something about these things, 
things that are not, so that he and also anyone 
would make things that are nowhere also be? 
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 Hermann‘s emendation. On the contrary, T Vind goes with the marginal conjecture: ‗[T]hen is it possible that 
someone could do something about these things, things that are not, so that he and also anyone would make 
them things that are nowhere? (Ἔζηηλ νὖλ ὅπσο πεξὶ ηαῦηα, ηὰ κὴ ὄληα, πξάμεηελ ἄλ ηίο ηη, ὥζη' ἐθεῖλα 
πνηήζεηελ ἂλ θαὶ ὁζηηζνῦλ ηὰ κεδακνῦ ὄληα;)‘. 
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Οὐθ ἔκνηγε δνθεῖ, ἔθε ὁ Κηήζηππνο. It does not seem so to me, said Ctesippus. 
Τί νὖλ; νἱ ῥήηνξεο ὅηαλ ιέγσζηλ ἐλ ηῶ δήκῳ, 
νὐδὲλ πξάηηνπζη; 
[Euthydemus said] Well then, do the rhetoricians 
do nothing, when they speak in public? 
Πξάηηνπζη κὲλ νὖλ, ἤ δ' ὅο. No, they do [something], he [sc. Ctesippus] said. 
Οὐθνῦλ εἴπεξ πξάηηνπζη, θαὶ πνηνῦζη; [Euthydemus said] Then if they do [something], 
do they not also make [something]? 
Ναί. [Ctesippus said] Yes. 
Τὸ ιέγεηλ ἄξα πξάηηεηλ ηε θαὶ πνηεῖλ ἐζηηλ; [Euthydemus said] Is speaking, then, doing and 
making? 
Ὡκνιόγεζελ. He [sc. Ctesippus] agreed. 
Οὐθ ἄξα ηά γε κὴ ὄλη', ἔθε, ιέγεη νὐδείο! πνηνῖ 
γὰξ ἂλ ἢδε ηί· ζὺ δὲ ὡκνιόγεθαο ηὸ κὴ ὂλ κὴ 
νἷόλ η' εἶλαη κεδέλα πνηεῖλ! ὥζηε θαηὰ ηὸλ ζὸλ 
ιόγνλ νὐδεὶο ςεπδ῅ ιέγεη, ἀιι' εἴπεξ ιέγεη 
Δηνλπζόδσξνο, ηἀιεζ῅ ηε θαὶ ηὰ ὄληα ιέγεη. 
Then, he [sc. Euthydemus] said, no one speaks of 
things that are not, since he would be already 
making something; and you have agreed that no 
one is able to make what is not, so that according 
to your account, no one speaks falsely; yet if 
Dionysodorus really speaks, then he speaks the 
truth and of things that are. 
 
Euthydemus‘ argument for the impossibility of falsehood has two main parts. Each part 
arrives at the conclusion that speaking falsely is impossible. The first part is briefly 
summarized as follows: 
 
(1) When you speak falsely, you must speak of a pragma which your logos is about. 
(2) When you speak of a pragma which your logos is about, the pragma you are speaking of is 
to be one of the things that are (hen tōn ontōn) and distinct (chōris) from other things. 
(3) Then, you are speaking of what is (to on). 
(4) And speaking of ‗what is (to on)‘ and ‗also things that are (kai ta onta)‘ is the same as 
speaking ‗the truth (alēthē)‘. 
(5) Therefore, speaking falsely is impossible. 
 
When the first part of the argument ends, Ctesippus objects that one who speaks of the things 
such as those of which Dionysodorus speaks does not speak of things that are. Against 
Ctesippus‘ objection, Euthydemus now takes the second part of the argument for the 
impossibility of falsehood as follows: 
 
(6) Things that are not (ta mē onta) not only are not (ouk estin) but also are nowhere 
(oudamou). 
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(7) Doing is making, and you cannot do (prattein) or make (poiein) anything that is not. 
(8) Speaking is doing and making. 
(9) So, then, speaking of what is not is impossible. (from (7) and (8) above) 
(10) Hence even one who speaks of the things such as Dionysodorus speaks of does speak of 
things that are, therefore Dionysodorus does not speak falsely and speaking falsely is still 
impossible.
157
 (from (9) and (4) above) 
 
In order to establish the impossibility of falsehood, Euthydemus utilises the fallacy of 
equivocation of the Greek verb ‗to be (einai)‘. This verb has several uses, such as the 
existential use, the veridical use, and the copulative (predicate) use. In the existential use, the 
verb indicates the existence of the subject; while in the veridical use, it indicates that 
something is the case. This verb can also be used to indicate the subject-predicate connection 
in the copulative use. In (1) Euthydemus presupposes that speaking has always to be about a 
pragma, and in (2) he again clarifies that this pragma is one of things that are and is distinct 
from other things. As far as a pragma is considered one of the things that are, it then must be 
what is.
158
 Then, he argues in (4) that ‗speaking of what is and also things that are‘ is 
‗speaking the truth‘, and thus concludes in (5) that Dionysodorus, as long as he was speaking 
of things that are, does not accuse (i.e. speak) falsely. When Ctesippus agrees with 
Euthydemus that speaking is always about what is, he seems to understand it (to on, i.e. the 
present participle neutral nominative and accusative singular form of einai) in the existential 
sense, namely, speaking of something that exists; otherwise he would have disagreed with 
Euthydemus. However, when the argument arrives at (4), Euthydemus alters the sense of 
einai from the existential sense to the veridical sense, arguing that speaking of things that are 
is nothing but speaking the truth. In Greek usage, speaking of things that are (legein ta onta) 
can be taken by itself to mean speaking the truth (legein alēthē) on the grounds that the Greek 
expression ‗ta onta‘ has itself the meaning of ‗the truth‘ in the veridical sense of einai. On 
this basis of the equivocation of the Greek verb einai Euthydemus leads the argument to the 
conclusion that it is not possible to speak falsely.
159
 
Here Euthydemus‘ argumentative strategy of replacing ‗a pragma‘ with ‗what is (to on)‘ 
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 Hawtrey (1981, 99) suggests that behind this argument lies Parmenides‘ ‗ρξὴ ηὸ ιέγεηλ ηε λνεῖλ η' ἐὸλ 
ἔκκελαη (what can be spoken of and thought must be)‘ (DK28 B6). For the formulation of the argument, cf. 
Denyer (1991), 8–10. 
158
 Here Euthydemus clearly commits the fallacy of ambiguity of the Greek word pragma. On this cf. Section 3 
in Chapter VI above. 
159
 For Euthydemus‘ use of equivocation of einai (switching its meaning from ‗existential‘ to ‗veridical‘) in this 
argument, cf. Sprague (1962), 14–16; Hawtrey (1981), 98–9; Chance (1992), 87–8. 
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and ‗things that are (ta onta)‘ is found in the argument for the impossibility of falsehood. In 
order to lead the argument to the point of speaking of ‗things that are‘, which is identified 
with speaking ‗the truth‘ in the veridical sense of einai, Euthydemus needs first to bring 
‗what is‘ into the argument, considering speaking of ‗what is‘ equivalent to speaking of 
‗things that are‘. For this, he tries to show that that speaking of ‗a pragma‘ is speaking of 
‗what is‘. As shown above, at the beginning of the argument Ctesippus, abusing 
Dionysodorus, says that speaking of ‗toiouto pragma‘ (i.e. Ctesippus‘ wish that Cleinias be 
dead) is accusing (i.e. speaking) falsely. Euthydemus then argues that speaking of ‗a thing‘ is 
the same as speaking of such ‗this (auto) [pragma]‘ or such ‗that (ekeino) [pragma]‘, and 
finally speaking of ‗what is‘. Euthydemus asks Ctesippus whether, if one speaks of ‗this‘ or 
‗that‘, what he speaks of is what is, and Ctesippus agrees. However, at this stage, he does not 
bring ‗things that are‘ into the argument straight off; rather, he takes several further steps for 
this. He first says that ‗if one speaks of this [pragma], then one speaks of the very that 
[pragma] that one is speaking of, not any other thing among things that are (oukoun eiper 
legei auto, ouk allo legei tōn ontōn ē ekeino hope legei).‘ This sentence, while proving that 
one who is speaking speaks of what is, does not necessarily entail yet that one is speaking 
‗the truth‘. Thus, Ctesippus seems to feel safe in agreeing to this. As soon as Ctesippus 
agrees to this, Euthydemus straightaway concludes that ‗speaking of what is and also things 
that are is the same as speaking the truth‘ and thus speaking falsely is impossible. 
Nonetheless, Ctesippus raises an objection to Euthydemus‘ conclusion, insisting that 
one who speaks of the things in the way in which Dionysodorus speaks does not speak of 
things that are. From Ctesippus‘ objection, the argument continues on to the second part. At 
the beginning of the second part of the argument, Euthydemus characterises ‗things that are 
not (ta mē onta)‘, the negation of things that are (ta onta), as both ‗are not (ouk estin)‘ and 
‗nowhere (oudamou)‘. This characterisation shows that Euthydemus is here utilising the 
existential sense of einai, not the veridical use, and applying it to the whole second part of his 
argument for the impossibility of falsehood.
160
 It may be suggested, of course, as De Vries 
(1972, 47) argues, that those two phrases, ouk estin and oudamou, do not guarantee in 
themselves that the existential use of einai is necessarily in play; they could still carry the 
veridical or the copulative sense, and be understood as ‗not truly‘ and ‗in no way‘. However, 
it seems more reasonable to assume that here Euthydemus uses the existential meaning of 
einai, namely, ‗things that are not existent‘ and ‗nowhere existing‘, as Chance (1992, 243, n. 
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 Again, cf. Sprague (1962), 15; Hawtrey (1981), 99–100; Chance (1992), 88–9. 
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25) states, ―as we discover when Euthydemus caps it by submitting a locus before people (in 
public, en tōi dēmōi),‖161 that is, something existing in space. 
Moreover, the employment of the existential use of einai in the argument can be more 
easily clarified through Euthydemus‘ very next words, doing (prattein) and making (poiein). 
Euthydemus introduces the notion of doing and making into the argument in (7), and treats 
speaking (legein) as a case of doing and making in (8). Doing and making take certain 
objects that exist; otherwise, neither doing nor making ever happens, as Euthydemus insists 
that ‗no one can do anything about things that are not, so as to make things that are nowhere 
also be.‘162 The treatment of speaking as a case of doing and making enables the sophist to 
demonstrate that if one speaks, then one is thereby doing and making something, so that there 
must be an existing object of one‘s speech. If one tries to speak of what is not (existing) (to 
mē on), then one‘s action of speaking is nothing but an attempt to do or make things that are 
nowhere [existing], but this is not possible. Therefore, speaking of what is not is impossible, 
only speaking of what is is possible. The outcome of the second part of the argument requires 
us to go back to (4) in the first part, in which speaking of what is and also things that are is 
regarded as the same as speaking the truth. Consequently, again, speaking falsely is 
impossible.
163
 
In the whole argument for the impossibility of falsehood, it is remarkable that, just as in 
the OEA doctrine, the ‗logos (a noun corresponding to legein), is characteristically used in an 
objectivist way. Anyone who speaks of what is speaks of what is and things that are (first part 
of the argument), since no one is able to speak of things that are not (second part of the 
argument). Thus, everyone, as far as he is speaking, no matter who he is and no matter what 
context he takes to speak, speaks always and objectively the truth. According to the argument, 
in order to speak falsely, one needs to speak differently from another who speaks of what is. 
However, speaking differently from speaking of what is is accomplished only by speaking of 
what is not; but, this is not possible. Therefore, a logos of what is, so long as it is to be about 
what is, without asking for situational context such as qualifiers, is always true. My logos of 
what is is always the same as your logos of what is, and there is no difference between our 
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 On this point, cf. also Burnyeat (2002), 54. 
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 De Vries (1972, 47) argues that the notion of doing and making is not necessarily taken into the argument for 
the emphasis of the existential sense of einai, as ouk estin and oudamou can be still entailing the veridical or 
copulative sense, translating ‗not truly‘ and ‗in no way‘. But ‗doing and making not truly‘ and ‗doing and 
making in no way‘, of course, cannot be understood as doing and making at all, and this is not obviously what 
Euthydemus means in the argument. 
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 Cf. Sprague (1962), 15–16. 
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logoi. The logos is not relativised in the argument for the impossibility of falsehood.
164
 
 
 
2. Problems of the equation 
 
One question needs to be raised about the argument for the impossibility of falsehood. In the 
first part of the argument, Euthydemus argues that whenever one speaks, speaking is always 
of a pragma, stating it as what is (to on) and things that are (ta onta), then concludes that 
speaking falsely is impossible. However, there seems to be an illogical identification of what 
is (to on) with things that are (ta onta) in this part of the argument. It is acceptable that a 
thing is taken as to on (singular) in the argument, but taking it as ta onta (plural), i.e. the 
identification of [speaking of] to on with [speaking of] ta onta, needs explanation. 
The term ta onta is brought into the argument in (4). Before then, the argument was 
about speaking of a single thing, i.e. to on; Ctesippus‘ only agreement with Euthydemus‘ 
argument until (3) is that a thing which is spoken of is what is (to on), and distinct from other 
things. The term ta onta was not yet introduced in this step. After identifying speaking of a 
thing with speaking of to on, in (4) Euthydemus all of a sudden adds ‗ta onta‘ to the 
argument, arguing that one who speaks of to on ‗and also (kai) ta onta‘, speaks the truth. We 
see that Ctesippus, when the argument arrives at (5), objects to Euthydemus by insisting that 
one who speaks of the things such as Dionysodorus speaks of does not speak of ta onta (not 
to on). Ctesippus‘ objection would be awkward if speaking of to on and speaking of ta onta 
were to be considered entirely identical without any explanation. For in (2) and (3), Ctesippus 
has already agreed with Euthydemus that one must speak of one of ta onta, i.e. of to on, not 
ta onta, whenever one speaks of a thing. It is not possible for one to speak nothing whenever 
speaking. However, speaking of to on in itself does not imply speaking the truth, while 
speaking of ta onta does. Or, if speaking of to on implied in itself speaking the truth, then 
Euthydemus and Ctesippus would have reached agreement on the impossibility of falsehood 
in (4) without adding ta onta. This is why Euthydemus deliberately, but without a proper 
explanation, adds ta onta into the first part of his argument, and the identification of 
(speaking of) to on with (speaking of) ta onta plays a key role in the success of the argument. 
Arguing that there is no difference between ‗a table‘ and ‗tables‘ when speaking of 
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 Like the OEA doctrine, the impossibility of falsehood commits the same fallacies, i.e. the equivocation of 
einai and the ambiguity of logos and pragma. I will not discuss the same fallacies here again; instead, cf. 
Section 3 in Chapter VI above. 
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tables, one may suggest that to on can be taken without difficulty to be the same as ta onta 
and thus no explanation is necessarily needed. But this is not the case. For, unlike the case of 
speaking of ‗a table‘ and ‗tables‘, the change from to on to ta onta is not merely a change in 
the number of the objects of speech, from the singular to the plural, but also implies a 
possible but significant change of meaning, from speaking of something (existing) to 
speaking the truth. In other words, to on is taken to mean an existing object (of a logos), 
while in the argument ta onta is taken to indicate truth.
165
 An explanation of such equation of 
to on with ta onta thus needs to be provided in the argument.
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One more problem regarding the notion of making in the second part of the argument 
can be pointed out. Making (poiein) is a case of doing (prattein),
167
 and speaking (legein) is 
a case of making and thus also a case of doing. But doing is not a case of making and making 
is not a case of speaking. In this respect, speaking is not treated bi-conditionally with making 
and doing. However, as just seen, Euthydemus, utilising the existential sense of einai in the 
argument, argues that as making requires something existing as its object, speaking, which is 
always of ta onta also requires something existing as its object.
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 Finally, he concludes that, 
                                                 
165
 The different usages of the singular to on and the plural ta onta are also observed in Plato‘s works. When 
discussing the matter related to the impossibility of falsehood, including the passage from the Euthydemus 
quoted above, Plato generally employs the plural form, ta onta; at 429d5–6 in the Cratylus, for instance, he says 
that ‗speaking falsely is speaking of things that are not (or, speaking not of things that are) (ηὸ ςεπδ῅ ιέγεηλ 
ἐζηηλ ηὸ κὴ ηὰ ὄληα ιέγεηλ).‘ It is obvious that the negative form of ta onta (things that are), ta mē onta (things 
that are not), is still implicated with the matter of falsehood as far as ta onta refers to ‗the truth‘. Plato thus takes 
up ta mē onta in discussing the impossibility of falsehood in other dialogues as well. At 167a7–b1 in the 
Theaetetus, he argues that ‗it is not possible to judge things that are not, nor to judge something else than what 
one would experience, and the things [that one would experience] are always true (νὔηε ηὰ κὴ ὄληα δπλαηὸλ 
δνμάζαη, νὔηε ἄιια παξ' ἃ ἂλ πάζρῃ, ηαῦηα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀιεζ῅).‘ At 188d3–5, Plato argues again that ‗a man who 
about anything whatsoever judges things that are not, inevitably judges falsely (ὁ ηὰ κὴ ὄληα πεξὶ ὁηνπνῦλ 
δνμάδσλ νὐθ ἔζζ' ὡο νὐ ςεπδ῅ δνμάζεη).‘ On the contrary, he adopts the singular form, to on (what is), and its 
negative form, to mē on (what is not), when needing to deal with the impossibility of speaking of what is not, 
without relating it to the matter of truth and falsehood. At 477a1 in the Republic, for example, he asks ‗how 
would what is not be known (π῵ο ἂλ κὴ ὄλ γέ ηη γλσζζείε).‘ He also argues that ‗no one is able to either think of 
or speak of what is not, because what is not never partakes of being (ηὸ κὴ ὂλ νὔηε δηαλνεῖζζαί ηηλα νὔηε ιέγεηλ· 
νὐζίαο γὰξ νὐδὲλ νὐδακῆ ηὸ κὴ ὂλ κεηέρεηλ)‘ at 260d2–3 in the Sophist. 
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 Some modern scholars seem to have noticed this problem; Badham rejects ηἀιεζ῅, leaving the phrase ‗one 
who speaks of to on speaks also of ta onta.‘ Gifford, however, rejects this suggestion, explaining that ―the 
alteration is unnecessary, since the extension of to on into kai ta onta is justified by the comprehensive phrase 
that ‗the thing one is talking about (πεξὶ νὗ ἂλ ὁ ιόγνο)‘ at 283e9‖ (on Badham‘s suggestion and Gifford‘s 
rejection, cf. Gifford, 1905, 29). However, the problem of the repetition still remains unsolved, so thus later 
Schleiermacher again omits ta onta in his edition in 1973. But Schleiermacher‘s omission cannot explain how 
speaking of to on is directly identified with speaking the truth and why Ctesippus agrees with Euthydemus on 
this here. 
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 Plato seems to have believed that doing and making cannot be equivalent to each other, and to be aware of 
the difference between doing and making in meaning, discussing this difference in the Charmides 162e–163d. 
There Plato implies that such a distinction of the two words comes from Prodicus, by having Socrates say that 
he himself has heard Prodicus‘ discourse upon the distinction of words a hundred times. Cf. also Men. 75e2–3. 
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 Hawtrey (1981, 101) further suggests that the meaning of making for poiein seems more suitable to 
Euthydemus‘ purpose to emphasise the existential sense of einai in the argument, utilising the presence of the 
meanings ‗doing‘ and ‗making‘ in poiein.  
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as no one can make things that are nowhere [existing], no one can speak of things that are not. 
It is simply impossible to speak of things that are not, insofar as it is impossible to make 
things that are not. 
It is somewhat doubtful whether the idea of making can be taken to be valid for the 
success of the argument. Making takes existing objects, but also it produces products (from 
the objects). In the case of making a (wooden) table, for example, the product is, of course, 
the table that is made, but the object of this action of making is not the table but the wood. If 
the object and the product in the case of making a table were both the same table—namely, 
the same what is, to on—, then this would not really be making; rather, it would be leaving 
an object as it is without doing anything to it. Simply making X (from) X is not an action of 
making at all but that of leaving X as it is (i.e. doing nothing to it, and not-making). Thus, 
making, if it really needs to be an action of making, must take objects and produce products 
that are no longer the same as the objects; namely, making X (from) Y. 
However, making X (from) Y is exactly what Euthydemus himself earlier denied to be 
possible, arguing that this is nothing but an attempt to make what is not (cf. Euthyd. 283e). 
For instance, if the object is wood and the product is a table in the case of making a (wooden) 
table, then it is the same as making what is not. For, while wood is what is, the table that is 
made of wood is no longer what wood is, i.e. what is different (from what it was) as what is 
not (as it was). This is the same case as Dionysodorus‘ argument that wishing Cleinias to 
become wise is not different from wishing him to be gone and dead (from what he is—
alive—now), for which he was criticised by Ctesippus. By utilising the idea of making in the 
argument for the emphasis on the existential sense of einai, Euthydemus clearly contradicts 
himself. 
The argument for the impossibility of falsehood shares with the argument for the OEA 
doctrine the basic idea that speaking of what is not is entirely impossible, and they both adopt 
an objectivist use of logos to speak of its object as it is; the logos of something is not relative 
to its user. Also they both commit the fallacies of the equivocation of the Greek verb einai 
(by utilising this verb both in the predicative and existential senses) and the Greek words 
logos and pragma. These similarities may make us believe that they are the same argument, 
as Socrates turns the former immediately into the latter as soon as the latter is proposed. 
However, the problem of equation of these two arguments was examined above and I 
suggested that the OEA doctrine is not really equated with the impossibility of falsehood. The 
argument for the impossibility of falsehood is established on the conditions of (a) the 
identification of to on with ta onta, (b) the adoption of a notion of making (for the emphasis 
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of the existential sense of einai), and (c) the equivocation of the Greek verb einai (by 
switching the sense of this verb from the veridical sense to the existential sense). Yet these 
conditions are not needed at all for the establishment of the argument for the OEA doctrine. 
The terms of such conditions, i.e. ‗things that are (ta onta)‘, ‗doing (prattein)‘ and ‗making 
(poiein)‘, are neither adopted nor even implied in the argument for the OEA doctrine. As 
Socrates says, ‗the OEA doctrine may imply (dynatai) the [same conclusion as that of the] 
impossibility of falsehood‘; yet it is not the case that ‗the OEA doctrine is not anything but 
that it is not possible to speak falsely‘, unless those conditions for the argument for the 
impossibility of falsehood arecorrectly attributed to that for the OEA doctrine, or necessarily 
required for its establishment.
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 For Plato‘s refutation of the impossibility of falsehood (as equated with the OEA doctrine), cf. n.142 in 
Chapter VI above. 
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Appendix 3: The Platonic reading of the Man-Measure Doctrine in the Theaetetus 
 
 
In the Theaetetus Plato has Socrates aim at the definition of knowledge and examine three 
suggested definitions, in a reductio ad absurdum—thus aporetic in the end—and dialectical 
way. The dialogue can be divided into four parts. The introductory part (145c–151d) 
establishes the main question of the dialogue, ‗what is knowledge (ti estin epistēmē)?‘, and 
represents Socrates‘ occupation as a form of intellectual midwifery. The other three parts 
examine three suggested definitions of knowledge: the first (151d–186e), in which 
Protagoras‘ MMD is introduced and examined by Socrates, begins with Theaetetus‘ definition 
of knowledge as perception (aisthēsis); the second (187a–201c) opens when Theaetetus 
suggests another definition according to which knowledge is true judgement (alēthēs doxa); 
the last (201d–210a) examines Theaetetus‘ final definition that knowledge is true judgement 
with an account (alēthēs doxa meta logou). In each part Socrates carefully scrutinises 
Theaetetus‘ suggested definitions, but they all are in the end refuted, and the dialogue ends in 
aporia. As far as Protagoras‘ MMD is concerned, I will examine the passages in the first part 
in which the doctrine is discussed. 
 
 
1. Interpretation 
 
1.1. Theaetetus‘ definition of knowledge as perception and the Man-Measure Doctrine 
 
At the beginning of the first part, Theaetetus says that ‗one who knows something perceives 
that which one knows (ho epistamenos ti aisthanesthai touto ho epistatai),‘ and then defines 
knowledge as nothing other than perception (ouk allo ti estin epistēmē ē aisthēsis) (151e2–3). 
Socrates, as a midwife who cares for the soul, is happy with this non-trivial account (ou 
phaulon logon) of knowledge as perception, and proposes to examine it in order to see 
whether it is merely a wind-egg or a fertile idea. He comments that, indeed, Theaetetus‘ 
definition of knowledge as perception is nothing but what Protagoras too used to say in his 
MMD, although their expressions differ somehow (tropon tina allon) (151d7–152a5). This 
passage goes as follows: 
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ΘΕΑΙ. … δνθεῖ νὖλ κνη ὁ ἐπηζηάκελόο ηη 
αἰζζάλεζζαη ηνῦην ὃ ἐπίζηαηαη, θαὶ ὥο γε λπλὶ 
θαίλεηαη, νὐθ ἄιιν ηί ἐζηηλ ἐπηζηήκε ἠ αἴζζεζηο.  
THEAET. … Well, then it seems to me that one 
who knows something perceives that which one 
knows, and so, at least for now, it appears that 
knowledge is nothing other than perception. 
ΣΩ. Εὖ γε θαὶ γελλαίσο, ὦ παῖ· ρξὴ γὰξ νὕησο 
ἀπνθαηλόκελνλ ιέγεηλ. ἀιιὰ θέξε δὴ αὐηὸ θνηλῆ 
ζθεςώκεζα, γόληκνλ ἠ ἀλεκηαῖνλ ηπγράλεη ὄλ. 
αἴζζεζηο, θῄο, ἐπηζηήκε;  
SOC. Well and also nobly [said], my boy; for one 
ought to speak in that way when displaying 
[one‘s own thoughts]. But come now, let us 
examine this together, whether it is fertile or 
barren. You say that perception is knowledge, 
right? 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. THEAET. Yes. 
ΣΩ. Κηλδπλεύεηο κέληνη ιόγνλ νὐ θαῦινλ 
εἰξεθέλαη πεξὶ ἐπηζηήκεο, ἀιι' ὃλ ἔιεγε θαὶ 
Πξσηαγόξαο. ηξόπνλ δέ ηηλα ἄιινλ εἴξεθε ηὰ 
αὐηὰ ηαῦηα. θεζὶ γάξ πνπ πάλησλ ρξεκάησλ 
κέηξνλ ἄλζξσπνλ εἶλαη, η῵λ κὲλ ὄλησλ ὡο ἔζηη, 
η῵λ δὲ κὴ ὄλησλ ὡο νὐθ ἔζηηλ. ἀλέγλσθαο γάξ 
πνπ;  
SOC. Well, you venture a non-trivial account of 
knowledge, but something which Protagoras also 
said. But he said the same things in a somewhat 
different way. For, I think, he said that ‗man is 
the measure of all things, of things that are 
that/how they are, of things that are not that/how 
they are not‘. You have probably read [this], 
right? 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλέγλσθα θαὶ πνιιάθηο. THEAET. I have read [this], and often indeed. 
 
Theaetetus‘ definition of knowledge as perception is no sooner offered than Socrates claims 
that it is equivalent to the MMD. In support of the equation of Theaetetus‘ definition with the 
MMD, Socrates offers an argument at 152a6–c6 that identifies ‗aisthanetai (it is perceived)‘ 
from Theaetetus‘ definition with ‗einai (to be)‘ in the MMD, passing through the 
identification of the former with ‗phainetai (it appears)‘: 
 
1) ὡο νἷα κὲλ ἕθαζηα ἐκνὶ θαίλεηαη ηνηαῦηα κὲλ 
ἔζηηλ ἐκνί, νἷα δὲ ζνί, ηνηαῦηα δὲ αὖ ζνί. 
1) As each thing appears to me, so it is for me, 
and [as it appears] to you, so it is again for 
you.
170
 
2) ἆξ' νὐθ ἐλίνηε πλένληνο ἀλέκνπ ηνῦ αὐηνῦ ὁ 
κὲλ ἟κ῵λ ῥηγῶ, ὁ δ' νὔ; θαὶ ὁ κὲλ ἞ξέκα, ὁ δὲ 
ζθόδξα; 
2) When the same wind is blowing, one of us 
shivers and the other not, right? And one of us 
[shivers] more, the other [shivers] less? 
3) πόηεξνλ νὖλ ηόηε αὐηὸ ἐθ' ἑαπηνῦ ηὸ πλεῦκα 
ςπρξὸλ ἠ νὐ ςπρξὸλ θήζνκελ; ἠ πεηζόκεζα ηῶ 
Πξσηαγόξᾳ ὅηη ηῶ κὲλ ῥηγ῵ληη ςπρξόλ, ηῶ δὲ κὴ 
3) Well then, will we say that the wind itself, by 
itself, is cold or not cold? Or shall we be 
persuaded by Protagoras that [the wind] is cold 
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 Theaetetus‘ answers to Socrates‘ questions in this passage which mostly mean just ‗yes‘ are omitted in the 
quotes above. 
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νὔ; for the one who shivers, while [it] is not for the 
other who does not? 
4) νὐθνῦλ θαὶ θαίλεηαη νὕησ ἑθαηέξῳ; 4) Then, isn‘t this also how it appears to each [of 
us]? 
5) ηὸ δέ γε θαίλεηαη αἰζζάλεηαί ἐζηηλ;171 5) But ‗it appears‘ is ‗it is perceived‘, right? 
6) θαληαζία ἄξα θαὶ αἴζζεζηο ηαὐηὸλ ἔλ ηε 
ζεξκνῖο θαὶ πᾶζη ηνῖο ηνηνύηνηο. 
6) Thus, appearance is the same as perception in 
the case of hot and things like that. 
7) νἷα γὰξ αἰζζάλεηαη ἕθαζηνο, ηνηαῦηα ἑθάζηῳ 
θαὶ θηλδπλεύεη εἶλαη. 
7) For, as each [man] perceives, things would 
also happen to be so for him. 
8) αἴζζεζηο ἄξα ηνῦ ὄληνο ἀεί ἐζηηλ θαὶ ἀςεπδὲο 
ὡο ἐπηζηήκε νὖζα. 
8) Perception, then, is always of what is and is 
infallible, as if it were knowledge. 
 
The steps from (1) to (7) show how Socrates interprets Protagoras‘ MMD. In (1) Socrates 
identifies phainetai (it appears) with esti (it is), in saying that as one thing appears, so it is for 
the person to whom it appears. And then, again, he replaces hōs in the MMD with toiauta, to 
indicate the cases of things appearing and thus being in a certain way, and at the same time 
‗man (anthrōpos)‘ each individual such as ‗[to] me (emoi)‘ and ‗[to] you (soi)‘. Thus, even 
from the first step of the interpretation, Socrates seems to reveal his idea of the doctrine as a 
form of epistemological relativism. Each thing is for each one as it appears to him; 
something is for me as it appears to me, and it is for you, as it appears to you. And in (2) and 
(3), Socrates introduces the famous example of the wind in understanding how our 
perceptions relatively to each other operate regarding the same object. Then in (5) Socrates 
equates ‗it appears (to phainetai)‘ with ‗it is perceived (aisthanetai), and so in (6) he also 
counts ‗appearance (phantasia)‘ and ‗perception (aisthēsis)‘ as identical. By doing so, 
Socrates can safely arrive at connecting aisthanetai with esti as well in (7). 
On the basis of the argument that to phainetai is interchangeable with aisthanetai, 
Socrates attempts to equate Theaetetus‘ definition with Protagoras‘ MMD. The proof goes as 
follows; first, (1) if something appears in a certain way to someone, then it is so for him, and 
second that (5, 6) something appears to someone is the same as that it is perceived by him, 
and thus last, (7) if something is perceived by someone—so, if someone perceives something 
in a certain way, then the thing is so for him.
172
 And in this process, Socrates attempts to read 
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 New OCT emendation; αἰζζάλεηαί ἐζηηλ Faehse: αἰζζάλεηαί Berl.: αἰζζάλεζζαί ἐζηηλ βTW. 
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 Burnyeat (1990, 9–11) argues for this point that Theaetetus, defining knowledge as perception, ―will have to 
adopt a Protagorean epistemology,‖ because ―‗it appears‘ means ‗he perceives it‘ or, rephrasing in the material 
mode, to perceive something is to have it appear to one‖ and ―x appears F to a if and only if a perceives that x is 
F.‖ Thus, Theaetetus‘ definition of knowledge as perception and Protagoras‘ MMD are taken to be identical on 
the assumption that ‗appearing‘, ‗being perceived‘ and ‗is‘ are all linked bi-conditionally: phainetai ⇔ esti; 
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the MMD as meaning that how things are [for man] (hōs estin) is the same as how they 
appear [to man]. Thus, ‗appearing‘ and ‗being perceived‘ are equivalent to each other, and 
this makes the MMD mean that how things are [for man] is how they are perceived by man. 
To state how man perceives things is the same as to state how man knows them, according to 
Theaetetus‘ definition of knowledge as perception. Consequently, as Sedley (2004, 38–9) 
indicates, Socrates, acquiring ―a complete identity between knowledge and perception‖ as a 
result,
173
 arrives at identifying Theaetetus‘ definition of knowledge as perception with 
Protagoras‘ MMD.174 
Kahn (1966, 245–65, esp. 250) suggests that the use of einai in hōs clause of the MMD 
has the meaning that it is the case that/how something is. According to him the fundamental 
use of einai in the fifth century BCE is not to refer to the existence of something (X ‗exists‘), 
which we call the existential use, but to express that ‗it is the case‘, using the veridical 
sense.
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 Kahn‘s suggestion seems congruent with (2); for a perceiver, not that it is the case 
that the wind exists to him, but that it is the case that/how the wind is cold to him. 
Accordingly, the Socratic interpretation of the doctrine goes as follows; it is the case that 
something is [for me] as it appears [to me] (i.e. is perceived [by me]). In the MMD, then, 
man is the measure not of the fact that a certain thing exists to him, but of that/how a certain 
thing is for him. On this suggestion, Kerferd (1981a, 87) points out that the Platonic reading 
of the MMD advocates an epistemological criterion, or a criterion of judgement, to show how 
to apply correctly the predicates to the subjects when a judgement is made by each perceiver, 
namely ‗that/how things are‘, not to show that the predicates really exist for each perceiver. 
Furthermore, in (8) Socrates comments on two conditions of knowledge; it is always 
                                                                                                                                                        
phainetai ⇔ aisthanetai; thus aisthanetai ⇔ esti (n.b. this process is valid only when they are all bi-conditional). 
In the light of this interpretation, therefore, the MMD, as determined to be a perceptual epistemology thesis, also 
satisfies the condition that all perceiving is knowing, and all knowing is also perceiving. Cf. also McDowell 
(1973), 117–20; Chappell (2004), 58–9; Sedley (2004), 38–9. On the dialectical process from Theaetetus‘ 
definition of knowledge as perception to Protagoras‘ MMD, cf. Cornford (1935), 29–36; Levi (1940a), 151–2. 
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 On a counter-argument that Theaetetus‘ definition of knowledge as perception is logically independent from 
Protagoras‘ MMD, cf. Sayre (1969), 61–2, where he claims that since knowledge and perception are both 
infallible, Theaetetus‘ definition and Protagoras‘ MMD are topically linked, although they are logically 
independent. Cf. also White (1976), 160. 
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 However, we can see that in Socrates‘ argument for the equation of Theaetetus‘ definition with the MMD he 
uses a non-proved premiss by which the doctrine indeed entails that when someone perceives—and thus 
judges—the wind to be cold it is the case for him that the wind is truly as it appears so to him, i.e. the premiss 
that, like knowledge to be infallible and about what is (152c5–6), metron and chrēmata in the MMD mean 
respectively the standard of truth and any things so that the Greek verb einai in the following hōs clauses, which 
is originally utilised as the predicative use (that/how they ‗are‘), could mean ‗the case‘ or ‗true‘ in the light of 
the meaning of metron (it is ‗the case‘ that/how they are), as well as anthrōpos to mean each individual. 
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 Similarly, Burnyeat (1976, 187–91) points that since perception defined as knowledge is always of what is 
and infallible, ‗the wind does or does not appear cold to someone‘ means ‗the real wind is or is not cold for that 
someone‘ from which Plato‘s reading of Protagoras‘ MMD is determined as a relativism of perception. Cf. also 
McDowell (1973), 117–20; Burnyeat (1990), 9–11; Chappell (2004), 58–9; Sedley (2004), 38–9. 
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about what is (to on) and infallible (apseudes).
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 Each individual, since he is the measure of 
all he perceives, assures himself of the truth of his own judgement about them. This 
guarantees perceptual infallibility. Furthermore, since the implication of this notion would be 
that there is no possibility for the same object to appear as it is and as it is not to the same 
person at the same time, and also for one to perceive it as it appears and as it does not appear 
at the same time, perception always accompanies infallibility concerning its objects. In his 
view, it seems implied that it is not possible for anyone to know or perceive what is not (to 
mē on) (as knowledge must be about what is and equivalent to perception), since either what 
is not would not appear at all or perceiving what is not is the same as perceiving nothing, and 
again not-perceiving. From this point of view, thus, Socrates seems to be able to assert that 
‗perception is always of what is and is infallible‘. What we can confirm through the Socratic 
interpretation of the MMD is that he understands the doctrine as a relativistic epistemological 
claim. 
Socrates, in his example of the wind, seems to draw a distinction between the wind and 
the coldness that a perceiver perceives (percept, aisthēton) from the wind.177 Then what 
exactly does one perceive when perceiving? The coldness or the wind? Socrates does not 
explicitly say what we perceive, and his illustration in (2) is vague; ‗one of us shivers when 
the wind blows, and the others do not.‘ But he gives some hints about this question. In (3) 
Socrates closes the possibility for us to perceive how the wind itself is. The thing I can 
perceive is the coldness relativised only to me, which appears to me when the wind is 
blowing; the wind itself is not perceived, thus not known. What man can perceive and thus 
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 The condition of ‗being about what is‘ is about the state of objects, and the condition of ‗infallibility‘ is 
about the state of subject. These conditions must be taken to be necessary and sufficient conditions for 
knowledge, otherwise we would have a logical fallacy as follows: 
(1) If a thing is knowledge, then it must be infallible and of what is. 
(2) X is infallible and of what is. 
(3) Therefore, X is knowledge. 
However, this formulation is committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent, like: 
(1) If a thing is man, then it must be rational. 
(2) X is rational. 
(3) Therefore, X is man. 
But, X can be something rational other than man, like the gods. In order to avoid this logical fallacy, Plato must 
take ‗knowledge‘ and ‗something that is infallible and of what is‘ to be bi-condition (i.e. necessary and 
sufficient condition); if something which is of what is and is infallible, then it is knowledge, and if something is 
knowledge, then it is of what is and is infallible. Plato again comments upon these two conditions in the 
Republic (476e ff.) in defining knowledge. There he refers to ‗to on‘ by expressions ‗to gnōston‘ (and sometimes 
by ‗ta noēta‘, both as distinguished from ‗to doxaston‘), and to ‗infallibility‘ by ‗to anhamartēton‘. Cf. also 
Theaet. 146a4 and 200e4 –5. 
177
 Cornford (1935, 33) calls the perceived objects (aisthēta) (e.g. the wind) ‗physical object‘, and the perceived 
quality (aisthēton) (e.g. the coldness [of the wind]) ‗sense-object‘. 
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know is the quality of a thing, i.e. the coldness of the wind. And again in (6) he explicitly 
confirms that appearance is the same as perception in the case of ‗hot‘ and all things like that, 
not in the case of a hot thing (to thermon). Similarly, he states again at 156e7–8 that ‗and thus 
others like hard, hot and all [qualities] have to be understood in the same way (θαὶ ηἆιια δὴ 
νὕησ, ζθιεξὸλ θαὶ ζεξκὸλ θαὶ πάληα, ηὸλ αὐηὸλ ηξόπνλ ὑπνιεπηένλ)‘. 
If what is perceived is only a quality of a thing, not the thing itself, how can a perceiver 
connect the perceived quality with its bearer, i.e. the thing from which the quality is 
perceived in his judgement (e.g. ‗the wind is cold‘)?178 The answer to this question will be 
found in the following argumentative stages where Socrates introduces the Secret Doctrine, 
i.e. the Flux-theory, and a theory of perception to interpret the MMD. 
 
1.2. The Secret Doctrine: the Flux-theory 
 
An epistemological claim needs to be supported by a proper ontological perspective; without 
an ontological basis, no epistemology can be established. After interpreting the MMD as a 
relativism of perceptual qualities, Socrates now introduces a certain ontological viewpoint 
into the discussion as an ontological basis of the MMD. This ontological basis has been 
labelled ‗the so-called Secret Doctrine‘, since Socrates states that Protagoras did not express 
this ontological idea in public, but ‗told the truth of it in a secret way only to his pupils (ηνῖο 
δὲ καζεηαῖο ἐλ ἀπνξξήηῳ ηὴλ ἀιήζεηαλ ἔιεγελ)‘ (152c8–10).179  The Secret Doctrine, 
entailing a form of the Flux-theory according to which everything is (in) motion runs as 
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 This question is simply understood as a question that among the qualities or the things from which the 
qualities are perceived, what the object of perceptual knowledge is. On this question, On this issue, modern 
scholars‘ suggestions have been divided into three positions: (1) there is no wind at all, but two private winds, 
my wind which is cold and your wind which is not cold; (2) there is a public wind but it is neither cold nor 
warm, and the coldness of the wind only exists privately for me when I have the feeling of the cold—thus the 
wind itself exists independently of my perceiving it but its coldness does not; and (3) the wind in itself is both 
cold and warm—warm and cold are two qualities which can co-exist in the same physical object, and I perceive 
one, you perceive the other. Cf. Kerferd (1981a), 86–7, n. 3. 
179
 Why secretly, even though Protagoras is said to have opened his lectures to everyone, so anyone could hear 
his claims, not having had his own school (cf. Cornford, 1935, 36)? Plato, who founded his own Academy, in his 
corpus, especially in the later works, is believed to have been concerned about establishing his own 
philosophical position and examining the philosophical views given by his predecessors and contemporaries. In 
this respect, it would be plausible to conjecture that the connection between the Secret Doctrine and the MMD is 
Plato‘s own philosophical project. Sedley claims (2004, 38–40) that Socrates ―introduces a historical fiction‖, 
not a historical fact, ―about Protagoras, indicating its fictional status by suggestion that what he is about to 
formulate is what Protagoras (long dead at the dramatic date of the dialogue, 399 BCE) used to tell his pupils in 
secret.‖ Besides, it is also remarkable that Theodorus, who is described by Plato as having associated with 
Protagoras (tou hetairou sou Prōtagorou, 160b7; philos anēr [sc. Protagoras], 162a4) but not with Heraclitus 
and the Heracliteans (ou gar soi hetairoi [sc. the Heraclitean] eisin, 180b7), does not speak at all against such 
connection. The word ‗secret‘ seems thus to imply fictional Platonic philosophical concern—albeit a necessary 
philosophical connection for Plato, not historical Protagorean position. On this, cf. also Chappell (2004), 62–3. 
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follows (152d2–154b8):180 
 
9) ἄξα ἓλ κὲλ αὐηὸ θαζ' αὑηὸ νὐδέλ ἐζηηλ, νὐδ' 
ἄλ ηη πξνζείπνηο ὀξζ῵ο νὐδ' ὁπνηνλνῦλ ηη. 
9) Nothing is in itself one, and you could not call 
it something or something of any sort (any sort 
of thing). 
10) ἀιι' ἐὰλ ὡο κέγα πξνζαγνξεύῃο, θαὶ ζκηθξὸλ 
θαλεῖηαη, θαὶ ἐὰλ βαξύ, θνῦθνλ, ζύκπαληά ηε 
νὕησο, ὡο κεδελὸο ὄληνο ἑλὸο κήηε ηηλὸο κήηε 
ὁπνηνπνῦλ. 
10) If you call a thing large, then it will appear 
small, and if you call it heavy, [then it will 
appear] light, and so on with everything, since 
nothing is one or anything or any sort of thing. 
11) ἐθ δὲ δὴ θνξᾶο ηε θαὶ θηλήζεσο θαὶ θξάζεσο 
πξὸο ἄιιεια γίγλεηαη πάληα ἃ δή θακελ εἶλαη, 
νὐθ ὀξζ῵ο πξνζαγνξεύνληεο· ἔζηη κὲλ γὰξ 
νὐδέπνη' νὐδέλ, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγλεηαη. 
11) From movement and change and blending 
with each other all things of which we say that 
they are (einai), speaking incorrectly, become 
(gignetai); for nothing ever is, but [everything] 
always becomes. 
 
In short, Socrates introduces the primary point of the Secret Doctrine that ‗nothing is in itself 
one (9) or can be called in a definite way (10), thus to say that something is (esti) is indeed 
wrong, and we have to say that it comes to be (gignetai) all the time, since it is generated 
through movement (phora), change (kinēsis), and blending (krasis) with other things: nothing 
ever is, everything is always coming to be (11).‘ 
After this, Socrates adds that according to the Secret Doctrine, change causes ‗being (to 
einai)‘ and ‗coming to be (to gignesthai)‘, while a state of rest (hēsychia) brings forth ‗not-
being (to mē einai)‘ and ‗passing away (to apollysthai) (ἐπεὶ θαὶ ηάδε ηῶ ιόγῳ ζεκεῖα ἱθαλά, 
ὅηη ηὸ κὲλ εἶλαη δνθνῦλ θαὶ ηὸ γίγλεζζαη θίλεζηο παξέρεη, ηὸ δὲ κὴ εἶλαη θαὶ ἀπόιιπζζαη 
἟ζπρία).‘ Everything is in a state of constant change or flux, so that everything is also the 
result of change. 
Socrates applies this Flux-theory to the case of the constant change of the quality that is 
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 We see Socrates calling it ‗the truth‘. If we assume that Plato emphasises the hidden-underlying meaning of 
the MMD by calling it the truth [of Protagoras‘ MMD which would probably be an incipit of his book Truth 
(Alētheia)], then it is probable to infer that he indeed believes that the Secret Doctrine had a philosophically 
cardinal role as the alleged truth in building up the MMD in a firmer way. Thus, it is safer to think that Plato 
was indeed aware of a philosophical—not necessarily historical—relation between the MMD and the Secret 
Doctrine, and so had Socrates introduce the latter into the interpretation of the former. Under a similar 
understanding, Burnyeat‘s ‗Reading B‘ suggests (1990, 8–10) that ―Plato does not accept the theories of 
Protagoras and Heraclitus. Theaetetus is made to accept them because having defined knowledge as perception, 
he is faced with the question, What has to be true of perception and of the world for the definite to hold good? 
The answer suggested is that he will have to adopt a Protagorean epistemology, and that in turn will commit him 
to a Heraclitean account of the world.‖ (On the contrary, ‗Reading A‘ which Burnyeat rejects (ibid.), explains the 
structure of the Theaetetus as follows; ―Plato himself accepts the theories of Protagoras and Heraclitus, subject 
to certain qualifiers: in particular the theories must be restricted to perception and the world of sensible things. 
Sensible things are, Plato agrees, in a perpetual flux of becoming, and in perception each of us has a ―measure‖, 
i.e. an incorrigible awareness, of the sensible qualities whose coming and going constitute that flux.‖) 
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perceived, namely, the percept (aisthēton) (153d8–154a2): 
 
12) θαηὰ ηὰ ὄκκαηα πξ῵ηνλ, ὃ δὴ θαιεῖο ρξ῵κα 
ιεπθόλ, κὴ εἶλαη αὐηὸ ἕηεξόλ ηη ἔμσ η῵λ ζ῵λ 
ὀκκάησλ κεδ' ἐλ ηνῖο ὄκκαζη κεδέ ηηλ' αὐηῶ 
ρώξαλ ἀπνηάμῃο· ἢδε γὰξ ἂλ εἴε ηε δήπνπ ἐλ 
ηάμεη θαὶ κέλνλ θαὶ νὐθ ἂλ ἐλ γελέζεη γίγλνηην. 
12) First, regarding the eyes, what you call a 
white colour is not itself something else [i.e. a 
distinct entity] either outside your eyes or in your 
eyes, and you should not assign a specific place 
to it; for it would already be somewhere in a 
[certain] place and remain [as it is] and would 
not become in [process of] becoming. 
13) ἑπώκεζα ηῶ ἄξηη ιόγῳ, κεδὲλ αὐηὸ θαζ' 
αὑηὸ ἓλ ὂλ ηηζέληεο· θαὶ ἟κῖλ νὕησ κέιαλ ηε θαὶ 
ιεπθὸλ θαὶ ὁηηνῦλ ἄιιν ρξ῵κα ἐθ η῅ο 
πξνζβνι῅ο η῵λ ὀκκάησλ πξὸο ηὴλ πξνζήθνπζαλ 
θνξὰλ θαλεῖηαη γεγελεκέλνλ, θαὶ ὃ δὴ ἕθαζηνλ 
εἶλαί θακελ ρξ῵κα νὔηε ηὸ πξνζβάιινλ νὔηε ηὸ 
πξνζβαιιόκελνλ ἔζηαη, ἀιιὰ κεηαμύ ηη ἑθάζηῳ 
ἴδηνλ γεγνλόο. 
13) Let us follow what has been just stated, and 
establish that nothing is in itself one being. And 
so it will appear to us that black and white and 
any other colour come into being from the 
impact of the eyes on the appropriate movement, 
and what we call each colour will be neither what 
strikes nor what is struck, but something which 
comes into being between the two and is private 
(idion) to each individual. 
 
What we call white is neither in our eyes nor outside our eyes, nor can it occupy a certain 
place; otherwise, it would be in a state of changeless rest as a definite thing, violating the 
primary point of the Flux-theory. When we see a thing white, whiteness comes into being 
from the impact between our eyes and an external object which happens in a middle location 
(metaxy) between them. Thus, in (12) it is stated that this sort of percept is not in itself 
characterised as an independent entity which occupies a certain fixed place. This view seems 
consistent with that according to which when the wind is blowing one shivers and the other 
not, since it is cold for the one who shivers and not cold for the other who does not, and not 
because the wind itself, by itself, is cold (cf. (2), (3) above). Socrates explains again in (13) 
the MMD‘s epistemological relativist point by clarifying the qualifier of the judgement made 
by each perceiver as ‗to me (moi)‘ or ‗to you (toi)‘; perception and the qualities that are 
perceived—i.e. the percepts—such as ‗whiteness‘ and ‗sweetness‘ are particular and private 
(idion) to each perceiving subject and external object. The quality that I perceive is particular 
and private only to me. 
This constant change of qualities is, however, not independent, but happens only in 
relation to other things, as Socrates argues at 154c1–155c7, presenting the so-called dice 
puzzle. The puzzle tells that if you place 6 dice next to 4 dice, then 6 dice are more than 4 
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dice (half as many), but if you place them next to 12 dice, then they are less than 12 dice 
(half). Thus, 6 dice, which are not being increased or decreased in themselves, come to be 
more and less, i.e. change, only in relation to other dice. 
Socrates suggests three principles concerning identity (155a2–b2): first, nothing can 
become either greater or less, either in size or in number, so long as it remains equal to itself; 
second, anything to which nothing is added and from which nothing is taken away, neither 
increases nor decreases, but remains the same; third, what was not before cannot be later 
without becoming. But, these three principles seem to produce a conflict
181
 in the case of the 
dice puzzle. When being placed next to 4 dice, 6 dice are what they were not before (more 
than 4 dice), without being increased. If being placed next to 12 dice, 6 dice are again what 
they were not before (less than 12 dice), without being decreased. However, the 6 dice cannot 
become more or less since they have remained the same as and so equal to themselves, given 
that nothing has been added to or taken away from them. Again, Socrates introduces a similar 
puzzle into the discussion (155b5–c1): ‗Socrates was taller than Theaetetus last year, but is 
smaller than him this year, without having become smaller or taller than himself. He cannot 
have become taller or smaller since he has remained the same and so equal to himself, given 
that nothing has been added to or taken away from his height.‘182 
The dice puzzle illustrates that the same thing comes to have opposite qualities without 
its own change. If one, by perceiving more when 6 dice are placed next to 4 dice and less 
when they are placed next to 12 dice, judges that the same 6 dice are both more and less at the 
same time, one‘s judgements about the same 6 dice are self-contradicting. This problem, 
however, can be solved by relativising everything in constant flux; since the more and less of 
6 dice are constantly coming into being and passing away in relation to other dice, the 6 dice 
become more and less, so they change continuously, without being increased or decreased, or 
being added or taken away. In this manner the dice puzzle answers to a question how the 
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 For a suggestion that unlike Socrates‘ argument, these three principles are indeed incompatible with each 
other, cf. McDowell (1973), 133–6. 
182
 Runciman suggests (1962) that the dice puzzle is an allusion of Plato‘s theory of Forms, explaining the 
changes in a similar way to the Phaedo 102b–103a where Socrates argues that Phaedo was smaller than Socrates 
last year, but is taller this year, because he partook in the Smallness last year and the Largeness this year. 
Accordingly, Runciman argues that 6 dice is more than 4 dice because it partakes in the Largeness (a Form for 
being more) when it is compared to 4 dice, and is less than 12 dice because it partakes in the Smallness (a Form 
for being less) when compared to 12 dice. It may seem possible to assume that Plato would probably have 
intended to show by this puzzle that an epistemological claim established without the ontological basis of 
absolute and universal entities such as Platonic Forms must encounter these types of problem of identity 
described in the puzzle. However, Runciman‘s suggestion does not explain the roe of the Flux-theory and why 
this theory is introduced in the dialogue. The Flux-theory has an ontological ground for the change of qualities 
which undergo constant movement. Plato has Socrates initially attempt to solve the dice puzzle on the grounds 
that ‗everything is in a state of constant change‘, and later, as we will see, refute this viewpoint. 
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same wind can be both cold and not-cold (warm); when it interacts with one perceiver (me), 
then I perceive coldness, and when it interacts with another perceiver (you), then you 
perceive not-coldness (warmness). That is why Socrates earlier said that ‗we cannot say that 
the wind itself, by itself, is cold, but that it is cold for the one who shivers (152b5–7)‘. 
Every quality of things is always in a state of constant change, and relativised only in 
relation to each perceiving subject and external object, as Socrates says at 157a8–b1 that 
‗nothing is in itself one, but comes into being always for somebody (or something) (νὐδὲλ 
εἶλαη ἓλ αὐηὸ θαζ' αὑηό, ἀιιά ηηλη ἀεὶ γίγλεζζαη).‘ Socrates further states that ‗nothing is, but 
always becomes good, beautiful and all what we have passed through (ηὸ κή ηη εἶλαη ἀιιὰ 
γίγλεζζαη ἀεὶ ἀγαζὸλ θαὶ θαιὸλ θαὶ πάληα ἃ ἄξηη δηῆκελ)‘ (157d7–8). It is noticeable that 
Socrates here mentions agathon and kalon (predicates and qualities), not to agathon and to 
kalon (substantial nouns and things), to emphasise the becoming of qualities which are 
predicated in propositions, not the thing itself which would reveal those qualities to its 
perceiver in relation to that perceiver. So far only the constant change of qualities seems to 
have been included and focused on in his interpretation of the MMD (cf. 156e7–8, (6) in the 
above quote, and the suggestion (2) in n. 178 above). 
Having confirmed that the percepts, i.e. qualities, are in a state of constant change, 
Socrates further clarifies the Flux-theory by putting the perceiving subjects and the objects—
i.e. literally ‗everything‘—into the state of constant change: ‗we should not leave it [sc. the 
interpretation of the MMD] with anything incomplete (κὴ ηνίλπλ ἀπνιίπσκελ ὅζνλ ἐιιεῖπνλ 
αὐηνῦ)‘ (157e1). Socrates argues that ‗everything‘, like the qualities in a state of constant 
change, is in endless motion, becoming, and the result of movement. In support of this point, 
Socrates brings the cases of ‗dreaming‘ and ‗awake‘, ‗insane‘ and ‗sane‘, and ‗Socrates 
healthy‘ and ‗Socrates ill‘ into discussion (157e2–160a6): 
 
14) ὁξᾷο νὖλ ὅηη ηό γε ἀκθηζβεη῅ζαη νὐ 
ραιεπόλ, ὅηε θαὶ πόηεξόλ ἐζηηλ ὕπαξ ἠ ὄλαξ 
ἀκθηζβεηεῖηαη, θαὶ δὴ ἴζνπ ὄληνο ηνῦ ρξόλνπ ὃλ 
θαζεύδνκελ ᾧ ἐγξεγόξακελ, ἐλ θαηέξῳ 
δηακάρεηαη ἟κ῵λ ἟ ςπρὴ ηὰ ἀεὶ παξόληα 
δόγκαηα παληὸο κᾶιινλ εἶλαη ἀιεζ῅, ὥζηε ἴζνλ 
κὲλ ρξόλνλ ηάδε θακὲλ ὄληα εἶλαη, ἴζνλ δὲ 
ἐθεῖλα, θαὶ ὁκνίσο ἐθ' ἑθαηέξνηο δηηζρπξηδόκεζα. 
14) You see, then, that it is not difficult to 
dispute, when it is disputed whether this is reality 
or a dream, and as our periods of sleeping and 
waking are indeed equal [in length], and as in 
each period our soul contends that the opinions 
(dogmata) [of the period] are rather true, so that 
we say in one equal period things are like these, 
and in the other equal period like those, and we 
affirm equally each of two. 
15) νὐθνῦλ θαὶ πεξὶ λόζσλ ηε θαὶ καλη῵λ ὁ 15) Then, isn‘t there the same account (as (14) 
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αὐηὸο ιόγνο, πιὴλ ηνῦ ρξόλνπ ὅηη νὐρὶ ἴζνο; above) about the cases of disease and madness, 
except that the period is not equal [in length]? 
16) ιέγσκελ δὴ ἐκέ ηε θαὶ ζὲ θαὶ ηἆιια ἢδε 
θαηὰ ηὸλ αὐηὸλ ιόγνλ, Σσθξάηε ὑγηαίλνληα θαὶ 
Σσθξάηε αὖ ἀζζελνῦληα. … θαὶ ἕηεξνλ [ὅινλ 
ὅιῳ ηῶ ὑγηαίλνληη Σσθξάηεη] ἄξα νὕησο ὥζπεξ 
ἀλόκνηνλ; 
16) Well, let us now say about the other things 
according to the same account, [for example] 
about Socrates healthy and Socrates ill. … And is 
he [sc. Socrates ill as a whole] thus different 
from [Socrates healthy as a whole], in so far as 
they are unlike? 
17) θαὶ θαζεύδνληα δὴ θαὶ πάληα ἃ λπλδὴ 
δηήιζνκελ, ὡζαύησο θήζεηο; 
17) And you will say in the same way, about a 
case of sleeping and all the cases we have just 
went through? 
18) ἕθαζηνλ δὴ η῵λ πεθπθόησλ ηη πνηεῖλ, ἄιιν 
ηη, ὅηαλ κὲλ ιάβῃ ὑγηαίλνληα Σσθξάηε, ὡο ἑηέξῳ 
κνη ρξήζεηαη, ὅηαλ δὲ ἀζζελνῦληα, ὡο ἑηέξῳ; 
18) Then, [consider] each of the naturally active 
factors, when it takes Socrates healthy it will be 
related with one different me [sc. Socrates 
healthy], and when it takes [Socrates] ill, with 
another different me [sc. Socrates ill]? 
19) ὅηαλ δὴ νἶλνλ πίλσ ὑγηαίλσλ, ἟δύο κνη 
θαίλεηαη θαὶ γιπθύο; 
19) Now when I [sc. Socrates healthy] being 
healthy drink wine, it appears pleasant and sweet 
to me? 
20) ὅηαλ δὲ ἀζζελνῦληα, ἄιιν ηη πξ῵ηνλ κὲλ ηῆ 
ἀιεζείᾳ νὐ ηὸλ αὐηὸλ ἔιαβελ; ἀλνκνίῳ γὰξ δὴ 
πξνζ῅ιζελ. 
20) But when [the active factor takes] me [sc. 
Socrates] being ill, then, first of all, is it not the 
case that in truth it has not taken the same man 
[as me/Socrates being healthy]? Because it has 
indeed come to something unlike. 
21) νὔθνπλ ἐγώ ηε νὐδὲλ ἄιιν πνηὲ γελήζνκαη 
νὕησο αἰζζαλόκελνο· ηνῦ γὰξ ἄιινπ ἄιιε 
αἴζζεζηο, θαὶ ἀιινῖνλ θαὶ ἄιινλ πνηεῖ ηὸλ 
αἰζζαλόκελνλ· 
21) Thus I shall never again become percipient in 
this way of anything else. For a perception of 
something else is another [perception], and 
makes another and a different percipient. 
 
Just as in the dice puzzle above, it might be assumed that someone contradicts himself if he 
makes two opposite judgements about the same object; he contradicts himself if he judges 
that the wine is sweet, and that the (same) wine is bitter, i.e. not-sweet. Socrates here takes a 
slightly different argument from that of the dice puzzle in order to resolve the self-
contradicting problem. He evaded the self-contradiction in the dice puzzle, as we saw above, 
through the argument about placing an object in a relational state with others, from which 
relativised and changing qualities result: 6 dice are more when they are placed next to 4 dice, 
and are less when they are placed next to 12 dice. 6 dice in this argument remain the same 6 
dice. And now Socrates avoids the problem of self-contradicting by making the person 
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perceiving sweetness (of the wine) different from another person perceiving bitterness (of the 
same wine); ‗everything itself is in itself becoming and changing.‘ In (16) Socrates explicitly 
states, with Theaetetus‘ agreement, that Socrates who is ill is different from Socrates who is 
healthy. The key to this process of making Socrates healthy different (heteron) from Socrates 
ill is ‗their being unlike (anomoion) as a whole‘. They are different because they are unlike. 
How can one then become wholly unlike oneself? The reason for the perceiving subject‘s 
unlikeness, i.e. difference, of course, is the constant change and movement of the perceiving 
subject: the perceiving subject, just like the qualities, is in motion, and thus it continually 
changes and becomes unlike itself, thereby different from itself. In this sense the Flux-theory 
really constitutes the strong claim that ‗nothing is really in itself one and ever is, but 
everything becomes from movement and change and blending with each other.‘ 
Socrates applies the expanded view of the constant change of perceiving subjects to 
almost all cases in steps from (14) to (18): Socrates awake is unlike, and thus different from, 
Socrates asleep and dreaming, Socrates insane from Socrates sane. Hence, if you make a 
judgement about a thing while you are awake, then that judgement is true only for you when 
awake, and the same account is applied to the case of another judgement that you make about 
the thing while you are asleep and dreaming. This account is equally applied to the case of 
two opposite judgements made by an insane perceiver and a sane one, or a healthy one and an 
ill one, as Socrates shows in (19) and (20): Socrates healthy has a judgement that the wine is 
sweet, while Socrates ill makes another judgement that the (same) wine is not-sweet (i.e. 
bitter). As illustrated in (21), the perception of a subject is different from the perception of 
another different subject. Then, in each state of perceiving subject, the problem of self-
contradiction no longer remains, since each judgement can simply be considered equally true 
for its maker. 
 
1.3. A theory of perception 
 
Socrates now turns to explaining how the process of perception occurs. He says that there 
have been two groups of thinkers; one includes those who believe that nothing exists besides 
the things which they can grasp with their hands, while the other includes those who 
understand that everything is movement (kinēsis). The former group is portrayed as the 
‗uninitiated‘, the latter as the ‗subtle‘. Socrates, implying that those who hold Protagoras‘ 
MMD and the Flux-theory belong to the latter group, now tries to tell ‗a story (mythos, 
156c4)‘ about what exactly the movement and change are and how the movement and change 
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work in relation to the occurrence of perception.
183
 The story goes as follows (156a2–
157c3): movement is innumerable, and of two kinds, active powers and passive powers. 
These movements are called ‗parents‘, and always paired whenever perception occurs. And 
from the interaction of each member of this pair with the other, twin offspring are generated 
in a middle location between the parents. The twin offspring, just like their parents, are [in] 
movement too, also innumerable, and constitute a pair as perception (aisthēsis) and percept 
(aisthēton) corresponding to each other. That is, perception always occurs with its twin, i.e. 
what is perceived. Some perceptions have names such as seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, 
tasting, feeling cold, feeling hot, and pleasure, pain, desire; some do not. Among the 
movements, the parents are ‗slow‘, and do not undergo spatial movement but moves in one 
and the same place;
184
 while the twin offspring move ‗fast‘ and through space. And again, 
among parents, the parent that becomes what is perceiving takes passive movement, whereas 
the other parent that becomes what is perceived has active movement. For instance, when a 
visual perception occurs, an eye (i.e. passive and slow movement) and an object like a stone 
(i.e. active and slow movement) which is commensurate with (symmētron) the eye, constitute 
themselves as a pair as parents and generate their twin offspring, i.e. vision and whiteness 
respectively. This twin offspring move very swiftly through space between their parents, and 
through their impact, the eye is filled with vision and becomes a white-seeing eye, while the 
stone which is commensurate the eye is filled with what is commensurate with the vision, i.e. 
whiteness, and becomes a white stone (156d6–e5).185 
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 This theory of perception seems to be a Platonic philosophical explanation for how the perception process 
occurs on the basis of the MMD and the Secret Doctrine, rather than an original philosophical theory of 
Protagoras, or Heraclitus if the Secret Doctrine, i.e. the Flux-theory, can be attributed to him. Two reasons can 
be supplied for this: first, neither Protagoras nor Heraclitus (cf. DK22) are said to have given any account of this 
theory of perception; second, Socrates counts the theory of perception not as a logos in which a genuine 
philosophical or argumentative point of the originator of the theory must be implied, but as a mythos by which 
Plato can be released from the responsibility of the correct representation of others‘ thoughts. cf. Chappell 
(2004), 48–9 and 73, n. 53. 
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 On the meaning of the idea that the parents move in one and the same place, scholars have argued in two 
ways: first, as Bostock suggests (1988, 62–4), the parents do not move through space but merely rotate in one 
and the same place by themselves; second, as Cornford (1935, 49) and McDowell (1973, 138) suggest, the 
parents do not perform any spatial movement but undergo their quality changes constantly. Both answers, yet, 
seem implausible. First, the rotation movement in one and the same place does not need to be considered as 
slow movement–it can still be fast, and indeed the parents do not rotate. (One may argue that some parents do 
rotate, but such few examples shall not rashly be generalised.) Second, the parents whose interaction generates 
twin offspring also need to be in a state of constant movement in every respect, thus if they are assumed to take 
only the quality changes and not spatial movement, then they are both in a state of change in one sense and in a 
state or rest–as we will clearly see later at 181b–183c, it violates the Flux-theory. Regarding this expression, I 
assume that Plato may have expressed himself in this way in order to emphasise the parents‘ slow movement 
compared to the offspring‘s very swift movement. The parents indeed move through space, but they look to be at 
rest in one and the same place when their slow movement is compared to that of their twin offspring‘s which is 
extremely fast. 
185
 By an analogy of tap, Crombie (1963, 21) argues that the water which is flown from a tap fills a jar, not the 
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However, a problem still remains. In this answer no explanation of direct interaction 
between the eye and the stone is suggested. In other words, by the vision the eye encounters, 
not the stone, but the colour that is generated by the stone, and likewise, the stone encounters, 
not the eye but the vision generated by the eye. Then, how can the eye be sure that the 
whiteness originates from the stone, when the eye becomes the white-seeing eye? In order to 
solve this problem, Socrates seems to adopt two significant agents by which the parents and 
twin offspring are bound, kinship (syngenē: 156b7–c3), and necessity (anangkē: 160b6–10): 
 
22) ηὸ δ' αὖ αἰζζεηὸλ γέλνο ηνύησλ ἑθάζηαηο 
ὁκόγνλνλ, ὄςεζη κὲλ ρξώκαηα παληνδαπαῖο 
παληνδαπά, ἀθναῖο δὲ ὡζαύησο θσλαί, θαὶ ηαῖο 
ἄιιαηο αἰζζήζεζη ηὰ ἄιια αἰζζεηὰ ζπγγελ῅ 
γηγλόκελα. 
22) And again, the race of what is perceived is 
born at the same time/twin (homogonon) to each 
of them, there are all kinds of colours for all 
kinds of seeings, all kinds of sounds for all kinds 
of hearings, and all kinds of what is perceived for 
all kinds of perceptions in kinship (syngenē). 
23) ἐπείπεξ ἟κ῵λ ἟ ἀλάγθε ηὴλ νὐζίαλ ζπλδεῖ 
κέλ, ζπλδεῖ δὲ νὐδελὶ η῵λ ἄιισλ νὐδ' αὖ ἟κῖλ 
αὐηνῖο. ἀιιήινηο δὴ ιείπεηαη ζπλδεδέζζαη. ὥζηε 
εἴηε ηηο εἶλαί ηη ὀλνκάδεη, ηηλὶ εἶλαη ἠ ηηλὸο ἠ πξόο 
ηη ῥεηένλ αὐηῶ, εἴηε γίγλεζζαη· 
23) For necessity (anangkē) ties our being 
(ousias) [sc. parents], but it ties [our being] to 
none of the other things nor again to ourselves. 
Thus it remains that we are tied to each other. 
Hence, whether someone says that something is 
or becomes, he must say [that it ‗is‘ or 
‗becomes‘] ‗for somebody (something)‘ or ‗of 
somebody (something)‘ or ‗relative to somebody 
(something)‘. 
 
According to (22), perceptual information is possible when perceptions and the qualities with 
which the perceptions are commensurate are generated as twins in kinship (syngenēs). Vision 
operates only with what is seen such as colour since vision and what is seen are akin just like 
hearing is akin with what is heard; vision cannot work with what is heard, i.e. sound, or what 
is touched, e.g. hardness. This kinship binds the perceptions with the relevant and correct 
qualities—i.e. percepts—in cases of perception; in the case of an eye seeing a white stone, 
vision only works with whiteness, not with hardness.
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 And in this case, so long as vision 
                                                                                                                                                        
tap itself. His argument is questioning, then, how an eye and a stone can be filled with vision (of white) and 
whiteness respectively, since the twin offspring are generated in a middle location between their parents. An 
answer is possible as follows: the offspring, i.e. vision and colour, after being generated by their parents, i.e. an 
eye and a stone, move through the space between their parents, and have an impact with each other in the 
middle spot. At the moment of the impact, vision becomes the vision of white and colour the whiteness, and 
move back to their own parents, filling them up. Thus the eye which is filled with the vision of white becomes 
the white-seeing eye, the stone filled with the whiteness the white stone. 
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 In the Meno 76c7–d5, Socrates says that according to Empedocles (who is listed among those taking the side 
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and whiteness are tied up tightly together, this vision cannot be wrong about it (this satisfies 
one condition of knowledge to be infallible). In (23) Socrates explains the relation of an eye 
with a stone. It never happens for someone who is perceiving to perceive nothing, and if he 
perceives nothing (to mē on), then he is not-perceiving. Whenever one perceives, therefore, 
one‘s perception must be about what is (to on), i.e. an external object. Perceiving subject and 
the external object are uniquely bound by necessity (anangkē) which leads them into a role of 
parents to generate twin offspring when perception occurs—this satisfies another condition of 
knowledge, that it is of what is. For example, if my body which is tied to the wind by 
necessity interacts with the wind when perception occurs, they generate twin offspring, my 
tactile perception of coldness and coldness, that are bound with each other by kinship, and 
then through the impact of those offspring, my body is filled with the tactile perception of 
coldness and the wind with the coldness, and finally the former becomes a cold feeling body 
in relation to the wind and the latter a cold wind for me. In this regard, I can truly but 
relatively judge that the wind is cold for me, or that it is a cold wind for me. The whole 
process of the occurrence of perception in this theory can be briefly pictured as follows: 
 
The case of an eye seeing a white stone
187
 
 
(Necessity: anangkē) 
 
(Kinship: syngenēs) 
 
 
Eye             Vision - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Whiteness         Stone 
 
One of Offspring            One of Offspring 
i(fast movement)            i(fast movement) 
 
Parent                                                        i Parent 
(passive and slow movement)                      ii (active and slow movement) 
                                                                                                                                                        
of perceptual relativism on a flux ontological basis, together with Protagoras and Heraclitus, in the Theaetetus 
152e) there are effluvia of things and channels through which the effluvia make their way when perception 
occurs; in this case, some effluvia fit (ἁξκόηηεηλ) some of the channels, while others do not, thus, for example, 
colour which is an effluvium from shapes is commensurate with (ζύκκεηξνο) vision and perceived. In this 
passage Socrates probably intends to mean ‗kinship (syngenēs)‘ by ‗fitting (harmottein)‘ and ‗being 
commensurate with (symmetros)‘. Symmetron also appears in the discussion on the case of an eye seeing a white 
stone (Theaet. 156d3–4). Cf. also Chappell (2004), 78. 
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 Cf. Burnyeat‘s schema (1990), 16: 
   
 
180 
 
To sum up, according to this whole way of interpreting the MMD, Socrates clarifies that we 
have to think that nothing is in itself as it is, everything comes to be through the interaction 
with other things in a state of constant change and motion. Since my perception is always a 
perception of what is, and is also always true for me, I can safely be a measure of things that 
are how they are and of things that are not how they are not (the Flux-theory → the MMD). 
And I know the things that I perceive and I perceive the things that I know too, since I am 
always right about them (the MMD → Theaetetus‘ definition of knowledge as perception) (cf. 
Burnyeat‘s ‗Reading B‘ (1990, 8–10) and n. 180 above). By making them coincide with each 
other, Socrates concludes his interpretation of the MMD as a claim of epistemological 
relativism in which knowledge equated with perception is private to each perceiver in a world 
of radical flux. 
 
 
2. Refutation 
Having established a whole argument for the MMD combined with the Secret Doctrine and a 
theory of perception, now Socrates examines it. The examination is first made of the MMD, 
and then the Secret Doctrine, and finally Theaetetus‘ definition of knowledge as perception—
my research focuses on the first examination. The first examination divides into three parts: 
first, a preliminary stage of the refutation; second, Socrates‘ defence of the MMD on 
Protagoras‘ behalf; last, a more serious stage of the refutation including the self-refutation 
charge against the MMD. 
 
2.1. Refutation of the Man-Measure Doctrine 1 
 
Socrates raises three paradoxical cases which will occur if the MMD is taken to hold good; 
one concerning wisdom (161c–162a), one concerning foreign languages which have never 
been learnt (163b–c) (these two cases turn into the problem that one does and does not know 
at the same time, if knowledge is perception), and one concerning memory and remembering 
(163d–164b). 
According to the MMD, every judgement about everything made by each individual is 
true for him. Then, there can be no one wiser or less wise than anyone else. Protagoras who 
proclaims the MMD cannot be wiser than anyone or even than a baboon or a pig that has 
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perceptions too, nor can he be less wise than the gods.
188
 Protagoras then does not deserve to 
be called ‗a wise man (sophos) with wisdom (phronēsis)‘, and no one needs education from 
him, since he claims that everyone‘s judgement is true. No matter what subject, Protagoras‘ 
teaching profession thus becomes meaningless.
189
 
Since knowledge is defined as perception in the MMD, one would not have any 
difficulty in knowing (eidenai)—and thus understanding (manthanein)—foreign languages 
that have never been taught to one, if one perceives (aisthanesthai) them. This brings the 
paradoxical conclusion that one knows and does not know at the same time. When you 
encounter and see or hear the language that you have never met before, you have to say that 
you know it so long as you are seeing or hearing, namely perceiving, it; but, simultaneously 
you have to admit that you do not know it because you do not understand it at all.
190
 This, 
however, does not seem acceptable. To this problem, Theaetetus replies that we hear and see, 
i.e. perceive and thus know the sounds and the shapes and the colours of the foreign 
languages spoken and written, but we do not perceive their meanings, and this is why we 
know (the sounds, the shapes, the colours) and do not know (the meanings) simultaneously. 
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 Concerning the problem about the gods, Socrates says that Protagoras would probably have said that ‗you 
[sc. Socrates] drag in the gods which I exclude from all discussion, written or spoken, about them how they are 
or how they are not (δεκεγνξεῖηε ζπγθαζεδόκελνη, ζενύο ηε εἰο ηὸ κέζνλ ἄγνληεο, νὓο ἐγὼ ἔθ ηε ηνῦ ιέγεηλ θαὶ 
ηνῦ γξάθεηλ πεξὶ αὐη῵λ ὡο εἰζὶλ ἠ ὡο νὐθ εἰζίλ, ἐμαηξ῵)‘ (162d6–e2), and does not discuss this problem 
anymore in the dialogue. On the discussion about Protagoras‘ views on the gods, i.e. the PTH fragment, cf. 
Chapter IV above. 
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 Here, Socrates‘ sarcastic criticism of Protagoras that he is not even wiser than a baboon surely enables us to 
infer an implication of Plato‘s epistemological idea that in human cognitive state the level of perception is 
different from that of knowledge (cf. Men. 98a; Alc. Ma. 117b). Probably, one of Plato‘s purposes is to show in 
the dialogue that one who takes the MMD to be true cannot be a teacher of any subject, Protagoras thus claims 
something meaningless, entirely wrong or lies to everyone. 
190
 This paradox, nonetheless, does not seem congruent with the theory of perception in which parents and twin 
offspring are explained to be bound by necessity and kinship: the eyes and a stone are tied to one another by 
necessity, vision and whiteness by kinship. Likewise, eyes and a foreign language need to be tied to one another 
by necessity, vision and shape of the language by kinship (in a case of seeing the language), or ears and a 
foreign language by necessity, hearing and sound of the spoken language by kinship (in a case of hearing it). In 
the light of this theory, thus, an object (a foreign language) which generates its meaning as one pair of twin 
offspring must be tied to a perceptual (or cognitive) organ, i.e. a perceiving subject, which generates its 
perception (or cognition) as another pair of twin offspring. And the object and perceptual (or cognitive) organ 
must be tied to one another by necessity, their twin offspring by kinship. Simply: 
 ‗eyes – vision : white – a stone‘  
 ‗ears – hearing : high pitch – a bird‘ 
Likewise: 
 ‗eyes – vision : shape – a foreign language‘ 
 ‗ears – hearing : sound – a foreign language‘ 
 ‗? (a perceptual organ) – ? (a certain type of perception) : meaning – a foreign language‘ 
However, what is commensurate with the meaning of the language is not discussed in the paradox; Socrates here 
does not seem to take this point into consideration, or it may be that it is clearly an implicit problem for the 
epistemological theory of perception, if Plato tries to insist that it is not a perceptual organ but something else 
like soul or mind (psychē or nous; cf. 185a–e where soul is described to function through itself, not by any other 
sensory organs, and 189ea–190a where it is said to have a talk with itself about any subjects which it considers, 
i.e. dianoia), which is commensurate with the meaning of the language. 
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Socrates and Theaetetus end up agreeing that we neither perceive nor know by seeing or 
hearing what schoolmasters and interpreters tell us (163c2–4). This agreement seems to have 
the implication that according to the epistemological state of the MMD, teaching is 
impossible. What schoolmasters and interpreters do is to teach the (foreign) languages, but 
through perception no one can grasp their teaching. According to Socrates, the Protagoras 
who himself professes to teach is now unable to teach according to his own epistemological 
claim. Socrates says that some objections to Theaetetus‘ reply could be raised, but he does not 
explicitly say what they are. One of the objections would perhaps be that it is not possible for 
anyone to see or hear the meanings, and thus knowledge should not be defined as 
perception— i.e. not all knowledge is perception.  
For the paradoxical case of remembering, Socrates argues that one would come both to 
know and not know something simultaneously again if one now remembers something which 
one perceived or learnt before. One knows it because one remembers it now, and one does not 
know it because one does not perceive it now. This paradox could also entail that one can 
remember something without knowing it—because knowing is perceiving, and you do not 
perceive it now.
191
 In order to avoid these absurd cases, Theaetetus admits the difference 
between memory that occurs at the present time about the past things and sense-perception 
that occurs at the present time about the present things, saying that no one remembers 
anything exactly as one before perceived it. 
The paradoxical cases of foreign languages and remembering can be presented again as 
follows (165b–e): it is agreed that it is not possible for anyone not to know what he knows. 
And one cannot see with the eyes covered, but can with the eyes uncovered. One can have 
one eye covered and the other eye uncovered, so one can both see and not see at the same 
time. Since seeing is knowing and not seeing is not knowing, it is possible to know (see) what 
one does not know (not see), and this situation surely violates the agreement—after this, 
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 This refutation based of the function of memory and remembering also could bring two controversies into 
discussion: first, here Socrates seems to take for granted that memory and remembering are (at least a part of) 
knowledge and knowing, and is always right, i.e. infallible. It has not, however, been argued yet, and so is not 
sure at this stage; second, Socrates, as seen above, seems to mean by the Greek word aisthēsis only sense-
perception (cf. 166b3 where Socrates distinguishes perception from memory). In this regard, some scholars have 
labelled the MMD respectively as ‗Narrow Protagoreanism/perceptual relativism‘ when it claims that whatever 
each individual perceives is so as he perceives it, narrowing down the meaning of aisthēsis to sense-perception 
and the objects to sensible ones; and as ‗Broad Protagoreanism/Global relativism‘ when it entails that whatever 
each individual man judges is true for him, expanding the objects into ethical-social ones. On this, cf. Fine in 
Gill and McCabe (eds.) (1966), 106–7; McDowell (1973), 172–3 (his term ‗a modified Protagorean doctrine‘); 
Fine (2003), 134–5 and 161–2; Sedley (2004), 49–53; Chappell (2004), 118–20 (his term ‗restricted 
Protagoreanism‘). But it is not necessary for aisthēsis to be narrowly so, since this word was used in ancient 
Greece with a much wider meaning, including sensing, feeling, dreaming, remembering, calculating, than mere 
sense-perceiving. On this, cf. 156b2–7; Beare (1992), esp. 202–3. 
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Socrates at 165d alludes to some other similar paradoxical cases such as cases of knowing 
something clearly and dimly, knowing near at hand and not from a distance, and knowing 
something both intensely and slightly. 
Knowledge has been regarded as infallible (apseudes) and about what is (to on). At this 
preliminary stage of the refutation, Plato adds some more conditions for knowledge. Wisdom 
must be derived not from perception but from knowledge, and a technical and professional 
cognitive state of knowledge must not be reduced to the level of sense-perception (from the 
paradoxical case of wisdom); knowledge must contain the possibility of understanding 
meanings and of teaching them to others (from the paradoxical case of foreign languages); 
and memory and remembering must take an important position in (establishing) knowledge 
(from the paradoxical case of memory and remembering). 
 
2.2. Socrates‘ Defence of the Man-Measure Doctrine on Protagoras‘ behalf 
 
Has Socrates refuted the MMD in a fair way? Socrates himself asks to pay more attention to 
what has been said and to what Protagoras would genuinely say; otherwise Protagoras would 
say that ‗when you [sc. Socrates] are examining some of my [i.e. Protagoras‘] ideas through 
questioning, if the one who is questioned is tripped up while answering as I would answer, 
then I am refuted, but if [he is answering something] different [from what I would answer], 
then he is refuted (ὅηαλ ηη η῵λ ἐκ῵λ δη' ἐξσηήζεσο ζθνπῆο, ἐὰλ κὲλ ὁ ἐξσηεζεὶο νἷάπεξ ἂλ 
ἐγὼ ἀπνθξηλαίκελ ἀπνθξηλάκελνο ζθάιιεηαη, ἐγὼ ἐιέγρνκαη, εἰ δὲ ἀιινῖα, αὐηὸο ὁ 
ἐξσηεζείο)‘ (166a6–b1), Socrates imagines. Socrates first tries to defend the MMD on 
Protagoras‘ behalf in order to avoid the opponent‘s examining traps, and says that the sophist 
would have replied to the above paradoxical cases as follows (166b–c): first, one‘s present 
memory of something that one experienced in the past is not of the same type as one‘s 
experience in the past; second, it is possible for the same man to know and not to know the 
same thing at the same time; third, one who is in process of becoming unlike and different is 
not the same person as one was before. 
Socrates does not explicitly say by means of what arguments Protagoras would have 
defended the replies above. However, as Sedley (2004, 55) suggests, it is possible to 
conjecture that the first and second replies are possible within the MMD if the doctrine takes 
memory and remembering to be types of perception and provides the correct qualifiers to the 
perceiving subjects in the case of perceiving things. Remembering a thing is (a form of) 
perceiving it, thus one who remembers perceives and so knows. But this type of perception 
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does not need to be necessarily the same as another type of perception like seeing, in the 
same way as seeing is also different from hearing. Thus, when one remembers something one 
knows it in the way of remembering (the correct qualifier), but one does not know it in the 
ways of seeing or hearing. 
Similarly, the case that the same man can and cannot know the same thing 
simultaneously could be admitted to happen if the correct qualifiers are applied. If one has 
one eye uncovered and the other eye covered, then one see something with the eye uncovered 
and does not see that something with the eye covered. The proper qualifiers, ‗with the eye 
uncovered‘ and ‗with the eye covered‘, need to be applied, as Socrates has already put 
everything in a radical flux state so that each perceiving subject differs from each other. And 
the third reply is a reminder that perceiving subjects are in a state of constant change; a man 
who is in process of becoming unlike is not the same as he was before, thus Socrates ill is the 
result of becoming unlike from Socrates healthy, and the former is not the same as the latter 
(cf. 157e–160a).192 
Subsequently, Socrates provides a defence on Protagoras‘ behalf concerning the problem 
of wisdom (166c–167d). Socrates says that according to Protagoras, no one judges falsely: so 
long as everything is perceived truly and privately, everyone is true in his judgement. Judging 
falsely is the same as judging things that are not (ta mē onta), and ‗it is not possible to judge 
things that are not, or to judge anything other than what one is immediately experiencing, and 
what one is immediately experiencing is always true (νὔηε γὰξ ηὰ κὴ ὄληα δπλαηὸλ δνμάζαη, 
νὔηε ἄιια παξ' ἃ ἂλ πάζρῃ, ηαῦηα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀιεζ῅)‘ (167a7–b1). Hence there is no difference in 
the truth of judgements between different perceivers, and no wiser man regarding the matter 
of truth. Yet, still there is the difference of ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ between perceivers or judges. No  
one judges in a truer way, but some people judge in a way good/better than others.
193
 From 
this point of view, Protagoras goes on to suggest the possibility of wiser men who can bring 
about better judgements than others, i.e. change others‘ judgements. Doctors are wise men in 
relation to the case of bodies and health (they cause the change of bodies by drugs to make 
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 In this respect Aristotle claims in the Metaphysic IV.6.1011a19–25 that the MMD as a relativist claim (that 
‗x is F to a at t1‘) does not violate the PNC, if judgements are fully equipped with proper qualifiers. 
193
 In this Defence Protagoras would probably mean by ‗better‘, as the literal meaning of chrēmata in the 
doctrine may imply, ‗more useful and beneficial (ōphelimōteron and chrēsimōteron)‘ or ‗most influential 
(dynatōtatos) (cf. Prot. 318e5–319a2)‘. One‘s good/better judgement is the judgement that produces more 
useful and beneficial results in one‘s life in a community by which one becomes able to act and speak in a better 
way (cf. Section 3 in Chapter II above). From this point of view, some scholars have suggested that the 
Protagoreanism illustrated in the Defence is the first pragmatic or utilitarian claim in the history of philosophy, 
and is almost the same as modern pragmatism. On this, cf. Schiller (1907), 1; Cornford (1935), 73, n. 1; Levi 
(1940b), 287–8; Cole (1966), 111; Oehler (2002), 207–14. On the contrary, Burnyeat (1990, 23–5) argues 
against the above view on the grounds that a pragmatic claim does not require the truth of judgements. 
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men act and live in a better way), gardeners with regard to plant-life, sophists in relation to 
souls (they cause the change of souls by logoi to make men judge and live in a better way), 
and rhetoricians with regard to public affairs. The wisdom of these experts is not a matter of 
truth, but of experience of what is better; the more experience about a certain issue, i.e. a type 
of technē (cf. Section 2 in Chapter II above for the Protagorean experience and technē in the 
Great Speech) one has, the more chances to be wise and wiser about the issue one has (167b). 
Now Socrates‘ Defence applies Protagorean relativism to the ethical and social realms. 
The Protagorean wise man is one ‗who makes things appear, and thus be, good to people by 
effecting a change in them when they appears, and thus are, bad to them (αὐηὸλ ηνῦηνλ θαὶ 
ιέγσ ζνθόλ, ὃο ἄλ ηηλη ἟κ῵λ, ᾧ θαίλεηαη θαὶ ἔζηη θαθά, κεηαβάιισλ πνηήζῃ ἀγαζὰ 
θαίλεζζαί ηε θαὶ εἶλαη)‘ (166d7–8). For example, the wise rhetoricians, or sophists in each 
city, are those who ‗make beneficial things, instead of harmful things, seem and be just to 
their cities, so they replace harmful things which used to be for them, with beneficial things 
by making them seem and be just to people in their cities (ζνθνύο ηε θαὶ ἀγαζνὺο ῥήηνξαο … 
πόιεζη ηὰ ρξεζηὰ ἀληὶ η῵λ πνλεξ῵λ δίθαηα δνθεῖλ εἶλαη πνηεῖλ, … ἀληὶ πνλεξ῵λ ὄλησλ 
αὐηνῖο ἑθάζησλ ρξεζηὰ ἐπνίεζελ εἶλαη θαὶ δνθεῖλ)‘ (167c3–7). Taking this role of wise men 
in the cities into consideration, sophists who are able to educate their pupils are wise men, 
and are worth their large fees, Socrates emphasises on Protagoras‘ behalf.194 
Despite Socrates‘ effort to defend the MMD, still a significant problem remains; as 
Burnyeat (1990, 23–55; cf. also Chappell, 2005, 106–7) correctly points out, in the Defence 
Protagoras‘ MMD ―becomes an objective matter that one of two states of mind is more 
beneficial than the other‖, and ―an equally objective, non-relative question whether experts 
exist.‖ As initially examined, in Protagoras‘ thought, if all judgements are true, then all 
judgements regarding those judgements that are judged to be beneficial must be true. These 
sorts of true judgements would not change, so long as one takes them to be true. Meanwhile, 
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 Some scholars have attempted to ascribe this part of the Socratic Defence of the MMD to historical 
Protagoras. On this attempt, cf. Campbell (1883), xviii–xxx; Schiller (1908), 9 ff.; Cornford (1935), 72; 
Untersteiner (1954), 102–3; Versenyi (1962), 180, n. 5; Kerferd (1981a), 105; Zilioli (2007), 66–9. However, the 
whole Socratic interpretation of the MMD in the Theaetetus is based on the equation of knowledge with 
perception and with Plato‘s own interpretation of the doctrine (i.e. the Platonic reading of the MMD), and so the 
Defence is also believed to be constructed on the basis of them too, having a relativist structure that ‗what 
appears good to someone is indeed good to him‘. In so far as this equation cannot be surely attributed to the 
historical Protagoras, so is the Defence. Moreover, it does not seem appropriate to assume that Plato suddenly 
represents the historical Protagoras‘ genuine view point only in this part, while neglecting it in the earlier part of 
defence against the paradoxical cases of ‗memory‘, ‗knowing and not-knowing‘, and ‗becoming unlike‘ (166b–
c). For further discussion against the Protagorean authenticity of the Defence, cf. Burnet in Gillespie (1910), 471 
ff.; Levi (1940b), 302; Cole (1966), 7; Nill (1985), 36–7; Allen (1996), 101–2. On the suggestion that the 
question should be left open, cf. Gillespie (1910), 471 ff.; McDowell (1973), 165 and 172–3; Burnyeat (1990), 
22, n. 30. 
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some people‘s (the laymen‘s) judgements about what is beneficial must be in conflict with 
others‘ (the wise men‘s) judgements about the same issue. In this case, Protagoras‘ attempt to 
change one‘s judgements about what is beneficial is indeed meaningless unless he admits the 
universal belief that what is beneficial is not relative. This, however, contradicts Protagoras‘ 
relativistic position earlier made by Socrates, thus the Defence of the MMD on Protagoras‘ 
behalf is not really successful in the dialogue. 
 
2.3. Refutation of the Man-Measure Doctrine 2 
 
Now Socrates proposes again to examine the MMD. At this stage, Socrates asks to change his 
interlocutor from Theaetetus to Theodorus. Socrates was required to make a distinction 
between refuting Theaetetus and refuting Protagoras (166a6–b1), so that he seems to want to 
discuss with someone who can act more directly on behalf of Protagoras, i.e. Theodorus who 
is described as old enough (like Protagoras) and as having associated with Protagoras as his 
friend and pupil (cf. 160b7, 162a4).
195
 This is because Socrates wants to avoid the possibility 
of wrong examination since he was criticised by the phantom of Protagoras for addressing his 
arguments to a young man (pais), i.e. Theaetetus, and exploiting this young man‘s fear in 
order to argue controversially against Protagoras‘ ideas (168c9–d2). Having Theodorus as his 
interlocutor, Socrates now goes on to refutation of the MMD again. 
 
2.3.1. The self-refutation 
 
Socrates has earlier said that regarding wisdom (phronēsis) Protagoras claimed that there is 
no ‗truer‘ or ‗more false‘, but only ‗better‘ or ‗worse‘ in judging. The wise man in 
Protagoras‘ view is one who makes things appear, and thus be, good and better to people by 
effecting a change in them when they appear, and thus are, bad and worse to them (166d7–8). 
For instance, a wise rhetorician, or a wise sophist in a city, is one who replaces pernicious 
things with beneficial things by making them appear and be just to people in their city 
(167c6–7). The wise man is thus the one who is in charge of making a good/better and 
                                                 
195
 It may be a Platonic device of dramatisation for a more effective refutation of the MMD that Theodorus was 
associated with Protagoras, rather than a historical fact, as no ancient sources prove their association except for 
the Theaetetus. Theodorus (340–250 BCE) the atheist who is stated by Cicero (De. Nat. Deor. I.1.2) and Sextus 
Empiricus (M. 9.54–56: DK80 A12) to have joined an atheist group with Protagoras is certainly different from 
Theodorus the mathematician (the 5
th
 century BCE) in the Theaetetus. 
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beneficial and useful judgement, not a true judgement. Theodorus agreed with Socrates on his 
defence. 
Socrates asks Theodorus again to examine the defended MMD in the shortest way (hōs 
dia brachytatōn) as to whether Protagoras or anyone would disagree with Socrates—as well 
as Theodorus since he agreed with Socrates—on it. As a result of the examination, it turns out 
that the MMD has the serious problem that it refutes itself. The argument for this examination 
has been thus labelled as ‗self-refutation (peritropē) argument‘196 by scholars, and falls into 
two parts. According to Socrates, the self-refuting problem of the MMD is caused both by 
ordinary people‘s general belief that wisdom and ignorance exist and are respectively true 
thinking and false judgement (in the first part) and the specific anti-Protagorean disagreement 
with the MMD that the doctrine is false (in the second part). The first part goes as follows 
(170a3–c8): 
1) ηὸ δνθνῦλ ἑθάζηῳ ηνῦην θαὶ εἶλαί θεζί πνπ ᾧ 
δνθεῖ; 
1) I suppose, he [sc. Protagoras] says that what 
seems (to dokoun) to each one also is for him. 
2) νὐθνῦλ, ὦ Πξσηαγόξα, θαὶ ἟κεῖο ἀλζξώπνπ, 
κᾶιινλ δὲ πάλησλ ἀλζξώπσλ δόμαο ιέγνκελ, θαὶ 
θακὲλ νὐδέλα ὅληηλα νὐ ηὰ κὲλ αὑηὸλ ἟γεῖζζαη 
η῵λ ἄιισλ ζνθώηεξνλ, ηὰ δὲ ἄιινπο ἑαπηνῦ, θαὶ 
ἔλ γε ηνῖο κεγίζηνηο θηλδύλνηο, ὅηαλ ἐλ 
ζηξαηείαηο ἠ λόζνηο ἠ ἐλ ζαιάηηῃ ρεηκάδσληαη, 
ὥζπεξ πξὸο ζενὺο ἔρεηλ ηνὺο ἐλ ἑθάζηνηο 
ἄξρνληαο, ζση῅ξαο ζθ῵λ πξνζδνθ῵ληαο, νὐθ 
ἄιιῳ ηῳ δηαθέξνληαο ἠ ηῶ εἰδέλαη· θαὶ πάληα 
πνπ κεζηὰ ηἀλζξώπηλα δεηνύλησλ δηδαζθάινπο 
ηε θαὶ ἄξρνληαο ἑαπη῵λ ηε θαὶ η῵λ ἄιισλ δῴσλ 
η῵λ ηε ἐξγαζη῵λ, νἰνκέλσλ ηε αὖ ἱθαλ῵λ κὲλ 
δηδάζθεηλ, ἱθαλ῵λ δὲ ἄξρεηλ εἶλαη. θαὶ ἐλ ηνύηνηο 
ἅπαζη ηί ἄιιν θήζνκελ ἠ αὐηνὺο ηνὺο 
ἀλζξώπνπο ἟γεῖζζαη ζνθίαλ θαὶ ἀκαζίαλ εἶλαη 
παξὰ ζθίζηλ. 
2) Well, then, Protagoras, we are also talking 
about the judgement of men, or rather of all men, 
and we say that there is no one who does not 
believe that he himself is wiser than others in 
some matters, while others are wiser than him in 
other matters, and that in the case of great 
dangers, when they are distressed in the 
battlefield, or in sickness, or in the sea, they 
consider their leaders as gods, and expect [them] 
as their saviours since they are distinguished in 
nothing else than knowing. And, I suppose, all 
human affairs are full of those who look for 
teachers and leaders for themselves and other 
living creatures and the [human] works, and 
again full of those who think that there are some 
who are capable of teaching, and others who are 
capable of leading, and in all these cases, we 
                                                 
196
 The word peritropē is etymologically connected to the verb peritrepein (‗to turn around or over‘) and 
literally means ‗a turning around‘. In the context of ancient philosophy, this word was used to indicate ‗turning 
an opponent‘s arguments against himself‘ (cf. LSJ. s. v.). Sextus Empiricus, dealing with the self-refutation of 
the MMD, also adopts this word (M. VII.389–390). For this term, cf. Burnyeat (1976a), 44–69, esp. 47–9; 
Castagnoli (2010), 41, n. 31 and 95. The argument for the MMD‘s self-refutation has been referred to by 
scholars in various terms (as ‗self-defeat‘, ‗self-referential incoherence/inconsistency‘, ‗reversal‘, ‗pragmatic 
paradox‘, ‗self-contradiction‘, ‗performative contradiction‘, self-stultification‘, ‗self-destruction‘, ‗recoil‘, 
‗turning the tables‘, ‗retorition‘). 
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cannot say anything else but that men themselves 
believe that both wisdom (sophia) and ignorance 
exist (amathia) among themselves. 
3) νὐθνῦλ ηὴλ κὲλ ζνθίαλ ἀιεζ῅ δηάλνηαλ 
἟γνῦληαη, ηὴλ δὲ ἀκαζίαλ ςεπδ῅ δόμαλ; 
3) Well, then, they believe that wisdom is true 
thinking (alēthēs dianoia), while ignorance is a 
false judgement (pseudēs doxa), right? 
4) ηί νὖλ, ὦ Πξσηαγόξα, ρξεζόκεζα ηῶ ιόγῳ; 
πόηεξνλ ἀιεζ῅ θ῵κελ ἀεὶ ηνὺο ἀλζξώπνπο 
δνμάδεηλ, ἠ ηνηὲ κὲλ ἀιεζ῅, ηνηὲ δὲ ςεπδ῅; ἐμ 
ἀκθνηέξσλ γάξ πνπ ζπκβαίλεη κὴ ἀεὶ ἀιεζ῅ ἀιι' 
ἀκθόηεξα αὐηνὺο δνμάδεηλ. ζθόπεη γάξ, ὦ 
Θεόδσξε, εἰ ἐζέινη ἄλ ηηο η῵λ ἀκθὶ Πξσηαγόξαλ 
ἠ ζὺ αὐηὸο δηακάρεζζαη ὡο νὐδεὶο ἟γεῖηαη ἕηεξνο 
ἕηεξνλ ἀκαζ῅ ηε εἶλαη θαὶ ςεπδ῅ δνμάδεηλ. 
4) How then, Protagoras, are we to treat your 
doctrine? Are we to say that men always judge 
what is true, or sometimes what is true but 
sometimes what is false? For, from both, I 
suppose, it follows that they do not always judge 
what is true, but both [what is true and what is 
false]. For, examine, Theodorus, if someone of 
Protagoras‘ followers, or you yourself, would 
want to maintain that no one thinks that anyone 
else is ignorant and judges what is false. 
 
At (1) Socrates first confirms the basic notion of the MMD that what seems to each one also 
is for him, thus false judgement is impossible. Then, through (2) and (3), Socrates presents a 
general belief accepted by people that everyone believes that wisdom and ignorance exist, 
and the former consists in true thinking and the latter in false judgement. At (4) Socrates 
presents a dilemmatic situation which Protagoras‘ MMD must encounter according to the 
general belief. The situation is that either men always judge what is true according to the 
MMD, or they sometimes judge what is false; either way there have to be false judgements; 
thus the MMD is false. These steps briefly go as follows: 
 
Premises: 
(1) According to Protagoras‘ MMD, what seems to each one also is for him; accordingly, no 
false judgement exists. 
(2) Everyone believes that he is better than others in some respects, but worse in other 
respects, thus that wisdom and ignorance exist. 
(3) (Many or most) men believe that wisdom is true thinking, ignorance is a false judgement. 
(4) Thus, everyone believes that (many or most) men believe that false judgements exist. (from 
(2) and (3)) 
 
Dilemmas: 
(a) Men always judge what is true according to the MMD; then, false judgements exist, since 
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the widespread judgement that false judgements exist must also be true. (from (1)) 
(b) Men sometimes judge what is false; then, of course, false judgements exist. 
(c) Whether (a) or (b), false judgements exist. 
(d) Therefore, the MMD is false. (against (1)) 
 
At (2) Socrates appeals to people‘s general belief that wisdom and ignorance exist. This 
general belief is proved, not by an argument, but by people‘s practice, based on a belief that 
wisdom is valuable, of looking for experts, teachers, and leaders whom they believe to be 
wiser in their specialties than any men. Thus, many or most men (except for Protagoras) 
believe that wisdom is true thinking, ignorance a false judgement, since the former is 
provided by specialists, the latter by non-specialists (3). 
However, it may be disputed whether Protagoras himself would admit the general belief. 
Earlier, in the Defence, both Socrates and Protagoras agreed that wisdom is attributed to 
those who are capable of good judgements by making good things appear and be just, not of 
true judgements. Protagoras says that wisdom is not true thinking, but a good judgement, and, 
of course, then, ignorance not a false judgement, but a bad/harmful judgement (166d2–8). 
Although Protagoras admits the general belief above, still a problem remains regarding 
Socrates‘ argument. At (1) Protagoras explicitly claims that ‗what seems to each one also is 
for him.‘ Thus, Protagoras needs to admit the general belief in a relativised way; wisdom and 
ignorance exist, not for Protagoras himself, but for those who believe them to exist, and 
wisdom and ignorance are true thinking and false judgements respectively, not for Protagoras 
himself, but again for those who believe them to be. The dilemmas then need to be corrected 
as (a') ‗men always judge what is true according to the MMD; then, false judgements exist for 
those who believe them to exist, since the judgement that false judgements exist must also be 
true for them‘, and as (b') ‗the belief that men sometimes judge what is false is true for those 
who believe so; then, false judgements exist for those whose belief that men sometimes judge 
what is false is true.‘ From these corrections, then, it follows that ‗false judgements exist for 
those who believe them to exist‘. The dilemmatic situation is no longer dilemmatic, since the 
absolute existence of false judgements in general does not result; neither horn of the dilemma 
concludes the falsehood of the MMD in the argument. Here Socrates surely commits the 
fallacy of ignoratio elenchi in constructing the argument, by dropping the qualifiers. 
After the self-refutation argument based on this general belief, Socrates takes the second 
part to continue his refutation. In this part, he discusses the self-refuting problem of the 
MMD on the grounds of the anti-Protagorean disagreement. Socrates shows that Protagoras 
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must be refuted by his own doctrine since he needs to admit that some believe the MMD to 
be false. The second part runs as follows (170d4–171c7): 
 
5) ὅηαλ ζὺ θξίλαο ηη παξὰ ζαπηῶ πξόο κε 
ἀπνθαίλῃ πεξί ηηλνο δόμαλ, ζνὶ κὲλ δὴ ηνῦην 
θαηὰ ηὸλ ἐθείλνπ ιόγνλ ἀιεζὲο ἔζησ, ἟κῖλ δὲ δὴ 
ηνῖο ἄιινηο πεξὶ η῅ο ζ῅ο θξίζεσο πόηεξνλ νὐθ 
ἔζηηλ θξηηαῖο γελέζζαη, ἠ ἀεὶ ζὲ θξίλνκελ ἀιεζ῅ 
δνμάδεηλ; ἠ κπξίνη ἑθάζηνηέ ζνη κάρνληαη 
ἀληηδνμάδνληεο, ἟γνύκελνη ςεπδ῅ θξίλεηλ ηε θαὶ 
νἴεζζαη; 
5) When you have decided something by 
yourself, and express a judgement about it to me, 
then let it be true for you according to that 
account [i.e. the MMD]. But isn‘t it possible for 
the rest of us to become judges (kritai) about 
your decision, or do we always decide that you 
judge the true? Or, aren‘t there on every occasion 
thousands men who fight with you making 
counter judgements, believing that you decide 
and think what is false? 
6) ηί δὲ αὐηῶ Πξσηαγόξᾳ; ἆξ' νὐρὶ ἀλάγθε, εἰ 
κὲλ κεδὲ αὐηὸο ᾤεην κέηξνλ εἶλαη ἄλζξσπνλ 
κεδὲ νἱ πνιινί, ὥζπεξ νὐδὲ νἴνληαη, κεδελὶ δὴ 
εἶλαη ηαύηελ ηὴλ ἀιήζεηαλ ἡλ ἐθεῖλνο ἔγξαςελ; εἰ 
δὲ αὐηὸο κὲλ ᾤεην, ηὸ δὲ πι῅ζνο κὴ ζπλνίεηαη, 
νἶζζ' ὅηη πξ῵ηνλ κὲλ ὅζῳ πιείνπο νἷο κὴ δνθεῖ ἠ 
νἷο δνθεῖ, ηνζνύηῳ κᾶιινλ νὐθ ἔζηηλ ἠ ἔζηηλ. 
 
 
 
(ΘΕΟ. Ἀλάγθε, εἴπεξ γε θαζ' ἑθάζηελ δόμαλ 
ἔζηαη θαὶ νὐθ ἔζηαη.) 
6) Then, what for Protagoras himself? Isn‘t it 
necessary that, if he himself did not think that 
man is the measure, and the many did not either, 
as indeed they do not, then this truth which he 
wrote is [true] for no one? Whereas, if he did 
think [it to be so], but the masses do not agree, 
then, you know that first, the more numerous 
those who do not think [it to be so] are than those 
who think [it to be so], so much the more [it] is 
not [so] than [it] is [so].  
(THEOD. It is necessary, if it will be and not be 
according to each individual judgement.) 
7) ἔπεηηά γε ηνῦη' ἔρεη θνκςόηαηνλ· ἐθεῖλνο κὲλ 
πεξὶ η῅ο αὑηνῦ νἰήζεσο ηὴλ η῵λ ἀληηδνμαδόλησλ 
νἴεζηλ, ᾗ ἐθεῖλνλ ἟γνῦληαη ςεύδεζζαη, ζπγρσξεῖ 
πνπ ἀιεζ῅ εἶλαη ὁκνινγ῵λ ηὰ ὄληα δνμάδεηλ 
ἅπαληαο.  
7) Second, it [i.e. the MMD] has this subtlest 
feature: he [sc. Protagoras] admits, I suppose, the 
opinion of those judging contrary to his own 
opinion, in which they think he says the false, to 
be true, since he agrees that all men judge things 
that are (ta onta). 
8) νὐθνῦλ ηὴλ αὑηνῦ ἂλ ςεπδ῅ ζπγρσξνῖ, εἰ ηὴλ 
η῵λ ἟γνπκέλσλ αὐηὸλ ςεύδεζζαη ὁκνινγεῖ 
ἀιεζ῅ εἶλαη; 
8) Well then, would he not admit his [opinion] to 
be false, if he agrees that the opinion of those 
thinking that he says the false is true? 
9) νἱ δέ γ' ἄιινη νὐ ζπγρσξνῦζηλ ἑαπηνῖο 
ςεύδεζζαη; 
9) On the other hand, the others do not admit that 
they themselves say the false, right? 
10) ὁ δέ γ' αὖ ὁκνινγεῖ θαὶ ηαύηελ ἀιεζ῅ ηὴλ 
δόμαλ ἐμ ὧλ γέγξαθελ. 
10) But, again, he also agrees that this opinion 
[of theirs] is true, according to what he has 
written. 
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11) ἐμ ἁπάλησλ ἄξα ἀπὸ Πξσηαγόξνπ 
ἀξμακέλσλ ἀκθηζβεηήζεηαη, κᾶιινλ δὲ ὑπό γε 
ἐθείλνπ ὁκνινγήζεηαη, ὅηαλ ηῶ ηἀλαληία ιέγνληη 
ζπγρσξῆ ἀιεζ῅ αὐηὸλ δνμάδεηλ, ηόηε θαὶ ὁ 
Πξσηαγόξαο αὐηὸο ζπγρσξήζεηαη κήηε θύλα 
κήηε ηὸλ ἐπηηπρόληα ἄλζξσπνλ κέηξνλ εἶλαη 
κεδὲ πεξὶ ἑλὸο νὗ ἂλ κὴ κάζῃ. νὐρ νὕησο; 
11) Therefore, it [i.e. the MMD] will be disputed 
by all men, starting with Protagoras, or rather, it 
will be agreed by him [sc. Protagoras], when he 
concedes to the one speaking oppositely that he 
judges what is true, at that time even Protagoras 
himself will admit that neither a dog nor anyone 
who you might encounter on the street by chance 
is the measure of any single thing which he has 
not learnt. Isn‘t that so? 
12) νὐθνῦλ ἐπεηδὴ ἀκθηζβεηεῖηαη ὑπὸ πάλησλ, 
νὐδελὶ ἂλ εἴε ἟ Πξσηαγόξνπ Ἀιήζεηα ἀιεζήο, 
νὔηε ηηλὶ ἄιιῳ νὔη' αὐηῶ ἐθείλῳ. 
12) Then, since it will be disputed by all men, the 
Truth of Protagoras will be true for no one, 
neither for someone else nor for himself [sc. 
Protagoras]. 
 
At (5) Socrates alludes to the case in which a number of people are against a certain belief, 
believing that it is false. And at (6) and (7) Socrates suggests two possibilities for the MMD 
to be false: first, if no one, including Protagoras himself, believes that the MMD is true, then 
this doctrine is, of course, not true for anyone; second, although Protagoras himself believes 
the MMD to be true, if the masses do not agree with him on this, then either the MMD is not 
true more than it is true, or Protagoras himself must admit the belief that the MMD is not true 
to be true, on account of the MMD that every judgement is true. The first point is too obvious 
to argue; Socrates gives much more attention to the second point, pointing out that 
Protagoras‘ MMD has the subtlest (kompsotaton) feature that it is self-refuting, contradicting 
its holders, including Protagoras himself. At (8) Socrates concludes that Protagoras needs to 
admit that his MMD is false, because Protagoras has to accept his opponents‘ belief about it 
to be true too. Socrates says that Protagoras himself must admit that that they are true in 
believing that the MMD is false, at (9) and (10), due to the doctrine‘s own claim. And thus, at 
(11) and (12), Socrates confirms again that the MMD, being disputed by all men including 
Protagoras himself, would be true for no one. The argumentative steps are briefly formulated 
as follows:
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(I) There are some who judge that the MMD is false. 
(II) According to the MMD, every judgement is true. 
(III) According to the MMD, the judgement that the MMD is false is true. 
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 The term ‗the MMD‘ here in the formulation is interchangeable with the term ‗Protagoras‘. 
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(IV) Then, Protagoras himself admits that the MMD is false. (from (3) 
(V) Those who judge that the MMD is false will dispute the MMD. 
(VI) Thus, Protagoras will also dispute the MMD. (from (4)) 
(VII) Therefore, the MMD is self-refuting. 
 
If there are those who judge that the MMD is false, then their judgement that it is false is also 
true according to the MMD‘s very own claim that every judgement is true. And those who 
judge that the MMD is false will, of course, dispute it; it is the same as that the MMD itself 
will participate in those disputing it since it is also taking itself to be false. In this case, not 
only those who believe that the MMD is false, but also the holders of the MMD themselves, 
will dispute it. Hence, the MMD itself is self-refuting, and so is Protagoras by his own thesis. 
A problem, however, can be also raised about the second part of the argument. Socrates 
has earlier interpreted the MMD as a thesis of epistemological relativism. The truth of each 
judgement is thus limited to its judger relatively. As far as the qualifiers are concerned in 
relation to the truth of the judgements, some propositions need to be corrected with 
restoration of the missing qualifiers: (II') ‗according to the MMD, each judgement made by 
each person is true for them‘, (III') ‗according to the MMD, the judgement that the MMD is 
false is true for those who made this judgement‘. Thus, in (IV'), what Protagoras himself 
needs to admit is not the general fact that the MMD is false, but the relativised case that ‗the 
MMD is false for those who judge it false‘. Consequently, in (VI'), the conclusion needs to be 
re-stated as follows: ‗not Protagoras, but only those who judge it false dispute the MMD‘, 
since only those who judge that the MMD is false will dispute it (from (V)), and it does not 
absolutely follow that it is false (from (IV')). Therefore, (VII') ‗the MMD is not self-refuting‘. 
Although Protagoras‘ opponents keep trying to argue against Protagoras by refusing to 
concede that the judgement that the MMD is false is true only for them, he can continue to 
add the qualifiers to their judgements, denying the case that the MMD is false for him. Again, 
this shows that the self-refutation argument does not prove the absolute falsehood of the 
MMD. Thus, Socrates, just as in the first part of the argument for the self-refutation of the 
MMD, again, seems to be guilty of ignoratio elenchi in the second part.
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 For discussion that Socrates is fully guilty of ignoratio elenchi, cf. Grote (1875), Kerferd (1949), Vlastos 
(1956), Runciman (1962), Sayre (1969), Zilioli (2007). For the suggestion that Socrates is guilty of ignoratio 
elenchi, but still the MMD itself is problematic although the missing qualifiers are restored, cf. Lee (1973), 
McDowell (1973), Guthrie (1978), Newman (1982), Waterfield (1987), Bostock (1988), Polansky (1992), 
Chappell (1995, 2004), Bailey (1997), McCabe (2000). For suggestion that Socrates is not guilty of ignoratio 
elenchi since the readers of this dialogue are required to supply the missing qualifiers implicitly to the argument 
and will find that the MMD is still self-refuting, cf. Burnyeat (1976b and 1990, 29–31), Denyer (1991), Gottlieb 
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Some commentators, reconstructing the self-refutation argument from the dialogue, 
have suggested (cf. Burnyeat, 1976b, and 1990, 29–31) that Socrates is in fact not guilty of 
ignoratio elenchi. Burnyeat even argues that it is in fact Plato‘s deliberation that Socrates 
drops the qualifiers in arguing against Protagoras, and that Plato wishes the readers of his 
Theaetetus to realise that they can still obtain a sound argument against Protagoras‘ MMD 
when they restore all the missing qualifiers. According to Burnyeat‘s reading, Protagoras 
cannot grant the judgement that the MMD is false for those who judge it false, without also 
admitting that his doctrine is false simpliciter. He (1976b, 172, and 181–2) says that 
―Protagoras‘ theory is, after all, a theory of the truth and a theory of the truth must link 
judgements to something else—the world, as philosophers often put it, though for a relativist 
the world has to be relativised to each individual. … each of us lives in a private world 
constituted by a succession of momentary appearances, all of which are true in that world 
quite independently of what happens next in a given world,‖ that is, he clarifies the MMD as 
a ―subjectivist thesis‖. In his understanding, a thing which seems to x (as) F (since x believes 
it to be F) and so is F for x, is F in x‘s private world. When we apply this to the case of the 
self-refutation argument, it follows that ‗the MMD which seems to Protagoras‘ opponents 
(as) false and so is false for them, is false in their private world.‘ Since Protagoras claims that 
every judgement is true in its holder‘s own world, he in his own world must admit that his 
opponents‘ judgement that the MMD is false is true in their worlds. Accordingly, not only 
those who believe the MMD to be false but also Protagoras, who believes it to be true, must 
admit that the MMD is false.
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However, it is disputable whether this suggestion properly depicts Protagoras‘ MMD, 
since it does not seem likely that ‗being true for x‘ indeed signifies ‗being true in x‘s world‘ 
                                                                                                                                                        
(1992), Emilsson (1994), Sedley (2004). For the suggestion that Socrates is not guilty of ignoratio elenchi since 
the argument indeed works without the qualifiers, cf. Arthur (1982), Ketchum (1992), Fine (1998a and b). For 
the view that the self-refutation argument indeed aims at the infallibilism of Protagoras‘ doctrine, cf. Waterlow 
(1977), Cooper (1990), Lee (2005). And for alternative discussion on Plato‘s self-refutation argument, cf. 
Cornford (1935), Tigner (1971), Haden (1984), White (1989), Narcy (1995), Rezendes (2001), Bemelmans 
(2002), Long (2004), Castagnoli (2004) and (2010). 
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 Burnyeat‘s suggestion is briefly formulated as follows (cf. Castagnoli, 2004, 16): 
(1) Protagoras believes that all men judge what is the case <for them>. 
(2) Protagoras admits that his opponents judge that the MMD is false. 
(3) Protagoras must concede that it is true <for his opponents> that the MMD is false. (from (1) and (2)) 
(4) Protagoras must concede that the MMD is false <for his opponents>. (from (3)) 
(5) Protagoras‘ opponents do not concede that their own judgement about the MMD is false. 
(6) Protagoras must admit that his opponents‘ judgement that their own judgement about the MMD is not 
false is true <for them>. (from (1) and (5)) 
(7) Since (a) Protagoras has conceded that it is true <for his opponents> that the MMD is false, (b) he 
must admit that the MMD is false (simpliciter). 
For the arguments in support of Burnyeat‘s suggestion, cf. Emilsson (1994), 136–49; Sedley (2004), 57–62. And 
for the arguments against Burnyeat, cf. Wedin (2005), 171–91; Castagnoli (2004), 3–32 and (2010), 40–67. 
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in the MMD. According to the MMD as interpreted so far by Socrates as an epistemological 
form of relativism, truth is relative to the individual. Yet, the interpreting ‗true for x‘ as 
meaning ‗true in x‘s world‘ requires an assumption that the MMD in fact admits that there is 
an objective conception of the truth. For, as Bostock (1988, 90–1; cf. also Chappell, 2004, 
113–4) points out, according to Burnyeat‘s reading, Protagoras‘ relativist claim is ―taken to 
be ‗true for x‘ if and only if it is a description of x‘s world which is true (of that world) in an 
absolute and objective way.‖ Then, unlike Socrates‘ (or Plato‘s) reading of the MMD in the 
Theaetetus, this suggestion does not treat the Protagorean truth as a fully relativist one. 
Socrates has shown that Protagoras‘ MMD maintains that simply the same public thing, not 
some private thing in an individual‘s world which other people cannot grasp by their 
perception, appears differently, i.e. relatively, to different people, i.e. in relation to each 
perceiver, because this thing, and also each perceiver, is in constant change. That is to say, 
the MMD connected with its ontological basis, i.e. the Flux-theory (153d8–154a2), is 
understood as a relativist epistemology in which the percepts of perceived objects, not the 
objects themselves, are private to each perceiver.  
Moreover, even if the MMD indeed entailed a form of subjectivism, it would seem still 
possible for Protagoras to ‗subjectivise‘ his opponents‘ belief that the MMD is false within 
their own private worlds, not within his world. For, Protagoras would probably simply argue 
that Protagoras‘ judgement that his opponent‘s judgement that the MMD is false is true in the 
opponent‘s world is true in Protagoras‘ world. Thus, the MMD is false only in his opponent‘s 
world, not in Protagoras‘ world, not ‗self-refuting‘ in Protagoras‘ world. In this regard, taking 
Socrates‘ interpretation of the MMD as a subjectivist thesis in order to support the self-
refutation argument seems inappropriate. 
 
2.3.2. The impossibility of ‗wisdom‘ and ‗future benefit and usefulness‘ 
 
After discussing the self-refutation of the MMD, Socrates tries to refute the doctrine from the 
points of view of ‗wisdom‘ and that of ‗future benefit and usefulness‘. From the first 
viewpoint, he says that Protagoras at least admits that some are wiser and some are not: ‗at 
the moment, then, we should say that anyone would admit at least this, that some men are 
wiser than others, and some more ignorant (θαὶ δ῅ηα θαὶ λῦλ ἄιιν ηη θ῵κελ ὁκνινγεῖλ ἂλ 
ηνῦηό γε ὁληηλνῦλ, ηὸ εἶλαη ζνθώηεξνλ ἕηεξνλ ἑηέξνπ, εἶλαη δὲ θαὶ ἀκαζέζηεξνλ)‘ (171d5–7). 
At this stage, the concept of ‗wiser‘ is limited to making things better and beneficial to 
people in certain fields like medicine or politics. Many things that provide perceptual 
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information to men (e.g. what is hot, what is sweet, what is dry, and so on) are as they are to 
men for just as long as they appear so to them. But in other cases—e.g. what is good/better 
and bad/worse, i.e. what is beneficial and useful and what is harmful—there are experts who 
are supposed to be wiser than others. For instance, about what is good/better, i.e. beneficial 
and useful, in the case of medicine, doctors are wiser. This case is equally applicable to 
political and ethical issues. Let us concede that concerning things that can and cannot be done, 
just and unjust, pious and impious, each city is the measure of them. What appears to the city 
is true for that city at the time when it seems that way and for just as long as it so seems to it. 
And the city establishes them as law and convention.
200
 However, in making laws that 
benefit or harm a city, there is a distinction between experts in the truth of their judgements: 
‗one adviser differs from another, and the judgement of one city differs from another, in 
respect of the truth (ζύκβνπιόλ ηε ζπκβνύινπ δηαθέξεηλ θαὶ πόιεσο δόμαλ ἑηέξαλ ἑηέξαο 
πξὸο ἀιήζεηαλ)‘ (172a7–8). That is, there are some people who are wiser and superior in 
establishing laws for a city. Socrates argues that Protagoras will have to agree on this point, 
since he has professed to be able to teach about these issues. In all these cases, thus, neither a 
patient, nor an individual citizen, nor another city can claim wiser judgements concerning 
health and political issues, but a doctor or a wise politician. 
As shown above, Socrates says that the experts are superior in making judgements in 
specific fields, ‗in respect of the truth (pros alētheian)‘. As Cornford (1953, 80–1) asks, if 
Protagoras needs to admit this, it is worth asking where the distinctions between the experts 
and the laymen in making judgements and the superiority of the experts lie. In the Defence 
Protagoras explicitly maintains that in respect of the truth there is no difference between men, 
but in respect of good/better and bad/worse there is. The expression, ‗in respect of the truth‘, 
which must imply the Socratic or Platonic idea that being good and bad also requires a 
certain standard (criterion, or metron) to be judged so, does not seem to belong to Protagoras‘ 
idea. At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates identifies wisdom (sophia) with knowledge 
(epistēmē), and says that knowledge is to know an object rightly, not wrongly (145d–e). Thus, 
here Socrates requires Protagoras to admit that even in the sophist‘ view, doctors and wise 
politicians, i.e. the experts, need to know what is good in health and political affairs in order 
to make better judgements in each case, and this knowledge is the same as knowing the 
objective truth. If a man does not have knowledge of what good is when maintaining that 
what seems to each person is true for him, then there is no way for that man to be an expert in 
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 Note the difference between the ethical relativism presented in this passage and the form of relativity of the 
application of the objective civic senses argued in Section 3 in Chapter II above. 
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any case. The Protagorean wise man (sophos), if he claims to make good things seem and be 
just without respect to the truth, has no place to stand to be wise. The wise man must have 
power (dynamis) to lead people into a better state, and this sort of power must be knowledge 
about the truth concerning the beneficial and harmful. Knowledge of what is good/better and 
beneficial and useful must be knowledge of the truth concerning these matters (cf. 166c–
167d).
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Secondly, Socrates proceeds with the refutation form the point of view of ‗future benefit 
and usefulness‘. He reminds Theodorus that in a relativist view of ethical and political issues 
whatever a city decides and establishes to be just and right as its law, actually is what is just 
and right for that city and for as long as it remains so established (177d). Socrates then 
argues that laws and customs are about what is beneficial at the present moment, while the 
establishment of them indeed aims at what will produce beneficial and useful effects in the 
future (178a8–10): the political experts establish laws, looking at what will be in the future. 
In the light of this point, Socrates poses a question (178b9–c2): ‗does man have in himself 
the standard of things that will be in the future, and things that would be thought to be going 
to be, will these things happen to him who thought so (θαὶ η῵λ κειιόλησλ ἔζεζζαη ἔρεη ηὸ 
θξηηήξηνλ ἐλ αὑηῶ, θαὶ νἷα ἂλ νἰεζῆ ἔζεζζαη, ηαῦηα θαὶ γίγλεηαη ἐθείλῳ ηῶ νἰεζέληη)?‘ 
Protagoras‘ MMD concerns perception which always occurs only at the present moment, and 
cannot be about the future. The doctrine is thus not able to give any answer to this question. 
The real experts, whatever subjects they are experts in, are the best judgement makers about 
what will be and seem in their field in the future. 
Now Socrates ends his refutation of the MMD, emphasising the role of knowledge. 
According to the MMD, anyone is a measure. But what is the case is that one who is wiser 
than another must be the measure (in a field where one is expert in, e.g. establishing laws in a 
city), the other who lacks knowledge can never be a measure (in establishing laws). Here 
Socrates insinuates that knowledge which must be of the truth ought to be a power to produce 
benefit in the future, and that without such knowledge, no one can be the measure of certain 
objects when they are related to producing benefit. Finally, at 179b6–9, Theodorus (on 
Protagoras‘ behalf) admits that in this respect Protagoras‘ MMD is most convicted (ἐθείλῃ 
κάιηζηα ἁιίζθεζζαη ὁ ιόγνο), and so refuted. 
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 Cf. Chappell (2004), 118–20. 
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